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Introduction
Translation: perspectives on language 
and on life
You can choose your philosophy of translation just as you choose 
how to live: the free adaptation that sacrifices detail to meaning, 
the strict crib that sacrifices meaning to exactitude. The poet 
moves from life to language, the translator moves from language 
to life; both, like the immigrant, try to identify the invisible, what’s 
between the lines, the mysterious implications.– Anne Michaels.1
In Fugitive Pieces, Anne Michaels relates translation to questions of 
forgetting and remembrance, belonging and exclusion, understanding 
and confusion. For her protagonist, Jakob, life becomes a matter of 
translation: having escaped the Nazis as a Jewish child living in Poland, 
he makes a new life for himself in Greece, and learns to speak Greek 
and English. This linguistic gain enables him to survive the traumas of 
his past, but only by erasing his memories of that past: the experience 
of moving from one language to another, Michaels implies, involves 
an escape that is also, always, an erasure. In the extract quoted above, 
Michaels suggests that every moment of translation forces us to choose 
between freedom and constraint, significance and precision, past and 
present. These choices apply to the ways in which we interact with texts, 
but also to the ways in which we interact with the world. Do we live freely 
but lose our attachment to the past that shaped and formed us? Or do 
we cling to that attachment, at the expense of giving our life meaning in 
its present incarnation? In Fugitive Pieces, these questions have no easy 
answers: language and memory intersect, troubling Jakob’s attempts to 
move forward, hindering his efforts to go back. But Michaels also suggests 
that translation offers us a unique perspective: operating from ‘between 
the lines’, translation enables us to explore what is unclear or uncertain, 
even as it sometimes obscures what we seek to understand, helping us 
to bridge the very differences which we create as we move across and 
between languages, cultures, identities, past and present.
1TRANSLATION: PERSPECTIVES ON LANGUAGE AND ON L IFE
As Michaels reveals, translation is about how we approach 
language, but it is also about how we approach life. When we translate a 
literary text across linguistic and cultural borders, we negotiate a series 
of aesthetic questions regarding the interaction of form and content, 
the location of textual meaning, and the challenge of transmitting that 
meaning interlingually while preserving the artistic shape of the text. 
But we also confront a set of ethical questions about our interlinguistic, 
interpersonal and intercultural relations. As Sandra Bermann suggests, 
‘the translator’s task is inevitably an ethical one. In attempts to translate, 
we become most aware of linguistic and cultural differences, of the 
historical “hauntings,” and of experiential responsibilities that make our 
languages what they are and that directly affect our attitudes towards 
the world.’2 In the movement it creates between languages and cultures, 
translation offers us a model through which we can explore the losses 
and gains involved in all our communications with another. Can we 
recognize the diversity of our linguistic and cultural perspectives? Or are 
we trapped in monolingual and monocultural frames of reference, blind 
and deaf to alterity? Translation also highlights issues of memory and 
forgetting. When translating, we confront the spectres of the past – the 
original text, language, author and moment of publication. How should 
we negotiate those spectres: on their terms, or on our own? Can those 
two perspectives ever be aligned without annexation or erasure?
Translation helps us think about ethical questions because it 
foregrounds the appropriations and forgettings we enact even as 
we attempt to recognize and remember. My conception of the role 
translation can play in these ethical debates has been formed particularly 
by the work of Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and 
Paul Ricœur. In this book, I draw upon these thinkers to develop a 
critical vocabulary of translation which explores not only interlingual 
but also intercultural, interrelational and interdisciplinary issues in 
the work of three bilingual authors. Bernardo Atxaga writes in both 
Basque and Spanish; Milan Kundera has written in Czech and French; 
Jorge Semprún wrote in Spanish and French.3 Focusing particularly, 
although not exclusively, on one text by each author, I argue that, in 
each, translation – integrated into both form and content – works to raise 
and negotiate ethical questions surrounding some of the major political 
moments of twentieth-century history. But in each text translation also 
highlights a broader set of ethical questions, focused upon the limitations 
of the monolingual and the democratic possibilities of linguistic plurality; 
upon our innate desire to translate difference into similarity; and upon 
the ways in which translation responds to the challenges of individual 
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and collective remembrance. Through these texts, I read translation as 
offering a potent, often violent, but always illuminating, vision of the 
possibilities of differentiation and connection, generation and memory, 
in temporal, linguistic, cultural and political terms. 
What is a good translation?
Translation is always a dialogue: between two languages – source 
and target; two people – author and translator; and two different, but 
connected texts – the ‘original’ and the ‘copy’. This dialogue foregrounds 
questions which are at the heart of our understanding of textual 
forms. Where does the meaning of a literary text reside – in its form 
or in its content? Can these ever be separated and, if not, what is the 
relation of one to the other? In the shift from the author’s words to the 
translator’s interpretation of those words, can textual meaning ever be 
transmitted intact? And who creates that meaning: the author, writing 
the original text, or the translator, creating a new text through his or her 
interpretation? For Italo Calvino, as the title of his 1982 essay ‘Tradurre è 
il vero modo di leggere un testo’ attests, translating is the true way to read 
a text; for Harry Mathews ‘Translation is the paradigm, the exemplar of all 
writing’.4 In fact, translation operates at the intersection of both reading 
and writing: the translator negotiates the challenges of interpretation 
and of creation in two languages. In this regard, translation responds to 
Roland Barthes’s suggestion that we try ‘d’abolir (ou tout au moins de 
diminuer) la distance entre l’écriture et la lecture […] en les liant tous 
deux dans une même pratique signifiante’/‘to abolish (or at the very least 
to diminish) the distance between writing and reading […] by joining 
them in a single signifying practice’.5 The translator occupies the space of 
this signifying practice, interrogating our understanding of writing and 
reading, the values we assign to originality and imitation, the location of 
textual authority and the possibility of its disruption. 
The questions translation raises about the nature of textual 
production and interpretation are frequently channelled into a single 
question focused upon the purpose of translation itself: what type of 
translation would best respond to the challenges of transferring meaning 
from one language to another? Attempts to respond to this question 
have led to the description of translation through a series of binary 
oppositions: the word-for-word versus sense-for-sense approach, first 
articulated by Jerome in the fourth century; the split between a beautiful 
translation and a faithful one, attributed to Nicolas D’Ablancourt’s 
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translation process; the ‘foreignizing’ and ‘domesticating’ options 
proposed by Friedrich Schleiermacher; the ‘visibility’ versus ‘invisibility’ 
binary discussed by Lawrence Venuti.6 These dichotomies highlight the 
challenges involved in translation: the need for a translated text to remain 
faithful both to the meaning and the aesthetic shape of an original; the 
importance of negotiating the claims of both source and target culture; 
and the difficulties of managing the hierarchical relations between 
original and copy, author and translator. Ultimately, however, each 
binary is a variation on a single question: what is a good translation? This 
question is one of both aesthetics and ethics. What type of translation 
can transmit meaning without distortion? And how can it do so without 
inflicting forms of violent appropriation or erasure upon texts, authors, 
languages, cultures, and the status of translation itself? 
But how do the aesthetic questions raised by translation help us 
think ethically? Plato claims that artistic forms cannot help us understand 
the essence of morality or the absolute Truth of our experiences. Art is a 
‘false’ discipline, a weak form of representation, ‘at third remove from 
the throne of truth’, which absorbs its audience into a fantasy world.7 
In Phaedrus, Socrates opposes writing to ‘the living word of knowledge’: 
words, once written down, can be distorted from their original meaning, 
opened to multiple interpretations which the author can no longer 
defend or correct.8 Socrates elucidates this division of writing from 
knowledge through the story of the Egyptian god of writing, Theuth 
(Thoth). Theuth tells King Thamus that writing is a pharmakon, a remedy 
to prevent forgetting. But Socrates notes that pharmakon also translates 
as poison: writing, he posits, is thus not a remedy but a drug which 
allows forgetfulness by preventing the author and reader from striving 
to remember on their own. Translation, which is not only a copy of 
reality, a written inscription of lived knowledge, but a copy of that artistic 
inscription, would be at yet another remove from the understanding 
Socrates seeks. When we translate, we remove a text even further from 
the guidance of its author, inevitably distorting the knowledge that text 
originally contained. In Platonic terms, then, translation itself would be 
a pharmakon: a forgetting of a forgetting, an imitation of an imitation of 
reality, which separates us from the Truth.
And yet it is translation which Derrida deploys to interrogate, and 
ultimately destabilize, this Platonic critique of writing. In ‘La Pharmacie 
de Platon’, translation operates as revelation, challenging and unpicking 
what is masked within Plato’s use of the word pharmakon: the accepted 
polysemy which enables this single word to be translated multiply – as 
‘remedy’ and ‘poison’, ‘recipe’ and ‘drug’. As Derrida demonstrates, 
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Plato relies on the polysemy within pharmakon to explain the damaging 
nature of writing. Writing, originally described by Theuth as a remedy, 
is revealed by Socrates’s alternative translation of the term to be a drug. 
And yet this revelation collapses precisely because of this translation. By 
translating the word pharmakon only as ‘drug’ and not also as ‘remedy’, 
Socrates erases the innate polysemy of the word, ignoring the very 
contradiction within the meaning of pharmakon which initially enabled 
him to reverse Theuth’s formulation and dispute the remedial powers of 
writing. In so doing, Socrates translates ‘a nonphilosopheme’, a word with 
multiple meanings, into ‘a philosopheme’, a philosophical formulation or 
principle which, in order to establish the Truth of an action or a concept, 
can only have one true meaning. For Derrida, 
[l]’unité plastique de ce concept, sa règle plutôt et l’étrange logique 
qui le lie à son signifiant, ont été dispersées, masquées, oblitérées, 
frappées d’une relative illisibilité […] par la redoutable et 
irréductible difficulté de la traduction […] d’un non-philosophème 
dans un philosophème. Avec ce problème de traduction nous 
n’aurons affaire à rien de moins qu’au problème du passage à la 
philosophie.
The malleable unity of this concept, or rather its rules and the 
strange logic that links it with its signifier, has been dispersed, 
masked, obliterated, and rendered almost unreadable […] by 
the redoubtable, irreducible difficulty of translation […] of a 
nonphilosopheme into a philosopheme. With this problem of 
translation we will thus be dealing with nothing less than the 
problem of the very passage into philosophy.9
This ‘passage into philosophy’ is exposed, troubled and undermined by 
translation. For even when employed as a philosopheme, pharmakon 
still retains its dual meaning as remedy and drug. Plato’s repression of 
this duality, his prioritization of one meaning over another, allows him 
to explain definitively the Truth of writing. But the definitive nature of 
this Truth is destabilized by the continued instability of the language he 
uses for that explanation. Through translation, Derrida thus addresses 
the impossibility of succeeding in an attempt to uncover a solid structure 
outside language through an enquiry which, inevitably, is pursued 
through language. As Kathleen Davis suggests, translation is central to 
Derrida’s enterprise because it elucidates his concept of différance: the 
temporal and semantic deferrals and differences which occur every time 
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we use language.10 In every moment of translation, we negotiate the 
slipperiness of meaning, attempt to stabilize it, and find it again eluding 
our grasp. Derrida employs translation as exploration, as a violent and 
explosive force of insight into the nature of textual relations, but also into 
the centrality of these textual relations to our lived knowledge and our 
philosophical attempts to formulate that knowledge. 
Derrida highlights the ways in which translation can offer us an 
insight into reality precisely through and not despite its textual distance 
from the reality being described. Similarly, in Alberto Giacometti: The 
Art of Relation, Timothy Mathews suggests that the copying of reality 
which takes place in artistic forms offers us a unique opportunity to 
recognize our perceptions of that reality: ‘Lived reality is full, to copy it is 
to understand our capacity for exploration and self-exploration, vitality 
and humanity: for what can be copied other than the ability to see our 
own seeing and to account for it?’11 Translation – a copy of a copy, a 
reproduction of an aesthetic form – illuminates our perceptions of our 
experiences. In translating from life to text, and then from one version 
of that text to another, channelled through the perspective and language 
of another, what do we see that we did not see before? As Adorno and 
Horkheimer suggest in Dialectic of Enlightenment, forms of copying and 
mimesis are always concerned with the relation between sameness 
and otherness: how this relation is developed and understood depends 
on the regulation of the mimetic action.12 So too, translation is always 
implicated in questions of relation – between one text and language and 
another, but also between individuals, nations, and belief systems. In 
this sense, the illuminations offered by translation confront but also go 
further than an analysis of the ethical implications of translating novels. 
They touch upon the broader relationship between content and form, 
between ethics and aesthetics, between politics and literature. They are 
bound up with the violent nature of translation itself, a violence which 
contains the potential to alchemize the textual worlds which translation 
touches, and, through this alchemy, to shed light on the forms of our 
lived experience. 
The ethical turn in translation
Translation is never a neutral activity: forms of linguistic, textual and 
cultural violence are an inevitable effect of the movement between 
languages, texts and sites of authorship. As Bassnett and Lefevere suggest, 
translation is a process of rewriting, and rewriting ‘is manipulation 
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undertaken in the service of power [which] in its positive aspect can help 
in the evolution of a literature and a society. […] But rewriting can also 
repress innovation, distort and contain’.13 While Bassnett and Lefevere see 
translation as simultaneously generative and reductive, Lawrence Venuti 
suggests that, conventionally, translation operates to bolster dominant 
discourses: ‘Violence […] resides in the very purpose and activity of 
translation: the reconstitution of the foreign text in accordance with 
values, beliefs and representations that pre-exist it in the target language, 
always configured in hierarchies of dominance and marginality, always 
determining the production, circulation, and reception of texts’.14 For 
Venuti, this textual violence arises because translation is an activity 
which normalizes the alterations it effects, transforming a text without 
acknowledging the assumptions underpinning that transformation.
For Barbara Godard, responses to this violence are at the heart of an 
‘ethical turn’ in translation, initiated by Antoine Berman in his 1984 text 
L’Épreuve de l’étranger, and pursued by Venuti in texts such as The Scandals 
of Translation: Towards an Ethics of Difference. This ethical turn hinges 
upon perceiving the oscillating, and often aggressive, dynamic between 
self and other, foreign and domestic, which occurs in translation. Godard 
explains:
Cette logique des relations où le propre est fécondé par la médiation 
de l’autre se heurte à des résistances profondes dans la structure 
ethnocentrique de toute culture qui cherche à conserver son 
autosuffisance dans un retour au même. La traduction occupe alors 
une place ambiguë, à la fois ouverture et appropriation violente.
This logic of relation, where the self is fertilized by the mediation 
of the other, collides with the profound resistance within the 
ethnocentric structure of every culture, which seeks to conserve 
its self-sufficiency through a return to the same. Translation thus 
occupies an ambiguous place, at once an opening and a violent 
appropriation.15 
Situated between connection and annexation, translation reveals our 
engagement with alterity to be one of simultaneous expansion and 
annexation.
In responding to this oscillation, both Berman and Venuti draw 
upon Friedrich Schleiermacher’s dichotomy of translation, which posits 
that a translation must either shift an author towards the reader or the 
reader towards the author, either foreignize a text or domesticate it.16 
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Berman suggests that the ethical potential of translation resides in 
foreignization: translations must ‘féconder le Propre par la médiation de 
l’Étranger’/‘fertilize what is one’s Own through the mediation of what 
is Foreign’ – essentially, transform and expand the domestic language 
through its interaction with the foreign one. This foreignization is ethical 
because it confronts ‘la structure ethnocentrique de toute culture, ou 
cette espèce de narcissisme qui fait que toute société voudrait être un 
Tout pur et non mélangé’/‘the ethnocentric structure of every culture, 
that species of narcissism by which every society wants to be a pure and 
unadulterated Whole’.17 For Godard, however, Berman’s articulation 
of the ethics of translation is limited by his focus upon ‘le Propre’ at the 
expense of ‘l’Étranger’: he recognizes the ‘test’ of the foreign enacted by 
translation, but reads the value of this test primarily in relation to the 
changes the foreign can create within the domestic. 
In her exploration of the ethical turn of translation, Godard moves 
from Berman to Venuti, suggesting that Venuti converts Berman’s ‘test of 
the foreign’ into a call for an ethics of translation situated in a recognition 
of the foreign on its own terms.18 Venuti splits the violence of translation 
into oppositional terms: ethnocentric and ethical; domesticating 
and foreignizing; fluent and resistant; invisible and visible. Invisible 
translators domesticate the cultural and linguistic differences of the 
source text in order to create a fluent translation that attempts to repress 
the fact that the text has been translated at all.19 To combat this invisible 
violence, Venuti proposes that translators make themselves visible 
through a process of resistant ‘foreignization’, rendering the linguistic and 
cultural differences between source and target text apparent in order ‘to 
force translators and their readers to reflect on the ethnocentric violence 
of translation’.20 In so doing, translation offers an ethical response to its 
own inherent violence. 
As Godard suggests, the dichotomies Venuti offers provide useful 
entry points to discuss the ways in which we can engage ethically with the 
cultural and linguistic violence of translation.21 But Venuti’s argument 
also elides some of the nuances I read as integral to understanding the 
ethical vision which translation can offer us. Venuti’s acknowledgement 
that violence ‘resides in the very activity of translation’ is undermined by 
his attempt to suggest that, if it is made visible, this violence can be tamed, 
whether by theorist or practitioner. For the violence of translation is not 
one which can be employed at will, either in the service of hegemonic 
or excluded discourses: rather, as Derrida reveals in ‘La Pharmacie de 
Platon’, it is a violence inherent within language and within texts, which 
translation reveals rather than counters. Moreover, Venuti’s call for an 
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ethics of foreignization involves a question integral to translation: can we 
ever recognize the foreign, other than on our own terms? By categorizing 
the violence of translation through the binaries of visibility/invisibility, 
domestic/foreign and fluent/resistant, Venuti creates an either/or 
approach which fails to account for the reality of translation: the complex 
and shifting negotiations it enacts between foreign and domestic, self 
and other, author and translator.
The narratives of two fictional translator figures, who initially 
appear to epitomize Venuti’s binaries, reveal the ethical insights which 
are released when we shift from reading translation as an either/or to 
reading it as a between. Jake, the translator-protagonist in Iris Murdoch’s 
Under the Net (1954), is the epitome of an invisible translator, a 
disenfranchized, disengaged ‘hack-writer’, defined by his reliance upon 
the words of others, both literally and figuratively, in order to survive: 
‘I am a parasite’, he says, ‘I just enjoy translating, it’s like opening one’s 
mouth and hearing someone else’s voice come out’.22 Jake’s desire for 
invisibility leads him from translating texts to translating those around 
him. He engages in aggressive appropriations of their words, ideologies 
and experiences, seeking within their existence his sense of self, and 
failing to realize he has distorted their words in the process. Ermes 
Marana, the translator-protagonist of Italo Calvino’s If on a Winter’s 
Night a Traveller (1979) is, by contrast, a highly visible translator, ‘a 
serpent who injects his malice into the paradise of reading’ and who 
ensures his textual visibility by creating textual confusion.23 In so doing, 
Marana makes the losses in the translation process only too apparent 
to the protagonist of the text, known only as the Reader, who finds that 
Marana’s textual manipulations prevent him finishing any of the ten 
novels he begins: once touched by the ‘interfering swindler’, each novel 
terminates unexpectedly after its opening chapter.24
Jake and Marana reveal opposing approaches to translation: an 
invisible approach, which sees the translator fail to acknowledge the 
distortions of translation; and a visible approach, through which the 
translator profits from these distortions, rendering the Reader only too 
aware that he is reading a translation. And yet, as both texts progress, 
this opposition collapses, for each translator ultimately comes to offer 
a powerful insight into the nature of our textual and interpersonal 
relations. Marana’s textual machinations reveal the impact translation 
can have upon textual creativity. Believing the translator’s increasing 
invisibility will enable ‘the spell of interrupted readings [to be] broken’, 
the Reader-protagonist visits the library to request each of the ten novels 
he has begun. But for a variety of reasons, each one is unavailable.25 As 
the Reader waits, he describes the books he has lost to another reader 
who, hearing their titles, constructs from them a new text: 
“May I see?” the sixth reader asks, taking the list of titles. […] “If 
on a winter’s night a traveler, outside the town of Malbork, leaning 
from a steep slope without fear of wind or vertigo, looks down in the 
gathering shadow in a network of lines that enlace, in a network of 
lines that intersect, on the carpet of leaves illuminated by the moon 
around an empty grave – What story down there awaits its end? – he 
asks, anxious to hear the story.” He pushes his eyeglasses up on his 
brow. “Yes, a novel that begins like that […] I could swear I’ve read 
it…” […]. “But, look here, there’s a misunderstanding,” you try to 
warn him. “This isn’t a book…these are only titles […] this isn’t the 
story whose continuation I want to know….”.26
Through Marana’s actions, a text originating in translated fragments 
offers the possibility of another textual beginning, beyond the remit of 
the author. The ‘serpent’ in the ‘paradise of reading’ is, like the serpent 
in the garden of Eden, one who brings knowledge and change, as well as 
confusion, initiating a textual growth born from the fragmentary relation 
between the texts he touches. 
In Under the Net, Jake’s actions as a translator ultimately offer him 
an insight into the nature of interpersonal understanding. As the novel 
progresses, Jake begins to realize the distortions he has enacted as he 
translates the words of others into his language, their ideologies into his 
philosophy of life. Jake resolves to speak for himself. But he also comes to 
realize that translation is at the heart of all human interaction. A desire to 
translate the words, thoughts and beliefs of another into our own words, 
thoughts and beliefs is inevitable. And to do this without distortion is 
impossible. In that failure, however, lies the vision of translation, its 
ability to make us reflect upon the annexations we enact within all our 
relationships. At the end of the text Jake asks: 
When does one ever know a human being? Perhaps only after one 
has realized the impossibility of knowledge and renounced the 
desire for it and finally ceased to feel even the need of it. But then 
what one achieves is no longer knowledge, it is simply a kind of 
co-existence; and this too is one of the guises of love.27
Jake, the parasitic translator, thus moves from an understanding 
based upon appropriation to one based upon an understanding of that 
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appropriation; a gesture of love towards difference which recognizes 
the desire to annex that difference: the type of understanding we might 
assign to translation itself. 
Both If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller and Under the Net reveal the 
insights that are available if we move away from locating an ethics of 
translation on one side of a binary divide. As Anthony Pym suggests, to 
read translation through dichotomies such as those used by Venuti is 
to ‘silence the middle term of translation’: the reality of translation as 
experienced by those who attempt to translate.28 This reality is interstitial. 
As a process of crossing and transfer, translation must always negotiate 
the between: between languages, between voices, between individuals, 
between form and content. As Susan Bassnett discusses, translation is 
a ‘threshold’, a liminal space ‘filled with mysterious power’.29 Engaging 
with translation means inhabiting this threshold, exploring the liminal 
spaces between binary poles, rather than selecting one over another.
Translation: between the binaries
My understanding of translation in this book is indebted to a set of texts 
which themselves approach translation from between the elements in 
binary oppositions. In each, translation is revealed to be a propagative 
and connective action, as well as a disruptive one. In ‘The Task of the 
Translator’ (1923), Benjamin reads translation as a generative act, 
capable of challenging the chronicity of historical momentum. In ‘Des 
tours de Babel’ (1985) and ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une traduction “relevante”?’ 
(1998), Derrida draws upon Benjamin’s thinking to emphasize the ways 
in which translation highlights our debt to the memory and body of the 
original text. In texts such as ‘Causes et raisons des îles désertes’ (1953) 
and Mille plateaux (1980), Deleuze develops a cartography of repetition 
with difference that, read tangentially, reveals ways in which translation 
can interrogate the linguistic, cultural, political and literary territories 
which impact upon us. And in Sur la traduction (2004), Ricœur suggests 
that translation allows us to think through forms of linguistic, cultural 
and social untranslatability and hospitality. In the work of each of these 
theorists, the binaries of translation are subjected to an interrogation. 
Defining a translation as good or bad, relevant or irrelevant; a text as 
translatable or untranslatable; a translation method as faithful or 
unfaithful; a language as major or minor, is, as Benjamin, Derrida, 
Ricœur and Deleuze emphasize repeatedly and diversely, never the end 
of a discussion of translation, but only its beginning. 
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More recent work in Translation Studies has continued to illuminate 
this space between the binaries, in linguistic but also historical, cultural 
and political terms. In her seminal text, ‘The Politics of Translation’ 
(1993), Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak explores the ways in which 
translation engages in forms of interpersonal ‘fraying’. She suggests that 
translation allows us to imagine alterity even as we inevitably appropriate 
it into our own perspective.30 In The Location of Culture (1994) Homi 
Bhabha offers his conception of ‘cultural translation’, arguing that cultural 
meaning is located, not in oppositional terms, but in the ‘inter’: ‘For it is 
by living on the borderline of history and language, on the limits of race 
and gender, that we are in a position to translate the differences between 
them into a kind of solidarity’, he suggests.31 And in The Translation Zone 
(2006), Emily Apter argues that translation confronts the stability of our 
collective and individual identities, forcing us to confront, and transgress, 
the boundaries through which we constitute our sense of self. Texts such 
as these develop translation as a powerful and productive model with 
which to approach the critical questions of affective experience and 
of our relations one to another, to the communities we inhabit and the 
communications we attempt across those borders. This book follows their 
approach in engaging with translation as a paradigm for these interactions, 
on an interlinguistic but also an intercultural and interpersonal level.
Blendlinge and bilingualism: the liminal identities of 
Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún 
In his 2012 book On Translator Ethics, Anthony Pym creates his own 
challenge to the binary oppositions which have conditioned discussions 
of an ethics of translation, from Schleiermacher to Berman to Venuti. 
Pym is interested in Schleiermacher’s use of the term Blendlinge to 
describe the results of a foreignizing method of translation: Pym unpicks 
the etymology of the term, variously translated as ‘bastards’ (Lefevere), 
‘sang-mêlé’/‘mixed-bloods’ (Berman) and ‘half-breeds’ by Pym himself.32 
In Pym’s reading, the singular form of Blendlinge, Blendling, connotes 
something or someone exotic but also false, perhaps, or shifty; exciting 
but inherently unnatural – the epitome of a translator-figure such as 
Ermes Marana, perhaps. In fact, Schleiermacher associates the term not 
with the figure of the translator, but with language itself, a language 
which has been forced to contort itself into unnatural forms to follow 
the phrasing and rhythm of a foreign source text as closely as possible. 
For Schleiermacher, this contortion is troubling, even dangerous, but it 
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is also necessary as a means for the German language to grow, adapt and 
strengthen itself. 
Yet for Pym, this connection of Blendling with a linguistic rather 
than an ontological state – with translation rather than the translator 
– undermines Schleiermacher’s approach to translation, for it reveals 
Schleiermacher’s failure to engage with the inevitable interculturality 
of the translator’s identity. In fact, Schleiermacher rejects the possibility 
of Blendlinge as subjects: as Hokenson and Munson note, he suggests 
that bilingual identity is ‘a flat impossibility’, ‘in defiance of nature and 
morality’.33 In Schleiermacher’s reading, the translator, necessarily able 
to understand both languages in question, remains unaltered by the 
transformative process of translation, always identifying only with the 
language and culture into which s/he translates: ‘One must be loyal to one 
language or another, as to one nation’.34 As Pym notes, Schleiermacher’s 
emphasis upon the one – unsurprising, given the rhetoric of nineteenth- 
century nation-building within his text – links language and nation in 
essentializing and totalizing ways, positioning translation as a means of 
separation rather than connection: if you are this, it says, you cannot be 
that; if you are with them, then you cannot be with us. 
What happens then, Pym asks, if you reject such essentialism? If you 
feel your identity to be dual, triple, plural? If you live not in one language 
but in two, three, four? For Schleiermacher, you are cursed to remain in the 
‘un-lovely in-between’: at home in neither language; homeless in both.35 
This condemnation of the -inter reflects an understanding of the liminal 
space as threatening to the status quo: anyone who cannot be placed on 
one side or the other of a border – national, social, cultural, linguistic, 
political, literary – becomes unknowable and potentially dangerous. Yet 
the liminal – in anthropological terms – has also been associated with forms 
of insight and understanding which are not available in more conventional 
identities. Existing outside the laws and structures of social convention, the 
liminal individual within a ritual experience is not beholden either to what 
has come before – the pre-liminal – or to what will come later – the post-
liminal. Rather s/he exists – temporarily at least – in a spatial and temporal 
moment which, precisely because it is between two states, can shed light on 
both.36 Pym’s reading of the Blendlinge positions multilingual individuals 
as similarly liminal, caught between linguistic and national identities, and, 
as such, able to illuminate the shape of this intercultural space. This space, 
like the liminal in ritual, is always temporary: anybody who operates 
between linguistic identities is always in motion between these – sometimes 
pulled in one direction by the claims of one tongue, sometimes pushed in 
another direction by the demands of the other tongue. But this push–pull 
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makes the intercultural space one of continual and productive questioning 
about the status and stasis of the linguistic, national, political and cultural 
identities which surround it. For Pym, the existence of the Blendlinge opens 
onto an ethics of mediation, communication, and negotiation, ‘issuing 
from a mix of cultures […] roaming along the borders, traveling between 
the territorial powers’.37 From this borderland, the Blendlinge are uniquely 
placed to understand translation, not as an either/or, but as a between, an 
endlessly liminal activity which they inhabit, shift and explore through 
their own experience.
It is the ethics contained within and revealed by this between that 
I approach in this book through the work of Bernardo Atxaga, Milan 
Kundera and Jorge Semprún. Why these authors in particular? The 
bilingualism of these three European authors reflects the violence of the 
twentieth century: their biographies and bibliographies are marked by 
the impact of Fascism and of Communism; by wars which have raged 
around national and linguistic borders; by tyranny and totalitarianism, 
exile and domination. Their texts approach these experiences in varying 
ways, but always with a concern for the role which aesthetic forms, 
and particularly narrative, can play in the exploration of socio-political 
questions. Their bilingual identities are implicated in this investigation 
of the relationship between the aesthetic and the political: in the work of 
all three authors, the possibility or impossibility of translation emerges 
as a way to explore the power of the between – understood in linguistic, 
political, cultural and national terms –, an exploration which positions 
identities which are liminal or in flux as potentially democratic and 
pluralist alternatives to the authoritarian and essentializing systems 
which all three authors critique in their texts. 
On one level, then, the work of these three authors can be explored 
in relation to an aesthetics of the twentieth-century European bilingual 
novelist. Like the works of Michel de Castillo or Ágota Kristóf, their texts 
reflect the traumas of the post-war experience, deploying a multilingual 
aesthetics to shape their exploration of these traumas. And as with Eva 
Hoffman and Vassilis Alexakis, this approach becomes part of a broader 
focus upon the connection between language and identity. Yet, as Pym 
suggests in On Translator Ethics, attempts to universalize the experiences 
of those who work between languages elide the inevitable differences 
within those experiences. We must, he posits, always ask ‘Why translate?’, 
and acknowledge that the answer to this question will be situational 
rather than general.38 In the same way, we must acknowledge that the 
ways in which bilingual authors experience the relationship between their 
two languages is always governed by the particular vibrations – economic, 
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political, social and cultural – which surround those languages. To uncover 
these vibrations we need to ask ‘Why translate?’, as Pym suggests, but also 
a series of other linked questions: ‘Why do you not translate?’; ‘Why write 
in this language rather than the other?’; ‘Why write in two languages 
rather than one?; ‘Why write in one language rather than two?’ 
For Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún, responses to these questions 
have fluctuated across their careers, from one text to another, and 
between their fictional work and their discussions of these fictions in 
interviews and essays. The diversity of these responses, a diversity 
which emerges in relation to each author but also in their relations to 
one another, opens onto a complex territory of bilingualism, in which 
loss and gain, creativity and stultification, repression and liberation, 
the claims of the individual and those of the community, are repeatedly 
brought into focus. It is this territory which I map in their work, for these 
differences within a certain similarity have opened challenging and 
productive angles into my consideration of the ethical questions raised 
by and through translation. The impact of translation upon the work of 
these three authors – visible in the production, reception, content and 
form of their texts – has allowed me to take a multidimensional approach 
to understanding translation within their work, one which combines 
an understanding of translation as linguistic transfer with an approach 
which reads translation as a paradigm to express the experience of 
cultural appropriation, historical trauma and interpersonal relations.
While the work of these three authors can be read in two major 
European languages and situated within two major European literary 
systems – French and Spanish – their experiences as bilinguals open onto 
a diversity of linguistic, literary and political frameworks. Atxaga is a 
contemporary Basque author who first writes his texts in Basque before 
translating them into Castilian, either alone or in collaboration. Franco’s 
repression of the Basque language and culture between 1936 and 1975 
forced Atxaga to contend with questions about the role language and 
literature could play in relation to political calls for a Basque nation 
state. Basque is now a co-official language within the Basque Country 
in Spain, but the criticism Atxaga has received following his decision 
to self-translate his texts into Castilian reveals the asymmetrical power 
relations which continue to exist between the two languages. Milan 
Kundera began his career writing in Czech. When he was exiled from the 
Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia in 1975 for the perceived dissidence of 
his texts, he began to publish in French translation, although he did not 
translate his texts himself. Kundera has sought to evade political readings 
of his texts, and believes that these early translations deliberately altered 
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the form of his texts to emphasize their political, rather than novelistic, 
aspects: he subsequently authorized certain translations of his texts. 
Kundera now only writes in French. Jorge Semprún was born in Spain, 
but wrote the majority of his texts in his second language, French. His 
bilingualism reflects the series of political traumas which separated him 
from Spain: his family’s move to France during the Spanish Civil War, his 
work for the French resistance and subsequent capture by the Gestapo, 
and his incarceration in Buchenwald concentration camp. 
The experiences of each author reveal both the complexity of the 
bilingual experience and the complexity of European identity. Bilingualism 
can originate through forms of violence such as colonization and war. It 
can be created through exile and displacement, as in the movements of 
refugees, immigrants and the growth of diasporas. But it can also arise 
because of education and opportunity. It can occur as a form of resistance 
or collaboration, a choice or an imposition, a symbol of freedom or 
restriction. The disparity of experience revealed by Atxaga, Kundera and 
Semprún also troubles a generic understanding of European identity. All 
three authors invoke a sometimes-utopian conception of a multilingual 
Europe in their work, associating linguistic diversity with forms of 
resistance, whether implicit or explicit, to the challenges of nationalism 
and totalitarianism which they confront in their texts. On one level, 
this plurality is a reality: as bilinguals, all three authors reveal ‘another’ 
Europe, one traversed by the vibrations of more minor languages such 
as Basque and Czech, and by challenges to singular or stable national 
identities. Yet, as their texts reveal, this plurality is also subject to potential 
repression and violence: the borders of nation and language do not 
necessarily collapse when faced with transnational realities; sometimes 
they solidify by reifying, oppressing, or expelling difference. This tension 
between these two visions of Europe – heterogeneous and homogeneous; 
democratic and totalitarian; peaceful and violent; utopian and tyrannical 
– emerges within the texts of Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún, often in 
relation to questions of translation. Their work thus offers a challenging 
engagement with issues of European linguistic and national identity 
which remain as relevant now, in the twenty-first century, as they were 
when Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún began to write.
Writing and translating from the ‘between’
The relative diversity within their identities as bilingual authors is 
replicated in the range of ways in which Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún 
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respond to or reflect upon these identities in their writing. Hokenson 
and Munson describe the bilingual text as ‘a self-translation, authored 
by a writer who can compose in different languages and who translates 
his or her texts from one language into another’.39 This definition 
would ostensibly include Atxaga’s novels, which appear in both Basque 
and Castilian, although his decision to move towards collaborative 
translations reframes his more recent texts as problematic examples of 
self-translations. But it would exclude Milan Kundera’s work: both the 
Czech texts which appeared first in French translation, ‘authorized’ but 
not ‘authored’ by Kundera; and his more recent texts written in French. 
It would also exclude almost all of Jorge Semprún’s texts, for while he 
composed texts in both his literary languages, he only self-translated one 
of these from French into Spanish. 
The bilingual text, understood as the type of self-translation or 
parallel text described by Hokenson and Munson, offers one way in 
which a bilingual or multilingual author might choose to produce her or 
his texts. But texts produced by those who conceive of their identity as 
shared between different nations and languages can take myriad forms. 
There are authors who blend both languages within one text – Semprún, 
for example, or Chinese-English author Xiaolu Guo, whose novel A 
Concise Chinese-english Dictionary for Lovers mirrors its protagonist’s 
attempts to learn English with a style built from misunderstood English 
words, Chinese characters and pinyin. There are those who are not 
fluent in another language, but whose work is nonetheless permeated 
with another linguistic identity (here one may think of Anita Desai’s 
incorporation of German, Hindi and Urdu into her texts, or Atxaga’s 
use of English words and phrases in Obabakoak). There are writers who 
begin their literary careers in one language and then later shift entirely 
to another. Kundera falls into this category, as does Nancy Huston, who 
began her career writing in her second language, French, before moving 
to English – her mother tongue – in later works. And there are authors, 
such as Joseph Conrad, or Tahar Ben Jelloun, who have always chosen to 
write in just one of their languages; or who, like Semprún, choose their 
language depending on the subject matter of the text in question.
None of these decisions renders a writer any less bilingual. But the 
decision as a bilingual to write a text in just one language – whether first 
or second – rather than in both, shifts that text from a linguistic between to 
a linguistic either/or. This either/or can enable critics to move away from 
intercultural and interlinguistic readings of writers of the ‘in-between’ 
towards a more monolingual approach. Kundera can be read as either 
a French author or a Czech one, depending upon which texts a critic 
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chooses to consider, while the differences in subject matter and style 
between the texts produced in each language make it relatively easy to 
consider them as separate bodies of work. So too, Semprún’s work can be 
categorized by a connection between language choice and subject matter 
that allows his French texts – which generally focus upon his experiences 
in Buchenwald – and his Spanish texts –which tend to explore his time as 
a member of the Spanish Communist Party – to be considered separately. 
In Atxaga’s case, his decision to self-translate or to collaborate on the 
translations of his texts from Basque into Castilian does emphasize the 
liminality of his authorial identity. Yet the relatively small size of his 
Basque readership means that his Castilian self-translations often stand 
in for the Basque texts in an international literary market, thereby subtly 
erasing the duality of Atxaga’s identity. 
Reading Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún in translation
The potential for each of these bilingual authors to be situated within one 
linguistic and literary identity as opposed to two reveals the between they 
inhabit to be conditioned by the ways in which they are read, as much as 
by the ways in which they write. What does it mean, for example, to read 
Atxaga in Castilian rather than in Basque? Is such a reading an assimilation 
of Atxaga into a hegemonic discourse at the expense of a minor language? 
Or should both his texts be considered of equal value,  each being a 
legitimate object of study? Are the authorized French translations of 
Kundera’s texts more valid than unauthorized French, or indeed English, 
translations of his work? Or is the fact that Kundera now writes in French 
enough for all these translations to be accepted as part of his French œuvre? 
Should we consider Semprún a Spanish author who writes in French, or a 
French author who sometimes writes in Spanish? Given his dual literary 
and linguistic identity, are Spanish translations of Semprún’s French texts 
part of his œuvre, despite the fact that he has had no input into them?
Questions such as these have arisen repeatedly as I have written 
this book, challenging me to justify my reading choices, my assumptions 
about language and authorship, and my understanding of the relationship 
between translation and originality. My experience of reading these 
authors has led to an awareness of the need for a continual and continuous 
negotiation with the question of why, how and under what circumstances 
we can, should and do read in translation. For this reason, I have focused 
predominantly upon the bilingual identity of these authors as it emerges 
within texts written in their second language. This focus has led me to 
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those texts within their œuvre which I read as particularly liminal: either 
because of the ways they situate or reveal the relationship between the 
languages used by each author; or because of their destabilization or 
affirmation of an opposition between an original text and a translated 
one. Atxaga’s Obabakoak was first published in Basque in 1988, but 
was republished in a Castilian translation created by Atxaga in 1989, 
with significant alterations. Kundera wrote Le Livre du rire et de l’oubli 
(henceforth Le Livre) in Czech in 1978; however, it was not published 
until its French translation by François Kérel in 1979. In 1985, Kundera 
revised the French text and offered a new authorized French version. 
Quel beau dimanche! was written in French in 1980, but it is also – as 
the narrator continually suggests – a rewriting of Semprún’s first text, Le 
Grand Voyage, written in 1967. Semprún’s 1994 text L’Écriture ou la vie 
offers another rewriting of several of the incidents which appear in Quel 
beau dimanche!, positioning this text on a spectrum between originality 
and repetition which exceeds interlingual questions.
Each of the texts upon which I focus in the chapters that follow is 
thus a rewriting, subject to a repetition between languages, between the 
voice of the author and the voice of a translator, and between different 
temporal and cultural locations. These texts are all positioned as 
unfinished projects, to be revisited in ways which integrate the ethical 
and aesthetic possibilities of translation into the ethical and aesthetic 
possibilities of the novel form. Individually, each text raises questions 
about the relationship of literary language to authorial identity; about 
the role of translation in disseminating the work of a bilingual author; 
and about the challenges of responding to such translations as an author 
who can work between source and target language. Brought together 
within this book, these questions also shed light on the often hierarchical 
relationship which exists between originality and repetition, and between 
author and translator. For these three texts are conditioned by their 
relative proximity to or distance from their author: Semprún’s original 
text, Atxaga’s self-translation and Kundera’s authorized translation all 
appear to be positioned on a vertical axis descending from originality to 
replication. In fact, though, these three texts highlight, challenge, and 
sometimes upend the separation of original writing and translation, 
drawing our attention to the assumptions and reifications of authorial 
identity which lie behind our attempts to define a text as authentic or 
inauthentic, an original or a copy. 
Yet despite the ways in which they problematize the relationship 
between a translation and an original text, all three books remain 
conditioned by their relation to their author, and are legitimized by the 
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assumption of authorial control contained within the terms ‘original’, 
‘self’ or ‘authorized’. For this reason, I have also explored the English 
translations of the texts I discuss. In exploring these translations and 
including them as parallel quotations within the pages of this book, new 
issues emerged, both about the impact and role of translation within 
the work of Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún, and about the nature of 
translation itself. Margaret Jull Costa’s 1992 English translation of 
Obabakoak, for example, contains additions to the Castilian text which 
is its model, raising questions about how and why a translation might be 
modified to connect with a new readership beyond those who can read 
in Atxaga’s two languages. Kundera’s decision to authorize Aaron Asher’s 
1996 English translation of Le Livre based upon Kerél’s French translation, 
as opposed to Michael Henry Heim’s 1980 English translation based upon 
Kundera’s Czech text, gives added authority to the French version of Le 
Livre, and emphasizes Kundera’s dominance over all his translations. And 
A. Sheridan’s 1982 English translation of Semprún’s Quel beau dimanche! 
was astounding for the sheer quantity of text which was not transmitted 
from the French book into the English one.
On occasion, then, and particularly in relation to Sheridan’s text, 
I found myself modifying or adding to these translations according to 
errors or elisions I perceived within them. I have commented upon these 
modifications within this book, as and when they arise. But my decision 
to do so raises its own set of questions about reading in translation. To 
be able to modify a translation requires one to be able to read a text in 
both its original version and its existing translation: to be, to a greater 
or lesser extent, somewhere on the bilingual spectrum oneself. Bilingual 
readings of translated texts offer their own illuminations, revealing 
erasures, absences, mistranslations and additions between an original 
and a translation. But these bilingual readings also erase a key purpose 
of translation: if we were to answer Pym’s question ‘why translate?’ as a 
reader rather than a translator, the response would probably be: ‘because 
it is only through translation that I can gain access to this text’. In this 
regard, I have found myself continually confronting the losses and gains 
inherent within the experience of reading in translation. As a reader 
who does not understand Basque or Czech, I am indebted to the forms of 
cross-linguistic and cross-cultural connectivity which (self-)translation 
from these languages into Spanish and French respectively enables; at 
the same time, as a reader able to explore the English translations of 
these French and Spanish texts, I am only too aware of the ways in which 
that connectivity always entails a potential appropriation and/or erasure 
of the text it seeks to transmit interlingually. 
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This loss and gain inevitably raises the question of whether one 
should read and criticize a text in translation at all. Stanley Corngold 
asserts that ‘[d]oing comparative literature means studying works written 
in different languages without the benefit of translation. It means not 
needing to translate, on the claimed strength of being able to translate’.40 
Corngold’s focus upon reading in an original language emphasizes the link 
between language and meaning, delegitimizing critical readings which 
take place in translation. Yet, whether we acknowledge it or not, some of 
what we do as comparatists does take place in translation, whether that 
be as a non-Russian speaker referencing the work of Bakhtin in English, 
or as a non-Japanese reader beginning a monograph with a translated 
quotation by Murakami. For none of us can read every text in its original 
language: we are all, to some extent, reading in translation if we wish to 
read beyond the borders of our linguistic abilities. If we refuse to do so, 
we risk shutting ourselves away, not necessarily in a monocultural world, 
but in one made narrower by the absence of translation: as George Steiner 
comments, ‘Without translation we would inhabit parishes bordering on 
silence’.41
The alternative view, then, posits that reading in translation – the 
basis of World Literature – is essential if we are to avoid constructing 
canons which focus predominantly upon texts written in major languages. 
Yet, as Emily Apter suggests in Against World Literature, this approach 
often operates according to a ‘translatability assumption’ in which critics 
‘zoom over the speed bumps of untranslatability’, creating a globalized 
canon in English which erases as much as it illuminates the diversity of 
global textual production’.42 To conceive of reading in translation as a 
good thing in and of itself risks creating a homogenized literary culture 
which fails to recognize the value of learning languages other than our 
own. As Pym comments succinctly, ‘Translations are for the person who 
stays home. Or are they so that the person stays home?’43
Reading in translation, then, like the process of translation itself, 
operates between domestic and foreign: between the desire, on the one 
hand, to read any text and attempt understanding beyond the limits of our 
linguistic abilities; and, on the other, to acknowledge the irreducibility of 
linguistic and cultural difference to homogeneous terms by approaching 
a text in its original language. These seemingly irreconcilable desires 
speak to the tension between the global and the local, but also between 
the translatable and the untranslatable. If we argue that all texts can be 
read in translation, we suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that meaning can 
be transmitted across linguistic borders – the translatability assumption. 
But if we refuse to read in translation, we insist that a text is so altered by 
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translation as to render criticism of it in anything other than the original 
language illegitimate – the untranslatability assertion. 
In fact, both these options – as opposed as they seem – delegitimize 
the partial, the incomplete and the between. By insisting either that the 
meaning of a text can be transferred perfectly into another language, or 
that, because the meaning and the language are so closely connected, 
reading in a language other than the original is illegitimate, we polarize 
translation and reject the very liminality which is characteristic of its 
process. For can any text ever be considered translatable, given the losses 
and distortions involved? Conversely, given that translation does occur, 
can any text really be defined as untranslatable? In Le Monolinguisme 
de l’autre, Derrida explores this paradox, claiming that ‘Rien n’est 
intraduisible en un sens, mais en un autre sens tout est intraduisible, 
la traduction est un autre nom de l’impossible’./‘In a sense, nothing is 
untranslatable; but in another sense, everything is untranslatable; 
translation is another name for the impossible’.44 When we consider 
whether to read a text in translation we situate ourselves and our 
critical practice on this border between possibility and impossibility, 
understanding and confusion, the said and the unsaid, the read and the 
unread: approaching a text which we cannot read in its original language, 
we find ourselves again at the Tower of Babel, silenced and unable to 
comprehend the world which is presented to us without calling for help.
It is translation which answers this call. But in order to cross from 
silence to communication, we need to accept the partiality of that response. 
For only if we acknowledge what is lost and what is gained when we read in 
translation can we move away from the opposition between translatability 
and untranslatability. In Against World Literature, Emily Apter highlights 
the importance of this move, suggesting that both ‘translation and 
untranslatability are constitutive of world forms of literature’.45 Apter’s 
response to this reality is to call for critics to take ‘an approach to 
literary comparatism that recognizes the importance of non-translation, 
mistranslation, incomparability and untranslatability’.46 In this book, I 
follow Apter by focusing upon moments of potential untranslatability or 
mistranslation in each of the texts I discuss, exploring these moments of 
resistance to linguistic transfer and the creative approaches this resistance 
enables each author to deploy. At the same time, however, I stake a 
claim for the possibility, the reality, the necessity, the creativity and the 
connectivity of translation by often reading in translation myself.47 As 
Domínguez, Saussy and Villanueva suggest, a claim of untranslatability 
is in fact always a call for translation.48 What appears to be a dead-end 
is in fact an ‘arcade’, to use Benjamin’s term. Adapted to the context of 
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translation, such an arcade might signify an opening onto other possible 
passageways that hold out the hope of enhancing understanding across 
linguistic and cultural borders. This understanding will always, inevitably, 
be incomplete: there are losses inherent in every reading, and particularly 
when reading in translation. Yet only in the failed attempt to understand 
can we grasp the limits of that comprehension. 
In this regard, the work of bilingual authors offers a unique angle 
into the losses and gains inherent when reading in translation. When a 
bilingual author produces a text in two languages, s/he simultaneously 
expands and narrows the possibilities for reading and understanding: 
even as s/he increases the chance that a reader will be able to approach 
that text in an ‘original’ version, s/he also increases the chance that that 
reading will be partial, only one version of a text which is now doubled. 
This simultaneous expansion and narrowing is an inherent part of the 
impact which translation has upon a text. Through translation, the 
potential for a text to be encountered beyond its linguistic boundaries 
is amplified. But that encounter is also rendered incomplete, for the 
singular, definitive and original text has been fragmented and multiplied 
in ways which render every reading only one of many possible ones. In 
this regard, reading in translation both reveals the other languages, other 
worlds and other words that we fail, are unable, or choose not to hear, 
and emphasizes the ethical possibilities of seeking forms of cross-cultural 
and interlinguistic understanding.
Reading translation in Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún
This focus upon the possibility and limitations of understanding, 
illuminated by the experiences of translation, is an integral trope within 
the work of Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún. For if there is a link between 
these authors which has led me to engage with their work particularly 
within this book, it is in the ways in which their texts repeatedly raise 
questions about the miscommunications and misapprehensions which 
haunt all our attempts at understanding – intralingually as well as 
interlingually; as individuals and as communities; in both the public and 
the private sphere. The link resides also in the ways that translation – 
operating as linguistic transfer, as a textual motif, and as integral to the 
structure of the texts I discuss – offers partial but illuminating responses 
to these questions. In Atxaga’s Obabakoak, translation highlights 
questions surrounding linguistic politics, interrogating the role the 
Basque language and literature have played in relation to the formation 
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of the Basque nation state, and to the more hegemonic European literary 
and linguistic systems which surround it. In Le Livre, Kundera explores a 
series of individual and collective ‘forgettings’ in post-war Czechoslovakia 
under Soviet control, interrogating the ways in which aesthetic forms 
can operate to bolster forms of political and personal tyranny. And in 
Semprún’s Quel beau dimanche!, forms of translation interrogate a double 
trauma: Semprún’s lived experience of the Buchenwald concentration 
camp, and his textual understanding of the Soviet Gulag, an intersection 
of life and literature which also reveals the intersections between the 
Nazi and the Communist regimes. 
In all three texts, questions about identity formation – on both 
an individual and a communal level – intersect with questions about 
the role aesthetic forms play within this formation. These questions 
return again and again to one crucial issue: how can we translate our 
experiences – past and present – into an aesthetic form without falling 
prey to essentialism or universalizing those experiences? In Atxaga, 
Kundera and Semprún’s texts, possible answers to this question are 
offered through an aesthetics of translation: the inclusion of multilingual 
loans; the deployment of untranslated words; the glossing of challenging 
words or phrases; the inclusion of intertextual excerpts in translation. 
This aesthetics operates, on one level, to introduce and problematize the 
specific political enquiries at stake in each text. Atxaga’s integration into 
Obabakoak of an intertextual network drawn from both Basque authors 
and from a global literary history reveals and challenges the insularity 
created when a literary and linguistic scene is defined by a nationalist 
struggle. Kundera’s use of the ‘untranslatable’ Czech word litost within Le 
Livre draws attention to his exile, and highlights the forms of repression 
enacted by the Czech Communist Party. And Semprún’s focus upon the 
German phrase Jedem das Seine is part of his enquiry into the parallels 
between the Nazi and the Stalinist regimes. 
But this multilingual approach does more than highlight the specific 
political aspects of each text. To include multiple languages in a text is to 
emphasize the partiality of any single perspective, and thereby to reveal 
the dangerous illusions inherent in an attempt to support essentialist 
narratives of language, nationality and political belief through aesthetic 
forms which are inherently unstable, subject to misreadings, and subject 
to the dissonance between intention and interpretation. This dissonance 
is integral to the narratives of these three novels, which all suggest that we 
misread one another in the very ways in which we believe we understand. 
But it is also integrated into the form of each text through a series of 
textual ‘mistakes’ which only reveal themselves through close reading: in 
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Obabakoak, intertextual excerpts are falsely attributed or plagiarized; in 
Quel beau dimanche!, quotations are mistranslated or unreferenced; in Le 
Livre, a photograph is misdescribed or misremembered. Are such mistakes 
deliberate, or simply a reflection of the inevitable challenges of attributing 
meaning correctly in aesthetic forms? Whatever the case, their existence 
emphasizes the power of the illusion of understanding: we are all prey to 
the pull of authority, guilty of putting our faith in pre-digested meanings 
and accepting reality as it is presented to us without question. 
Can we challenge this illusion? As I suggested earlier, forms of copying 
and translation offer us an opportunity to repeatedly consider our ways of 
being, our principles of action, and our forms of understanding. In each 
text, this opportunity is foregrounded through a narrative structure which 
we might characterize as ‘writing-as-translation’: a structure run through 
with forms of repetition which reflect the chronological challenges, 
multiple perspectives and connection between mimesis and originality 
inherent within translation. While all three texts have been described as 
novels, their fragmented, dialogic and elastic forms raise as many questions 
as they answer about the possibilities of the novel form. What is the 
correspondence between the different parts of each text? How do they speak 
to one another? And what do they illuminate about the relation between 
the aesthetic and the ethical in the novel form itself? Atxaga’s connected 
stories, interlaced with intertextual excerpts, focus upon the creative power 
of repetition, promoting and employing plagiarism as a means to revive 
Basque literature. Kundera re-forms repetition as illumination, developing a 
novelistic structure based upon the repetition of key themes with variations, 
each one revealing a different way in which we might understand that 
theme and its permutations. And Semprún repeats words and phrases in 
different contexts in order to draw attention to the shifts in history and 
ideology that he is concerned with exploring, developing a text which 
fragments chronology and perspective to insist upon the illusions inherent 
in our understanding of the past. In this ‘writing-as-translation’, what do we 
see about the world which we could not see before? This question is posed 
again and again, repetitively itself, in the work of these three authors, as 
the ethical and aesthetic possibilities of translation are integrated into the 
ethical and aesthetic possibilities of the novel form.
A journey of translation
This is the first critical volume to bring these three authors together in 
one study.49 In doing so, I seek to elaborate the connections between their 
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approaches to translation, as both action and aesthetics, and through 
those connections to shine a light upon the ethics of translation itself. My 
argument in this book has been informed by several critical studies which 
have explored issues of translation and bilingualism in the work of each 
individual author. I discuss these critical responses at the start of each 
chapter, as part of a linguistic, historical, national, biographical and critical 
contextualization of each author. I then follow this overview by integrating 
the questions raised in this contextualization into a close reading of the 
ethical and aesthetic questions that these texts raise about translation.
Through the work of each of these authors, I thus follow a journey 
of translation, one which begins in the impact of translation upon their 
texts, continues into moments of linguistic translation, untranslatability 
and mistranslation within their texts, and ultimately becomes an 
exploration of social, political and affective (un)translatability. These 
journeys of translation often begin in the binaries of translation 
theory: in an opposition between major and minor languages; in the 
hierarchies of original and copy; in the categorization of certain words, 
texts or types of text as translatable or untranslatable; in a definition of 
a translation as good or bad, faithful or unfaithful. But these binaries 
are always interrogated, challenged and ultimately destabilized in the 
work of Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún: in each text, an engagement 
with questions of linguistic, cultural and political identity shifts from an 
either/or to a between, a liminal space that is constantly and consistently 
to be renegotiated in every instance of textual production, translation, 
reading or critical enquiry. 
In the chapters which follow, I explore this between through 
Obabakoak, Le Livre and Quel beau dimanche! but also through a series of 
intersections between these texts and the theories of translation offered 
by Deleuze, Ricœur and Derrida, among others. These illuminating 
encounters, which I have framed primarily as a series of pairings – Atxaga 
and Deleuze; Kundera and Ricœur; Semprún and Derrida – offer new 
readings of the impact of translation upon and within the work of Atxaga, 
Kundera and Semprún. But these pairings also offer new readings of an 
ethics of translation, developed through an investigation of the practice 
of translation, its function as a textual motif, and its role as a theoretical 
paradigm for our interlinguistic, but also interpersonal and intercultural 
relations. These encounters have emerged through connections I 
perceived between the approaches to translation offered by each author 
within the pair; in bringing them together, however, these connections 
developed, shifted and extended, creating a dialogue between fiction 
and theory which offers both a reading of translation, and a reading 
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through translation. We might, as Kenneth Reinhard suggests, consider 
these collisions of fiction and theory as neighbourhoods rather than 
families of thought or critical practice: ‘a mode of reading logically and 
ethically prior to similitude, […] determined by accidental contiguity, 
genealogical isolation and ethical encounter’.50 In responding to these 
contiguities, I have chosen not to approach these texts chronologically, 
but rather to pursue ‘constellations’ of thinking, to use Benjamin’s term, 
which emerge as three connected but also independent, complex and 
diverse stories of translation.
Chapter 1, ‘Bernardo Atxaga’s Obabakoak: towards a minor 
literature of translation’, explores the ethical role translation can play 
with regard to the asymmetry between minor and major linguistic and 
literary systems. Bernardo Atxaga’s translation of Obabakoak from 
Basque to Castilian reveals the violence of translation and its ability 
to alter texts for inclusion in hegemonic literary cultures. But Atxaga’s 
representation of the Basque language through a spatial figuration, the 
desert island, emphasizes the role translation can play as a force of both 
connection and separation. Reading Atxaga alongside the geoliterary and 
geopolitical questions developed by Gilles Deleuze, I reframe the debate 
surrounding Atxaga’s self-translations. I argue that, through translation, 
Atxaga creates his own form of ‘minor’ literature. I understand this term 
in the sense Deleuze and Guattari give to it: a literature which challenges 
the stasis of linguistic, national and literary identity.
Chapter 2, ‘Milan Kundera’s Le Livre du rire et de l’oubli: a 
hospitable translation’, explores the spaces between translatability and 
untranslatability, fidelity and betrayal. Beginning with a discussion of 
Kundera’s alleged attempts to write with a view to ‘translatability’, I argue 
that his attitude to translation reveals his awareness of the impossibility 
of absolute translatability. I then turn to Kundera’s discussion of the 
‘untranslatable’ Czech word litost, exploring the forms of linguistic, 
relational, political and aesthetic untranslatability which Kundera 
develops through his engagement with this word. Kundera’s famous 
privileging of the novel form above the poetic hinges, I suggest, on a 
division between translatability and untranslatability which Kundera’s 
texts repeatedly dissolve. Drawing on the work of Paul Ricœur, I argue 
that by dissolving this division ourselves, as readers, and exploring the 
spaces between fidelity and betrayal as an alternative way to understand 
translation, we can discover the hospitable reality of translation, and 
Kundera’s embrace of this hospitality in his aesthetics of the novel. 
Chapter 3, ‘Jorge Semprún’s Quel beau dimanche!: a “relevante” 
translation’, explores the question of what might constitute a ‘good’ or 
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‘relevant’ translation. Beginning at the intersection of writing and politics 
which characterizes Semprún’s work, I argue that translation is integral 
to his attempt to narrate the complex history of the twentieth century 
in which he was immersed. I focus on his multilingual interrogation 
of memory and survival, and particularly his analysis of the German 
language loan Aufhebung, the Hegelian dialectical term which the 
narrator of Quel beau dimanche! suggests both structures and dissolves 
the Stalinist understanding of Marxism. Reading this alongside Derrida’s 
discussion of a ‘relevante’ translation, which itself draws a parallel between 
translation and dialectical thinking, I argue that translation interrogates 
the power of the dialectic. In Semprún’s work this interrogation operates 
to reveal the traumas of the past and acknowledge the impossibility of 
transcending them. 
Each chapter thus offers a vision of translation and a vision 
through translation, a vision concerned with exploring linguistic, 
affective, historical and relational forms of (mis)understanding in the 
texts discussed. This vision is always diverse: the perspectives offered 
by translation are never unitary, but always complex, shifting and 
plural. Yet, through this diversity, translation offers a powerful critical 
vocabulary with which to explore the ethical challenges involved in the 
communicative impulse, on both an individual and a community level, 
and to begin to negotiate and transform those challenges into productive 
forms of understanding. 
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Bernardo Atxaga’s Obabakoak: 
towards a minor literature of 
translation
Introduction: the territory of translation
‘[E]l cohete – Translatio, Traductio, Tradutrice – esta siempre cerca; 
a veces, dentro de la propia casa.’/‘[T]he spaceship – Translatio, 
Traductio, Tradutrice – is always nearby; sometimes, inside the 
house itself.’ – Bernardo Atxaga.1
In his essay ‘Superficies de la literatura vasca’, Bernardo Atxaga discusses 
the persistent line of questioning which accompanies his decision to 
write his texts primarily in the Basque language, also known as Euskera. 
Referencing the territorial asymmetry between a planet and an asteroid, 
Atxaga emphasizes a similar disparity which exists linguistically between 
those languages conceived as major – Spanish or French, for example 
– and those conceived as minor, such as Basque. Encircled by the more 
dominant linguistic territories of French and Spanish, Basque – a language 
with fewer than one million speakers worldwide – only developed as 
a unified language in the late 1960s, a delay reflected in the relatively 
small size of the Basque bibliography and the small readership for Basque 
texts. Why then, as a bilingual author, able to write in Castilian as well as 
Basque, does Atxaga choose to write in this minor language? 
Atxaga suggests that it is precisely because he is a bilingual author 
that such divisions between major and minor languages lose their 
relevance: he is subject to two languages, and is an inhabitant of both 
literary systems. And the best response to the question of why he writes 
first in a minor language, he claims, is offered by translation: translation 
operates as ‘un cohete especial’ – a spaceship – which can travel with ease 
from asteroid to planet, minor language to major, in only a few months.2 
In Atxaga’s case, translation from Basque to Castilian and beyond, 
into twenty-four other languages, has transformed his readership. Yet, 
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as Michael Cronin notes, ‘translation relationships between minority 
and majority languages are rarely divorced from issues of power and 
identity’.3 This charged relationship holds true even for bilingual authors 
who choose, like Atxaga, to self-translate between minor and major 
languages. While Atxaga emphasizes the connective and liberating 
power of translation in ‘Superficies de la literatura vasca’, the question 
remains whether his choice to translate his texts in fact accentuates the 
minority status of the Basque language.
In this chapter I explore this question, focusing predominantly 
upon Atxaga’s 1988 text, Obabakoak. I engage with both Atxaga’s 1989 
Castilian self-translation of Obabakoak and Margaret Jull Costa’s 1992 
English translation of this Castilian text. Both these translations add 
new paratexts to frame the text within its Basque context for a non-
Basque readership. These paratexts focus particularly upon the unusual 
features of the Basque language and its literature, thereby exposing 
Atxaga to the criticism that he has exoticized his text for translation to 
meet the expectations of the new, more dominant, Castilian and English 
readerships. Yet while the changes Atxaga makes for his self-translation 
appear to affirm the minority status of the Basque literary, linguistic 
and cultural scene, in the narrative of Obabakoak Atxaga confronts and 
disturbs this conception. Throughout the text, Atxaga employs forms of 
literary recreation – plagiarism, translation, intertextuality – to create 
a textual territory traversed by the vibrations of multiple languages, 
literatures and voices. In so doing, Atxaga problematizes the relationship 
between the terms minor and major in relation to his texts. For in texts 
which blend languages and literary traditions from around the globe, and 
which are themselves translated, what precisely do these terms mean? 
In this chapter I argue for a reconception of the ways in which 
Obabakoak can be conceived as a text from a minor literary and linguistic 
system. For Deleuze and Guattari, in Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure, 
‘becoming-minor’ is not an exoticizing or limiting exercise, but rather 
a powerful reframing of the different power structures which surround 
and constrain us. Drawing upon their work, I explore the ways in which 
both the narrative of Obabakoak and Atxaga’s translation of the text into 
Castilian involve forms of ‘becoming-minor’. In the stories Atxaga tells, 
rigid hierarchies and stable identities often collapse: his characters are 
transformed physically and mentally by their connection to languages, 
worlds and experiences different from their own. Moreover, the creative 
adaptations Atxaga deploys in the translation of his text from Basque to 
Castilian involve a similar transformation, in which his text is altered and 
reframed by its connection to a new language. This connection impacts 
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his text, but it also has an impact upon the two literary and linguistic 
systems – Basque and Castilian – within which Obabakoak is formed. 
As I suggested earlier, a translation from a minor to a major language is 
often understood to create a lopsided dynamic in favour of the dominant 
language. But could we, in fact, read such a translation as a form of 
minor literature itself, in the sense Deleuze and Guattari give the term: 
a literature which challenges the stasis of the linguistic and literary 
systems which surround it? In this chapter, I argue that, in relation to 
Atxaga’s Obabakoak, translation operates as a potent and transgressive 
form of minor literature, reframing the relation between the minor and 
major in Atxaga’s literary practice and, in so doing, shifting the ways in 
which we might approach and read his texts in translation.
Atxaga: writing between identities
The territory of Basque literature
Joseba Irazu Garmendia, who uses the pen name Bernardo Atxaga, was 
born in 1951 in the small village of Asteasu, in the province of Guipúzcoa 
in the Basque Country of Spain.4 Atxaga grew up speaking Basque as his 
first language, and only learnt Castilian later, at school.5 Nevertheless, 
Atxaga suggests that he considers both these linguistic identities to be 
mother tongues: Euskera he describes simply as the ‘primus inter pares’ – 
the first among equals.6 Given that one of these languages was learnt at 
home and one at school, Atxaga’s definition of both as ‘mother’ tongues 
appears contradictory. In fact, his comment reflects the diglossia within 
the Basque Country, which means that the majority, if not the totality, of 
Basque speakers are bilingual.7 In Atxaga’s writing process, this diglossia 
gives his two languages equally crucial, if distinct, roles to play: Basque, 
the ‘primus inter pares’, is the language in which Atxaga first creates his 
novels; Castilian, his second mother tongue, is the language into which 
these texts are subsequently (self-)translated, thereby expanding his 
readership beyond the Basque-speaking world. 
Yet while Atxaga suggests that each of his languages has a crucial 
part to play in his literary process, his decision to write initially in Basque 
has implicated him in a ‘“national author” paradigm’, and positioned his 
work as integral to a potential revitalization of the Basque language and 
literature.8 Until the latter half of the twentieth century, Basque struggled 
to assert itself as a literary language, despite the presence of foundational 
Basque-language texts such as Etxepare’s Kontrapas (1545) and Axular’s 
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Gero (1643). When, in 1901, Miguel de Unamuno called for the death of 
the language, he was reflecting a prevailing understanding that Castilian 
Spanish was a superior literary language and Basque an ‘outmoded’ 
form of expression.9 From Etxepare’s onwards, texts written in Basque 
could not just be produced, but had to justify their mode of production 
in a minority language. As Lasagabaster notes, ‘authors would inscribe in 
their works a defence of the language to prove its versatility and compare 
it to other, more developed languages capable of expressing complex 
universes, both real and ideological’.10 The need to justify its existence 
meant that the Basque novel was subordinated to a linguistic purpose, 
and was circumscribed by perceptions of it as a tool for the promotion 
and teaching of the language, a conception that destroyed its autonomy 
beyond the language of its expression.11 
The latter half of the twentieth century saw the Basque novel begin 
to loosen those constraints. In 1978, Basque was recognized as an official 
co-language for the Basque Autonomous Region of Spain. This political 
validation led to the inclusion of Basque in the school curriculum of the 
region, thereby relieving the Basque novel of its primary role as linguistic 
disseminator. Instrumental to this recognition was the development of 
a standardized form of Basque, Euskera batua, a language which also 
gave Basque literature a significant boost. Before the arrival of batua 
in the late 1960s, texts classed as Basque might have been written in 
one of a number of dialects, creating a fragmented system in which 
texts were comprehensible only to a tiny minority who spoke the same 
dialect. Standardization enabled Basque literature to develop a unified 
literary system, and created the foundations for Basque writers to prove 
that Euskera batua was as viable a literary language as Castilian. But, as 
Lasagabaster notes, ‘writers […] had a challenging job ahead of them: 
turning a somewhat “artificial” version of the language into a live, flexible 
[language] for the literary expression of the new realities’.12 As the most 
prominent of the three hundred or so people currently writing in Basque, 
Atxaga has undoubtedly embraced this challenge: he has been described 
as the ‘Shakespeare of his language’.13 But Atxaga’s eminence in this 
regard has also led to claims of erasure and appropriation: Gabilondo 
suggests that Atxaga’s approach to turning Euskera batua into a literary 
language has inflected it with a syntax drawn from his own dialect, 
Gipuzkoan, a move which authors with backgrounds in other Basque 
dialects have read as an ‘imperialist imposition’.14 In this regard, Atxaga 
has also had to accept the responsibility and the criticism that come with 
pre-eminence in a minor literary field; his every move is scrutinized for 
its potential impact upon the Basque literary and linguistic scene. 
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Atxaga’s impact on this scene has certainly been notable. Until 
the mid-twentieth century, the Basque novel focused predominantly 
on moral, religious or political issues.15 Atxaga was part of a group of 
new writers who sought to shift this emphasis: his texts blend fantasy 
with realism, twentieth-century literary theory with nineteenth-century 
narrative techniques, the novel form with short stories and poetry, 
and a focus on the Basque community with a more global perspective. 
His 1988 novel Obabakoak was his first major international success, 
gaining Atxaga a new readership both within the Basque Country and 
beyond, and positioning Atxaga as a role model for a future generation 
of Basque writers. Yet the dominance of Atxaga’s name inevitably has 
its drawbacks; like all canons, the Basque canon offers opportunities 
for imitation and disruption but also for exclusion. In the small field of 
Basque literature, where so few texts are known globally, the dominance 
of Atxaga’s name means that his inclusion in a non-Basque academic 
text or debate can substitute for the entirety and diversity of the Basque 
literary scene.
Indeed, Atxaga’s place at the forefront of the Basque canon means 
that, when discussed by non-Basque critics, his name is frequently 
considered synonymous with Basque literature.16 Such a response is 
unsurprising, but for Atxaga, the ways in which it shapes readings of his 
work can be problematic. In ‘Mi primera lengua’, he describes several 
stereotypes which accompany the transmission of his texts beyond the 
borders of the Basque Country. In particular, he suggests, critics and 
interviewers tend to emphasize the importance of orality in Basque 
literature: ‘“Usted habrá escuchado muchos cuentos en el regazo de su 
abuela”, le dirán, en un tono tal que dará la impresión de el resto de los 
escritores de este mundo carecen de abuelas con regazo’./‘“You probably 
heard many stories at your grandmother’s knee,” they will say, in a tone 
of voice which gives the impression that other writers in the world do not 
have grandmothers with knees’.17
The light-hearted tone of Atxaga’s comment here belies his 
frustration with the rhetoric of exoticism and isolation which infiltrates 
discussions of his work. In fact, Atxaga plays with this rhetoric 
in Obabakoak, subjecting a vision of the Basque literary scene as 
simultaneously insular and mysterious to a vehement, if tongue-in-
cheek, critique. But there is, Atxaga notes, a more serious strand to the 
stereotype of the Basque author: ‘Una palabra de más y el euskaldun se 
convierte en una nacionalista furibundo e incluso en un colaborador 
de los terroristas de ETA’./‘One word too many and an euskaldun can 
become, in the eyes of others, a rabid nationalist and even an ETA 
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collaborator’.18 If Atxaga’s decision to write in Basque has positioned him 
at the forefront of Basque literary development, it has also brought him 
firmly into the politico-linguistic debate which surrounds the language. 
Euskera is indelibly linked to the identity of the Basque people and the 
Basque land, a connection which has seen the language repeatedly 
made a pawn in the power struggles waged over the Basque Country. In 
1894, when the founder of Basque nationalism, Sabino Arana, created 
the Basque Nationalist Party, the revitalization of Basque was at the 
heart of his project.19 Euzkadi, the name Arana coined to represent the 
geopolitical entity that was to be the Basque nation state, means simply 
‘the place where euskera is spoken’.20 During his dictatorship (1939–75), 
Franco turned this connection into a weapon: he attempted to annihilate 
Basque nationalism by repressing all elements of Basque culture and 
banning Euskera, in order to enforce his vision of Spain as a nation 
united culturally and linguistically.21 Against this backdrop, speaking or 
writing in Basque became an act of linguistic rebellion, as powerful and 
dangerous as any act of violence or sabotage.22 When the Basque armed 
separatist group ETA was formed in 1958, a key part of its campaign to 
create a Basque nation state involved the regeneration of this banned 
language.23 In this politically charged context, texts written in Basque 
could be part of a linguistic rebellion, resistance or revitalization, but 
they struggled to be independent from the political context in which they 
were written.
Atxaga’s decision to write in Basque involves him, inevitably, 
in this conflicted literary scene: when he began writing in the 1970s, 
Euskera was still banned, and Atxaga notes that his initial impetus for 
writing in Basque was political as much as literary.24 The dynamics of the 
struggle for Basque nationalism have infiltrated several of his texts: El 
hombre solo (1993), Esos cielos (1995) and El hijo del acordeonista (2003) 
all explore the experiences of members of ETA. El hijo del acordeonista 
focuses particularly upon the relationship between Basque politics and 
the Basque language: the ETA group which the narrator eventually joins 
arrives in Obaba on the pretext that its members are developing a Basque-
language version of a set of playing cards. Unlike the abovementioned 
texts, Obabakoak does not directly discuss politics, and is above all a 
playful exploration of literary theory, intertextuality and the power of 
storytelling. However, through its focus upon the importance of literature 
and writing, Obabakoak implicitly explores Atxaga’s concern with 
the connection between the Basque political situation and the Basque 
literary scene.25 Indeed, the text has been considered the embodiment of 
a nationalist allegory of Basque identity.26
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Despite the political themes which dominate his early work, 
Atxaga continually asserts the importance of literary autonomy, even 
– or perhaps especially – in a literary arena as politically charged as 
the Basque one. Literature, he suggests, can engage powerfully with 
collective social issues, but only if it can resist being coerced into a tool 
for political consumption.27 Atxaga was a founding member of the group 
Pott (Failure), which argued that literature should be engaged in the 
exploration of aesthetic form and literary creativity, rather than the 
dissemination of particular political viewpoints.28 This fascination with 
the possibilities of aesthetic form is apparent in all Atxaga’s texts, which, 
even when discussing the political context of the Basque Country, do so 
through a form which challenges and disturbs any simplistic vision of that 
context. Both El hombre solo and Esos cielos, for example, offer a nuanced 
exploration of the internal world of ETA, using interior monologues to 
explore the psychological and personal realities contained within the 
sometimes one-dimensional media depiction of ETA and the Basque 
troubles which existed at the time these texts were written.29 
The desire among authors of Atxaga’s generation to separate the 
political and the literary, coupled with the changing political situation in 
Spain after the death of Franco in 1975, led to an increasing liberation 
of the Basque literary scene from overtly political concerns in the latter 
part of the twentieth century.30 Nowadays, Gabilondo suggests, Basque 
literature is concerned with defining itself within a post-nationalist 
context, as opposed to a nationalist one.31 Atxaga’s more recent texts 
seem to reflect this increased autonomy from the question of how to 
write, and write about, the Basque community: his 2009 novel Siete 
casas en Francia focuses on the early twentieth-century Belgian Congo, 
and is his first book set entirely outside the Basque Country. Within the 
text, Atxaga reveals a continued interest in political themes: Siete casas 
en Francia is a book about politics on a micro and a macro level, about 
social breakdown, individual arrogance, and the repression and abuse of 
an indigenous community. In setting his narrative completely outside the 
Basque Country for the first time, Atxaga shifts the ‘national paradigm’ 
surrounding his texts, insisting that the freedom to choose theme, 
content, setting and form exists for a Basque author as much as for any 
author. To expect otherwise, to believe that a Basque author will and 
can only address the political situation in the Basque Country, is to be 
guilty of the same constricted perception which believes that only Basque 
authors have ‘grandmothers with knees’.32 
This concern with shifting the ‘national paradigm’ continues in Dias 
de Nevada (2013), Atxaga’s  fictionalized account of his time as a writer-
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in-residence in Nevada. The events of the text – predominantly a series of 
encounters with the human, animal and inanimate inhabitants of Nevada 
– displace Atxaga’s literary world beyond the borders of the Basque 
Country. Unlike the Congolese location of Siete casas en Francia, however, 
the location of Dias de Nevada is not as removed from the Basque Country 
as it might appear: Nevada is home to several thousand members of the 
Basque diaspora, who arrived there in search of wealth during the Gold 
Rush, or of refuge during the Spanish Civil War.33 The Basque genealogy 
of the Nevadan landscape infiltrates the text itself, as the narrator finds 
his time in Nevada troubled by dreams and stories from his past in the 
Basque Country. In blending the foreign and the domestic in this way, 
Atxaga displaces and disturbs the location of Basque literature without 
losing his link to it, a textual engagement with the tension between 
connection and separation which he began in Obabakoak twenty-five 
years earlier.
Despite this shift of narrative location away from the Basque 
Country, however, critical responses to Atxaga’s work remain conditioned 
by his place of birth. As Gabilondo notes, his work is never considered 
as ‘literature’ but always as ‘Basque literature’.34 In fact, Gabilondo has 
suggested that, despite being set outside the Basque Country, both Siete 
casas en Francia and Dias de Nevada reflect and enforce an ‘othered’ 
conception of a Basque identity: ‘They guarantee a rural, idealic [sic] 
Basque Country from a global point of view: even Africa and California 
end up being more global versions of the Basque town of Obaba whose 
ultimate reader is still the Spanish state’.35 Gabilondo’s point here is 
part of a broader critique of Atxaga’s texts as always caught up in the 
desire to write a national, and nationalist, allegory of Basque identity, 
one Gabilondo suggests is designed to fit Western expectations of Basque 
culture as rural, magical and ‘other’.36 As Gabilondo notes, Atxaga has 
often appeared exempt from negative reviews because of his status as the 
founder of a contemporary Basque canon.37 Gabilondo’s own critique of 
Atxaga’s rural and idyllic vision of the Basque Country can then be seen 
as an attempt to interrogate rather than institutionalize Atxaga’s cultural 
capital, an approach which is essential to the development of a Basque 
critical scene able to challenge as well as laud its literary figures. Yet by 
insisting upon the ‘Basqueness’ of even those of Atxaga’s texts that are set 
outside the Basque Country, Gabilondo’s particular criticism also affirms 
the geographic limitations placed upon Atxaga’s writing experience. For, 
whether positive or negative, all critical approaches to Atxaga’s work 
maintain their focus upon the link between Basque language, literature 
and national identity, as read from within his texts.
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Translation and self-translation: between minor and major 
languages
As we have seen, then, despite his assertions of the importance of literary 
autonomy, the changing linguistic scene post-Franco, and his own 
decision to shift the location of his texts outside the Basque Country, 
Atxaga continues to face questions regarding the political and literary 
role of an author who writes in a minority language. Writing only 
in Castilian would undoubtedly allow Atxaga to evade at least some 
of these questions. Tijana Miletic notes that many bilingual authors 
choose to write in a second language because it ‘provides them with the 
freedom from the conscious and unconscious heritage of their mother 
tongue’.38 Miletic’s comment is directed towards bilingual authors such 
as Kundera and Semprún, whose bilingualism was the result of exile 
from their country of birth. Yet in Atxaga’s case, his bilingualism is the 
result of living in his country of birth: the diglossia in the Basque Country 
implicates both Castilian and Basque in a complex – and connected – 
political, cultural and social heritage, thereby limiting the freedom either 
language could provide alone.
With over one hundred million speakers, Castilian is classed as a 
‘supercentral’ language, and is the only official language throughout the 
whole of Spain; Basque, like Galician, Catalan and Aranese, has co-official 
status, but only within one region of Spain, and therefore inevitably 
occupies a peripheral space within the Spanish linguistic system.39 
The status granted to Basque reveals the simultaneous recognition 
and exclusion at stake within Spanish linguistic policy: as Sally Perret 
notes, by officially conceding (some of) the diversity of languages and 
cultures within Spain, this policy acknowledges the multicultural and 
multilingual nature of the nation. At the same time, the ways in which 
this multilingualism is regulated contain and control this diversity by 
maintaining Basque’s marginal position within the Spanish state.40 
For Gil-Oslé, the dynamic between Basque and the broader Spanish 
subsystem is characterized by a controlling and excluding impulse: 
‘En España, el escritor en vasco es un extraño, un ente colonizado’/‘In 
Spain, the Basque writer is a foreigner, a colonized being’, he suggests.41 
The linguistic duality which Atxaga describes as his inheritance is, 
then, always caught up in the historical reality of violence and cultural 
oppression wielded within and by the Spanish state upon the Basque 
community.42 At the same time, it is connected to the broader political, 
cultural and economic dynamics which surround all relationships 
between minor and major languages. 
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In El hijo del acordeonista, Atxaga focuses upon some of these 
undercurrents, suggesting that for a Basque author, writing only in 
Castilian would merely replace one set of difficulties with another. At 
the start of the text we learn that David, a Basque rancher now living in 
California, has written a memoir about his experiences growing up in a 
Basque community struggling with the legacy of the Spanish Civil War. 
To the surprise of his American wife Mary Ann, who cannot understand 
his loyalty to a language with such a small readership, David decides to 
write this memoir in Basque. But, as David’s friend Joseba explains, for 
a Basque writer, linguistic decisions are about much more than attaining 
maximum readership: 
¿Desaparecería nuestra lengua? ¿Éramos, él y yo y todos nuestros 
paisanos, el equivalente al último mohicano? «Escribir en español o 
en inglés se le haría duro a David […] Somos muy poco gente. Menos 
de un millón de personas. Cuando uno solo de nosotros abandona 
la lengua, da la impresión de que contribuye a su extinción».
Would our language disappear? Were we, he and I and our fellow 
countrymen and women, the equivalent of the last Mohican? 
“Writing in Spanish or English would have been very hard for 
David. […] There are so few Basque speakers, fewer than a million. 
And every time even one of us abandons the language, it feels as if 
we were contributing to its extinction”.43
Disappearance, abandonment, extinction: the vocabulary of erasure Atxaga 
employs here emphasizes the sense of linguistic and emotional betrayal 
which would accompany a decision to write in any language but Basque. 
In the face of this potential loss, El hijo del acordeonista articulates the need 
for a linguistic revival. At the start of the novel, we discover that David has 
been burying Basque words in the land around the ranch in California for 
his children to dig up in order that they may, quite literally, uncover their 
linguistic heritage. While the burial of these words emphasizes the death 
of the language, Atxaga highlights the possibility of a resurrection through 
the actions and engagement of another generation of Basque speakers. 
David’s decision to write his memoir in Basque is similarly situated as both 
a testament to linguistic forgetting and an attempt to halt its progression, a 
textual memorial offered to his children which will require them to engage 
with their linguistic heritage in order to discover their familial one.
While writing in Castilian might enable Atxaga to evade the 
paradigm of the national author, this decision would thus implicate him 
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in another paradigm: that of the disloyal Basque author, abandoning 
a minority language while validating the hegemony of Castilian and, 
implicitly, the Spanish literary and political system. Such a critique has 
been levelled at other bilingual writers who have chosen to write in 
Castilian rather than a minority language: as Kirsty Hooper discusses, a 
number of Galician authors, including Alfredo Conde and Emilia Pardo 
Bazán, have found their commitment to Galicia questioned because of 
their decision not to write in Galician.44 The link between nation and 
language – inherent in Schleiermacher’s rejection of the possibility 
of bilingualism which I discussed in the Introduction – remains, in 
relation to minor languages, and particularly those languages without 
an accompanying independent nation state, a critical subject of enquiry. 
Indeed, as Giorgio Agamben suggests in Means Without End, a necessarily 
violent entangling of people, language and the state often arises when the 
existence of that state is in question.45 The violence of this enmeshing of 
ontology and language does not diminish the importance of a connection 
between a people and its language, but it emphasizes the ways in which 
such a connection can force bilingual authors to choose their minority 
language over their other tongue or risk accusations of betrayal. 
But writing only in a minority language also has its limitations, as 
Atxaga explores in El hijo del acordeonista. For while David’s decision 
to write in Basque connects him to the preservation of his language, it 
simultaneously operates to exclude his non-Basque-speaking wife Mary 
Ann from the history of which she is a part. In the same way, were Atxaga 
to write only in Basque, he would exclude readers from his ‘other’ mother 
tongue, a language which also forms part of his linguistic and cultural 
identity. Given that our relations and our sense of self frequently exceed 
monolinguistic boundaries, there is a need for other forms and models 
of connectivity. In El hijo del acordeonista Atxaga promotes translation 
and rewriting as the best solution to this type of linguistic exclusion. 
The linguistic boundaries that prevent Mary Ann from reading David’s 
story will be dissolved, Atxaga suggests, by two rewritings: firstly, an 
intralingual rewriting of David’s text by Joseba, which will bring the text 
to the attention of a wider audience; secondly, an interlingual translation, 
based upon this rewriting, into a language Mary Ann can understand.46
Translation and self-translation offer Atxaga a similar pathway 
through the impasse surrounding his two languages, allowing him 
to replace a substitutive dynamic with a conjunctive one, and support 
Basque without being circumscribed – politically or creatively – by its 
minority status. Atxaga’s international success is in fact predicated on 
translation: he is the most translated author in the Basque literary canon 
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to date.47 But Atxaga’s decision to self-translate is not exempt from the 
complex and charged dynamic between his two mother tongues. Is this 
decision actually a choice? Or is it a compulsion? As Rainier Grutman 
discusses, ‘a variety of political or market-related reasons’ can explain 
why speakers of minority languages ‘might feel compelled to translate 
their work into the dominant language’.48 Atxaga’s decision to translate 
Obabakoak into Castilian falls squarely in this camp. In 1989, Obabakoak 
was nominated for the Spanish Premio Nacional de Literatura (National 
Prize for Literature). While nominated texts can be written in Castilian, 
Catalan, Galician or Basque, they must be translated into Castilian 
before they will be considered by the jury, a reality which, as César 
Domínguez notes, somewhat ironically represses the very diversity 
of the literary system which the prize purports to represent.49 Atxaga 
complied with this request, hiring three different translators to help him 
translate Obabakoak into Castilian in order to ensure that it was ready 
in time, and then proof-reading and creating a text from these different 
versions.50 Obabakoak was named that year’s winner. As Domínguez 
comments, ‘award of the prize was, therefore, indissolubly linked to 
that (self-) translation to Castilian’.51 Domínguez raises a crucial point: 
although Atxaga continues to be read predominantly as a Basque author, 
his authorial success is in fact predicated upon his ability to conform 
to the demands of the hegemonic Castilian literary subsystem through 
translation. Rather than the connective and liberating ‘spaceship’ Atxaga 
discusses in ‘Superficies de la literatura vasca’, translation here operates 
to further separate and reify the unequal dynamic between the literary 
and linguistic territories which it touches. 
Atxaga subsequently decided to replace this collaborative 
translation with a self-translation; it is this self-translation which 
was published and which provides the basis for translation into other 
languages, including the English translation by Margaret Jull Costa.52 As 
Elizabete Manterola notes, although Atxaga has himself drawn attention 
to the collaborative aspect of the original translation of Obabakoak, the 
names of the translators are not credited within the final published text.53 
The erasure of this collaborative element – part of Obabakoak’s textual 
journey from Basque to Castilian – emphasizes the higher status assigned 
to self-translations, a status confirmed by the decision to use the Castilian 
text as the source for subsequent translations. These two decisions affirm 
the hegemony of authorship within the subsystem of translated literature, 
a hegemony which emerges in similarly problematic forms in relation to 
Kundera’s work. The use of Castilian as source text also reaffirms the 
dominance of Castilian, relegating the original Basque text to second-
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order status within the international literary market. On one level, this 
decision reflects the small number of Basque speakers, and therefore the 
potential challenges of finding a translator capable of working between 
Basque and Albanian, for example. Yet there is no such excuse for the use 
of the Castilian as a source text for the English and French translations, 
since there are several Basque–English and Basque–French translators. 
In ‘Mesa Redonda’, Atxaga suggests that the international preference 
for using the Castilian source text is connected to an editorial desire 
to use renowned translators, few of whom can translate from Basque, 
to maximize the ‘name’ associated with the text.54 Atxaga’s comments 
refract and nuance the invisibility which Venuti suggests is the preserve 
of the translator: certain translators are rendered invisible because of 
the minority status of the language from or into which they translate; 
others become visible by developing sufficient fame to attain a status not 
dissimilar to that of an author.
Atxaga’s relationship to translation has shifted in recent years. As 
Manterola discusses, Atxaga now works with a professional translator – 
normally Asun Garikano – on the translations of his texts into Castilian, 
and her name is given precedence in the book credits.55 And in a collapse 
of the separation of original and translation, author and translator, 
Atxaga’s 2012 text Borrokaria – El luchador – The Fighter, appeared in a 
one-volume version including Atxaga’s Basque text, Garikano’s Spanish 
translation and an English translation of the Basque text by Amaia 
Gabantxo. 
But the translation of Obabakoak, the text considered seminal to 
the creation of a twentieth-century Basque literary identity, remains 
caught up in the power asymmetry between Basque and Castilian, an 
asymmetry exacerbated by the ways Atxaga chose to alter the text as 
it moved from source to target language. Some of these alterations 
were dictated by the specific challenges of translating from Basque: 
Olaziregi notes that one story, written in a Basque dialect particular 
to the mountain region of the Basque Country, was removed because 
it proved too difficult to translate into Castilian.56 The erasure of 
this particular story, which implicitly acknowledged the diversity of 
dialects within the Basque language, emphasizes the ways in which the 
difference within the Basque community, as opposed to the difference of 
it, can be repressed by the process of translation. Other changes to the 
text reveal the challenges inherent within all translations, regardless of 
the languages in question. As Olaziregi discusses, the original Basque 
text is split into two sections, and the second of these contains a series 
of short stories organized in alphabetical order.57 This alphabetization 
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adds another interpretative layer to the text, connecting the stories to 
one of the key themes of Obabakoak: the development of language itself. 
As Atxaga explains: 
el sonido “B” es el primero que emitimos como seres humanos. 
[…].en Obabakoak se hablaba de unas gentes que […] pasaban del 
mutismo a decir algo. Decidí que el nombre de la geografía debería 
tener varias “B”, y elegí “Obaba” por ser una palabra que figura en 
las canciones de cuna vascas. 
the sound “be” is the first that we make as human beings. [...] 
Obabakoak described a people […] who moved from silence to 
saying something. I decided that the name of the geographic space 
should contain several “B”s and chose “Obaba” since it is a word 
which appears in Basque lullabies.58
Atxaga’s decision to create a sequence of alphabetized stories in the text 
mirrors this linguistic journey from babyhood to adulthood, from silence 
to speech. Yet the Castilian text does not – or rather cannot, if it wishes 
to remain faithful to the meaning of the stories’ titles – reproduce this 
alphabetization. The loss of this structure in the Castilian undermines 
the connections between these stories and the linguistic journey Atxaga 
posits as a key theme of Obabakoak. In so doing, Atxaga’s translation 
from a minor to a major language enacts a double erasure: as Euskera is 
literally erased from the text by translation, it is also erased thematically, 
and the importance Atxaga assigns to giving a voice to the Basque 
community is  weakened by the loss of this structural emphasis in the 
text upon linguistic development. 
In place of this formal focus upon the development of Basque, 
Atxaga supplies in the translated text a content-based discussion, adding 
a new section, ‘A modo de autobiografía’, to guide the non-Basque reader 
into the specifics of the Basque linguistic, literary and cultural scene. ‘A 
modo de autobiografía’ focuses upon the challenge of writing in Basque, 
and particularly the limited precedent for such a project: 
Nosotros, los que ahora empezamos a ser traducidos a otras 
lenguas, partimos con muy poco equipaje. Mirábamos nuestro 
hatillo y allí no encontrábamos más que cinco o diez libros escritos 
en la lengua en que pretendíamos escribir. […] Lo que nos faltaba 
era el antecedente […] nos faltaban libros donde aprender a escribir 
en nuestra propia lengua.
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Those of us who are just beginning to be translated into other 
languages, set off with very little baggage. We looked into our 
bundle and found only five, at most ten, books written in the 
language we were trying to write in. […] What we lacked was an 
antecedent […] we lacked books from which we could learn to 
write in our own language.59
The problem with such a lack of heritage, suggests Atxaga, is dual: 
writers who wish to express themselves in Basque must effectively 
construct their own language in order to do so; once they have done 
this, however, they still face the challenge of finding a readership, given 
the limited material and precedent for reading in Basque. Atxaga notes 
the progress that has been made in recent years, which ‘permite que 
escritores como yo puedan vivir de los derechos de obras como […] 
Obabakoak (1988)’/‘enables writers like myself to live off the royalties 
from such works as […] Obabakoak (1988)’.60 In referring to Obabakoak 
metatextually here, Atxaga emphasizes that the text we are reading is 
a translation, positioning this autobiographical section as a paratextual 
addition to an already existing text. 
Gérard Genette suggests that paratexts operate ‘pour le présenter 
[le texte], au sens habituel de ce verbe, mais aussi en son sens le plus 
fort: pour le rendre présent, pour assurer sa présence au monde, sa 
«réception»’/‘to present [the text] in the usual sense of this verb but also 
in the strongest sense: to make present, to ensure the text’s presence in the 
world, its “reception”’.61 ‘A modo de autobiografía’ presents Obabakoak 
as a Basque text, ensuring it is received as such within the more 
hegemonic literary system it is entering. In focusing upon the cultural 
specificity of the text, Atxaga appears, in Lawrence Venuti’s terms, to 
‘foreignize’ the Castilian version of Obabakoak, insisting upon its status 
as a translation, and upon the marginal elements of its source culture.62 
For César Domínguez, however, Atxaga’s paratext evokes that specificity 
through a rhetoric of marginality and limitation which exoticizes the 
Basque linguistic and literary culture.63 Unlike Venuti’s conception of 
foreignization, which seeks to present the marginal on its own terms, the 
concept of exoticization invokes otherness as a product for consumption 
by a more dominant receiving culture, thereby affirming an asymmetrical 
relationship between the two.64 In this regard, Domínguez addresses 
Atxaga’s comment that ‘a los veintitrés, ya había acabado de leer toda 
la literatura vasca que el dictador no había conseguido quemar’/‘by the 
time I was twenty-three, I had read all the Basque literature that the 
dictator had not managed to burn’.65 ‘There is’, writes Domínguez, 
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no doubt of the desired impact – unnecessary in the case of the 
Basque audience – on the Spanish audience of the record of a 
literature that can be read in all its entirety in three years. Thus, we 
have the motif of a “small literature” thematized in a hermeneutic 
experience impossible for the audience of the “great” literatures.66 
For Domínguez, the translation enacts a ‘Castilian-ization’ of Obabakoak, 
presenting the text through a rhetoric of smallness and marginality which 
accords with the pre-existing beliefs of the wider Spanish literary system. 
This focus upon the minor elements of the Basque language and culture 
is inevitably transferred into translations of Obabakoak based upon the 
Castilian version, such as Jull Costa’s English text.67 
In fact, this emphasis upon the minority status of Basque literature 
is extended in Jull Costa’s translation of Obabakoak by the inclusion of 
another paratext, the poem ‘Prologue’. This poem was written by Atxaga 
in Castilian, but specifically for the English edition of Obabakoak, in order 
to elucidate the literary and linguistic context of the text.68 ‘Prologue’ 
is thus a poem written specifically for translation, and for a readership 
assumed to have a limited awareness of the source culture. And again, as 
in ‘A modo de autobiografía’, the entry of Obabakoak into a new literary 
and linguistic system is accompanied by an emphasis upon the unusual 
elements of the system in which the text originated:
I write in a strange language. Its verbs
the structure of its relative clauses,
the words it uses to designate ancient things
– rivers, plants, birds – 
have no sisters anywhere on Earth.
[…]
Born, they say, in the megalithic age,
it survived, this stubborn language, by withdrawing,
[…]
The language of a tiny nation, so small
you cannot even find it on the map,
in four centuries it produced only a hundred books…69
In introducing the Basque language to an English audience, ‘Prologue’ 
emphasizes five key points about that language: its strangeness, its 
age, its isolation, the smallness of the geographical and political space 
in which it resides, and the limitations of its bibliography. Atxaga here 
highlights the parallels between language, literature and geography 
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which Arana, and later ETA, developed into a rhetoric of linguistic and 
literary nationalism. 
‘Prologue’ implicitly and explicitly explores the inadequacies of such 
rhetoric: the language Atxaga describes here is one which has survived for 
centuries by ‘withdrawing’ and resisting political and cultural attempts 
at erasure or appropriation. Atxaga also focuses upon the connections 
which exist between Euskera and other languages, playing, through 
issues of translation, with the very strangeness and isolation which his 
poem initially evokes:
The sun of the long winters we call eguzki or eki;
The sun of the sweet, rainy springs is also
 – as you’d expect – 
called eguzki or eki 
(it’s a strange language but not that strange)
[…]
Yet its isolation could never have been absolute
 – cat is katu, pipe is pipa, logic is lojika – 70
This emphasis upon the connections between the Basque language and 
the Romance languages which surround it highlights the inconsistency 
of Arana’s linguistic policy, which sought to create linguistic purity by 
purging Basque of any words derived from Latin.71 Atxaga also discusses 
the expansion of the Basque bibliography during the twentieth century. 
But despite Atxaga’s references to connectivity and growth, ‘Prologue’ 
continues to underline the differences between the source and target 
cultures, contrasting the still small Basque bibliography with the extensive 
British one: the poem describes Obabakoak as ‘this book published now 
in this city,/the city of Dickens, of Wilkie Collins and of so many others’.72 
In invoking the strength of the British canon, ‘Prologue’ maintains the 
asymmetry between the Basque literary scene and the hegemonic one 
which Obabakoak enters through translation.73
For Domínguez, paratextual additions such as ‘A modo de 
autobiografía’ and ‘Prologue’ reflect the dominance of motifs of 
geographical limitation within the literary field of translations from 
Basque: ‘when they abandon the Basque language’, he suggests, ‘literary 
works and histories need to be presented, a presentation that is highly 
geographical and, in consequence, reveals Euskal Herria as the true 
terra incognita of the Peninsula’.74 This geographical presentation, 
he argues, reframes the relationship between minor literatures and 
territories invoked by Deleuze and Guattari in Kafka: Pour une littérature 
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mineure: ‘Basque historiography made spatial limitation into a sign of 
identity for its literature, a conception of small literature that privileges 
territorialization, while Deleuze and Guattari denied it’.75 Domínguez 
here refers to Deleuze and Guattari’s reading, through Kafka, of minor 
literatures as forms of writing which operate to ‘deterritorialize’ the 
different territories they encounter. In Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking, 
territories signify systems of thought – political, social, national, cultural, 
poetic, familial, bureaucratic, literary – which are static and implicated 
in existing assemblages. These territories are traversed by multiple 
lines: ‘molar lines’, which regiment and stratify; ‘molecular lines’, which 
travel and transmit beyond these territories, but adapt themselves to the 
new systems they encounter; and ‘lines of flight’, which create paths of 
mutation and change which can ‘deterritorialize’ these assemblages.76 As 
Parr suggests, 
Deterritorialisation can best be understood as a movement 
producing change. In so far as it operates as a line of flight, 
deterritorialisation indicates the creative potential of an 
assemblage. So, to deterritorialise is to free up the fixed relations 
that contain a body all the while exposing it to new organisations.77
Deleuze and Guattari read Kafka’s writing as an expression of a literary 
deterritorialization which transforms content and form, allowing 
the German language to ‘disarticulate’, and in the process to shift the 
relations between the text and the politicized linguistic systems which 
border it.78 In so doing, Kafka’s texts ‘become-minor’, entering a process 
of continual creativity and change which transforms not only their own 
form and content, but also their relation to the political, linguistic and 
literary territories which inform them.79
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of minor literature is, then, 
less about denying its territoriality than about suggesting forms of 
literature which work to repeatedly engage and disengage with the 
multiple literary, political and linguistic territories which surround 
them. Given this, we might rethink the opposition Domínguez reads 
between the territorialized vision of small literature described by Basque 
historiography and the deterritorialized one which Deleuze and Guattari 
invoke. As we have seen, for Deleuze and Guattari, territorialization and 
deterritorialization are not opposed; instead, all territories contain their 
own deterritorializing lines which traverse and transform the boundaries 
which enclose them, just as movements of deterritorialization often find 
their limits in other territories. Nonetheless, the paratexts Atxaga adds 
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to his self-translations undoubtedly emphasize a highly geographic 
conception of Basque literature, and work to root Obabakoak within 
one, specifically Basque, territory. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, his 
self-translation creates a ‘molar line’ which connects the text firmly to 
the existing literary, linguistic and political frameworks of the Basque 
Country. Simultaneously, however, it also creates a ‘molecular line’, 
which transforms the text but only to align it to the expectations of a 
new framework: that of the Castilian and English readerships. In this 
sense, the process of ‘becoming-minor’ which Obabakoak undergoes 
in translation appears less as the transformative process of rethinking 
territorial relations understood by Deleuze and Guattari, and more as 
a process which solidifies the asymmetrical relationship between the 
minor text and the major assemblages which surround it. 
Obabakoak: a literary puzzle
If the translation of Obabakoak consolidates the asymmetry between 
minor and major languages and literary systems, the narrative of the 
text itself reveals Atxaga’s exploration of the Basque territory to be more 
complex than a major/minor hierarchy allows. In the text, Atxaga plays 
with the semblance of geographical unity, exploring and disturbing the 
relations between inside and outside, foreign and domestic, connection 
and isolation. As Margaret Jull Costa suggests, Obabakoak is concerned 
with ‘the power of language and literature to open […] doors that show 
us other countries and cultures’.80 In the thirty years since its publication 
in Castilian, Obabakoak’s unusual title, its fragmented yet connected form 
and its wide-ranging frame of reference have led editors and publishers 
to replace a literal translation of the title with a gloss or subtitle, each 
one highlighting a particular – and frequently different – element of this 
complex text. English-language titles have focused upon genre: Graywolf 
Press added ‘Stories from a Village’, while Pantheon Press opted to include 
the subtitle, ‘a novel’. Such definitions only emphasize their limitations: 
Obabakoak is neither a novel nor an unconnected collection of short 
stories, but rather a series of interlinked and independent stories which 
hinge loosely upon the inhabitants of Obaba, a fictional town in the 
Basque Country. The Portuguese translation focused upon this spatial 
unity, adding ‘Um Lugar Chamado Obaba’ – ‘A Place Called Obaba’ – to 
the title. But if this addition gestures towards geographic cohesion, this 
too is undermined by the book itself, since the characters who inhabit 
Obaba also travel far from this space, to Barcelona, to Hamburg, to South 
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America, thereby fracturing and fragmenting the ostensible focus on 
Obaba. Moreover, the book’s constituent stories are interspersed with 
others drawn from a global literary tradition reminiscent of A Thousand 
and One Nights, which transport the reader to China, to France, to 
Baghdad. Through these wide-ranging narratives, Obabakoak welcomes a 
myriad of diverse genres, from magical realism to metafiction, and draws 
on varied textual influences, from Dante to Gautier. 
The range of intertextual elements within Obabakoak, some explicit, 
others masked, engages the reader in a game of ‘spot the reference’, 
and several translations of the title highlight this ludic element. The 
German translation adds, ‘Ein literarisches Puzzle’ – ‘A Literary Puzzle’ 
– positioning the text as a mystery to be decoded or uncovered. In many 
of the stories, characters undertake to solve such puzzles: in ‘Esteban 
Werfell’, the eponymous protagonist seeks to make sense of a mysterious 
and formative episode from his past, an exchange of letters with a 
beautiful German girl whom he met only once, in a dream; in ‘Exposición 
de la carta del canónigo Lizardi’, an unnamed narrator pieces together 
fragments of a series of letters, hoping to uncover the denouement of 
the tragic story of a young boy who metamorphosed into a wild boar; in 
the final set of stories, ‘En busca de la última palabra’, a Basque author 
investigates a mysteriously prophetic old wives’ tale which he believes 
explains the deafness of one of his school friends. The Dutch translation 
picks up this playful motif, entitling the text Obabakoak of het ganzenbord 
– Obabakoak or the Game of the Goose. ‘The Game of the Goose’ is a board 
game with a combination of lucky and unlucky squares, which Atxaga 
references briefly in ‘En busca de la última palabra’. In ‘A modo de 
autobiografía’, Atxaga returns to this motif, describing it as a metaphor 
for life itself, ‘una viaje lleno de dificultades donde, a partes iguales, 
intervienen el Azar y nuestra Voluntad’/‘a journey full of difficulties 
in which Chance and Free Will intervene in equal measure’.81 These 
difficulties are an integral element of the text itself: ‘Esteban Werfell’ and 
‘Exposición de la carta del canónigo Lizardi’ are among a series of stories 
in the first section of the Castilian text, entitled ‘Infancias’, each of which 
explores a challenging experience of childhood or adolescence.
But ‘The Game of the Goose’ can also be read as a description of 
another process of maturation: ‘la vida de un escritor vasco’/‘the life of 
a Basque writer’.82 The importance of writing and reading is a theme 
which runs throughout Obabakoak: Atxaga’s characters are themselves 
frequently storytellers – the text abounds with diary extracts and letters – 
each offering a different perspective on the community they inhabit and 
the communities which surround them. The importance of storytelling 
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infiltrates Atxaga’s translation of the name ‘Obabakoak’, which he 
provides for the English reader in ‘Prologue’: 
Obaba is just Obaba: a place, a setting;
ko means ‘of’; a is a determiner; k the plural.
The literal translation: The People or Things of Obaba; 
a less literal translation: Stories from Obaba.83
The discrepancy between the literal and the less literal translation here 
dramatizes the central tension at the heart of Obabakoak, namely that 
between the people of Obaba whose experiences Atxaga narrates, and 
the international stories with which he frames these experiences. In this 
way Atxaga highlights the power of the storyteller to create imaginative 
connections which stretch beyond geographic or linguistic borders. In 
‘Método para plagiar’, one of the stories from the final section of the text, 
the story told is that of Basque literature itself, as the narrator of the story 
explores the importance of looking beyond the boundaries of his own 
community for narrative inspiration.
A deserted island
‘Método para plagiar’ is the account of a dream which the narrator uses 
to explain a new theory he has uncovered regarding literary originality. 
The dream begins, in the narrator’s description, ‘en medio de una selva 
agreste, tupida e inhóspita’/‘in the midst of a wild forest, dense and 
inhospitable’.84 Attempting to explore the forest, he finds at first only 
‘completa oscuridad […] los parajes de alrededor estaban sin vida, y 
ninguna planta crecía en aquella tierra estéril’/‘utter darkness […] no sign 
of life anywhere to be seen, not a single plant growing in that sterile soil’.85 
Suddenly, however, he is approached by a shadowy male form which he 
identifies as the Basque writer Axular, whose seventeenth-century text 
Gero, as I mentioned earlier, is one of the foundational works of Basque 
literature. Guided by Axular, the narrator climbs through the forest until 
he reaches a peak from which he looks down upon ‘una isla, perdida en 
la inmensidad del mar. Era muy pequeña, y no había en ella señales de 
vida’/‘an island, lost in the immensity of the seas. It was very small and 
there was no sign of life there’.86 The limited size and empty terrain of 
the island, are however, figurations which exceed the cartographic. For, 
as the narrator comes to realize, ‘aquella isla no era como la de Sardinia, 
o como la de Sicilia, sino que estaba hecha de otra materia; y que, por 
increíble que pareciera, aquel accidente geográfico que contemplaba no 
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era otra cosa que mi propia lengua’/‘the island was not like the islands 
of Sardinia or Sicily, but made of quite different material. Incredible 
though it may seem, the geographical feature I was looking at was none 
other than my own language’.87 Atxaga’s decision to imagine the Basque 
language as a desert island surrounded by an immense, empty ocean, 
maps geographically an isolation which exists linguistically. For Basque 
is a language isolate, a language which, having been compared with 
every other known Eurasian language, has demonstrated no discernible 
genealogical relationship with any of them. The sea surrounding the 
island is empty, then, because of the lack of linguistic correspondence 
between Basque and the Indo-European romance languages which 
surround it geographically.
For Domínguez, island motifs, such as the one Atxaga creates in 
Obabakoak, reflect a form of self-perception conditioned by insularity 
within Basque literary historiography:
Islands are only those (literary) spaces whose inhabitants, but also 
whose visitors, perceive them as such. […] One constant of the geo-
symbol of the island is the minimal territoriality, the limitation, the 
claustrophobia of the border, which make the space in question 
a microcosm. “Large” islands cease to be islands and are lived as 
continents. A literature is (self-)defined as insular when it presents 
itself as “small”.88
Domínguez’s focus upon the island motif emphasizes its role as part of 
the minor–major rhetoric surrounding Basque literature. In this reading, 
dominated by invocations of exoticism and separation, the Basque island 
refuses to perceive itself as a continent, insisting upon its inability to 
sustain life and its difference from other national literatures. In choosing 
to depict Basque as an isolated, deserted island, Atxaga employs the 
same rhetoric of limitation which he uses paratextually in ‘A modo de 
autobiografía’ and ‘Prologue’. This rhetoric, then, is an integral part of 
Obabakoak in all its versions. But Atxaga’s construction here is highly self-
aware: rather than represent Basque as an island in order to emphasize 
the insularity and limitation of the language, he develops this figuration 
in order to point out the limitations of such emphases themselves. In 
the narrative, Axular is keen to lay the blame for the isolation of the 
island firmly on the Basque community. A ship approaching the island 
carries some of those whom Atxaga’s imagined Axular holds particularly 
responsible for this isolation: the hypocrites who talk at length about the 
importance of sustaining Basque culture but never act upon their words; 
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the politicians who come only to spread anger and enmity among the 
island’s inhabitants; and ‘los tristes’ (author’s italics) – the sad ones, who 
offer the island only grief and defeatism. There are also the banausians, 
whose name derives from the Greek word banausos and is etymologically 
connected to ideas of profit, vulgarity and commercialism. For Atxaga’s 
Axular, this group is much to be feared because they seek to make money 
by playing upon the isolation and ostensible exoticism of the Basque 
language and culture.89
Atxaga’s Axular is clear that responsibility for the aridity of the 
island lies precisely with the forms of insular self-perception which 
Domínguez describes in his exploration of the island motif – in projects 
which, whether actively or passively, isolate the language and literature. 
Such projects have had a knock-on effect upon the literary culture of the 
Basque country, inhibiting Basque writers from drawing upon other texts 
and other languages in order to develop their own literary practices. As 
this fictional Axular tells the narrator, ‘Si se hubieran escrito en euskara 
tantos libros como se han escrito en francés o en cualquier otra lengua, 
también el euskara sería una lengua rica y perfecta como ellas, y si eso 
no es así, son los mismos euskaldunes los que tienen la culpa, y no esta 
isla’/‘if as many books had been written in euskera as have been written 
in French or in any other language for that matter, it would be as rich and 
perfect as they are and if that is not the case it is the speakers of euskera 
themselves who are to blame, not the island’.90
This provocative quotation, which lays the blame for the limitations 
of Euskera at the feet of its speakers, is adapted from the actual Axular’s 
prologue to Gero, in which Axular legitimizes his decision to write in 
Basque.91 Atxaga’s inclusion of this intertext in Obabakoak highlights the 
rhetoric of accusation and justification which has surrounded the Basque 
language question since Axular was writing. The contrast between the 
insularity of the island and the richness of the linguistic worlds which 
surround it emphasizes the continued tension at the heart of Basque 
literature with which Atxaga is concerned in Obabakoak. For without 
literary ancestors, Basque authors remain castaways, adrift in an empty 
sea, gazing longingly across the water at more habitable scenes. How, 
then, can life be returned to the island of Euskera? From which literary 
tradition can Basque writers draw inspiration?
In the narrator’s dream, Axular commands him to turn to plagiarism 
– the rewriting of canonical stories from other, more dominant, 
languages into Basque – in order to restore creativity to the island. 
Initially, the narrator is resistant; plagiarism, he notes, has extremely 
negative connotations: ‘Tan mal como el robar. Hoy en día, el trabajo 
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de un escritor ha de dar la impresión de haber sido creado de la nada. 
Dicho de otro modo, el trabajo ha de ser original’/‘It’s considered as bad 
as stealing. Nowadays, the work of a writer has to give the impression of 
being created out of nothing. In other words the work has to be original’.92 
The narrator’s perception of plagiarism here reflects a hierarchical binary 
of original/simulacrum which devalues forms of textual replication. But 
the imagined Axular responds to the narrator’s perception of plagiarism 
by upending this hierarchy, suggesting that it is the desire for absolute 
originality, for an absolute separation from other languages and 
literatures, which has made the island barren and bare. ‘De verdad te 
digo que esa consideración de latrocinio es prejudicial’/‘The idea that it 
is theft is most unfortunate’, he suggests, for in devaluing the work of 
the plagiarist, Basque authors have deprived themselves of the literary 
ancestry to be found beyond the boundaries of the island.93 Atxaga’s 
Axular suggests that plagiarism should be viewed not as theft, but as a 
valuable literary tool which builds connections with other languages and 
literatures and, while imitating these, seeks to create from them anew. 
Finally convinced, the narrator awakes, and goes on to develop his own 
‘método para plagiar’.
In ‘Método para plagiar’, Atxaga highlights a dichotomy at the heart 
of perceptions of plagiarism: is plagiarism a derivative form of literary 
theft? Or is it a creative adaptation of a global literary heritage? In 
Pragmatic Plagiarism, Marilyn Randall explores this question, suggesting 
that our assessment of what constitutes plagiarism is entirely subjective: 
plagiarism, she states, ‘is in the eye of the beholder’.94 Randall explores 
a ‘discourse of repetition’ surrounding textual production, which splits 
textual repetition into two, value-laden forms: plagiarism is its negative 
manifestation; intertextuality and allusion its positive expression. 
The difference between these forms hinges less upon any objective 
dissimilarity, and more upon our understanding and interpretation of 
the values of intellectual property and authenticity. In Randall’s reading, 
textual repetition – or rather, how we think about textual repetition – takes 
on an ethical slant: the term ‘plagiarism’ is a judgement imposed upon a 
text, which reveals our own judgements about the type and strength of 
the authority systems which inform textual production and reception.95 
As Randall’s reading suggests, the value we assign to imitation is 
always in flux. In the Classical period, imitatio was considered an innately 
innovative exercise; the Romantics valorized originality – understood 
as authorial inspiration – above any other form of artistic production; in 
the twentieth century, intertextuality and quotation were perceived as 
inherently creative. In Obabakoak, Atxaga engages with this contemporary 
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revalorization of copying, playing with the fine line between plagiarism 
and intertextuality in order to explore some of the ways in which textual 
authority is constituted. His narrator suggests that the potential plagiarist 
can evade accusations of plagiarism by manipulating his or her critics 
through a discussion of the importance of ‘metaliterature’: 
Tengo que decir que esos que andan buscándole el pelo al huevo 
para desacreditar a los demás están muy retrasados en lo que a 
teoría literaria se refiere. A lo mejor ni tan siquiera han oído una 
palabra acerca de metaliteratura. […] No hay nada nuevo bajo el 
sol, ni tan siquiera en literatura. […] Los escritores no creamos 
nada nuevo, que todos escribimos las mismas historias.
I must say that these hairsplitters intent on discrediting others are 
very backward when it comes to literary theory. They’ve probably 
never even heard of metaliterature. […] All the term means is that 
there’s nothing new under the sun, not even in literature. […] We 
writers don’t create anything new, we’re all continually writing the 
same stories.96
The hyperbole of the narrator’s statement – that there are no new stories, 
but only variants of previous ones, literary myths which travel across time 
and space – highlights a shift away from a Romantic faith in originality as 
the preserve of authorship, towards a ‘metaliterary’ focus upon repetition 
as the innate property of all literature. From T. S. Eliot’s description 
of mature poets stealing from their literary past, to Roland Barthes’s 
comment that all writing repeats an anterior gesture, this preoccupation 
with the inevitability of repetition has revalued the status of plagiarism, 
positioning it as an inevitable, but also creative and inspirational, 
element of textual production.97 Atxaga’s comic gameplay with this 
critical preoccupation affirms that, as Randall proposes, plagiarism is 
indeed in the eye of the beholder. Atxaga’s narrative suggests, however, 
that the definition of plagiarism is prey to the manipulations of those 
who use literary theories such as metaliterature to close down, rather 
than open up, debates surrounding the relationship between originality 
and repetition, between plagiarism and intertextuality. 
A textual inhabitation
How might we read the dynamic between originality and repetition 
without imposing a critical framework which elides, as opposed to 
BERNARDO ATXAGA’S OBABAKOAK
56
explores? Can plagiarism, as Atxaga’s Axular suggests, bring creativity 
from other literary spheres into a fragile literary scene such as the Basque 
one? Or is it a reprehensible appropriation of the words of another, a 
parasitic form of textual production which erases originality and merely 
confirms the authority and superiority of the plagiarized text upon 
which the plagiarism depends for its own existence? Atxaga’s suggestion, 
offered through the voice of Axular, that plagiarism could provide a 
solution to the aridity of the desert island seems caught in a double-
bind, halfway between repetition and originality, between a connection 
to other literary worlds and an attempt at literary self-sufficiency. For 
Domínguez, it is precisely this conflict between insularity and connection 
which is at the heart of Basque literature, and which is evoked by the 
use of the desert island motif: ‘a geo-symbol where closure (the island 
as a metaphor of self-sufficiency) and longing for communication (the 
island as the expression of a broader geographical reality) meet’.98 In 
this sense, the potential plagiarist appears to reflect, without necessarily 
disrupting, the problematic tension at the heart of the Basque literary 
scene as evoked through Atxaga’s own desert island figuration. 
In fact, the similarity of the tensions involved in plagiarism and 
those evoked by the figuration of the desert island – one set articulated 
textually, the other geographically – elucidates possible ways in which 
forms of textual repetition could regenerate Basque literature. In his 
1953 essay ‘Causes et raisons des îles désertes’, Deleuze suggests that 
the evolution of a desert island figures geographically a tension between 
repetition and originality, and connection and separation, which exists 
imaginatively: 
Rêver des îles, avec angoisse ou joie peu importe, c’est rêver qu’on 
se sépare, qu’on est déjà séparé, loin des continents, qu’on est seul 
et perdu – ou bien c’est rêver qu’on repart à zéro, qu’on recrée, qu’on 
recommence. Il y avait des îles dérivées, mais l’île, c’est aussi ce vers 
quoi l’on dérive, et il y avait des îles originaires, mais l’île, c’est aussi 
l’origine, l’origine radicale et absolue. [Author’s italics]
Dreaming of islands – whether with joy or in fear, it doesn’t matter 
– is dreaming of pulling away, of being already separate, far from 
any continent, of being lost and alone – or it is dreaming of starting 
from scratch, recreating, beginning anew. Some islands drifted 
away from the continent, but the island is also that toward which 
one drifts; other islands originated in the ocean, but the island is 
also the origin, radical and absolute.99
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In the form of their creation, desert islands are poised between 
connection and separation: ‘des îles dérivées’ are born of fragmentation, 
of a separation from the mainland to which they were once connected; 
‘des îles originaires’ are born of eruption, the creation of land where 
once there was only sea. In the geological pressures producing these two 
sorts of island, Deleuze reads the structures of the human imagination 
as conditioned by desires for creation and replication, by dreams of self-
sufficiency and communication. For Deleuze, our imaginative, critical 
and creative responses to the untouched space of the desert island both 
produce and reflect the form of these desires and dreams. Do we choose 
to remain alone, and in that way resist the pressures to conform? Do we 
seek to recreate a previous world on the island, replicating the systems to 
which we are accustomed? Or can we utilize the interplay in our desires 
for separation and connection, our need for repetition and originality, to 
re-draw the boundaries of creativity and its models? 
Deleuze explores this choice through two texts which depict 
desert island re-beginnings: Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719) and 
Jean Giraudoux’s Suzanne et le Pacifique (1921). Defoe’s text, suggests 
Deleuze, responds to this creative possibility by seeking a return to ‘the 
continent’: for Robinson, the island offers a blank space on which he 
can recreate the values and systems of the world from which he came, a 
world built upon the desire to produce, to grow, to colonize what is other. 
In Giraudoux’s text, however, the creative possibility within the island 
remains untapped. For Suzanne, the island is sufficient in and of itself; 
it already contains everything she desires, and as such it forecloses her 
potential to create anew. In Robinson’s story, then, it is the connection 
to the old world, the continent, which is continually recreated, whereas 
in Suzanne’s it is the independence of the new world, the desert island, 
which is constantly reaffirmed. While one imaginary island is built upon 
connection and one upon separation, Deleuze suggests that both are 
built upon a desire to maintain the status quo. Consequently, as Stewart 
Williams notes, ‘As a repetition of the same, neither the island depicted 
in such tales, nor its potential for novelty and difference, is fully realized 
there or elsewhere’.100 In this ‘repetition of the same’ lies the closure of 
the creative potential of the desert island as a space capable of helping 
us to rethink our relation to the cultural, ethical, political and aesthetic 
systems which structure our experiences. 
In Mille plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari develop a relation between 
this ‘repetition of the same’ and forms of textual representation and 
interpretation which they define as ‘tracings’: ‘Culturel, le livre est 
forcément un calque: calque de lui-même déjà, calque du livre précédent 
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du même auteur, calque d’autres livres quelles qu’en soient les différences, 
décalque interminable de concepts et de mots en place, décalquage 
du monde présent, passé ou à venir.’/‘The cultural book is necessarily 
a tracing: already a tracing of itself, a tracing of the previous book by 
the same author, a tracing of other books however different they may 
be, an endless tracing of established concepts and words, a tracing of the 
word present, past, and future.’101 Tracing reaffirms the already-thought, 
already-created, or already-defined: if we seek to trace what we already 
understand, or what already exists, we can only maintain our textual 
and linguistic structures, imitating the imaginative territories we already 
inhabit. As Atxaga suggests in ‘Método para plagiar’, seeking to maintain 
the isolation of the Basque language obliges Basque authors to trace the 
existing path of Basque literature, forcing the language to repeat itself 
over and over, without the prospect of development. Like Suzanne, alone 
on her island, this self-sufficiency can sustain certain possibilities but 
never transform them. 
Yet plagiarism, Axular’s solution to this insularity, seems no less 
problematic; tracing other literary models from a European or global 
canon could simply reinforce those major literary and linguistic territories 
and their systems of thinking. As Even-Zohar discusses in Polysystem 
Theory, young literatures which have limited models within their own 
languages often draw on more dominant literary cultures, through 
translation, to develop these languages. Yet such a practice can lead to 
dependence upon the source culture, affirming rather than destabilizing 
the power structures surrounding source and target culture.102 Like 
Crusoe colonizing his island, this focus upon the wider literary world can 
expand creativity, but it risks discounting the uniqueness of the island 
itself, or in this case the creative differences within Basque language and 
literature. The forms of erasure through translation which Venuti defines 
as ‘domestications’ can be read, in more elaborate forms, in Deleuze’s 
account of tracing as a repetition which sublimates variance, whether 
linguistic, cultural, geographic or temporal, in order to affirm what 
already exists.103
For Deleuze and Guattari, an alternative form of textual 
interaction can be enabled by ‘mapping’. Unlike tracing, mapping 
seeks to experiment with, explore and modify the textual assemblages 
and forms of thinking it encounters, drawing the contours it perceives 
without trying to flatten these into images: ‘La carte est ouverte, elle 
est connectable dans toutes ses dimensions, démontable, renversable, 
susceptible de recevoir constamment des modifications. […] Une carte a 
des entrées multiples, contrairement au calque qui revient toujours «au 
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même».’/‘The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is 
detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. […] A map 
has multiple entryways as opposed to the tracing, which always comes 
back “to the same”’.104 Deleuze’s figuration of the desert island is itself 
a map: through the connections and experimentations he pursues in 
his reading of the desert island he generates a cartography of creativity, 
mapping the spaces of our imagination and their relation to ideas of 
sameness and difference. 
Deleuze suggests that it is by mapping the island differently, by 
acknowledging its simultaneous movement away from and towards the 
old world and its structures, that the potential for novelty and difference 
can be unmasked from within its geological pressures. For within the 
desert island, Deleuze suggests, ‘ne s’opère pas la création elle-même mais 
la re-création, non pas le commencement mais le re-commencement. Elle 
est l’origine, mais l’origine seconde. À partir d’elle tout recommence’/‘it 
is not creation but re-creation, not the beginning but a re-beginning 
that takes place. The deserted island is the origin, but a second origin. 
From it everything begins anew’.105 For Deleuze, the fact that the desert 
island offers a second beginning positions it as uniquely able to figure 
the difference, as opposed to similarity, within forms of repetition: ‘La 
seconde origine est donc plus essentielle que la première’, he writes, 
‘parce qu’elle nous donne […] la loi de la répétition’/‘This second 
origin is more essential than the first since it gives us […] the law of 
repetition’.106 Deleuze’s thinking on repetition itself produces differences 
indefinitely, but broadly it can be understood as movement which 
creates difference even as it appears unchanged. As Adrian Parr writes, 
‘repetition is best understood in terms of discovery and experimentation; 
it allows new experiences, affects and expressions to emerge. To repeat is 
to begin again; to affirm the power of the new and the unforeseeable’.107 
A desert island offers the law of repetition precisely because it offers such 
discovery and variation. For even as the island gives us the chance to 
repeat our world, to begin it again, that ‘again’ is always being displaced 
temporally and spatially: where we begin again is never where we began 
originally, but neither is it totally separate from that original moment. In 
Deleuze’s reading, this displacement becomes creative: as questions of 
connection and separation collapse into each other, the island becomes a 
space capable of generating life anew, again. 
While Domínguez suggests that the dominance of the desert island 
motif in Basque literary historiography emphasizes the territoriality 
of the Basque literary scene, Deleuze invokes instead the innate 
deterritorialization which exists within figurations of the desert island. 
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Positioned between sea and continent, between old world and new, a 
desert island is always, endlessly, caught up in generating transformative 
and creative collisions between these different territories. The forms of 
creativity Deleuze develops in response to the desert island help us to 
think about the ways in which plagiarism might offer a reinvigoration of 
the Basque literary territory. If we see plagiarism as developing creativity 
through – as opposed to despite – the interplay of separation and 
connection, and of repetition and difference that defines it, plagiarism 
becomes a force of exploration and experimentation, rather than 
derivation and colonization. In Obabakoak Atxaga develops a method of 
plagiarism which incorporates this exploration and experimentation: he 
suggests that the desert island of Euskera will be brought to life, not by 
tracing the literary world it already contains or the literary world which 
exists beyond it, but by constructing collisions between those two worlds, 
mapping the relation between minor and major literary and linguistic 
systems in transformative ways. 
In ‘Método para plagiar’, the narrator describes how such a textual 
form might function: 
Supongamos que lo que hay que plagiar es una historia que sucede 
en Arabia o en la Edad Media, y que sus dos protagonistas – que 
están enzarzados en una discusión a causa de un camello – son Ibu 
al Farsi y Ali Rayol. Pues bien, el plagiario debe tomar la historia en 
su conjunto, pero – pongamos por caso – situándola en la Inglaterra 
de hoy en día. De manera que los protagonistas se conviertan, por 
ejemplo, en Anthony Northmore y Philip Stevens y la causa de la 
discusión entablada entre ambos sea, en lugar de un camello, un 
coche. Esos cambios, come es fácil de suponer, traerán consigo otros 
mil, con lo que la historia quedará prácticamente irreconocible para 
cualquiera.
Let’s suppose that we have to plagiarise a story that takes place in 
Arabia or in the Middle Ages and that its two protagonists – who 
are embroiled in an argument over a camel – are Ibu al Farsi and 
Ali Rayol. Right, the plagiarist should take the story in its entirety 
and set it – let’s say – in modern-day England. So the protagonists 
become, for example, Anthony Northmore and Philip Stevens 
and, instead of a camel, the cause of the argument between them 
can be a car. As you can easily imagine, these changes will bring 
in their train a thousand more so as to render the plot completely 
unrecognisable to anyone.108
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Plagiarism here becomes a process which is simultaneously repetitive 
and original: as an author repeats the original myths and stories of one 
language and culture, he or she repeatedly and necessarily reinvents 
them, displacing them temporally and spatially so that they offer not 
creation but re-creation, not a beginning but the re-beginning. Just as 
Deleuze’s desert island maps geographically an imagined re-beginning, 
so plagiarism here offers a textual ‘second origin’, recreating a text in 
another time, space, and language which are not the original ones and 
never can be.109 
Throughout Obabakoak, Atxaga engages in plagiarisms, 
adaptations, translations and alterations of existing texts which follow 
the method the narrator proposes in ‘Método para plagiar’, creating 
collisions between the Basque territory and the other literary territories 
which surround it. We can read these creative collisions as integral to 
the ways in which Atxaga himself returns life to the island of Euskera, 
for Obabakoak, this foundational text within twentieth-century Basque 
literature, is formed in no small part by Atxaga’s varied repetitions 
of other texts drawn from around the world, which contribute to the 
genre fluidity and expansive narrative focus of the text. As I explore in 
the next section of this chapter, mapping the contours of Atxaga’s use 
of plagiarism and translation alongside Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking 
on repetition with difference reframes the dynamic between the major 
and minor territories at stake in the production and reception of Atxaga’s 
work, and simultaneously offers different perspectives upon the nature 
of repetition and its own varied textual forms. 
Repetition with difference
Plagiarism
In ‘Método para plagiar’, the narrator discusses the types of stories most 
suitable for plagiarism. In an ironic reference to hierarchical perceptions 
of minor and major literary communities, he directs the potential 
plagiarist away from ‘las culturas de ámbito reducido, donde, al haber 
poco espacio, las relaciones – en particular las literarias – suelen estar 
llenas de intrigas, malicia y odio’/‘minority cultures where, since there 
is little space, relations – especially literary ones – tend to be rife with 
intrigue, malice and hatred’, instructing them to head instead towards 
‘Boulevard Balzac […] Hardy Gardens […] Hoffman Strasse […] Piazza 
Pirandello’: ‘lo que, expresado de otra manera, quiere decir que ha 
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de elegir sus modelos entre los autores que andan en boca de todo el 
mundo’/‘in other words, he must choose his models from amongst writers 
who are household names’.110 The humorous dichotomy the narrator 
creates between major and minor literatures becomes, in Atxaga’s hands, 
an opportunity for a creative interrogation and transformation of this 
dichotomy: Atxaga conforms to the stereotype of the intriguing minor 
author by ‘stealing’ stories from major literatures and using these as the 
backbone for his stories from Obaba.111
The most obvious instance of this is ‘Una grieta en la nieve helada’, 
a supposed plagiarism of a story by Auguste Villiers de l’Isle-Adam, ‘La 
Torture par espérance’ (1888), which follows directly from ‘Método 
para plagiar’. In Villiers de l’Isle-Adam’s story, the protagonist, held by 
the Spanish Inquisition in Segovia, is allowed to believe he is about to 
escape before, in sight of the door, he is recaptured and sent for ‘auto da 
fé’.112 Atxaga’s story maintains this narrative backbone but, as suggested 
by the narrator in ‘Método para plagiar’, transposes the narrative in time 
and space, resituating it in the Himalayas in the twentieth century. But 
Atxaga acknowledges that while the place and context have been altered, 
the basic plot is the same and ‘Algunas frases […] las había copiado 
palabra por palabra’/‘Some sentences […] I copied word for word’.113 
In fact, Atxaga bases much of the narrative of Obabakoak upon texts by 
other authors. ‘En busca de la última palabra’, for example, takes as its 
frame narrative Cortázar’s ‘Las babas del Diablo’ (1959), converting the 
photo of an amorous French couple at the heart of Cortázar’s text into a 
photo taken at a primary school in Obaba. ‘Método para plagiar’ begins 
with an excerpt adapted from Dante’s The Divine Comedy (1320), and 
transforms Dante’s journey to the underworld, guided by Virgil, into the 
narrator’s journey to the island of Euskera, guided by Axular. ‘Jóvenes y 
verdes’ alludes to Dylan Thomas’s poem ‘Fern Hill’ (1945), transposing 
the poetic lament for lost youth from Thomas’s visits to his aunt’s farm in 
Wales to the narrator’s experience growing up in Obaba. 
Are these plagiarisms, adaptations, intertextual excerpts or 
linguistic and temporal translations? The textual collisions Atxaga 
creates problematize these definitions again and again, foregrounding 
the critical assumptions we make when we perceive similarities and 
differences between forms of textual repetition. However we choose to 
define them, these inserts hinge upon a ‘domestication’ in which a text 
is pulled from its original context and rewritten according to the ‘values, 
beliefs and representations’ of another – precisely the type of alteration 
which enacts the dangerous erasure that potentially attends Atxaga’s 
self-translations.114 Atxaga’s use of such domestications in Obabakoak, 
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however, re-evaluates their potential: he suggests that a text becomes 
original precisely in, as opposed to despite, the ways that it appropriates, 
alters and adapts a pre-existing work. In this sense, Atxaga’s work 
resonates with the literary approach which John Barth describes as a 
‘literature of replenishment’. Discussing Borges’s story ‘Pierre Menard’, 
in which the French author Menard attempts to compose – rather than 
imitate or repeat – Cervantes’s Don Quixote, Barth suggests that Borges 
‘writes a remarkable and original work of literature, the implicit theme 
of which is the difficulty, perhaps the unneccessity, of writing original 
works of literature […] he confronts an intellectual dead end and 
employs it against itself to accomplish new human work’.115 In Barth’s 
reading, what is fascinating about Borges’s story is not that it reveals 
the impossibility of originality, but rather that, through exploring that 
impossibility, it creates a new, inherently original text. Similarly, Atxaga’s 
discussion of the limitations of the Basque literary scene in ‘Método para 
plagiar’ offers him the material to exceed those limitations, bringing the 
Basque literary scene into a state of replenishment, and positioning this 
foundational text of twentieth-century Basque literature as one formed 
through the different territories – linguistic, literary and political – which 
are implicated in the creation of his text.
By creating his Basque stories from canonical texts, Atxaga also 
flips the dynamic between minor and major literatures in relation to his 
work, incorporating these canonical texts from different eras into the 
creation of a text routed firmly in contemporary literary models. These 
intertextual insinuations are not immune to the challenging dynamic 
between the global and the local which is always at stake in Atxaga’s 
project. Still and Worton have suggested that intertextual forms are ‘an 
attempt to struggle against complicity and exclusion’, to create a path 
between identity and difference which does not always construct one in 
opposition to the other.116 Yet in seeking such a path, the particularity 
of the local is always at risk of erasure, of being subsumed by a more 
dominant literary scene. But while Atxaga’s decision to draw upon these 
global texts invokes their power, his deployment of them in the service 
of a more peripheral literary system also destabilizes the locus of that 
power. In this sense, Atxaga returns to the Classical tradition of imitatio, 
which saw Roman authors imitate and translate texts from Greek literary 
culture. As Rita Copeland notes, this process simultaneously invoked 
a reverence for that culture and a desire to displace its hegemony – 
something Copeland describes as the ‘paradox of difference through 
replication’.117 In a similar way, by creating his Basque stories from 
canonical texts, Atxaga flips the dynamic between minor and major 
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literatures: rather than a major culture imposing itself on a minor one, 
forcing the minor culture to conform to its cultural or linguistic systems, 
the minor culture here imposes itself on a major one, forcing major texts 
to conform to its dynamics. 
At the same time, the inclusion of these canonical texts as the 
framework for elements of Obabakoak shifts our understanding of 
the shape and form of the Basque literary scene itself, revealing the 
transformative potential of infusing a minor literary scene with more 
established literary influences. The stories Atxaga tells exceed the 
boundaries of Obaba: drawing on influences from Borges to Michel 
Tournier, Atxaga narrates stories set far beyond the Basque Country, 
transposing the reader from Germany to China, Baghdad to Barcelona. 
Through this intertextual game, Atxaga re-maps and re-imagines the 
geographic focus for his ‘stories from Obaba’: whether written in Basque 
or Castilian, these stories outstrip their initial focus upon the Basque 
community to reveal Obaba, and Atxaga’s own writing, to be plural, 
dynamic, and engaged in illuminating insinuations into the hegemonic 
literary, linguistic and cultural systems which threaten to enclose it. 
Atxaga’s creative collisions thus transform both the plagiarized text 
and the text created through this plagiarism, affecting both the major 
literary system from which the plagiarized text is drawn and the minor 
literary system into which it is incorporated. As Parvati Nair suggests, 
‘whilst Atxaga has undoubtedly put Basque literature on the world map, 
his narrative strategies reveal [this literature] to be a hybrid site of inter-
connections’.118 But as much as it destabilizes an opposition between 
minor and major literary systems, Atxaga’s hybridity also challenges 
conceptions of plagiarism as either theft or innovation, and literature as 
either inherently repetitive or innately original: instead, Atxaga creates 
a form which is both original and repetitive, formed through both theft 
and innovation. How might this hybridity affect our understanding of the 
creative nature of repetition itself? In Mille plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari 
describe a double process of ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’ 
at stake within the collision of two different forms, and elucidate through 
this figuration the relationship between repetition, representation and 
imitation:
L’orchidée se déterritorialise en formant une image, un calque de 
guêpe; mais la guêpe se reterritorialise sur cette image. La guêpe 
se déterritorialise pourtant, devenant elle-même une pièce dans 
l’appareil de reproduction de l’orchidée; mais elle reterritorialise 
l’orchidée, en en transportant le pollen. […] On pourrait dire que 
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l’orchidée imite la guêpe dont elle reproduit l’image de manière 
signifiante (mimesis, mimétisme, leurre, etc.). […] En même temps 
il s’agit de tout autre chose: plus du tout imitation, mais capture 
de code, plus-value de code, augmentation de valence, véritable 
devenir, devenir-guêpe de l’orchidée, devenir-orchidée de la guêpe 
[…] Il n’y a plus imitation ni ressemblance, mais explosion de deux 
séries hétérogènes dans la ligne de fuite.
The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a 
wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is 
nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid’s 
reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by 
transporting its pollen. […] It could be said that the orchid imitates 
the wasp, reproducing its image in a signifying fashion (mimesis, 
mimicry, lure, etc.). […] At the same time, something else entirely 
is going on: not imitation at all but a capture of code, surplus value 
of code, an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a becoming-
wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp. […] There 
is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an exploding of two 
heterogeneous series on a line of flight.119
The creativity of this figuration, which itself deterritorializes and 
reterritorializes a dynamic from the natural world into a philosophical 
exploration, positions difference as a productive force of development. 
The wasp and the orchid share points of contact, but their different 
anatomical structures, their different relations to one another and to the 
natural world around them, mean that each pushes the other beyond its 
own limits. In this continuous movement between deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization, mimesis is replaced by symbiosis, and the possibility 
of imitation mutates into capture, increase, becoming.120 For, in their 
symbiotic relationship, neither wasp nor orchid can imitate the other 
without subjecting themselves to a transformation: as each captures, 
alters and takes on the attributes of the other, any attempt at replication 
is converted into a becoming – a becoming-wasp and becoming-orchid. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of the relations of life and 
production in the natural world in terms of the relationship between 
deterritorialization, reterritorialization, imitation and becoming offers 
a swerve of thought which elucidates, and is elucidated by, the forms 
of textual repetition in Obabakoak. In Atxaga’s plagiaristic play, one 
text is caught up in another, bringing both the texts and the literature 
and language in which they originated into a symbiotic relationship. 
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Deterritorialized from its original context, the plagiarized text becomes 
part of a new assemblage, incorporated into Obabakoak in a way which 
transforms the plagiarized text’s own shape, narrative and interpretative 
possibilities. Reterritorialized into this new context, the plagiarized text 
also enables Obabakoak to ‘become’, shaping and forming Atxaga’s text 
and providing the backbone for Atxaga to engage in creative rewritings 
which extend the geographic and cultural scope of Obabakoak itself. In 
this capture, two a-parallel textual forms – developed from within two 
different literary systems, at very different moments in their creativity 
and development – collide, coincide and combine, but never replicate 
one another. 
In Dialogues, Deleuze suggests that the forms of interaction and 
relation he describes as ‘capture’ and in terms of ‘devenir’ are opposed to 
those of plagiarism: 
Voler, c’est le contraire de plagier, de copier, d’imiter ou de faire 
comme. La capture est toujours une double-capture, le vol, un 
double-vol, et c’est cela qui fait, non pas quelque chose de mutuel, 
mais un bloc asymétrique, une évolution a-parallèle, des noces, 
toujours «hors» et «entre».
Stealing is the opposite of plagiarizing, copying, imitating, or doing 
like. Capture is always a double-capture, theft a double-theft, and 
it is that which creates not something mutual, but an asymmetrical 
block, an a-parallel evolution, nuptials, always “outside” and 
“between”.121
But Atxaga’s approach to plagiarism in Obabakoak suggests that this 
textual practice can be a variation of stealing, in the meaning Deleuze 
gives to this term: a collision of two different entities engaged in a 
productive, transformative but not imitative interaction. In Atxaga, 
plagiarism is both theft and creative adaptation: it captures a text and is 
also captured by that text, thereby creating a space outside and between 
the traced models of our textual production.
Deleuze’s figuration of the desert island, and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
account of the wasp and the orchid, allow us to think differently about 
the problematic and shifting dynamic between repetition and originality, 
illuminating the ways in which two different texts can connect and 
separate, collide and transform in a-parallel formations. Creativity is 
born from this a-parallel evolution: it is the lack of similarity between 
two texts – the different modes of their production and reception – which 
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF TRANSLATION
67
incorporates difference into the textual evolution enacted by plagiarism, 
an evolution of alteration, then, rather than duplication. Could this 
figuration also help us think about translation, and particularly the 
relationship between the two different languages implicated in Atxaga’s 
experience of self-translation? 
Translation
As Barbara Godard emphasizes in ‘Deleuze and Translation’, ‘[t]ranslation 
[…] is not a question with which Deleuze was much concerned – explicitly, 
that is’. Nonetheless, she suggests, Deleuze’s thinking contains ‘an implicit 
theory of translation as creative swerve’, which becomes decipherable 
when his texts are read ‘transversally’.122 Mapping, rather than tracing, 
the contours of Deleuze and Guattari’s accounts of deterritorialization, 
reterritorialization, repetition and becoming allows me to explore 
new readings of the dynamics of translation, particularly in relation to 
Atxaga’s work. As with the desert island, Atxaga’s creative identity is torn 
between dreams of connection and dreams of separation; like the wasp 
and the orchid, Atxaga’s two texts and his two languages are derived from 
two different power structures. This asymmetrical dynamic can position 
translation as a violent imposition: when a text is incorporated into a new 
linguistic, literary and political system, its original system is disrupted, 
domesticated or destroyed. An ethics of translation, in Venuti’s terms, 
involves revealing this asymmetry, foreignizing a translated text so that 
this violence can be acknowledged and discharged. But, helped by the 
relation Deleuze and Guattari develop between the wasp and orchid, we 
can also read translation as a capture which replaces an either/or dynamic 
with a conjunctive one, as a theft which incorporates deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization into diverse movements of transformative and 
creative evolution. 
Atxaga has described the relationship between his two languages 
and cultures as involving a ‘leap’.123 In an interview with El Mundo 
in 1989, he suggested that this asymmetry makes it ‘prácticamente 
imposible traducir directamente del euskera al castellano. […] Lo que 
hice fue plantearme la novela de un modo distinto’/‘practically impossible 
to translate directly from Basque to Castilian. […] What I did was think 
about the novel in a different way’.124 Atxaga’s comment positions 
translation as a re-beginning, an opportunity, like the one Deleuze reads 
in the geography of the desert island, to recreate in different forms upon 
an existing territory. The dynamics of this recreation hinge upon an 
interplay of difference and repetition: in translation, difference produces 
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repetition; repetition, in turn, produces more difference. For without the 
linguistic and cultural dissimilarity between Basque and Castilian, or 
between these and English, there would be no need for Atxaga’s text to be 
repeated through translation. At the same time, translation incorporates 
differences, both explicit and implicit, into every text with which it 
engages. Just as the wasp and orchid together produce an explosion of 
creativity through the interaction of their different forms, so translation 
– in its very attempt to bridge the gaps between cultural and linguistic 
differences – creates an evolution-as-hiatus, in which each impasse 
and divergence only pushes creativity and development further. In the 
temporal, spatial and linguistic displacement created by translation, 
Atxaga acknowledges the impossibility of imitation or replication, 
deploying this impossibility in order to generate a ‘becoming’ of his 
original text. This ‘becoming’, produced through the creative pressures 
between his two literary and linguistic territories, incorporates difference 
into the structure of Obabakoak itself. These structural changes reposition 
the text within its new literary system, but the form of the alterations 
Atxaga makes also illuminates the disruptive, but potentially connective 
and transformative, nature of translation itself. 
As I discussed earlier, a desire to introduce the Basque literary 
scene to a foreign readership provides the impetus for Atxaga to 
shift Obabakoak into self-questioning narrative forms through the 
introduction of the paratext ‘A modo de autobiografía’. On a structural 
level, this paratext enacts a literal ‘becoming’ of Obabakoak, deferring 
its ending by extending the text by another six pages. This extension is 
particularly notable because of the focus of the series of stories which 
it follows: ‘En busca de la última palabra’ explores the endings we seek, 
both in life and in literature. The title, ‘In Search of the Last Word’, reflects 
the desire of the narrator, a Basque author, both to ‘have the last word’ – 
to prove that he is right – and to ‘find the last word’ – to finish the text he 
is writing. Ironically, the first of these desires culminates in the narrator’s 
inability to achieve the second. Convinced that an old wives’ tale that 
warns children ‘[n]unca os quedéis dormidos sobre la hierba […]. Si los 
hacéis, vendrá un lagarto y se os meterá en la cabeza’/‘Never go to sleep 
on the grass […]. If you do, a lizard will come along and climb inside 
your head’ is not metaphorical but literal, the narrator ends up spending 
the night locked in a hut full of lizards.125 Subsequently, he begins to lose 
his ability to create or comprehend any abstract use of language. As the 
text ends, we understand that the narrator has given up writing and will 
remain in Obaba, the boundaries of his experience limited by his inability 
to understand any non-functional use of language. In ‘Preguntas desde 
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Japón’ Atxaga suggests that Obabakoak is a text about the development 
of language; yet, the text – in its Basque version at least – culminates 
with the loss of language and creativity. For Gil-Oslé, Atxaga’s focus upon 
this loss of language integrates humility and humour into his project to 
reinvigorate Basque literature, revealing that this project must always 
confront its limitations.126 For Gabilondo, it converts the violent history 
of the Basque Country into a magical-realist narrative which cannot 
threaten the Spanish state.127 But the forms of this loss of creativity also 
have particular relevance to Atxaga’s exploration in ‘Método para plagiar’ 
of the aridity of the Basque literary scene. For the loss of the narrator’s 
ability to use abstract language occurs because of his decision to assign a 
functional rather than an experimental role to the lizard story, to read it 
as fact rather than fiction. The suggestion here is that to assign language 
or literature a solely utilitarian purpose – be that purpose cultural or 
political – undermines the ability of that language to function as an 
instrument of relation with the world.128
But while the narrator’s desire to have the last word proves creatively 
limiting, his failed search for the last word of his text proves creatively 
productive. For this search is subject to a continual postponement: every 
time the narrator seeks to tell us his story, a story destined to end in his 
own creative and, we understand, actual death, his words are delayed by 
the words of others, by the translations, variations and plagiarisms which 
run throughout Obabakoak: ‘Una vez más, la última palabra tendrá que 
esperar. […] Ha llegado, pues, el momento de hacer otro inciso, porque 
me resulta imposible continuar en busca de la última palabra sin antes 
transcribir este relato. He procurado traducirle lo mejor posible.’/‘Once 
again, the last word will have to wait. […] The time has come, then, to 
insert another parenthesis, because I find it impossible to continue my 
search for the last word without first transcribing this story. I did my best 
to make the translation a good one.’129
As in A Thousand and One Nights, in Obabakoak every story the 
narrator tells defers his existential and textual ending; and, just as the 
figure of Axular suggests in ‘Método para plagiar’ that plagiarism can 
bring life to the creatively desolate Basque language, so drawing upon 
the words of others replaces the creativity the narrator himself begins to 
lack. It is thus particularly apt that the last words of ‘En busca de la última 
palabra’ are themselves extended by translation, through the insertion of 
‘A modo de autobiografía’ into the Castilian version. Even more aptly, the 
content of this paratext, while focused upon the limitations of the Basque 
language, ends with an emphatic refusal to allow such limitations to stultify 
the creativity of the Basque literary scene: ‘Pero seguiremos intentándolo, 
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seguiremos escribiendo. El tablero está ahí para que juguemos’/‘But we 
will keep trying, we will keep writing. The reason the board is there is for 
us to continue playing’.130 In the narrative of ‘En busca de ultima palabra’, 
translation enables a continuation of writing, offering the material for 
new forms of creativity; in the translation of Obabakoak into Castilian, 
this material becomes incorporated into a literal continuation of the text 
itself, and into a shift of focus which sees the text end, not with a loss of 
literary creativity, but with a call for its continued development.
In the Castilian translation of Obabakoak, Atxaga complements the 
extension created by ‘A modo de autobiografía’ with another structural 
modification: a shift in the order of the stories. The story which begins 
the Basque text, ‘Exposición de la carta del canónigo Lizardi’, becomes the 
second story, replaced by ‘Esteban Werfell’, the third story in the Basque 
text. The difference between these two stories is the focus and location of 
their action. ‘Exposición de la carta del canónigo Lizardi’ is the story of an 
insular Basque community, its rejection of an outsider and the devastating 
consequences of this rejection. Narrated through the fragmented letters of 
Canon Lizardi, the story focuses upon Javier, an illegitimate child abused 
and finally excluded because of the nature of his birth. This exclusion 
takes a dramatic turn when a beautiful white boar appears in the village, 
bearing an uncanny resemblance to Javier himself. Just as they sought 
to destroy Javier-the-boy through emotional brutality, so the Obaban 
community seeks to destroy Javier-the-boar through physical cruelty. 
Unable to accept what they cannot understand, the villagers taunt and 
threaten the boar, until he turns on those who have harmed him, killing 
some and injuring others, before he is finally destroyed himself. 
While ‘Exposición de la carta del canónigo Lizardi’ focuses upon 
a somewhat parochial Basque community, ‘Esteban Werfell’ is a story 
about the pull of the world beyond that community. Esteban is a child 
torn between two cultures: the world of Obaba, where he lives and from 
where his mother came, and the world of Hamburg, where his father grew 
up. The battle between Esteban’s two cultures is thematized through 
the experience of writing: Esteban’s father, desperate to prevent him 
remaining enclosed in Obaba, writes letters to Esteban from an imaginary 
German girl. The experience of writing to someone beyond Obaba alters 
Esteban’s life irrevocably: ‘Yo […] iba a convertirme, a partir de ese 
momento, en un complete extraño […]. Comencé a sentirme superior 
a la gente de Obaba. […] Yo prefería quedarme en casa, estudiando 
alemán’/‘I realised that the letter marked the end of an era in my life. I 
[…] was about to become, from that moment on, a complete foreigner 
[…]. I began to feel superior to the people of Obaba. […] I preferred to 
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stay at home studying German’.131 Having learnt another language and 
connected, through this, to a world beyond Obaba, Esteban finally leaves 
Obaba for university, never to return. 
Atxaga’s decision to begin his translated ‘stories from Obaba’ with 
a story focused on a departure from Obaba emphasizes connectivity 
(as opposed to isolation) as the dominant trope of his imagined Basque 
community. Gabilondo has criticized Obabakoak for its invocation of a 
magical, archaic and pastoral Basque identity which conforms to Western 
expectations of a minority culture.132 But any expectation on the part of 
the Castilian, and later English readership, that Obabakoak will offer 
a stereotyped vision of a rural, isolated and somewhat archaic Basque 
world, such as the one explored in ‘Exposición de la carta del canónigo 
Lizardi’, is disrupted from the outset in the translated texts: in ‘Esteban 
Werfell’ Atxaga emphasizes that Obaba is part of a broader European 
reality as well as a specifically Basque one. Atxaga’s alteration to the 
order of stories thus mirrors a shift enacted by the process of translation, 
in which a text is liberated from its foundations in a single culture and 
brought into connection and conjunction with another culture and 
language. In translation, Obabakoak undergoes a journey, similar to the 
one experienced by Esteban, from separation to connection through the 
process of being written in another language.133
While the narrative of ‘Esteban Werfell’ explores the power of such 
connections, though, it also reveals the potential losses they involve. For 
the relationship Esteban builds through his letters – an imaginary one, 
after all – is formed at the expense of his existing, and very real, Basque 
culture. The loss of this culture has a limiting effect upon Esteban: ‘Nunca 
escribía o hablaba directamente, nunca se relacionaba francamente 
con la gente que le rodeaba. […] En su vida, todo había sido silencio, 
pasividad, retiro’/‘He never spoke or wrote directly, he never dealt 
frankly with the people around him. […] His whole life had been one of 
silence, passivity, withdrawal’.134 For Esteban, the triumph of the world 
beyond Obaba appears ironically to have limited his ability to connect 
in any meaningful way to the world around him. In ‘Esteban Werfell’, 
Atxaga suggests that the connections we form through writing, through 
translation into languages other than our own, are not only expansive, 
creative and generative: in the movement from one culture and language 
to another, something is lost as well as gained. 
This loss and gain is something Atxaga recognizes as implicit 
within his own experience of translation. In the epilogue to his Castilian 
translation of his novel Bi anai, he suggests that this translation, Dos 
Hermanos, which appeared eleven years after the Basque text, equals ‘“Bi 
BERNARDO ATXAGA’S OBABAKOAK
72
anai” más-menos once años de la vida de su autor’/‘Bi anai plus-minus 
eleven years of the author’s life’.135 The expression ‘más-menos’ is 
a recognition that, in every moment of re-writing, a text becomes 
different, its creation, production and reception altered by the passage 
of time. Even when two texts appear exactly the same, they interiorize a 
temporal, but also experiential, difference which cannot be sublimated, 
a disjunction – like the one Deleuze reads in the geography of the 
desert island – between a first and a second beginning. In Différence et 
répétition, Deleuze invokes Borges’s text ‘Pierre Menard’ to elucidate this 
interiorized difference. Menard’s story, suggests Deleuze, reveals to us 
the transformative, illuminating power of repetition, by demonstrating 
that even ‘la répétition la plus exacte, la plus stricte a pour corrélat le 
maximum de différence («Le texte de Cervantes et celui de Ménard sont 
verbalement identiques, mais le second est presque infiniment plus 
riche...»)’/‘In this case, the most exact, the most strict repetition has 
as its correlate the maximum of difference (“The text of Cervantes and 
that of Menard are verbally identical, but the second is almost infinitely 
richer…”)’.136 Deleuze’s discussion of Borges’s text articulates the 
difference inherent within ‘identical’ texts, the contextual and historical 
transformations generated in the very moment of apparent replication. 
But in that very difference lies the ability of translation to 
shift representation into transformation, imitation into becoming. 
I began this chapter by discussing Atxaga’s figuration of translation 
as a spaceship travelling on a flight path between his two linguistic 
territories. In this figuration Atxaga extols the ability of translation 
to overcome asymmetries and distances between languages to enable 
connection and transmission. But translation is never simply connective: 
it is simultaneously transformative, challenging, and disruptive. In their 
figuration of the wasp and the orchid, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that 
the two create an ‘explosion de deux séries hétérogènes dans la ligne 
de fuite’/‘an exploding of two heterogeneous series on a line of flight’, 
a force field of development and change operating at the intersection 
between different territories.137 We might therefore position translation 
itself as a ‘line of flight’, as opposed to a flight path, between different 
linguistic, literary and cultural territories. For Deleuze and Guattari, lines 
of flight create points of departure from the systems of thought which 
grasp us in formations of identity or similitude. Lines of flight connect to 
translation as two varied but linked forms of modification, mutation and 
metamorphosis, both being elements in an account of the ways in which 
systems and assemblages interact, connect and transform one another.
Lines of flight are not simply modes of escape: they also return us 
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to the systems we try to evade, reterritorializing us in new structures. As 
Deleuze and Guattari recognize, ‘[o]n fait une rupture, on trace une ligne 
de fuite, mais on risque toujours de retrouver sur elle des organisations 
qui restratifient l’ensemble, des formations qui redonnent le pouvoir à 
un signifiant.’/‘You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there 
is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that restratify 
everything, formations that restore power to a signifier’.138 In ‘Aesthetics 
of Encounter: Variations on Translation in Deleuze’, Michael LeVan 
suggests that lines of flight help us think about translation precisely 
because of their potential for failure: 
A line of flight is given in the mode of risk – that a movement of 
deterritorialization can always turn into a line a death. In other 
words, translation has no guarantees, no pre-ordained telos, and 
often is susceptible to failure. In this sense, translation […] is not 
an end in itself, but a risky and necessary mode for the possibility of 
the constitution of the new social arrangements.139
LeVan here emphasizes the immanent and temporary mode of 
translation: in every movement away from static forces of representation 
and understanding, we enter into dangerous territories which are not 
pre-formed but which may as easily lead us into new systems of limitation 
as free us from old ones. 
In this risk, however, resides the force of translation: because 
of its ability to liberate and constrain, to deterritorialize a text and 
reterritorialize it elsewhere, to repress but also expand, to overwrite but 
also to renew, translation offers us a site through which to interrogate the 
assemblages surrounding textual production. Translation can operate as 
a ‘molar line’, designating, ordering and regimenting the literary field of 
any text. But it can also be a ‘molecular line’, transmitting and travelling 
across these designated territories, bringing information in and out, but 
seeking to adapt itself either to the culture from which it comes or to the 
culture into which it enters. Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction is one we 
might, with Venuti, characterize as a double movement of ‘domestication’ 
and ‘foreignization’.140 But Venuti’s characterization fails to account for the 
other lines and vibrations at play within translation. For, conceived as a 
process of repetition with difference, translation can also behave as a line 
of flight, travelling beyond these regiments, beholden to neither source nor 
target, pursuing its own process of mutation and change through which 
it transforms and transmutes the territories it encounters, while never 
evading the possibility of re-appropriation.
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As I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Atxaga’s experience 
of writing has been conditioned by his bilingualism, and particularly by 
the minor–major dynamic which exists between his two languages. But 
does translation inevitably assert a hegemonic discourse at the expense 
of a minor one? Or can translation, operating as a line of flight, enable 
a different reading of the connection between translation and major/
minor dynamics, particularly in relation to Atxaga’s self-translation 
of Obabakoak? In the final part of this chapter, I turn to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s discussion of minor literature in Kafka: Pour une littérature 
mineure, and explore the ways in which both the narrative of Obabakoak 
and Atxaga’s translation of the text engage in forms of ‘becoming-minor’.
Towards a minor literature of translation
From metaphor to metamorphosis
For Deleuze and Guattari, bilingual authors inhabit a unique position: 
existing between two languages, they belong simultaneously to both and 
to neither. This liminality makes these authors foreigners in their own 
tongue, an experience which Deleuze and Guattari suggest is the property 
of minorities, and minor literatures: ‘Combien de gens aujourd’hui vivent 
dans une langue qui n’est pas la leur? Ou bien ne connaissent même 
plus la leur […]? Problème des minorités. Problème d’une littérature 
mineure’/‘How many people today live in a language that is not their 
own? Or no longer, or not yet, even know their own […]? This is […] 
the problem of minorities, the problem of a minor literature’.141 In El 
hijo del acordeonista, Atxaga suggests, through the voice of Joseba, that 
it is precisely this sense of alienation which underlines the difference 
between the descendants of Basque speakers, who may not speak Basque 
themselves, and those of speakers of more major languages: ‘Nunca se dará 
el caso de que un inglés o un español diga: “Las palabras que estuvieron 
en boca de mis padres me resultan extrañas”’/‘You’d never hear a speaker 
of English or Spanish saying: “The words that were in my parents’ mouths 
are strange to me”’.142 As Atxaga discusses in ‘A modo de autobiografía’, 
authors who write in Basque, and readers who engage with their texts, 
repeatedly confront this sensation that their language is not their own: 
Cuando un lector lee, en castellano, una novela con mucho diálogo, 
es muy probable que no vea los continuos dijo, respondió y replicó 
del texto. […] Que las ha leído tantas veces que ya no repara en 
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ellas. Escribiendo en euskara, yo no tengo problemas con dijo 
(esan), o con respondió (erantzun); pero empiezo a tenerlos con 
replicó (arrapostu), debido a que esta palabra no le es familiar al 
lector […]. Así las cosas, el escritor vasco sabe que su lector se 
detendrá en esa palabra, que supondrá una interferencia.
When a reader reads a novel with a lot of dialogue, he probably 
doesn’t even see the constant repetition in the text of ‘he said’, ‘he 
replied’ and ‘he retorted’. […] He has read the words so many times, 
he doesn’t even notice them. Writing in euskera, I have no problems 
with ‘he said’ (esan) or with ‘he replied’ (eratzun) but I begin to 
have problems with ‘he retorted’ (arrapostu) because this word is 
not familiar to the reader […]. So the Basque writer knows that his 
reader will stop at that word, that it will be a stumbling block.143
Atxaga suggests that this ‘interference’ is problematic because it renders 
a literary language too obviously artificial. But for Deleuze and Guattari, 
one of the ways in which a writer can become-minor is by becoming a 
stranger within his or her own language: to confront the artificiality of 
linguistic structures is also to confront their limits, to replace language as 
a site of representation and signification with language as disarticulation 
and experimentation, and to position writing as an impossible task, a 
continually unfulfilled pressure to inhabit new, challenging forms.144
Deleuze and Guattari map this impossibility through Kafka’s 
experience as a Jew living in Prague, writing in German: ‘Kafka définit en 
ce sens l’impasse qui barre aux juifs de Prague l’accès à l’écriture, et fait de 
leur littérature quelque chose d’impossible: impossibilité de ne pas écrire, 
impossibilité d’écrire en allemand, impossibilité d’écrire autrement’/‘In 
this sense, Kafka marks the impasse that bars access to writing for the 
Jews of Prague, and turns their literature into something impossible – 
the impossibility of not writing, the impossibility of writing in German, 
the impossibility of writing otherwise’.145 Deleuze and Guattari’s reading 
presents Kafka’s work as a literary machine, constituted of lines of 
flight and escape, of impasses and blockages, of desires and intensities, 
developed through space, object, character, event and expression.146 
Kafka’s literary machine operates through experimentation, rather than 
interpretation, metaphor, allegory or symbolism, as a way of engaging 
with the political and social realities which surround it: ‘Kafka tue 
délibérément toute métaphore, tout symbolisme, toute signification, 
non moins que toute désignation’/‘Kafka deliberately kills all metaphor, 
all symbolism, all signification, no less than all designation’.147 As Keith 
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Woodward and John Paul Jones III suggest, Deleuze and Guattari 
conceive metaphor as a ‘major’ form of expression, which, like tracing, 
operates to affirm an existing pattern of hierarchized relations: ‘They 
maintain that metaphor belongs to an idealist realm of relation that, 
like the evolutionary natural sciences, uses strategies of ‘series and 
structure’ to produce degrees of resemblance and difference between a 
set of terms’.148 Deleuze and Guattari argue that Kafka shifts metaphor 
– an imitative linguistic process which transfers properties from one 
system to another while suppressing their transformative relation – into 
metamorphosis – the mutual becoming of two forms conceived through 
the combinations created by their difference. The shift from metaphor to 
metamorphosis recalls the figuration of the wasp and the orchid in Mille 
plateaux, through which Deleuze and Guattari displace a conception of 
evolution as uninterrupted progression with a conception of evolution 
as becoming-through-hiatus: ‘La métamorphose est le contraire de la 
métaphore. Il n’y a plus sens propre ni sens figuré, mais distribution 
d’états dans l’éventail du mot’/‘Metamorphosis is the contrary of 
metaphor. There is no longer any proper sense or figurative sense, but 
only a distribution of states that is part of the range of the word’.149
Deleuze and Guattari argue that in Kafka’s The Metamorphosis 
(1915), Gregor’s conversion into an insect is not metaphorical but 
metamorphic, ‘capture d’un fragment de code, et non pas reproduction 
d’une image’/‘the capture of a fragment of the code, and not the 
reproduction of an image’.150 In this metamorphic shift, the ‘code’ 
of Gregor and the ‘code’ of insect – their habits and conventions, the 
structures of their actions and thinking – fragment and are captured 
and exchanged, each code overwriting, developing and distorting the 
original nature of the other:151
Il ne s’agit pas d’une ressemblance entre le comportement d’un 
animal et celui de l’homme, encore moins d’un jeu de mots. Il n’y 
a plus ni homme ni animal, puisque chacun déterritorialise l’autre 
[…]. Il s’agit d’un devenir qui comprend au contraire le maximum 
de différence comme différence d’intensité […].
It is no longer a question of a resemblance between the comportment 
of an animal and that of a man; it is even less a question of a 
simple wordplay. There is no longer man or animal, since each 
deterritorializes the other […]. Instead, it is now a question of a 
becoming that includes the maximum of differences as a difference 
of intensity […].152
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In this reading, imitation and metaphor shift into becoming, subjecting 
the libidinal, bureaucratic and familial structures forming and 
constraining Gregor to a deterritorialization, and positioning him on a 
line of flight into a new territory, in which his marginality can – briefly – 
be recognized rather than suppressed. 
This deterritorialization disrupts the binary oppositions between 
man and animal, Gregor and insect: Gregor-insect is neither one nor the 
other, but a molecular convergence of two different forms which interact 
in an endless process of becoming. In Deleuze’s and Guattari’s thought, 
becoming-animal, like becoming-woman and becoming-minor, involves 
a movement from opposition to interrelation: as in the figuration of the 
wasp and the orchid, two different entities engage in a dynamic transfer 
which transforms the oppositional systems which structure them. 
‘Becoming-animal’ reframes the opposition human/animal; ‘becoming-
woman’ unpicks the opposition man/woman’; ‘becoming-minor’ 
disturbs the opposition major/minor. This final opposition is connected 
to the others through extension and development: to become-animal 
or become-woman is also to engage in a politics of becoming-minor. 
Excluded from the majority discourse of possession, identity and being, 
such voices create and inhabit a space of difference through a process 
of endless metamorphosis, for only by undoing the oppositions which 
exclude it can the margin be incorporated into an interior, transforming 
that interior in the process. 
Atxaga’s experience of writing is conditioned by a similar set 
of linguistic impossibilities to those Deleuze and Guattari discuss in 
relation to Kafka’s work: the impossibility of writing in Euskera, because 
of its limited genealogy; the impossibility of not writing in Euskera, and 
thereby betraying his identity as a Basque author, and, implicitly, the 
Basque language itself; and the impossibility of not writing in Castilian, 
because of the ways this would limit his readership. Moreover, there 
are also interesting parallels within the narrative of Obabakoak to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s exploration of the connection between Kafka’s 
‘killing’ of metaphor and his development of metamorphosis and the 
transformative power of becoming, particularly in relation to the loss 
of language which Atxaga describes in ‘En busca de la última palabra’. 
For the decay of the narrator’s language within this story culminates, 
specifically, in an inability on his part to understand metaphor: when 
his uncle, attempting to make him comprehend what has happened, 
says ‘tu cabeza era antes como una antorcha […] pero que esa antorcha 
se está apagando por momentos’/‘before, your head was like a flaming 
torch. […] but that torch is burning lower by the minute’, the narrator 
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replies, ‘No le dije nada, pero creo que mi tío se está volviendo loco. Mi 
cabeza siempre ha sido redonda, nunca ha sido como una antorcha’/‘I 
didn’t say anything at the time but I really think my uncle is going mad. 
My head has always been round, it’s never been anything like a torch’.153 
As in Kafka’s texts, the narrator’s loss of metaphor is transformed into a 
material metamorphosis: following his failure to understand the relation 
of similarity which allows his uncle to progress from ‘torch’ to ‘head’, the 
narrator begins to undergo his own metamorphosis, incorporating the 
characteristics of the lizards he has been researching into his own identity, 
until his literary aspirations are replaced by a desire to do nothing more 
than catch flies. The last words the narrator utters announce that ‘[m]e 
aburro sentado aquí en la biblioteca. Menos mal que hay moscas. Quiero 
decir que luego iré […] a pescar, y que entonces nos vendrán de perlas 
las moscas que ahora estoy cazando aquí’/‘I get bored sitting here in the 
library. Just as well there are some flies here. I mean later on I can go 
fishing […] and they’ll come in really handy then, these flies I’m catching 
now’.154
The import of this ‘becoming-lizard’ can be read on multiple levels 
within Atxaga’s work. On one level, it is part of a series of becomings 
which permeate Obabakoak, becomings which raise questions about the 
structures that delimit our sense of individual identity. In ‘Exposición de 
la carta del canónigo Lizardi’, Javier’s metamorphosis into a white boar 
enables him to escape from and wreak a just revenge upon those who 
have tortured him. In ‘Margarete y Heinrich, gemelos’, a ship worker, 
unable to recover after the suicide of his twin sister, finds a new happiness 
after he inhabits her identity, gaining a connection to those around him 
in a way he found impossible as a man. As in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
reading of The Metamorphosis, in Obabakoak these becomings offer the 
characters freedom from the restrictions – social, familial and literary – 
which bind them. But they are not simply metaphors of escape, for these 
transformations occur on a molecular level which renders the characters 
neither male nor female; neither man nor animal. Instead, they inhabit 
a space between both identities, a liminality emphasized by a narrative 
ambiguity that leaves us unable to adequately determine or define the 
nature of their identity. 
The narrator of ‘En busca de la última palabra’ develops the 
characteristics of a lizard, his purpose defined by his need to catch flies. 
Yet Atxaga never reveals to the reader his narrator’s physical shape. The 
narrator is effectively suspended between man and animal, the resolution 
of his identity dependent on the reader’s interpretations. Neither does 
Atxaga offer any definitive answers regarding the nature of Javier’s 
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transformation. Indeed, the villagers who are so enraged by his presence 
fear him precisely because they are unable to quantify him: is he man, or 
animal? His physical shape is animal, yet his actions are motivated by his 
human loyalties, griefs and rancour: he only seeks revenge on those who 
hurt him as a boy, and protects those who protected him. The villagers’ 
desire to destroy Javier reveals their inability to accept an identity 
which exists between the binary opposition of man or animal. Finally, 
Heinrich’s appropriation of his sister’s identity shifts his own identity 
into a peripheral space. His initial transformation is a superficial one: he 
puts on his sister’s dress. But this surface transformation brings with it 
a fundamental alteration to the formation of his self: ‘la transformación 
se produjo en cuanto el vestido tocó su piel […]. – De ahora en adelante 
seremos la misma persona, Margarete–murmuró’/‘the transformation 
was made as soon as the dress his touched his skin […]. “From now on we 
will be one and the same person, Margarete,” he murmured’.155 Yet the 
ambiguity remains for the reader, in the Spanish text if not the English, 
through the lack of gender-specific pronouns to refer to Heinrich: 
throughout, his name remains masculine, and the only pronoun used to 
refer to him is the female ‘ella’, used only once, at the very end of  the text. 
The ambiguity of Spanish pronoun use, which does not require a 
subject pronoun, and conjugates the possessive pronoun according to the 
noun it precedes, is rendered problematic in the English translation, which 
requires the translator to select either male or female forms. Jull Costa 
maintains the use of ‘him’ and ‘he’ throughout, a shift which represses the 
liminality of Heinrich’s gender identity in the text. But in both texts the 
identity of the character, and our understanding of that identity, remains 
caught between two poles – between man and animal, man and woman 
– foregrounding and challenging our understanding of those definitions 
themselves. While metaphor emphasizes a resemblance between the 
behaviour of man and animal, or man and woman, metamorphosis 
initiates a becoming in which each identity is deterritorialized within the 
other, challenging the stasis of the structures through which we define 
gender and species identities in the first place.
Becoming-minor does have its limits: as in translation, the lines of 
flight the characters pursue away from the systems which repress them 
can culminate in what Deleuze and Guattari term ‘lines of death’. In The 
Metamorphosis, Gregor loses the will to live, and starves to death; the 
transformation of his relation to the systems constraining him collapses 
as those systems begin to regain their power. In Obabakoak, Javier 
is wounded by those who abused him as a boy, and ultimately dies at 
the hands of a friend who cannot bear his suffering; Heinrich finds that 
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becoming his sister means absorbing her destiny, and at the end of the 
story we understand that he too will commit suicide; the narrator of 
‘En busca de la última palabra’ undergoes a creative death which is the 
prelude to his imminent actual death.
Are becomings always destined to culminate in death? For Deleuze 
and Guattari, the possibility of failure is one of the principles of becoming: 
‘N’est-ce pas plutôt que les devenirs-animaux n’arrivent pas à remplir leur 
principe, gardent toujours une ambiguïté qui fait leur insuffisance et les 
condamne à l’échec?’/‘Isn’t it rather that the acts of becoming-animal 
cannot follow their principle all the way through – that they maintain 
a certain ambiguity that leads to their insufficiency and condemns 
them to defeat?’156 This ambiguity, as I have suggested, is at the heart of 
Atxaga’s narration of the metamorphoses in Obabakoak. But perhaps it 
is also what prevents metamorphosis from drifting back into metaphor, 
for if metamorphosis can never complete its transfer, can never shift 
one form into another without failing and leaving traces of that first self 
behind, it remains a transformative, as opposed to transcendent, mode 
of interaction. Metaphor requires a revelatory leap of interpretation 
which negates the difference between its originary terms, replacing and 
masking this difference with a semblance of similarity; metamorphosis, 
and the failure of absolute metamorphosis, insists that transfer can never 
be perfected, that no Ideal form can be attained through the interaction 
of two different terms.
The ethical potential Deleuze and Guattari find in this shift of 
metaphor into metamorphosis elucidates a second level on which we can 
read the forms of minor literature at play within Atxaga’s work, namely 
the level of translation. In ‘On the Border with Deleuze and Guattari’, 
Woodward and Jones explore Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of 
metaphor in terms which reveal its relation to translation. They speak of 
[t]he organization of a closed system that assembles terms and 
relations according to likenesses, imagining for itself a prior, 
transcendental Ideal form to which all other terms speak […] a 
hierarchical model that uses the supposed unity of the first term in 
the series, the Ideal subject or object, as a grounds for producing the 
individual (individuated) unities of subsequent subjects/objects, 
each of which differ in varying degrees of perfection, but find their 
wholeness through a hierarchy of likenesses.157
This reading of metaphor bears a striking resemblance to Platonic 
conceptions of translation, which perceive translation as a likeness, in 
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varying degrees, of a transcendental and Ideal original text. To read 
translation in this way is to insist upon a hierarchy of relations which 
positions an original – in Atxaga’s case, a Basque original – as the Ideal ‘to 
which all other terms speak’. But we can, with Deleuze and Guattari, read 
translation differently, as a form of becoming which shifts hierarchies 
between texts, languages and cultures into dynamic interrelation. 
Reading translation as part of a metamorphic, as opposed to metaphoric, 
interaction between languages allows me to explore the ways in which 
our understanding of translation itself illuminates and is illuminated 
by the form of minor literature. For, as I will explore below, there is a 
dynamic dialogue between translation and the three characteristics that 
Deleuze and Guattari ascribe to minor literature.
Translation as minor literature 
Deleuze and Guattari invoke three characteristics of minor literature: 
‘la déterritorialisation de la langue, le branchement de l’individu 
sur l’immédiat-politique, l’agencement collectif d’énonciation’/‘the 
deterritorialization of the language, the connection of the individual to 
a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation.’158 
The first of these three characteristics is apparent in Atxaga’s experience 
of writing in Basque: to write in Basque from within the broader Spanish 
sub-system is to trouble the hegemony of Castilian, and to insist upon 
the multilingualism of the Spanish state; equally, as I have discussed, in 
choosing to write in this minority language Atxaga inevitably connects his 
authorial identity to that of a collective, political, expression of Basque 
national identity. Yet for Deleuze and Guattari, minor literatures are not 
necessarily those written in the language of a small nation: the terms minor 
and major are more fluid than a simple separation between hegemonic 
and peripheral linguistic systems, determined by number of speakers, for 
example. For Deleuze and Guattari, ‘[u]ne littérature mineure n’est pas 
celle d’une langue mineure, plutôt celle qu’une minorité fait dans une 
langue majeure’/‘A minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; 
it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language’.159 
All languages have minor and major functions: a minor language is run 
through with lines of flight, with movements of deterritorialization which 
fragment and transform the possibilities it articulates; a major language is 
defined by the orthodoxy of its structures of thought and expression, and 
its attempt to create solid power structures. 
In Remnants of a Nation, Gabilondo explores this link between 
Obabakoak and Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of minor literature. 
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He argues that Deleuze and Guattari actually exclude texts written 
in small languages such as Basque from their discussion of minor 
literatures, because of their suggestion that it is only by writing in a major 
language that one can create a true minor literature.160 Yet for Deleuze 
and Guattari, defining a language as minor or major is not about size but 
approach; crucially, even languages considered small can aspire to major 
uses. As they ask, ‘[c]ombien de styles, ou de genres, ou de mouvements 
littéraires, même tout petits, n’ont qu’un rêve: remplir une fonction 
majeure du langage, faire des offres de service comme langue d’Etat, 
langue officielle’?/[h]ow many styles, or genres, or literary movements, 
even very small ones, have only one single dream: to assume a major 
function in language, to offer themselves as a sort of state language, an 
official language’?161 Deleuze and Guattari are here referring to a tendency 
of literary theories to seek to establish themselves as essential structural 
components of our understanding, but the point remains applicable 
to languages in general. Despite being a small language, Basque has 
historically been assigned a major function because of its conception as 
a building block within the struggle for Basque nationalism; for Arana, 
Euskera’s role was that of state language, a role he sought to affirm by 
insisting that Euskera remain rigid and unchanging, and refusing its 
connections with other languages and literatures.162 Given the political 
rhetoric surrounding Basque literature and its ability to revitalize the 
Basque language at the time his career began, Atxaga’s decision to write 
Obabakoak in Basque would thus, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, 
constitute not a minor use of the language but a major one. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, resisting this major use of language 
requires a writer to ‘faire le rêve contraire: savoir créer un devenir-
mineure’/‘[c]reate the opposite dream: know how to create a becoming-
minor’.163 Such a ‘becoming-minor’ would see an author ‘[s]e servir du 
polylinguisme dans sa propre langue, faire de celle-ci un usage mineure 
ou intensif’/‘make use of the polylingualism of one’s own language, to 
make a minor or intensive use of it’.164 Could we read Atxaga’s decision 
to self-translate his texts into Castilian as the locus of such a becoming-
minor? Does his self-translation, which emphasizes the polylingualism of 
Atxaga and his text,  put the stability of the major linguistic, political and 
literary territories which surround his work into flight? 
As I discussed in the Introduction to this chapter, the development 
of Basque literature and the Basque language was for many years 
positioned as part of a political development, and the linguistic 
boundaries of the Basque Country were seen as a way to represent or 
stand in for its fluid, challenged or imagined national and geographic 
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boundaries. In an interview, Atxaga explores this relation between 
language and politics, and suggests that it depends upon maintaining 
the dangerous illusion that language can directly represent or signify a 
national essence: ‘Tampoco estoy de acuerdo con aquellos que defienden 
las lenguas como “una visión del mundo”. Creo que esa concepción es 
sospechosa, y que no tiene otro objetivo que el dominio político. […] 
Hay que ser más sensatos. Lo que muestra una lengua es la historia de la 
gente, cómo vivió y cómo vive’/‘Nor do I agree with those who defend 
languages as a “world view”. I think that view is suspect, and has no other 
objective than political domination. […] We must be more sensible. A 
language is the story of a people, how they lived and how they live’.165
As Atxaga suggests, to equate a language with a particular world 
view is to both acknowledge and elide difference: a language is positioned 
as simultaneously unique – able only to represent the perspective of 
one particular community – and generic – able to represent the shared 
perspective of all the members of that community. In languages conceived 
as major – English, Spanish, German – such an idea appears spurious 
from the outset: speakers of these languages are culturally, politically 
and geographically diverse. But in the case of a language such as Basque, 
with fewer than a million speakers worldwide, and the majority of those 
located in a geographical space of only 20,000 km², this rhetoric of 
linguistic essentialism inevitably carries more weight. In Means Without 
End, Giorgio Agamben suggests that Basque is a language which lacks 
‘state dignity’ – it is not fully attached to the structures of the state and 
therefore cannot be understood only in relation to these. Operating as 
a dialect or a jargon more than a grammar or a structure, Basque, like 
Catalan or Gaelic, loosens the relationship between language and state-
formed identities in a way which Agamben reads as ethical in its ability 
to challenge these essentialist narratives.166 Yet, precisely in the ways in 
which Basque is not a state language, it also offers itself to appropriation 
as such, to a rewriting into the discourses of nationalism, deployed as 
part of the ‘nexus between the existence of language, grammar, people, 
and state’ that Agamben suggests languages conceived as jargons could 
resist.167
In his own discussion of the dangers of linguistic essentialism, 
Atxaga emphasizes the interpretative leap required to equate language 
with ontology. A language, he notes, is a story of a people, and that story 
contains multiple narrative voices, plots and perspectives: to perceive 
a language as representative of a single political or cultural world 
view involves a metaphoric erasure of the empirical diversity of those 
perspectives. As Gabilondo notes, this diversity is integral to the Basque 
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linguistic identity: there are numerous Basque speakers across Europe, 
America and Australia, and their experience of language is conditioned 
by a multilingualism which includes English as well as Spanish and 
French. Gabilondo is clear that this multilingualism remains caught up 
with questions of colonialism, exile, and historical and contemporary 
forms of repression.168 But these entanglements reveal the reality of that 
multilingual experience. To associate just one language with the essence 
of what it is to be Basque is to be guilty of an essentialism which has no 
grounding in contemporary, bilingual, reality. And you cannot tell a story 
of a community – its repression and expansion, violence and peace, past 
and present – by ignoring that reality.
Atxaga is a Basque author. But he is also inscribed into and described 
by a literary and linguistic tradition which exceeds the borders of the 
Basque language, through a continual and constant process of translation. 
Translation, a process both created through and generative of difference 
between and within languages, inevitably reveals the limits of forms 
of linguistic essentialism. Translation shifts language from metaphor 
to metamorphosis, from representation to becoming, from a major use 
into a minor. In translation, language confronts its poverty as well as 
its richness, the limits as well as the possibilities of its structures, words 
and expressions, before finding meaning reconstituted in new forms and 
new voices, in a transformative process of switch and exchange. The very 
existence of translation reveals the impossibility of containing a national 
essence within language: as the translation of Obabakoak into twenty-
five languages suggests, no single language can articulate the experience 
or essence of a community; equally, that experience and essence is never 
only articulable in a single language. 
Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, even single languages 
are always multiple: ‘Même unique, une langue reste une bouillie, un 
mélange schizophrénique, un habit d’Arlequin à travers lequel s’exercent 
des fonctions de langage très différents et des centres de pouvoir 
distincts’/‘Even when it is unique, a language remains a mixture, a 
schizophrenic mélange, a Harlequin costume in which very different 
functions of language and distinct centers of power played out’.169 The 
concept of harlequinism emphasizes both the major and minor functions 
of a language: all languages can delimit and frame, but they can also 
experiment, liberate and transform. And translation, which foregrounds 
the failure of any single language to account for the diverse experiences 
of reality, forces the languages and the texts it touches to reveal their 
harlequinism: their minor and major vibrations, their plurality and their 
difference. 
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For Gabilondo, Atxaga’s self-translation of Obabakoak is problematic 
precisely because of a relation he reads between it and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of minor literature. He suggests that the only way 
in which a minor literature, under this conception, could occur in Spain 
is through ‘linguistic difference’ – essentially by including literatures 
written in other languages, such as Basque, within the Spanish canon.170 
In this regard, the translation of Obabakoak into Spanish becomes key, 
not as a challenge to the hegemony of this canon, but as something to be 
appropriated by the Spanish state: ‘The fact that it was originally written 
in Basque is simply a symbolic sign of its “genuine minority status,” 
for ultimately the text that serves as the basis for translation is not the 
original, but its Spanish version’.171 For Gabilondo, the decision to write 
the text initially in Basque symbolically insists upon the importance of the 
Basque language as the epitome of a minorized, exoticized difference; 
at the same time, however, Atxaga prevents this otherness becoming 
problematic for readers by offering a Castilian translation.
But this potential exoticization and appropriation, this incorporation 
of Atxaga into a Spanish narrative of difference and his ostensible 
resistance to this narrative, is the reality of Atxaga’s writing process 
and his bilingualism. In ‘Preguntas desde Japón’, Atxaga describes his 
experience of translating El hijo del acordeonista from Basque to Castilian 
as one illuminating, and illuminated by, the plurality and difference 
within his own linguistic identity:
desde el mismo momento en que entregué el original a mi editorial 
vasca, Pamiela, mi mujer y yo ya estábamos traduciendo el libro al 
español. […] Esta es la única manera de ser un escritor bilingüe. 
El escritor tiene que desdoblarse. Más aún cuando las dos lenguas 
que maneja son muy distintas, tan distintas como el castellano y el 
Euskera.
from the moment I gave the original to my Basque publisher, 
Pamiela, my wife and I were already translating the book into 
Spanish. […] This is the only way to be a bilingual writer. The writer 
has to double/split themselves. Especially when they are handling 
two languages  which are very different, as different as Castilian and 
Basque’.172
Atxaga’s description of the task of the (self-)translator explores the 
exhausting temporal overlap within the writing of the two texts, and 
emphasizes the collaborative aspect of his translation process. The most 
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interesting element of Atxaga’s discussion, however, is his use of the 
reflexive verb desdoblarse, which connotes both splitting and doubling, to 
describe his experience of translation. The experience of self-translation, 
suggests Atxaga, is one of division and multiplication, of reduction and 
expansion. Self-translation positions Atxaga as a foreigner in both his 
languages: his authorial identity and the identity of his text are formed by 
his relationship to two languages, a relationship  which prevents him and 
his text from inhabiting entirely any single linguistic or literary system. 
Indeed, from the moment of their conception, his texts are preparing 
to be doubled, to be pulled from one system into another, through the 
collision of his two languages. 
By doubling, splitting and shifting his linguistic identity, 
Atxaga’s self-translations disrupt a ‘major’ use of the Basque language 
and literature: language as the site of identity, of possession and of 
delimitation, is metamorphosed into language as the site of becoming-
other. Manterola reveals that Atxaga has described his experience 
of working on Siete casas en Francia with Garikano as a ‘continuous 
flow, from the translation to the original and from the original to 
the translation’.173 In this flow, the text begins in Basque and is then 
translated into Castilian; this Spanish text re-informs the Basque version, 
which is thus modified; these modifications are then retranslated into 
Castilian.174 This movement, between two texts, between two languages, 
between two people, emphasizes the collaborative aspects of Atxaga’s 
particular translation practice, aspects which have in fact been implicit 
in all his translations from Obabakoak onwards. But Atxaga’s discussion 
also speaks to a more general understanding of translation as a tangential 
connection between original and copy, a ‘living-on’, to use Benjamin’s 
term, in which continuation is also, always, transformation.175 In this 
transformative continuation, every new version modifies the versions 
which came before, by its very existence changing and expanding 
the shape of the ‘text’ – which, following Barthes’s definition, we can 
understand as a proliferating and dynamic body of literature which spills 
over from the author’s original ‘work’.176 As translation fragments the 
possibility of linguistic essentialism, it emphasizes in its place linguistic 
diversity and multiplicity, creating a  textual  identity run through with 
vibrations from other voices and other places. This is both a disparate 
and a collective identity, which reforms the spaces of Atxaga’s literary 
practice with every reading, every translation, every text. 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that minor literatures are defined 
by their ability to offer a collective enunciation of a community, or a 
potential community. But if Obabakoak depicts a community of collective 
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voices, loosely framed by the fictional space of Obaba, it is through 
translation that this enunciation becomes truly collective. As these 
stories from Obaba are transmitted in different voices around the world, 
they are opened up to different readings and potential vibrations. In her 
discussion of translating Atxaga’s work in Between the Lines, Jull Costa 
emphasizes this collective encounter within translation: ‘in a sense’, she 
comments, ‘it is a duet […] it’s my voice as well as […] Atxaga’s voice 
[…] and they can’t be separated, that’s the strange thing about it’.177 Like 
the plagiarist whom Axular promotes, the translator operates between 
two literary assemblages, two voices, and between reader and writer, 
and thus becomes part of a collective enunciation which both absorbs 
and emits creativity. As Godard suggests, ‘[a] practice of the outside, 
translation affirms the expansion of creative possibilities in the scattering 
of tongues’.178 These creative possibilities are an encounter, like that 
between wasp and orchid, a two-way interaction between reading and 
writing, creating and critiquing, but one defined by its a-parallel quality, 
which generates movement through the clash of difference.
In creating such an encounter, translation shifts the location of 
textual authority from singular to multiple, reframing in the process our 
understanding of textual truth. As LeVan suggests, translation ‘falsifies’ 
a text: the unique perspective it offers is not limited to its inevitable 
difference from the original, but instead derives from the uniquely 
new truth it offers, a truth that is fermented in its creation through a 
‘population of others’, which operates ‘outside the polar concerns of 
fidelity and freedom that are always accountable to an original’.179 This 
dynamic is critically relevant to the political implications of Atxaga’s 
work, for it positions translation as a medium through which the possible 
alliance of political truth and textual form can be challenged, falsified 
and transformed. Atxaga’s work is always political, always traversed 
with the possibility of collectively enunciating ‘what it means’ to be 
Basque, and always subject to readings which emphasize the relationship 
between language, literature and the Basque political and geographical 
territory. In this regard, it is a text imbued with national meaning. But 
Obabakoak is also political in the sense Deleuze and Guattari perceive 
minor literature to be: it brings different voices together in a collective 
assertion of difference, putting to flight major systems which seek to 
promote a transcendent political or national ideal. More than other 
forms of writing, translation also has the ability to play with questions 
of political and national identity, to connect with and remain separate 
from multiple linguistic, cultural and national paradigms. In translation, 
Atxaga occupies and navigates different linguistic and literary territories, 
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transforming his authorial identity and his text as he seeks to transform 
the creative and critical spaces informing the Basque literary scene.
Epilogue: on not reading Basque
Asserting the power of translation to reformulate, rather than reify, the 
rhetoric of minor/major which accompanies discussions of Atxaga’s 
work raises questions about the ways in which we might read this 
work in its translations from Basque into Castilian and English. In ‘On 
Visible and Invisible Languages: Bernardo Atxaga’s Soinujolearen semea 
in Translation’, Mario Santana suggests that ‘the reader and scholar of 
translated texts is […] bound by particular ethical demands – and that 
those demands are even higher on readers of minority literatures when 
translated into dominant, globalized languages’.180 Santana expresses 
concern about a trend in US universities to approach Atxaga’s work solely 
through the Castilian translations, without addressing the erasures and 
alterations created in the process of translation. In reaction to this, 
Santana invokes Venuti’s call for visibility in translation to suggest that 
an ethical approach to reading translated texts must involve ‘the study 
of the “reminder” [sic] – the textual and linguistic features that are 
added to a translated text and frustrate any attempt to domesticate the 
work within the target language’.181 Santana engages in such a study of 
El hijo del acordeonista, comparing the Basque and Castilian versions 
of the text in order ‘to make visible what the dominant languages of 
globalization would rather keep invisible under the pretense of universal 
transparency’ – in this case, particular Basque words included within the 
Castilian version, which deterritorialize the text, preventing ‘the reader 
from establishing a comfortable, monolingual relation’ with it.182 So too, 
in ‘Historiography and the geo-literary imaginary’, Domínguez calls for 
comparative readings of the Basque and Castilian versions of Atxaga’s 
texts, suggesting that without these the alterations enacted by self-
translation remain encoded and unseen: ‘But seeing that a contrastive 
reading of the original and final texts is not a habitual practice’, he notes, 
‘this Castilian-ization is not noticed by the average Spanish-speaking 
reader’.183
As both Santana and Domínguez suggest, comparative criticism 
is invaluable in helping us understand the powerful political, linguistic 
and cultural violence which can be wielded by translation, particularly 
between asymmetrical languages. Just as Pierre Menard’s Quixote shines 
new light on Cervantes’s text, so all comparison elucidates difference, 
89BERNARDO ATXAGA’S OBABAKOAK
and the variety  between ostensibly similar texts. Yet at the same time, as 
Domínguez suggests above, translations – particularly those from minor 
to major languages – are rarely created to be compared. In this regard, 
comparative readings often rely upon bilingual critics who, by definition, 
have no need of the translation which is their object of study. Critical 
interpretation is often a form of translation, a textual interaction which 
requires others to decode those elements which evade our understanding. 
The process of such decoding adds a new voice and language to the 
multiple languages and voices which already constitute our critical 
vocabulary. But while we always depend upon these voices to guide, 
challenge, and extend our own readings, our dependence increases when 
we require help with interlinguistic as well as intralinguistic decoding. 
This engagement with the work of other critics does not discount the 
importance of comparative readings; indeed, it emphasizes the creative 
collisions and encounters which translation enables. At the same time, 
given that comparative readings are often only made possible by the 
participation of those who do not require the translations which they 
explore, it seems reasonable to ask whether comparison is the only 
ethical approach to reading in translation. 
For Deleuze, a comparative search for resemblance or dissimilarity 
misses the fundamental element at play within all forms of repetition: the 
innate, interiorized difference which means that two events, two texts, 
two moments of thought or expression, can never be the same, but only 
part of a continuous process of becoming, transformation and change. 
Crucially, as Cliff Stagoll suggests, such becomings cannot be understood 
comparatively, for they are unique in and of themselves: 
For Deleuze […] becoming is neither merely an attribute of, 
nor an intermediary between events, but a characteristic of the 
very production of events. It is not that the time of change exists 
between one event and another, but that every event is but a unique 
instant of production in a continual flow of changes evident in the 
cosmos.184
For Deleuze, thinking about repetition as becoming is not about 
comparison, nor about subtracting an end point from a start point, but 
rather about seeing the in-between, the intermediate, as the unique 
point in and of itself. When thinking about the relationship between an 
original and a translation, Deleuze’s perception of becoming would mean 
replacing a rhetoric of comparison with a relation of difference, governed 
by the a-parallel and developing relation between two texts. 
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What would this move look like? A shift from comparison to 
difference would have a powerful effect, both on the ways in which we 
read translations, and on our understanding of the nature of translation 
itself. Reading translations through a narrative of resemblance, as 
similar to or different from an original text, maintains certain hierarchies 
between source and target, original and copy, foreign and domestic. In 
The Bilingual Text, Hokenson and Munson suggest that the act of self-
translation inevitably disrupts such traditional binaries: ‘Theoretical 
models of source and target languages […] break down in the dual text 
by one hand, as do linguistic models of lexical equivalence, and foreign 
versus domestic culture. Literary critical models […] of translation as 
diminution and loss, a falling away from the original, similarly cannot 
serve.’185
But if these models do not serve, they remain surprisingly dominant, 
particularly in relation to self-translations between minor and major 
languages and cultures. The strength of these hierarchies is apparent in 
the translations of Atxaga’s work. As Santana describes, the Catalan and 
Galician translations of Atxaga’s El hijo del acordeonista enact a subtle 
denigration of the Castilian text, by claiming ‘to be translations of the 
original Basque’ when ‘they are in fact based on the Spanish version’.186 
Santana reads this erasure of the Spanish version as a form of resistance 
on the part of the Catalan and Galician translators and publishing houses 
to the dominance of Castilian within the Iberian Peninsula. But, he notes, 
this erasure also belittles the experience of second-hand translation, 
positioning it, as Gideon Toury suggests, as ‘some kind of a disease to be 
shunned […] an approach [which] only reflects a fallacious projection 
of a currently prevalent norm, ascribing uppermost value to the ultimate 
original, onto the plane of theoretical premises’.187
Margaret Jull Costa has revealed that a similar sense of shame 
dominates her experience of translating from Atxaga’s Castilian text: 
‘I do feel embarrassed about it, not translating from the Basque’, she 
suggests, describing ‘that feeling that I’m translating from a translation, 
even though the translator of that translation is the author, and so I’m at 
another remove from the original’.188 Jull Costa’s comment, like Toury’s, 
echoes the rhetoric of resemblance which, in Rethinking Translation, 
Lawrence Venuti suggests can condition perceptions of translation, 
ranking translation according to a Platonic distinction between authorized 
copy and deviant simulacrum.189 By ranking the translation below the 
original, such cultural practices marginalize the translation, insisting 
that it can only be understood in relation to that original. While self-
translations might be expected to be exempt from such marginalization – 
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they are, after all, a copy true to the author – their status as a translation, 
as a secondary repetition of a pre-existing text, means that the criteria of 
resemblance continues to apply. The implication that a self-translation 
might be less authentic than the original text has particular resonance in 
relation to my reading of Obabakoak. If the Castilian text is perceived as 
less valid, less authoritative and less original than the Basque one, does 
this reduce the validity and authority of any reading based upon that 
translation? 
If our readings of translations are forged solely in relation to Platonic 
conceptions of originality, resemblance and representation, then the 
answer is probably yes. But if we open ourselves to other ways of thinking 
translation, then we also open up other ways of reading translated texts, 
other avenues of productive exploration. For Deleuze, readings which 
insist upon viewing simulacratic texts as an unsatisfactory imitation of an 
already failed copy of reality fail to grasp the disruptive and generative 
nature of those texts: 
Le simulacre est construit sur une disparité, sur une différence, 
il intériorise une dissimilitude. C’est pourquoi nous ne pouvons 
même plus le définir par rapport au modèle qui s’impose aux 
copies, modèle du Même dont dérive la ressemblance des copies. Si 
le simulacre a encore un modèle, c’est un autre modèle, un modèle 
de l’Autre dont découle une dissemblance intériorisée.
The simulacrum is constructed around a disparity, a difference; 
it interiorizes a dissimilitude. That is why we can no longer even 
define it with regard to the model at work in copies – the model of 
the Same from which the resemblance of the copy derives. If the 
simulacrum still has a model, it is another one, a model of the Other 
from which it follows an interiorized dissimilarity.190
Deleuze’s distinction positions the simulacrum as difference in and of 
itself, rather than in relation to an external comparative, as a becoming 
of an event, a text, an experience. This becoming is innately creative in its 
ability to destabilize the value of terms such as original and copy, model 
and reproduction. Deleuze’s conception of the simulacrum sees it as a 
uniquely chaotic, disruptive, but inherently joyful force for celebrating 
difference, one which leads to the collapse of overarching authorities, 
and the birth of a repetitive, but illimitably different world – a world in 
which resemblance is not sought, in which hierarchies can be dissolved, 
and the power of the unique affirmed: ‘Il n’y a pas de hiérarchie possible: 
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ni second, ni troisième… […] C’est la ressemblance qui se dit de la 
différence intériorisée, et l’identité, du Différent comme puissance 
première.’/‘There is no possible hierarchy: neither second, nor third […] 
It is resemblance that speaks of interiorized difference and identity, of 
Difference as a primary power.’191 In Deleuze’s reading, when unleashed 
from a rhetoric of same as or different from, the simulacrum is freed to 
release its own powerfully charged originality and difference. 
To read not only Atxaga’s self-translations, but all the translations 
of his work as a simulacrum in Deleuze’s sense would transform the 
power differential between Basque and Castilian, or English, French, 
Russian or Vietnamese; between original and translation; and between 
author and translator. Originality and difference would be inserted into 
those translations, forms of writing-as-becoming which are different in 
and of themselves, rather than only in relation to another text. Such a 
project might be utopian, for how can we understand difference without 
thinking about similarity? But it sparks debate around the ethical 
frameworks through which we can approach our own relations – political, 
personal, and textual. As Heidegger commented, ‘Tell me what you think 
about translation and I will tell you who you are’: how we think about 
translation and about reading in translation reveals a great deal about 
our own critical practice.192 If we read translations only in their relation 
to another text we diminish them, whether intentionally or not, and in so 
doing diminish the potential translation offers us as a mode of thinking, 
reading, and writing. 
To read a translated text as simulacratic in a Deleuzian rather 
than a Platonic sense would be to perceive its differences as inevitable, 
as the heart of a liberating exploration of the structures of textual 
authority and linguistic power. To read in this way acknowledges our 
own limitations as critics, for it forces us to accept the difference within 
every textual event which renders our own interpretations transitory, 
unfinished and unfinishable. Translation is, inevitably, an encounter with 
another: as Brodzki suggests, ‘translation is the mode by which various 
discourses read each other, locate their commonalities, and name their 
differences’.193 But perceiving these differences and commonalities 
need not be exclusively conceived as an attempt to map the violence 
and erasures of translation: it can also be part of an acceptance of those 
differences, an acknowledgement that without them our own experience 
would be a little less rich, an awareness that these differences are the 
very heart of translating, of writing, of reading, of critiquing, of thinking. 
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Chapter 2
Milan Kundera’s Le Livre du rire et de 
l’oubli: a hospitable translation
Introduction: the paradox of translation
‘les traductions représentent tout’/‘translation is everything’. 
– Milan Kundera1 
‘translation is my nightmare’ – Milan Kundera2
As his somewhat contradictory definitions of translation quoted above 
suggest, Milan Kundera has a complicated relationship with translation. 
Kundera’s ‘authorization’ of the French translations of the texts he produced 
before he began writing only in French in 1993 suggests an approach 
to translation concerned with translatability and absolute fidelity to an 
original text. But in his texts themselves, Kundera is fascinated by issues 
of semantic instability and miscommunication, exploring the inevitable 
betrayals of meaning which arise as we seek to understand one another 
and ourselves. How can we interpret this paradox between Kundera’s 
approach to the translation of his texts and the issues with which he is 
concerned within those texts? In this chapter, I explore this question, 
focusing predominantly upon Le Livre du rire et de l’oubli (henceforth Le 
Livre), a text which, while originally written in Czech, was first published 
in 1979 in its French translation by François Kérel. Le Livre consequently 
occupies the fascinating position of having been originally published in 
translation, originally read by the majority of its readers in translation, 
but originally written in another language. In French translation it is 
thus simultaneously original and copy, a text which, in its very existence, 
queries the hierarchy of that ostensible binary. 
Within the text of Le Livre, Kundera highlights one particular 
instance of linguistic ‘untranslatability’: the Czech word litost. Litost, for 
Kundera, defines a contradictory emotion which arises when our need 
to make perfect sense of our experience – our desire for translatability – 
confronts our inability to do so – the inevitability of untranslatability. This 
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contradiction is an unavoidable element of our experiences, personal and 
political, but it is potentially dangerous: as Kundera explores, dreams of 
unity and consistency are often contingent upon repressing difference, 
both in our own identities and in our relations to those around us; upon 
forgetting the material reality of our individual and collective histories; 
and upon rejecting anything or anyone we deem to be untranslatable 
in the framework of our thought or action. In Le Livre Kundera explores 
such forgettings through the link he creates between lyric poetry and a 
certain type of totalitarian thinking, embodied in the Communist regime 
which came to power in Czechoslovakia in 1948. Both lyric poetry and 
totalitarian thinking, he suggests, share a desire to remove ambiguity in 
order to embrace absolutism, whether in art, life or politics. Kundera’s 
criticism of lyric poetry in Le Livre is not unique to this novel: in several 
of his texts, Kundera creates a heuristic opposition between the perfect 
translation of experience into aesthetics offered by the poetic form and a 
more ambiguous translation offered by the novel form. But as always in 
Kundera’s work, such an opposition contains a paradox: as Kundera’s use 
of the novel form attests, the novel has its own poetry, which we can read 
in the polyphony, the repetition, the structural and thematic variations 
through which Kundera explores and challenges the forgettings he 
suggests are enacted by lyrical constructions. 
Translation is crucial to the particular poetics which Kundera 
develops in Le Livre, and to his ability to articulate the dangers as well as 
the attractions of seeking perfection aesthetically, textually, personally 
or politically. In the novel we follow a journey of translation, one which 
begins, with litost, in linguistic untranslatability, but which ultimately 
becomes an exploration of social, political and affective untranslatability: 
a movement from the praxis of translation to an ethics of translation. 
This ethics, I suggest, can be explored through an engagement with two 
different dichotomies within translation theory: untranslatable versus 
translatable, and betrayal versus fidelity. In Sur la traduction (2004), 
Paul Ricœur explores the limitations of these dichotomies, and, from 
the spaces between the two, negotiates his ethical paradigm of linguistic 
hospitality. In this hospitality, what is foreign and untranslatable 
is incorporated into the desire for perfection, while that desire for 
perfection continues to expand and stretch the limits of what we believe 
we can transmit between self and other, home and abroad, domestic 
and foreign. In this chapter I argue that Kundera’s novelistic process is 
concerned with a similar hospitality, one which is embodied within his 
exploration of litost, the untranslatable word which always, endlessly, 
demands translation.
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Kundera: writing between identities
Translatability and untranslatability
It was the impact of the political situation in Czechoslovakia which 
pushed issues of translation to the forefront of Kundera’s literary career. 
Kundera joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) in 1948, 
and, apart from a six-year spell between 1950 and 1956 when he was 
expelled from the Party, remained a member until after the collapse of 
the liberal ideals of the 1968 Prague Spring. While some of Kundera’s 
early writing reflected Communist ideals, he subsequently became vocal 
about the importance of literary autonomy. In a speech given at the 
Fourth Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers in 1967, he spoke out for 
the importance of artistic and intellectual independence, commenting 
that any restrictions upon this were ‘a chain entangling the limbs of 
our national literature as it tries to bound forward’.3 Any possibility of 
intellectual freedom was dramatically reduced by the Russian invasion 
of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the subsequent clampdown by the 
KSČ: following this, Kundera’s experiences as a writer and an intellectual 
altered irreversibly. In 1970 he was expelled from the Party, his teaching 
post was withdrawn, and all his books were banned. Kundera moved to 
France in 1975, and in 1979, following the publication of Le Livre, his 
Czech citizenship was revoked. 
Like Bernardo Atxaga, Kundera highlights the reductive political 
readings and forms of censorship which dominate when an author writes 
in a minor language such as Czech.4 Unlike Atxaga, however, Kundera 
has shifted his writing entirely into a major language: since 1993 he 
has written only in French.  In her book Kundera: The Ambiguity of 
Authorship, Christine Angela Knoop explains Kundera’s decision to write 
in French as part of an attempt to evade what he perceives to be reductive 
interpretations based only upon his national identity and biography.5 
Kundera has certainly revealed a mistrust of responses which focus 
heavily upon his personal and political biography, insisting somewhat 
polemically that critics who read a novel by an Eastern European writer 
according to ‘some wretched political code’ are ‘murder[ing] it, no less 
brutally than the work of the Stalinist dogmatists’.6 Tijana Miletic’s 
comment, discussed in Chapter 1, that writing in a second language 
provides bilingual authors ‘with the freedom from the conscious and 
unconscious heritage of their mother tongue’ carries more weight 
in relation to Kundera than to Atxaga, for the relationship between 
Kundera’s two languages is not caught up in a complex political, cultural 
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or economic diglossia.7 In this sense, French offers Kundera a form of 
expression through which he can attempt to elude the specific political 
‘code’ which he suggests surrounds his work when produced in Czech.
Kundera’s choice of French is not, however, an attempt to position 
his work within an exclusively French tradition. As he comments in Une 
rencontre (2009) in relation to the work of the Franco-Czech author 
Vera Linhartova: ‘Quand Linhartova écrit en français, est-elle encore 
un écrivain tchèque? Non. Devient-elle un écrivain français? Non plus. 
Elle est ailleurs’/‘When Linhartova writes in French, is she still a Czech 
writer? No. Does she become a French writer? No, not that either. She 
is elsewhere’.8 This ‘ailleurs’ is a textual as well as a biographical space, 
concerned with the political and the national but not delimited by these. 
While ostensibly motivated by necessity, Kundera’s decision to write in 
French can also be read as an attempt to inhabit and mirror such a space 
within his texts and own authorial identity. In fact, Kundera’s ‘ailleurs’ 
does have a geographical and cultural location. In his 1983 essay ‘Un 
occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l’Europe Centrale’, Kundera suggests 
that Central European literature has been betrayed by critical readings 
which insist upon emphasizing its connections to the East as opposed 
to the West.9 In this sense, the ‘ailleurs’ Kundera occupies through his 
decision to write in French – an elsewhere which is nonetheless situated 
within a very specific Western European tradition – enables Kundera to 
reframe his texts within this cultural heritage. 
As Michelle Woods notes, however, Kundera’s decision to write 
in French has been seen as a ‘betrayal’ of his language and a ‘snub’ to 
his Czech heritage.10 In fact, accusations of linguistic betrayal had 
been levelled at Kundera even before this decision, with several critics 
suggesting that Kundera had created a deliberately ‘translatable’ style in 
his Czech texts to render them easier to transmit to a non-Czech literary 
market, and that he removed their culturally specific elements when 
authorizing their French versions. In this regard, Allison Stanger suggests 
that Kundera erased specific elements of Czech history in the English and 
French versions of La Plaisanterie in order to make it more accessible to 
a foreign readership.11 Stanisław Barańczak believes that Kundera wrote 
in Czech ‘in a deliberately translatable, clear and unequivocal style, 
so that the translator would not be prodded into too many deviations 
from the intended meaning’.12 For Søren Frank, Kundera attempted to 
neutralize the linguistic and cultural specificity of his Czech texts in his 
revised translations of them into French. Frank notes that even when 
Kundera includes Czech words in his French texts, he removes the Czech 
diacritics – lítost appears as litost, for example. Moreover, according to 
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Frank, Kundera adds explanatory passages for certain parts of his texts 
which might be too culturally specific for a Western reader.13 
These accusations of enhanced translatability position Kundera as 
on a quest to attain the holy grail of translation practice: a translation 
which could be achieved without any distortion of the original text – 
which also implies a faith in the existence of a translatable style which 
could obviate or diminish such distortions. Such a style, as Florence 
Uniacke suggests, would be designed to enhance the commercial viability 
of a text: 
It is often heard that to be truly great you must achieve international 
success. Combine this view with a competitive market and it’s easy 
to envisage a writer sidestepping lexical gaps. This trend has been 
termed ‘Literary Starbucks’, where publishers are seeing writers 
adopting more ‘neutral’ language and avoiding cultural idioms in 
order to appeal to foreign readers and editors.14
In the idea that lexical gaps can be sidestepped, and the differences of 
language neutralized, there resides a utopian faith in the possibility of 
a truly translatable form, style or language. But what is an unequivocal, 
translatable style? Could such a style, if it exists, really neutralize 
linguistic difference and so prevent deviations of meaning? Given the 
complexities of interlingual translation, even if we were to specify the 
elements of an absolutely translatable style it is unlikely that we would 
be able to realize such a style in practice. 
But, whether or not it is actually possible, the desire for full 
translatability reveals a problematic conception of translation, tasking it 
with the absolute elimination of linguistic and cultural difference. In his 
essay Sur la traduction, Paul Ricœur explores the concept of the ‘perfect 
translation’ which, he suggests, stems from just such a desire. Ricœur 
argues that ‘Le rêve de la traduction parfaite équivaut au souhait d’un 
gain pour la traduction, d’un gain qui serait sans perte’/‘The dream of 
the perfect translation amounts to the wish that translation would gain, 
gain without losing.’15 This gain would enable translation to transcend 
its own limitations and offer access to a linguistic universal. Ricœur 
offers two examples of the form such a task of perfect translation could 
take: either a Borgesian ‘Library of Babel’ (which would encompass 
every possible text and thereby erase the idea of untranslatability), or a 
Benjaminian universal language capable of transcending the very need 
for translation.16 Both of these models reveal the desire to erase from 
a language what is untranslatable within it, that which simultaneously 
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calls for translation and makes translation so challenging: ‘la différence 
indépassable du propre et de l’étranger’/‘the impassable difference of the 
peculiar and the foreign’.17 The perfect translation is, then, constructed 
from a wish to neutralize the possibility of linguistic, textual and cultural 
misunderstanding, and to erase specificity in the name of universal 
comprehension.
The criticism levelled at Kundera implicates him in this search for 
neutrality, shifting the emancipatory value of the elsewhere he seeks 
to inhabit through his bilingual writing into a rootless anywhere or 
nowhere. This shift, as Emily Apter discusses in Against World Literature, 
endorses cultural equivalence, replacing an ethical acknowledgement of 
forms of linguistic or cultural untranslatability with an insistence upon 
universal understanding.18 Yet, as Frank points out, any attempt to attain 
translatability for the novel form via cultural neutrality is fundamentally 
at odds with both the theories Kundera espouses within his novels 
themselves and the form through which he articulates those theories.19 
Kundera’s texts are frequently formed through a polyphonic technique 
which disrupts any generalized or universal narrative viewpoint. In Le 
Rideau (2005), he writes of the power of novels to fragment the dominance 
of single narratorial perspectives, ‘casser ce pouvoir, […] détrôner le 
narrateur, […] éclairer une seule «story» sous des angles multiples et faire 
[du] roman un carnaval des vérités individuelles et de leur irréductible 
relativité’/‘to break that power, to dethrone the narrator [...] throw light 
on a single “story” from several angles and [make the] novel a carnival 
of separate truths and their irreducible relativity’.20 This fragmentation 
infiltrates all Kundera’s novels, which through a combination of 
personal and political stories explore the endless mistranslations and 
misinterpretations involved in attempts to communalize meaning. But 
are such textual assertions about the relativity of our individual truths not 
fundamentally contradicted by Kundera’s desire to make these assertions 
universally understood through translation? How are we to understand 
the tensions which exist between form and content, theory and practice, 
in Kundera’s work? What is the nature of the dissonance between them 
that he seems to manufacture?
Authority and ambiguity
Kundera’s desire for translatability should be understood within two 
different contexts: his experience of political exile, and the nature of his 
theoretical assertions. Firstly, Kundera’s exile to France, combined with 
the repression of his books in Czechoslovakia, meant that translation 
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was crucial to the dissemination of his work. He claims that ‘my books 
lived their lives as translations; as translations they were read, criticised, 
judged, accepted or rejected’.21 Translation became a necessity, but more 
than this, it became ‘everything’. For if Kundera’s original language could 
no longer be his literary language, then the alternatives before him were 
inevitably conditioned by the experience of translation. Kundera could 
write his texts in Czech but publish them first in French translation, 
positioning the Czech text as a blueprint for the translation, rather 
than the translation as a copy of the original – the approach he took 
in Le Livre. He could write them in Czech and then self-translate them, 
creating two versions of the same text himself. (Kundera has ostensibly 
never taken this approach, although there is a critical consensus that 
L’Immortalité (1993) is a self-translation which Kundera published under 
the pseudonym Eva Bloch).22 Or he could write only in French, thereby 
replacing Czech with his second language and inevitably bringing an 
element of translation into his writing process. This third option is the 
one Kundera has followed since 1993. On one level, these linguistic 
decisions can be read as a journey from translation to original writing, 
from the Czech of the exiled and censored writer to the French of the 
naturalized citizen. At the same time, each of these literary practices 
reveals the impossibility of separating Kundera’s writing from issues of 
translation: in each of these options, forms of linguistic transference, 
doubling or substitution are implicit in the original instance of textual 
creation. Indeed, Kundera acknowledges that, before he began writing 
only in French, he created his texts in Czech with Kérel in mind. This 
admission, rather than confirming Kundera’s quest for ‘translatability’, 
merely reflects the reality of a situation in which Kérel was his first, his 
only, and his most essential reader.23 To indict Kundera for writing with 
an eye to translation is thus to address a fact rather than formulate a 
plausible accusation.
The second context within which Kundera’s desire for translatability 
should be understood is the broader framework of his affirmations – 
taken as a whole – on the nature of textual work, affirmations which 
help to clarify the apparent dissonance between his theories and his 
practice. The main accusation Kundera levels at the idea of universality, 
whether on a personal, political or textual level, is that it operates by 
rejecting ambiguity, seeking to create perfect alliances between thought 
and word, word and action, action and theory, theory and existence. 
Throughout his work, Kundera repeatedly highlights the ethical power of 
ambiguity, suggesting that the ability to understand the contingency of 
our experience requires an act of heroism: ‘Comprendre avec Cervantes 
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF TRANSLATION106
le monde comme ambiguïté, avoir à affronter, au lieu d’une seule vérité 
absolue, un tas de vérités relatives qui se contredisent […] posséder donc 
comme seule certitude la sagesse de l’incertitude, cela exige une force non 
moins grande.’/‘To take, with Cervantes, the world as ambiguity, to be 
obliged to face not a single absolute truth but a welter of contradictory 
truths […], to have as one’s only certainty the wisdom of uncertainty, 
requires no less courage.’24
The value Kundera assigns to ambiguity here, and throughout his 
work, elucidates somewhat the contradictions between his apparent 
desire for translatability and the general philosophical approach he 
espouses. For this contradiction reasserts, in Knoop’s phrase, the 
ambiguity of Kundera’s authorship, an ambiguity founded precisely 
on a continually reframed dissonance between theory and practice. 
The courage Kundera associates with accepting uncertainty resides 
in the difficulty of suppressing our human desire to convert relativity 
into certainty: ‘L’homme souhaite un monde où le bien et le mal soient 
nettement discernables car est en lui le désir, inné et indomptable, de 
juger avant de comprendre. Sur ce désir sont fondées les religions et les 
idéologies. […] Elles exigent que quelqu’un ait raison’/‘Man desires a 
world where good and evil can be clearly distinguished, for he has an 
innate and irrepressible desire to judge before he understands. Religions 
and ideologies are founded on this desire. […] They require that someone 
be right’, he writes in L’Art du roman.25 As Kundera’s somewhat dogmatic 
tone in this statement attests, a desire to attain certainty is present in all our 
pronouncements, interpretations and judgements, including Kundera’s 
own. Indeed, as Liisa Steinby notes, the forcefulness of Kundera’s textual 
pronouncements makes him a difficult author to approach critically: 
he writes, Steinby suggests, ‘in a manner that saves scholars from their 
usual task of grasping the thematic content and formal features’, so that 
critics often find his interpretation of a text included within its pages.26 
But, as I go on to discuss, it is through as opposed to despite this conflict 
in Kundera’s work – between the ambiguity he promotes as the language 
of the novel and the attractions of certainty – that we can see the ethical 
charge of Kundera’s approach.
Acknowledging this ambiguity and its accompanying desire 
for certainty is crucial when interrogating Kundera’s relationship to 
translation. If there is a dissonance between Kundera’s attempts to 
universalize elements of his writing and his sense of the relativity of 
all such pronouncements, there is an even greater one between these 
pronouncements and his engagement with the translation of his texts 
themselves. Kundera plays an active role in the translations of his texts, 
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particularly the French translations, which he revised between 1985 and 
1987, and which he now describes as ‘authentic’ versions of his work, 
equivalent to the Czech originals. This contentious description, with its 
implicit destabilization of the very concept of originality, gives credence 
to Kundera’s reputation as an exponent of absolute authorial control, 
and in fact, Kundera’s decision to revise the French translations of his 
texts did stem from his growing and vocal dismay at the alterations which 
the first French translator of his books, Marcel Aymonin, had made to 
La Plaisanterie when it was translated in 1968. Realizing that these 
translations, rather than the Czech originals, were serving as the source 
texts for translators of his work who could not read Czech, Kundera 
sought to rectify the flaws he perceived in them.27 As Woods discusses, 
subsequent translations of Kundera’s work into English have been taken 
from these authorized French versions, thereby giving Kundera ‘ultimate 
authority over the English translations’, as well as the Czech originals 
and their French counterparts. Woods suggests that Kundera has in 
fact ‘effectively translated’ both the definitive French and the definitive 
English versions of La Plaisanterie through the extensive additions and 
alterations he has made to the translations of both texts.28 
As Woods notes, Kundera’s interest in the translation process has 
led him to engage in extensive debates and disagreements with both 
publishers and translators of his work.29 These debates have given 
Kundera a certain notoriety among critics, who ‘castigate Kundera […] 
for a quixotic and irrelevant game of textual changes’, designed purely 
to assert his authorial power.30 Knoop suggests that Kundera’s insistence 
upon controlling the translations of his work stems from an unswerving 
dedication to the hegemony of authorship which he perceives translation 
fatally to distort:
in a rather conservative way, he believes in ‘faithful’ translations 
of texts and is very involved in their creation. This seemingly 
unsophisticated position is connected to an understanding of 
art as containing a certain, fixed essence that can be maintained 
irrespective of the language used to express, and is closely related 
to his refusal to allow for the semiotic complexity of the issue of 
non-mother tongue writing, the problematic of which must be very 
present to him.31
For Knoop, Kundera’s attitude to translation reveals an essentialist vision 
of texts which rejects the impact of language upon meaning. Knoop is 
by no means alone in her assessment of Kundera’s relationship with 
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF TRANSLATION108
translation: in The Scandals of Translation, Lawrence Venuti uses Kundera 
as an example of an author with a distinctly unethical approach to 
translation, one that is ‘remarkably naïve’. ‘He assumes that the meaning 
of a foreign text can avoid change in translation, that the foreign writer’s 
intention can travel unadulterated across a linguistic and cultural divide’, 
claims Venuti. ‘Kundera doesn’t want to recognize the linguistic and 
cultural differences that translation must negotiate’.32 More recently, 
in 2013, Liisa Steinby commented that Kundera ‘considers his own 
language to be clear and explicit’ and, because of this, insists ‘that the 
translator find exact equivalents’, suggesting that Kundera maintains 
a faith in the possibility of absolute semantic identification between 
different languages.33 
A Sisyphean task
Readings such as those offered by Steinby, Venuti and Knoop position 
Kundera as an author who believes in absolute translatability, in the 
possibility of a semantic essence which can be transferred from language 
to language intact, provided the translator has the capability and 
understanding to do so. Kundera has certainly acknowledged his great 
interest in translation, and his desire to control how his work is produced 
in other languages. He writes that ‘[j]usqu’alors je n’avais pas l’habitude 
de lire et de contrôler mes traductions; aujourd’hui, hélas, je consacre 
à cette activité sisyphesque presque plus de temps qu’à l’écriture elle-
même’/‘until then, I was not in the habit of reading and controlling 
my translations; nowadays, alas, I dedicate almost more time to that 
Sisyphean task than I do to writing itself’.34 Yet in Kundera’s description 
of the monitoring of the translation of his works as a Sisyphean task, 
a never-ending attempt to direct what is disseminated, resides the 
implication that he is only too aware that there is no fixed essence to his 
texts, no stable element which can survive intact the semantic transfer of 
translation. In Greek mythology, Sisyphus was condemned for eternity to 
haul a stone up a mountain in Hades, only to watch it roll down again as 
soon as he reached the top. Kundera’s efforts to control the translation of 
his work reflect a similar attempt to find a resting place for the weighty 
stone of textual ambiguity. But, like Sisyphus, Kundera is only too aware 
that this desire can never be realized.
In her excellent Milan Kundera and Translation, Michelle Woods 
suggests that the central connection between Kundera’s attitude to 
translation and his novelistic poetics is his focus upon the inevitability 
of untranslatability between various forms of communication, and 
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therefore the impossibility of achieving the type of translatability that 
he is frequently accused of pursuing in his writing practice. ‘Kundera 
does not believe a translation can be absolutely faithful to the original’, 
Woods claims. ‘The untranslatability of language because of cultural 
differences inherent in it is a paradox that Kundera focuses on again and 
again’.35 Woods argues cogently for re-envisioning Kundera’s perceived 
relationship to translation, precisely because she believes Kundera 
to be an author who reveals an almost hyper-awareness of the impact 
of language upon the meaning of texts and, therefore, the potential 
pitfalls involved in any attempt to transfer meaning interlinguistically 
and intralinguistically. This hyper-awareness, which is integral to both 
Kundera’s novels and his theoretical texts, leads Woods to conclude 
that Kundera’s attitude to translation is neither naive nor mistrustful, 
but instead one informed by ‘insight into misunderstanding rather than 
communication as the human norm of language’.36
This insight is apparent throughout several of Kundera’s texts: 
L’Insoutenable légèreté de l’être, L’Immortalité and Le Livre all include 
extended explorations of the forms we use to convey ideas, emotions and 
experiences – words, texts, gestures, expressions – and their ability to be 
endlessly translated into different modes and models of understanding 
and communication. In L’Insoutenable légèreté de l’être, Kundera creates 
an entire section, entitled ‘Les Mots incompris’ – words misunderstood 
– in order to reveal, through the mutual incomprehension of two lovers, 
Sabina and Franz, the multiplicity of perspectives which the same 
situation can engender. Franz, a professor, lives his life according to the 
idea of faithfulness: he has faith in absolute love, in grand ideals and in the 
beauty of a total sacrifice for those ideals. Sabina, an artist, is the mistress 
of betrayal; she refuses to weaken herself in love, evades idealism and 
seeks absolute freedom rather than absolute loyalty. In Sabina and Franz’s 
attempts at communication, the differences implicit in their respective 
attitudes cause every word the one utters to become fundamentally 
incomprehensible to the other: ‘[i]ls comprenaient exactement le sens 
logique des mots qu’ils se disaient, mais sans entendre le murmure du 
fleuve sémantique qui coulait à travers ces mots’/‘although they had a 
clear understanding of the logical meaning of the words they exchanged, 
they failed to hear the semantic susurrus of the river flowing through 
them’.37 This ‘semantic susurrus’ is the result of the life they have lived, 
which causes the same words to have entirely different meanings for 
each of them.  Interestingly, the split between Sabina and Franz mirrors 
one of the crucial binaries in translation theory: in Ricœur’s terms 
‘fidelité versus trahison’ /’faithfulness versus betrayal’.38 While Kundera’s 
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pronouncements on translation suggest a desire for fidelity to the original 
text, his exploration of Franz and Sabina’s different attitudes to existence 
reframes the value assigned to this fidelity: while Sabina’s attitude of 
betrayal prevents her from engaging with another in an individual sense, 
Franz’s faith in grand ideals is revealed as both absurd and destructive on 
a much larger scale. Kundera’s refusal to prioritize one attitude over the 
other is symptomatic of his sense of their proximity, a proximity which, 
as I will discuss later in this chapter, is integral to understanding his 
discussion of the betrayals of translation.
It is not only the endless mutability of people’s words which Kundera 
explores in his fiction, but also the mutability of people’s movement. In 
L’Immortalité he focuses upon the semiotic translation of a single gesture, 
and its changing affective meaning as it is performed by three different 
women in three different temporal and spatial moments. As a teenager, 
Agnès watches her father’s secretary wave goodbye to him, with a gesture 
‘si inattendu, si beau, qu’il resta dans la mémoire d’Agnès comme la trace 
d’un éclair’/‘so unexpected and beautiful that it remained in Agnès’s 
memory like the imprint of a lightning bolt’.39 Agnès begins to use the 
gesture herself when she says goodbye to her boyfriends, mimicking 
it so that she too may access the desires and depths which she equates 
with adulthood. But one day she sees her eleven-year-old sister, Laura, 
making the same gesture, and realizes that ‘ce geste fût à la disposition de 
tout le monde et nullement sa propriété; comme si, en l’accomplissant, 
elle se rendait coupable d’un vol ou d’une contrefaçon’/‘the gesture was 
available to all and thus did not really belong to her: when she waved 
her arm, she was actually committing theft or forgery’.40 In Kundera’s 
exploration here, we see the same gesture translated in time, place and 
relation, its status as original masked by the possibility that it may always 
be appropriated by another, its affective stability belied.41
Both L’Immortalité and L’Insoutenable légèreté de l’être thus 
foreground the impossibility of any ‘certain, fixed essence that can 
be maintained irrespective of the language used to express it’.42 The 
interaction between Kundera’s novelistic discussions of the fluidity of 
language, on the one hand, and his interference in the translations of 
his texts, on the other, draws attention to the inherent tensions running 
through his work: the tension between writing in Czech and writing in 
French; between the role of the translator and the role of the author; 
between interpreting a text and appropriating it; between seeking 
translation and valorizing its impossibility. In these tensions, however, 
and particularly in the dissonant connection which exists between his 
words and his actions, lies the productive charge of Kundera’s work. This 
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charge is best articulated through an exploration of a text which itself 
sits between French and Czech; between theory and fiction; between 
Kundera’s voice and the voice of his critics, readers and translators, 
namely the paratext which appears at the end of the Gallimard editions 
of Kundera’s work. This reads: ‘Entre 1985 et 1987 les traductions 
françaises des ouvrages écrits en tchèque ont été entièrement revues 
par l’auteur, et dès lors, ont la même valeur d’authenticité que le texte 
tchèque’/‘Between 1985 and 1987 the French translations of works 
written in Czech were entirely reviewed by the author and now have 
the same authentic value as the Czech text’.43 This comment appears 
to return us to the idea of Kundera as ultimate authoritarian, seeking 
to control his texts and their authenticity. And yet, as with so many of 
the comments connected to Kundera, this statement elides as much 
as it reveals. For ‘the same authentic value’ can only be assigned if we 
can fully understand and control the original, authentic value of an 
utterance, a gesture, or a text. And this understanding is one which, 
throughout his texts, Kundera reveals to be a Sisyphean activity. The 
quest to understand the nature of authentic value, though it is both 
impossible and endless, is also seemingly inescapable, being intimately 
connected to our sense of our own lives and our relations with others. 
The value of Kundera’s texts thus lies in their acknowledgement of their 
own uncertainty, inauthenticity and instability, an acknowledgement 
implicit in Kundera’s continual rewriting and revision of his texts 
through translation.
Form and architecture
Kundera’s acknowledgement of his texts’ instability is tempered, however, 
by his faith in the illuminating power of form. If content can never resist 
the impact of context, it is form alone which can give shape and purpose 
to our interpretations, enabling us to engage productively with issues of 
semantic and affective mobility. Kundera’s texts are based around certain 
formal principles that often reflect Bakhtin’s theories of the novel: 
a musical approach, which includes shifts in tempo and polyphonic 
variations upon different themes; an emphasis upon dialogism as opposed 
to monologism; the use of ellipsis, repetition and a structure based 
around the number seven.44 The connection Kundera creates between 
this architecture and the affective impact of his texts helps to explain his 
mistrust of any translation which he believes domesticates his style to 
ensure it corresponds with the stylistic norms of the target language. This 
mistrust is apparent in Kundera’s ‘Note de l’auteur’ in the revised 1985 
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edition of La Plaisanterie, in which he comments that ‘le traducteur […] 
n’a pas traduit le roman; il l’a réécrit’/‘the translator did not translate 
the novel; he rewrote it’.45 Kundera’s distinction between translating 
and rewriting suggests that he does not see rewriting as necessarily 
accompanying the changes which occur in the shift from one language 
to another. Rather it is the choices the translator makes in dealing with 
that shift, her or his ability to maintain or ignore the symbiosis between 
textual architecture and affective content, which either uphold or distort 
the emotional impact of the text. 
Kundera suggests that it is just such a distortion which occurred in 
La Plaisanterie, when Aymonin took the opportunity to rewrite the form 
of the text, converting a deliberately clear and repetitive structure into 
something ‘fleuri et baroque’/‘flowery and baroque’.46 While Kundera 
dislikes this formal rewriting in and of itself, he vehemently condemns 
what he perceives as its impact upon the critical reception of this text: 
following alterations to its form the text was, he suggests, ‘lu d’une 
façon unilatéralement politique’/‘read in a unilaterally political way’.47 
La Plaisanterie does engage with political themes: its protagonist, 
Ludvik, is a Communist activist excluded from the Party for sending 
a satirical postcard. But Kundera suggests that this political content 
should not elicit a unilaterally political reading. Ludvik’s experiences 
are grounded, interrogated and fragmented through a prismatic form 
which Kundera perceives as ethical precisely in its refusal to offer any 
single political viewpoint. Kundera believes, however, that the multiple 
angles and perspectives of the text depend upon the spare and repetitive 
form through which he narrates events, emotions and experiences. For 
Kundera, Aymonin’s shift of stylistic emphasis elides this plurality in 
favour of a flowery rhetoric vulnerable to a dominant political message. 48 
For Kundera, then, Aymonin’s betrayal resided not in the translation per 
se, but rather in the conversion, through translation, of an intentionally 
ambiguous text into one which was universally read as political.
By suggesting that alterations to the form of a text can create 
immutably political interpretations, Kundera highlights the powerful 
influence he perceives translation to exert upon the relation between the 
political and the aesthetic. In fact, Aymonin’s selection as the translator 
for La Plaisanterie raises wider questions surrounding this relation: as 
Jan Rubeš discusses, Aymonin gained a monopoly over the translation 
of Czech authors into French because he was the only French translator 
trusted by the Czech Communist Party. His political past thus sets him at 
odds with the satirical content of La Plaisanterie, a fact which partially 
explains the vehemence of Kundera’s reaction to his translation. At 
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the same time, Kundera’s connection to Aymonin through translation 
inevitably drew attention to Kundera’s own Communist past, and 
particularly the state-approved poetry which he wrote in the 1950s. For 
Rubeš, erasing Aymonin’s translation and replacing it with Kérel’s is part 
of an attempt by Kundera to erase this former political and aesthetic 
commitment to Communism, and replace it with more autonomous and 
ambiguous forms.49
Kundera’s resistance to Aymonin’s translation is thus caught 
up in the relation between the political and the aesthetic which runs 
throughout his work and his experiences as a writer. In Understanding 
Milan Kundera, Fred Misurella suggests that Kundera’s authorial 
resistance to translation is always a form of attempted resistance to 
coercion, one which links Kundera’s refusal to allow Western editors and 
translators to change his text for the purposes of fluency to his former 
refusal to allow Czechoslovak state censors to alter his texts so that they 
would conform to Stalinist diktat.50 In both these instances, Kundera’s 
rejection of attempts to change the structure of his texts reveals the 
potent connection he perceives between form and content, and the 
integral role played by both in the impact of his work. Within his texts, 
Kundera’s concern with the ways in which significance is created and 
transmitted hinges upon the relation of the political and the aesthetic: 
political movements, he suggests, have their own aesthetics, just as 
aesthetic forms have their own politics and ethics. Kundera’s attitude to 
translation, and the approaches to translation which appear throughout 
his texts, express and interrogate the shape of this dynamic between 
politics and aesthetics. My exploration, below, of Kundera’s use of an 
aesthetics of translation within Le Livre seeks to reveal the form and 
potential of this interrogation.
Le Livre du rire et de l’oubli: variations on laughter and 
forgetting
Le Livre is a novel in seven parts, which segues between the comic and 
the tragic, the factual and the fantastic, the individual and the collective. 
The text also spans the political and the personal, for Kundera believes 
that these two spheres are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually 
illuminating: ‘[p]olitics unmasks the metaphysics of private life’, he 
claims, ‘private life unmasks the metaphysics of politics’.51 Kundera’s 
comment elucidates his own position within the rather nebulous genre of 
the political novel: the rationales and impulses which motivate political 
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actions, he suggests, are not exclusive to the political arena; rather, these 
are innately human instincts which emerge in both public and private 
spheres.  Because of this, Kundera has emphatically argued that Le Livre 
is not a political allegory and is not using personal stories to outline a 
political thesis.52 Instead, personal and political strands mirror and 
illuminate each other, intersecting through thematic explorations of the 
two phenomena contained in the title: laughter and forgetting.
Laughter, Kundera initially suggests, is a binary phenomenon, 
split between the laughter of the Devil, which ‘désignait l’absurdité des 
choses’/‘denoted the absurdity of things’, and the laughter of the angels 
who ‘au contraire se réjouit que tout fût ici-bas bien ordonné, sagement 
conçu, bon et plein de sens’/‘on the contrary meant to rejoice over 
how well ordered, wisely conceived, good, and meaningful everything 
here below was’.53 Through this dual laughter Kundera introduces an 
opposition between sense and nonsense which is fundamental to each 
of the stories in Le Livre. Yet this opposition is heuristic, for Kundera’s 
vision is kaleidoscopic as opposed to split-lens, and the theme of laughter 
explodes beyond binary constraints and fragments into a multitude 
of different stories. Through vignettes focusing upon individual and 
collective relationships – sexual, marital, familial, pedagogical – Kundera 
explores the bathos, the poignancy, the possibilities and the dangers 
of our attempts to assign significance to our personal and political 
experiences. Questions of memory dominate these explorations: do we, 
Kundera asks, build the narratives of our personal lives and of our political 
communities by eradicating, rewriting and even forgetting history? Can 
we ascribe coherence and sense to our actions only by overlooking or 
denying the past? 
Translation is integral to the form and content through which 
Kundera explores these questions. Formally, Le Livre is constructed 
around a series of ‘variations’ on key words, through which Kundera 
translates a single theme into multiple contexts. These key words, 
he explains, are crucial to Le Livre not only linguistically, but also on a 
structural and a thematic level:
Le roman est fondé tout d’abord sur quelques mots fondamentaux. 
[…] Dans Le Livre du rire et de l’oubli, la «  série » est la suivante: 
l’oubli, le rire, les anges, la «  litost  », la frontière. Ces cinq mots 
principaux sont, dans le cours du roman, analysés, étudiés, définis, 
redéfinis, et ainsi transformés en catégories de l’existence. Le 
roman est bâti sur ces quelques catégories comme une maison sur 
des piliers.
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A novel is based primarily on certain fundamental words. […] In 
The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, the “row” goes: forgetting, 
laughter, angels, litost, border. Over the course of the novel, those 
five principal words are analyzed, studied, defined, redefined, and 
thus transformed into categories of existence. The novel is built on 
those few categories the way a house is built on its pillars.54
In this chapter I engage with each of these five different but interconnected 
‘categories of existence’, beginning with the Czech language loan litost. 
While Kundera does not directly explore litost until the fourth chapter 
of the text, the themes which it introduces – the desire for absolute 
interpersonal or intrapersonal identification, and the impossibility of 
attaining either – are at the heart both of Le Livre and of my exploration of 
the relevance of translation to understanding Kundera’s particular ethics 
and aesthetics of the novel. 
What is litost?
In the fourth section of Le Livre, Kundera dedicates an entire chapter 
to an exploration of litost, ‘un mot tchèque intraduisible en d’autres 
langues’/‘an untranslatable Czech word’.55 The narrator’s plaintive 
remark that ‘[p]our le sens de ce mot je cherche vainement un équivalent 
dans d’autres langues, bien que j’aie peine à imaginer qu’on puisse 
comprendre l’âme humaine sans lui’/‘I have looked in vain in other 
languages for an equivalent, though I find it difficult to imagine how 
anyone can understand the human soul without it’, provides the impetus 
for a textual search for the meaning of litost.56 This is a search which 
proves simultaneously fruitless and fruitful: fruitless, because what is 
untranslatable within litost remains untranslatable, refusing to unveil 
itself from within its multiple folds of meaning; fruitful because, in its 
attempted translation, litost provides Kundera with the springboard for a 
thematic as well as a formal enquiry into the nuances and contradictions 
of the human soul, both personal and political. 
Kundera’s narrator suggests that the closest translation for litost into 
French renders it as ‘un état tourmentant né du spectacle de notre propre 
misère soudainement découverte’/‘a state of torment created by the 
sudden sight of one’s own misery’.57 Yet even this expanded translation 
elides the subtleties of litost: given that the word remains in Czech 
throughout the French text it is, we understand, only by translating litost 
into lived or, rather, fictionalized experience, by glossing it rather than 
translating it interlingually, that we can grasp the multiple complexities 
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contained within this single word. ‘Je vais donner un exemple’/‘Let me 
give an example’, states the narrator, before relating the comic story of 
a student who attempts and fails to consummate his relationship with 
Christine, the young wife of a butcher.58 This is a story which hinges upon 
linguistic and semantic misunderstandings, as the student repeatedly 
seeks, and fails, to grasp the reason for Christine’s sexual reluctance:
Mais quoi? Christine résiste! […] Il aurait voulu lui demander 
pourquoi elle lui résistait, mais il ne pouvait pas parler. Mme Christine 
était si timide, si délicate qu’en sa présence les choses de l’amour 
perdaient leurs noms. Il n’osait parler que Le Langage du souffle et du 
toucher. Qu’avaient-ils à faire de la pesanteur des mots? Est-ce qu’il 
ne brûlait pas en elle? Ils flambaient tous deux de la même flamme!
But what’s this? Kristyna is resisting! […] He wanted to ask her why 
she was resisting him, but he could not speak. Kristyna was so shy, 
so delicate, that love’s functions lost their names in her presence. 
He dared use only the language of breathing and touching. Weren’t 
they beyond the heaviness of words? Wasn’t he burning within her? 
They were both burning with the same flame!59
The difference between the English and French renderings of the name 
Christine/Kristyna highlights a discrepancy between these two versions 
that I will return to later. In both versions, however, Kundera constructs 
an image of romantic love based upon a yearning for an absolute affective 
connection with another person. ‘L’absolu de l’amour est en réalité un 
désir d’identité absolue’/‘Love’s absolute is actually a desire for absolute 
identity’, the narrator claims, and the student’s every interaction with 
Christine, whether spoken or silent, emotional or physical, is motivated 
either by his faith that he can identify absolutely with her or by his desire 
to achieve such an identification.60
The student’s refusal to speak to Christine in spite of his inability 
to understand why she will not consummate their relationship suggests 
that he believes such an identification to be attainable without the 
need for the concrete weight of words. In desiring a world in which the 
language of touch is sufficient in and of itself, the student is seeking a 
space in which the inevitable slippage which occurs in spoken or written 
language between signified and signifier – which is further testified to 
by the slippage of translation – is taken out of the romantic equation. 
But the student’s faith in his ability to identify absolutely with Christine 
continues even when they do begin to speak: 
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«J’en mourrais. C’est vrai. J’en mourrais» répéta Mme Christine 
[…]. L’étudiant éprouvait un désespoir teinté de béatitude. […] 
Elle l’aimait à en mourir, elle l’aimait au point d’avoir peur de faire 
l’amour avec lui parce que, si elle faisait l’amour avec lui, elle ne 
pourrait plus jamais vivre sans lui et elle mourrait de chagrin et de 
désir. […] «Je te comprends ! Je mourrai avec toi !»
“It would kill me. It’s true. It would kill me,” Kristyna repeated. […] 
The student felt despair tinged with bliss. […] She loved him as no 
one had before. She loved him so much it would kill her, she loved 
him to the point of being afraid to make love with him because if she 
were to make love with him, she would never be able to live without 
him and she would die of grief and desire. […] “I understand you! 
I’ll die with you!”61
The student’s exclamation ‘Je te comprends’ is as spurious as his earlier 
faith that ‘la même flamme’ burnt in their silence: whether in silence 
or in speech, the student has repeatedly misunderstood Christine by 
imposing his own vision and version of events upon her gestures and 
speech. The following morning, Christine reveals the reality behind her 
words: ‘«Tu sais, il ne faut pas m’en vouloir, c’est vrai que je pourrais 
en mourir. Le docteur m’a dit après mon premier accouchement qu’il 
ne fallait plus jamais que je sois enceinte.»’/‘“You know, you shouldn’t 
[hold it against me], it really could kill me. The doctor told me after I 
had my baby I should never get pregnant again.”’62 The student’s failure 
to consummate his relationship with Christine is here revealed to be 
a failure of understanding but also of translation: in his exchange of 
silences, gestures and finally words with Christine, the student has 
repeatedly translated the pragmatic roots of Christine’s sexual reluctance 
into an utterly misguided vision of absolute romantic identification. 
In his seminal text After Babel, George Steiner describes ‘translation 
as understanding’: ‘To hear significance is to translate’, he writes, 
suggesting that all our communication, interlingual or intralingual, 
involves a translation between another’s idiom and our own, between 
their ‘fleuve sémantique’ and ours.63 By creating an analogy between 
understanding and translation, Steiner’s aphorism allows the ethical 
dilemmas and the potential involved in the act of interlingual translation 
to illuminate similar dilemmas and a similar potential within our 
attempts at interpersonal understanding. To acknowledge the veracity 
of such an analogy is to acknowledge that the inevitable distortions, 
miscommunications, losses and elisions present in every attempt to 
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understand another individual are also present in translation. It is to 
acknowledge, too, the subjectivity of relation, the alterity present in our 
intralingual as well as interlingual communications, the hierarchical 
frameworks we impose and affectively enact. Steiner’s analogy allows us 
to perceive the task of understanding another person as one precisely of 
translation, undertaken in the knowledge that it can never be completed 
fully or perfectly. This recognition requires us to understand translation 
as a task without end, as a process which can never achieve an absolute 
identification between a source and a target text. The student in Le 
Livre fails to achieve this recognition, for his desire to attain a perfect 
understanding of Christine hinges upon his belief that he can attain a 
perfect translation between her language, experience and individuality, 
and his own.
In Sur la traduction, Paul Ricœur suggests that the utopian idea of 
the perfect translation hinges upon precisely this desire to achieve an 
absolute identification between source text and target text. To return 
to the quotation I offered earlier, Ricœur suggests that ‘[l]e rêve de la 
traduction parfaite équivaut au souhait d’un gain pour la traduction, d’un 
gain qui serait sans perte […] adéquation totale […] une identité de sens 
démontrable’/‘The dream of the perfect translation amounts to the wish 
that translation would gain, gain without losing. […] total adequacy […] 
a demonstrable identity of meaning’.64 Ricœur’s comment emphasizes 
the affective power within our desire for this harmony of sense across 
languages: we dream of attaining the perfect translation, even as we 
acknowledge its impossibility. As Richard Kearney notes, Ricœur’s 
paradigm of translation is twofold. There is, first, ‘the linguistic paradigm 
which refers to how words relate to meanings within language or between 
languages. And, second, the ontological paradigm which refers to how 
translation occurs between one human self and another’.65 Ricœur then, 
like Steiner in After Babel, interweaves translation and understanding to 
suggest that translation embodies, on the linguistic level, the dynamics 
of our exchanges on the level of the ontological. Linguistically, the desire 
for the perfect translation is born of the desire for an absolute identity of 
copy and original, of source and target language: the desire to eliminate 
the untranslatability of a word such as litost, for example. Ontologically, 
in our relations with one another this desire becomes the affective desire 
for the absolute identity of self and other, of another’s language and our 
own. Such is the desire of the student in Le Livre. 
Thus, through his construction of the student’s story, Kundera 
develops his own narrative of the desire for a perfect translation. And in 
the student’s failure to achieve unity between himself and Christine we 
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see the failure of this desire mapped both linguistically and relationally. 
For, paradoxically, it is through this failure of relational translation that 
we come to understand how litost itself might be linguistically translated. 
‘Mais dès que l’illusion de l’identité absolue est brisée […] l’amour devient 
une source permanente du grand tourment que nous appelons litost’/‘But 
when the illusion of absolute identity vanishes […] love becomes a 
permanent source of the great torment we call litost’, writes Kundera.66 
Litost, ‘un mot tchèque intraduisible’, here exceeds its interlingual 
untranslatability to become representative of the untranslatability of 
relation. This untranslatability exists in both an interpersonal and an 
intrapersonal sense, for while the litost the student experiences arises 
from the failure of his desire to identify absolutely with another, it is 
ultimately symbolic of his inability to identify absolutely with himself, 
to correlate the lyricism of his vision with the actual banality of his 
experience. 
What then is litost? His failure to consummate his relationship with 
Christine forces the student to confront the discrepancy between his vision 
of love as absolute and its provisional and contingent reality, between his 
perception of the world and his experience of it, between his desire for a 
perfect translation and his inability to attain one. It is this confrontation 
which terminates in the experience of his ‘propre misère’/‘own misery’, 
his litost.67 In this sense, litost can be understood as a state which arises 
from untranslatability, from a sudden awareness of the impossibility of 
a matching communication and a matching understanding, whether 
with oneself or with another. In Sur la traduction, Ricœur suggests 
that the perfect translation reveals a desire for a space from which ‘les 
intraductibilités auraient toutes été effacées’/‘the untranslatabilities 
would all have been erased’.68 Through Kundera’s return to litost, the 
student is made to confront the impossibility of such an effacement, for just 
as what is foreign within litost itself cannot be absorbed into the French 
translation of Le Livre, so too what is foreign in the student’s experience 
with Christine cannot be absorbed into his vision of what has happened.
Variations on litost
In the seven stories of Le Livre, Kundera constructs multiple variations 
upon this ‘désir d’identité absolue’, whether in a sexual, romantic, 
pedagogical or political context. In ‘Litost’, Kundera mirrors the personal 
narrative of the student in a more explicitly political one. For the narrator, 
the untranslatability of litost hints at the possibility that it is an emotion 
more innate to the Czech soul than that of other nations, and therefore 
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one integrally connected to the political and historical experiences of the 
Czech nation: he suggests that ‘l’histoire des Tchèques […] est l’histoire 
de la litost’/‘The story of the Czechs […] is a story of litost’.69 Kundera’s 
connection between a national emotion and an apparently untranslatable 
word returns us to the intertwining of nation and language which I 
discussed in Chapter 1. The question of untranslatability is always caught 
up in this intersection; as Apter discusses, by approaching those words 
within a text which appear to be untranslatable, we can acknowledge 
forms of cultural and linguistic specificity which cannot be homogenized 
in a global context.70 But to read the Untranslatable as the epitome of an 
absolute difference which can never be understood beyond its cultural and 
linguistic specificity is a move which always leads towards an essentialized 
understanding of that difference. Kundera’s deployment of this link in Le 
Livre seeks to position it as a form of insight rather than essentialism, 
exploring litost as integral to understanding the thread of revolution and 
defeat running through Czech history. His narrator suggests that a desire 
on the part of the Czech people to identify themselves as strong and 
independent led them to revolt again and again against various invading 
forces. But these continual revolts against those stronger than themselves 
ended in ‘cette succession de glorieuses défaites qui mettaient en branle 
le cours de l’Histoire et conduisaient à sa perte le people’/‘a succession 
of glorious defeats that launched their history and led [the people] to 
ruin’.71 Obliged to submit to external powers stronger than itself, the 
Czech nation entered into a collective emotional encounter with litost, 
brought about by the discrepancy between a national conception of its 
political strength and the reality of its relative weakness.
Elsewhere in the text of Le Livre, Kundera narrates several stories, 
personal and political, which focus upon characters who attempt and 
fail to create coherent versions of their identities. In the first chapter, 
Mirek, an ex-Communist, struggles with what is untranslatable within 
his romantic history: his love affair with a woman he now considers to be 
ugly, an experience as shattering to his sense of self as the student’s failure 
to consummate his relationship with Christine. In the fourth and sixth 
chapters, Tamina, a Czech émigré living in an unnamed town in the West 
of Europe, seeks to reunite, and re-identify with, the fractured strands 
of her past through the recovery of her lost diaries. When she fails to do 
so, her sense of identity disintegrates until, in a dream-like episode, she 
allows herself to be transported to an island populated only by children 
who have no past. In the third chapter, ‘Les Anges’, the angelically named 
Mme Raphaël attempts, somewhat comically, to identify with a diverse 
range of different ideological systems:
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Elle a toute sa vie cherché un cercle d’hommes et de femmes 
auxquels elle pourrait donner la main pour danser une ronde, 
elle l’a d’abord cherché […] dans le parti communiste, puis dans 
le parti trotskiste, puis dans le parti trotskiste dissident, puis dans 
le mouvement contre l’avortement (l’enfant a droit à la vie!), puis 
dans le mouvement pour la légalisation de l’avortement (la femme 
a droit à son corps!), elle l’a cherché chez les marxistes, chez les 
psychanalystes, puis chez les structuralistes.
All her life she had looked for a circle of men and women with whom 
she could hold hands in a ring dance, first [...] in the Communist 
Party, then in the Trotskyist Party, then in a Trotskyist splinter party, 
then in the movement against abortion (a child has a right to life!), 
then in the movement to legalize abortion (a woman has a right to 
her body!), then she looked for it in Marxists, in psychoanalysts, in 
structuralists.72
Like the ‘major’ uses of language I discussed in Chapter 1 through the work 
of Deleuze and Atxaga, the different ‘circles’ described here seek to prove 
themselves dominant by ignoring the possibility of an alternative point 
of view, a ploy Kundera renders comically inadequate by emphasizing 
the almost endless series of groups to which Mme Raphaël seeks to 
belong. Through the diversity of the systems within which Mme Raphaël 
attempts to define her sense of self, Kundera positions this desire for 
perfect harmony as an intransitive urge, one which requires no object to 
come into being, and which seeks out any object through which to fulfil 
its needs. 
Through these variations, Kundera emphasizes the inescapability 
of litost in both our individual and our collective experiences: our desire 
to identify with something, or someone, beyond our present selves 
confronts the limitations of this desire, impacting affectively upon the 
relationships we form and the decisions we make. In the inevitability of 
this desire lies its danger. Kundera explores the example of a political 
movement which, he suggests, built its power precisely by manipulating 
our innate wish to belong. In the first chapter of Le Livre, ‘Les Lettres 
perdues’, Kundera interrogates the KSČ’s 1948 rise to power, which the 
narrator suggests was based partially upon the Party’s ability to tap into 
a collective desire for communal understanding and perfect harmony: 
‘cette idylle de justice pour tous […] où le monde ne se dresse pas en 
étranger contre l’homme et l’homme contre les autres hommes, mais où 
le monde et tous les hommes sont au contraire pétris dans une seule et 
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF TRANSLATION122
même matière’/‘that idyll of justice for all, […] where the world does not 
rise up as a stranger against man and man against other men, but rather 
where the world and all men are shaped from one and the same matter’.73 
In Kundera’s construction of it, the Communist idyll can only function 
when content and form ally absolutely, when individuals are united both 
by what they believe and the ways in which they believe it. If Kundera’s 
depiction of litost shows the untranslatability of elements in amorous 
relation, his depiction of the idyll shows a political desire for absolute 
translatability, an absolute unity of understanding and relation between 
individual and individual, and individual and world. 
In Ricœur’s Sur la traduction, the latent desire for a perfect 
translation can only be sustained by the repression of the foreign, 
which threatens to reveal the impossibility of a linguistic universal. 
‘L’universalité recouvrée voudrait supprimer la mémoire de l’étranger 
[…] Pareille universalité effaçant sa propre histoire ferait de tous des 
étrangers à soi-même, des apatrides du langage, des exilés’/‘Recaptured 
universality would try to abolish the memory of the foreign. […] Erasing 
its own history, the same universality would turn all who are foreign to 
it into language’s stateless persons, exiles’.74 In this statement we can 
read echoes of Kundera’s desire for an ‘ailleurs’, to be achieved through 
a writing capable of transcending its original linguistic, national and 
cultural borders. But for Ricœur, such a universality can only exceed these 
borders by erasing what is foreign, by suppressing those elements which 
threaten to challenge the perfection of its unanimity. In this reading, 
it is Kundera himself, rejected by Czechoslovakia for contravening the 
ideals of its Communist idyll, who embodies one of Ricœur’s ‘apatrides 
du langage’, his political untranslatability resulting in his linguistic and 
national exile. 
A similar erasure of the ‘foreign’, of individuals who cannot be 
gathered within the idyllic vision of universal understanding, occurs in 
Kundera’s representation of the idyll. In the idyll, he suggests ‘chacun 
est une note d’une sublime fugue de Bach, et celui qui ne veut pas en 
être une reste un point noir inutile et privé de sens qu’il suffit de saisir et 
d’écraser sous l’ongle comme une puce’/‘everyone is a note in a sublime 
Bach fugue, and anyone who refuses to be one is a mere useless and 
meaningless black dot that need only be caught and crushed between 
thumb and finger like a flea’.75 Kundera’s representation of the idyll 
hinges upon a division between meaning and non-meaning: within the 
inner sanctum of the idyll, meaning is unified, universal, total: outside the 
inner circle one is ‘privé de sens’, meaningless, translated out of context 
and beyond understanding. In Kundera’s vision of the idyll in Le Livre we 
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can read the dangers of Ricœur’s perfect translation transposed into a 
political context. Like the perfect translation, the Communist idyll can 
only sustain itself through the erasure of any element which threatens its 
vision of harmony and coherence. 
Erasing the untranslatable
Throughout Le Livre. Kundera is interested in exploring our desire to 
embrace absolutely something other than our present selves, whether 
that be another individual, a political group, a literary theory or our own 
past identity. But he is equally invested in exploring what happens when 
this desire collapses, bringing litost in its wake. How do we deal with the 
consequences of that collapse? How do we cope with litost? Kundera’s 
answer, articulated repeatedly and diversely through the various strands 
and narratives in Le Livre, is that we seek to forget our failures, and if we 
cannot forget, to erase or destroy any object, person, event or memory 
that disrupts the illusion of perfect harmony between our present self 
and that with which we desire to identify. In ‘Litost’, Kundera describes 
two possible forms of this erasure: if the person who has forced us to 
experience litost is weaker than us, we find a reason to harm him or her; 
if he or she is stronger than us, ‘il ne nous reste plus qu’à choisir une 
vengeance détournée, une gifle par ricochet, un meurtre par le biais du 
suicide’/‘all we can do is choose circuitous revenge – the indirect blow, a 
murder by means of suicide’.76 
Kundera offers various examples of the first response to litost, 
an externalization of internal pain. There is the student who slaps his 
girlfriend when she proves to be a better swimmer than he; the harassment 
and eventual arrest of Mirek when he criticizes the Communist Party to 
which he once belonged; the cruelty of the children who allow Tamina 
to drown when she fails to exist in harmony with them upon their island. 
In Kundera’s novelistic account of the Czechoslovakian national psyche, 
however, it is the second response which has dominated: in 1968, when 
Russian tanks arrived to crush the liberating movement of the Prague 
Spring, the Czechs were forced to confront their own weakness, and 
therefore the experience of litost. Their response – ‘Nous ne voulons pas 
de compromis, nous voulons la victoire!’/‘We don’t want compromise, we 
want victory’ – was, the narrator suggests, symptomatic of a revenge 
against the other translated into the annihilation of the self; the voice of 
inadequacy saving face by demanding absolute triumph.77 
But the narrative of Le Livre is primarily concerned with a more 
subtle, but no less devastating, response to the experience of litost: 
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deliberate or inevitable forgetting, enabled by aesthetic forms. Kundera 
begins Le Livre with a powerful example of the form which such a 
forgetting might take in a political context. In the first pages of the text, 
the narrator comments upon the experiences of Vladimír Clementis, the 
high-ranking Communist who was instrumental in organizing the coup 
d’état which led the KSČ to power. Clementis was a key member of the 
KSČ inner circle, holding the position of Foreign Secretary between 1948 
and 1950. But in 1950, Clementis found himself accused as a deviationist; 
he was evicted from the Party, and in 1952 was hung for treason. 
Kundera is principally interested, however, in exploring the ways in 
which the memory of Clementis has been erased from the history of the 
KSČ. In 1948, at the peak of his influence, Clementis was photographed 
standing on a balcony in Prague next to the KSČ leader Klement Gottwald. 
This photograph, taken just after the successful coup d’état, marked the 
beginning of Communist control in Czechoslovakia, thus documenting 
a turning point in Czechoslovakian history: the narrator of Le Livre 
comments that ‘[t]ous les enfants connaissaient cette photographie’/ 
‘[e]very child knew that photograph’.78 As Hana Pichová suggests, 
the photograph’s prevalence marks it as ‘an instrument of coerced 
remembrance’, a cultural artefact designed to commemorate the beauty, 
glory and, crucially, harmony of the KSČ.79 But after Clementis’s death, the 
photograph no longer achieves its purpose. Instead of revealing the idyllic 
values of absolute understanding and identification, it becomes evidence 
of an absence of understanding and identification, proof that there can be 
no perfect translation between the individual and the collective, between 
theory and action, between experience and ideology. And this is why, as 
Kundera reveals, reproductions of the photograph following Clementis’s 
death show Gottwald alone on the balcony: Clementis has been entirely 
erased from the image. Through this manipulation, the photograph 
is transformed from a symbol of remembrance into ‘an instrument of 
cultural forgetting’, from a glorification of political unity into the means 
of its sustenance in the face of collapse.80
This historical event is uncannily reminiscent of a fictional episode 
in Orwell’s 1984, published three years before Clementis’s death, in 
which Winston Smith uncovers photographic evidence which proves that 
forms of historical manipulation are taking place within Big Brother’s 
state. Winston’s decision to destroy this evidence is a stark example of 
the power which photographs can hold as a site of memory, but also the 
ways in which they can be manipulated to enable forms of forgetting 
to take place.81 Kundera’s narrative in Le Livre, like Orwell’s in 1984, 
draws our attention to the falsifications which can occur within all our 
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representations of the past. And, as Pichová shows, Kundera’s narratives 
are themselves implicated in historical distortions and alterations. In 
describing the photograph, the narrator of Le Livre claims that Gottwald 
was hatless and that Clementis took off his own hat and placed it upon 
Gottwald’s head.82 This claim allows him to end his discussion of the 
manipulation of the photo with this powerful image: ‘De Clementis, il 
n’est resté que la toque de fourrure sue la tête de Gottwald’/‘Nothing 
remains of Clementis but the fur hat on Gottwald’s head’.83 But, as Pichová 
reveals, in the original photo, both Gottwald and Clementis are shown 
to be wearing hats. For Pichová, Kundera’s distortion of the photograph 
in his ekphrastic translation of image into narrative offers us a warning 
against an unquestioning acceptance of the written word, and highlights 
the forgetting implicit in our every encounter with aesthetic forms.84 
This warning is, as Steinby notes, problematized by translation: the non-
Czech readership for Le Livre is unlikely to be familiar with the cultural 
references required to pick up on this falsification of the image.85 But this 
failure of detection, which Steinby suggests is inevitable among a French 
readership, in fact highlights the erasures, alterations and distortions 
which pass undetected within all our readings. Several of Kundera’s texts 
explore the ambiguity within aesthetic forms which makes them capable 
of both liberation and repression, both remembrance and forgetting: 
artistic and literary works, he suggests, offer us opportunities to rethink 
our relations to one another and to the world around us, but they can also 
undermine and overwrite these relations. 
In La Plaisanterie, for example, the satirical postcard that Ludvik 
sends to his girlfriend is converted into evidence in a case which sees him 
accused of political dissidence and sent to work in a mine. In L’Immortalité, 
Kundera explores the power of the political slogan, which he suggests 
reveals the perfect alliance of aesthetics and politics. Kundera focuses 
upon a quotation taken from Rimbaud’s Une saison en enfer: ‘Il faut être 
absolument moderne’.86 For the protagonist, Paul, this quotation is the 
symbol of the revolutionary spirit of May 1968. But it only attains this 
symbolic value through its translation from one historical and formal 
context into another, namely from Rimbaud’s suggestive, sometimes 
delirious, sometimes disturbing, prose poems of 1873, which meditate 
on the power and pain of the poetic imagination, to the political slogan 
scrawled on the walls on Paris in May 1968. This translation, suggests 
Kundera, is made possible through, and inevitably enacts, a negation of 
that original moment and form: a betrayal of Rimbaud’s verse.87 In this 
betrayal, the slogan marks the space where, stripped of the nuances, layers 
and contexts of its creation, poetry becomes reified into propaganda.
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In L’Insoutenable légèreté de l’être, Kundera explores another form 
of aesthetic erasure, which he defines as kitsch. Kitsch is both an attitude 
and an aesthetics, a way of presenting and interpreting experience which 
articulates and sustains our innate desire to attain fraternal unity with 
those around us:
Le kitsch fait naître coup sur coup deux larmes d’émotion. La 
première larme dit: Comme c’est beau, des gosses courant sur une 
pelouse! La deuxième larme dit: Comme c’est beau, d’être ému avec 
toute l’humanité à la vue de gosses courant sur une pelouse! Seule 
cette deuxième larme fait que le kitsch est le kitsch. La fraternité de 
tous les hommes ne pourra être fondée que sur le kitsch.
Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear 
says: How nice to see children running on the grass! The second tear 
says: How nice to be moved, together with all mankind, by children 
running on the grass! It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch. 
The brotherhood of man on earth will be possible only on the basis 
of kitsch.88
Kitsch, the narrator suggests, is born of a faith and delight in the power 
of cliché to evoke and respond to a perceived universal conception of a 
phrase, event or experience. Throughout L’Insoutenable légèreté de l’être, 
kitsch is represented as a form of aesthetic mauvaise foi which fails to 
engage with the criticism and self-criticism, the particularity, contingency 
and ambiguity, which Kundera perceives as essential to the potential, if 
frequently unrealized, ethics of artistic forms. Kitsch represents a form 
of beauty based upon pre-understanding; a beauty which rejects the 
unexpected and the surprising in favour of the predictable. This desire for 
kitsch, Kundera insists, is inescapable: ‘nul d’entre nous n’est un surhomme 
et ne peut échapper entièrement au kitsch. Quel que soit le mépris qu’il 
nous inspire, le kitsch fait partie de la condition humaine’/‘none among 
us is superman enough to escape kitsch completely. No matter how we 
scorn it, kitsch is an integral part of the human condition’.89 Like litost then, 
kitsch is integral to the human soul; indeed, these two responses are part 
and parcel of the same desire. For while litost is an emotion generated by 
our failure to achieve coherence between our image of reality and reality 
itself, kitsch is an artistic response which seeks to transcend this failure. 
In Le Livre, Kundera explores an example of this kitsch erasure and 
transcendence through his discussion of lyric poetry, an aesthetic form 
which he suggests reflects a particularly hyperbolic approach to the 
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translation of experience into form. The poetic in Kundera’s reading is 
a mobile term, and Kundera’s own aesthetics is formed through a poetic 
emphasis upon variation, within which the same terms are used again 
and again but reveal a different tone or overtone in each use. In the 
next section of this chapter, I discuss the implications of this mobility 
for Kundera’s reading of an ethics of aesthetic form. I explore, through 
ideas of translation, Kundera’s construction of the poetic in Le Livre, the 
relationship he creates between the poetic and the political idyll, and the 
heuristic opposition he develops between the poetic and the novel form.
An ethics of form
Poetry and lyricism
Throughout Le Livre, Kundera develops multiple variations upon the 
poetic attitude, in both a personal and a political context. In ‘Litost’, 
Kundera creates a division between ‘une nuit de poésie’/‘a night of 
poetry’, the student’s romantic interpretation of events, and ‘une journée 
de prose’/‘a day of prose’, their more banal reality.90 The ambiguous 
nature of all Kundera’s oppositions should alert us to the fragility of 
this division: there are illusions, erasures, and clichés within all our 
narrations, whatever form they take. Nonetheless, this opposition allows 
Kundera to explore the particular romantic illusions encouraged by 
what he regards as the hyperbole of the poetic form. For Kundera, lyric 
poetry exaggerates to create a strong emotional response. In the case 
of the student, this poetic exaggeration reveals his desire to render all 
experience lyrical, to translate the concrete and carnal into the gloriously 
universal and ethereal, a desire which not only affects his narration of 
his interaction with Christine, but comes to influence his experience of 
it. The student’s desire for lyricism, Kundera suggests, is based upon 
more than a wish for aesthetic coherence in the narrative of his life and 
loves: in his belief in the ‘béatitude’ of his encounter with Christine, 
the student reveals his faith in the possibility of completion, which for 
Kundera is an aesthetically inspired faith in the perfect unity of love as 
it is experienced and love as it is narrated. Here a heuristic idea of the 
poetic and its contrast with the prosaic is positioned as the locus of the 
student’s romantic and sexual failure.
The particular dangers Kundera equates with the poetic attitude 
can be read through the words of the character Pétrarque, who through 
his name alludes to the Petrarchan standards of ideal love and formal 
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perfection. ‘Comprendre c’est se confondre et s’identifier’/‘to understand 
is to merge and to identify with’, exclaims Pétrarque, ‘C’est ça le mystère 
de la poésie’/‘That is the secret of poetry’.91 The ‘secret’ of poetry here 
is one based upon the faith that understanding produces an absolute 
identity of two people, and the absolute possession of one by the other, 
what Steinby describes as ‘a dissolving of the boundaries between the 
self and everything else’.92 Such a belief is apparent even at the very 
moment when the student realizes that his poetic attitude is the cause of 
his romantic failure: ‘Il aurait suffi cette nuit d’une seule phrase sensée!’‘Il 
aurait suffi d’appeler les choses par leur vrai nom et il pouvait l’avoir’/‘Last 
night, one sensible sentence would have been enough! It would have 
been enough to call things by their right names, and he could have had 
her’, he wails.93 The student’s interpretation of his failure hinges upon 
various binary divisions: prose/poetry, sense/nonsense, truth/untruth, 
possession/non-possession. In recognizing these binaries, the student 
seems finally to recognize that his relations with Christine have been 
distorted by his repeated decision to prioritize the poetic over the prosaic, 
the implicit over the explicit. And yet, ironically, in his faith that ‘things’ 
can be called ‘by their right names’, that one can truly ‘have’ – possess or 
understand totally and absolutely – another person, physically, mentally 
or linguistically, the student reveals, not an awareness of the impossibility 
of absolute identification with another, but rather a continued faith in its 
possibility: a faith that a poetics of love will enable him to transcend the 
differences and discrepancies between two people.
The student is forced to recognize that his poetic conception of 
romantic experience is woefully misplaced. Yet ironically it is poetry 
which comes to his rescue, offering him an aesthetic form through 
which he can evade the experience of litost generated by his failure with 
Christine. Turning full circle, the student re-imagines this story of failure 
and miscommunication as ‘la poésie’, a lyrical emblem of thwarted 
desire, a gloriously perfect aesthetic homage to the tragedy of romantic 
experience. This poetic homage enables the student to reframe his 
experience of litost, translating his experiences with Christine into a form 
which corresponds to – as opposed to threatens – his self-perception. In 
the student’s use of poetry to overcome his experience of litost we can 
read the seemingly inevitable return of his attempt to affirm the qualities 
associated with the perfect translation: the absolutes of identity, unity and 
understanding. While poetry has often been considered untranslatable – 
Robert Frost  allegedly claimed that ‘poetry is what is lost in translation’ – 
Kundera’s construction of the poetic in Le Livre positions it as an aesthetic 
form embedded in a belief in the absolute translatability promised by 
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relation, and as a form which can provide the aesthetic illusion of this 
translatability when it collapses experientially.94
Poetry and politics
The dangers Kundera identifies within this lyrical approach to the 
translation of experience into narrative are not only personal but 
political, for as he understands only too well himself, there is a 
connection between poetic absolutism and political absolutism. 
Between 1950 and 1955 Kundera published two collections of poetry 
which ‘resonate with Communist imagery’; he subsequently sought to 
erase these collections from his bibliography, refusing to permit their 
republication or translation.95 This refusal is perhaps understandable, 
given the manner of Kundera’s subsequent departure from the Party. 
But, as Woods notes, this erasure through translation has been used as 
evidence of Kundera’s desire to airbrush his past collaboration with the 
Party.96 Kundera’s decision to erase these texts from his bibliography 
certainly suggests a collision, and collusion, of fact and fiction through 
which he seeks to create a coherent narrative of his authorial identity by 
means of an enforced forgetting of his poetry. As Woods notes, however, 
Kundera is interested in exploring his poetic experiences: while his 
poetry has disappeared through a lack of translation, Kundera confronts 
this forgetting in several texts which explore the motivation to write 
the very type of ideologically committed poetry which Kundera himself 
produced.97 This confrontation is most apparent in La Vie est ailleurs 
(1969), a novel which explores the experiences of a young poet, Jaromil, 
and his increasingly fanatical Communist beliefs.
Kundera equates Jaromil’s poetic desires specifically with youth, 
and a concomitant naïve adoration of the extremes of emotion existent 
within both his poetry and his politics. As Jaromil’s political ideals shift 
into Communism, so too does the form and content of his poems: his early 
fascination with Surrealism develops into ‘a poesy of totalitarianism’, 
which depicts the Communist ideals of ‘brotherhood, peace, justice, 
better tomorrows, […] for comradeship and against isolation, for joy and 
against gloom, for innocence and against cynicism’.98 Crucially, while 
the lyricism of his poetry initially allows Jaromil to map his political 
beliefs aesthetically, ultimately this lyricism becomes remapped onto 
those beliefs. This leads Jaromil into a tragic betrayal: lyrically faithful to 
his identification with Communist ideals, he denounces his  girlfriend’s 
brother as a political dissident, sacrificing human emotions and loyalty to 
a fanaticism driven by poetic fantasy. Kundera writes in the novel that ‘[l]
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a poésie est un territoire où toute affirmation devient vérité. […] Le poète 
n’a besoin de rien prouver; la seule preuve réside dans l’intensité de son 
émotion’/‘Poetry is a domain in which all assertions become true. […] 
The poet has no need to prove anything; the only proof lies in the intensity 
of his emotion’.99 In the intensity of his lyricism, Jaromil acts as though he 
can transcend the ambiguity of his particular situation, seeking and even 
manufacturing poetic idealism not only aesthetically, but personally and 
politically. Kundera’s presentation of the dangers inherent in the lyrical 
ability to overwrite ambiguity is reminiscent of Plato’s decision to expel 
the poet – ‘at third remove from the throne of truth’ – from his ideal 
republic.100 But while Plato perceived poetry as destructive in relation to 
the realities of the political, Kundera suggests that it is through lyricism, 
as both an aesthetic and an attitude of absolutism, that totalitarian 
political power can be constructed.
The link Kundera makes here between the poetic and the 
totalitarian is based upon the fact that both are motivated by the 
same desire: se confondre et s’identifier. In the first of two chapters of 
Le Livre entitled ‘Les Anges’, Kundera continues his exploration of this 
connection. The narrator reflects upon his expulsion from the KSČ while 
he watches groups of people dancing in the streets to celebrate a political 
anniversary. One of those dancing is the poet Paul Éluard, who, like the 
fictional Jaromil, embodies the intersection of the political and the poetic. 
Éluard also features in L’Immortalité, where he embodies the alliance of 
love and the poetic which we saw introduced in the student’s story. In 
Le Livre, Éluard’s poetry and his politics conjoin through a combination 
of movement and lyricism; the narrator notes that Éluard ‘était en train 
de danser dans une ronde gigantesque entre Paris, Moscou, Prague, 
Varsovie, Sofia et la Grèce, entre tous les pays socialistes et tous les partis 
communistes du monde, et il récitait partout ses beaux vers sur la joie et 
la fraternité’/‘was busy dancing in a gigantic ring between Paris, Moscow, 
Prague, Warsaw, Sofia, and Greece, between all the socialist countries 
and all the world’s Communist parties, and everywhere he recited his 
beautiful poems about joy and brotherhood’.101 In Kundera’s depiction 
of Éluard as part of a ‘ronde’ we see a balletic and poetic manifestation 
of a political experience. ‘La ronde’, in both form and content, embodies 
the aestheticized lure of unity: it is a formally perfect ‘cercle magique’ 
which requires that everyone within it think and act in absolute unity in 
order that it may sustain its shape and purpose. It is no coincidence that 
in Kundera’s depiction of Éluard and his dancing companions the content 
of the magic circle is political (a celebration of a political anniversary) 
and its form is poetic (built upon rhythm and lyricism). 
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In an interview with Philip Roth, Kundera comments upon the 
power of poetic form in relation to the political: ‘Nowadays, people all 
over the world unequivocally reject the idea of gulags, yet they are still 
willing to let themselves be hypnotized by totalitarian poesy and to march 
to new gulags to the tune of the same lyrical song’.102 In equating the 
poetic with a form of hypnosis, Kundera accords a power to the rhythm 
and meter of lyric poetry which transcends any actual message it may 
purport to offer. The very lyricism of this poetry engages the individual in 
a political moment. Uniting totalitarian forms of political thinking with 
the poetic, suggests Kundera, enables each to exceed its own boundaries. 
The lyrical transmits and consolidates the perfection of the totalitarian; 
the totalitarian affirms and mirrors the perfection of the lyrical. In both 
‘perfections’, it is the fraternal impulse, the human desire to connect 
interests and find communal meaning, which is at stake. But as Kundera 
suggests in Le Livre, fraternal unity can be constructed upon exclusion 
as well as inclusion. Translating totalitarian thought into the forms of 
the poetic is inherently dangerous, not only because it aestheticizes the 
political, converting individual and disparate experiences into a poetic 
invocation of unity, harmony and brotherhood, but also because such a 
translation is reversible, enabling poetic fantasies to be translated into 
political reality. Exactly in so far as this translation is itself perceived as 
perfect, as one which can bridge all possible gaps between thought and 
action, form and content, these poetic-political fantasies prove not only 
effective but deadly. 
‘Lorsqu’il n’y a plus moyen d’échapper à la litost alors la grâce de 
la poésie vole à notre secours’/‘when [we have] no means of escaping 
from litost, then poetry’s charm flies to [our] rescue’, writes Kundera.103 
Through this intersection of flight, poetry and litost, Kundera explores the 
dangers of mapping the poetic onto the political. For if Le Livre is a book 
of laughter and forgetting, it is also a book about flights, be those flights 
of fantasy, flights from the past and the present, or flights of exile and of 
homecoming. In ‘Les Anges’, the poetic desire to flee from experiences 
that are untranslatable into current political narratives – experiences 
that disrupt the rhetoric of absolute unity and agreement – is represented 
through a fantasy sequence. As the narrator watches Éluard and his group 
dancing in the streets, their feet begin to rise from the ground until they 
are flying above Wenceslaus Square. These rising figures, simultaneously 
political and poetic, appear untouched by gravity. Are they immune to it, 
or have they chosen to disregard and transgress the laws of existence? 
In Kundera’s vision, collective singing and dancing enables the 
group to rise and to affirm its unifying poetic faith. Yet what appears comic 
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in the student’s personal poetic vision becomes dangerous in Kundera’s 
account of Éluard’s political one. For as they rise above the streets of 
Prague, the political poets of Le Livre leave below them the mortal relics 
of Czechoslovakia’s political and literary history: ‘Au-dessous d’eux […] 
dans le crématoire on était en train d’incinérer une députée socialiste et 
un écrivain surréaliste, la fumée s’élevait vers le ciel comme un heureux 
présage et j’entendais la voix métallique d’Éluard «L’amour est au travail 
il est infatigable.»’/‘below them […] from the crematorium where they 
were incinerating a Socialist deputy and a surrealist writer the smoke 
ascended to the heavens like a good omen, and I heard Éluard’s metallic 
voice: “Love is at work it is tireless.”’104
The surrealist writer who Kundera refers to in this powerful extract 
is Záviš Kalandra, a member of the Prague Surrealist group and once a 
good friend of Éluard’s. In 1950 Kalandra was condemned to death for 
treason by the KSČ: Éluard, called upon to stand up for his friend, refused 
to say a word against the Party. The fictional betrayal of an individual in 
the name of a totalitarian poetics, which Kundera describes in La Vie est 
ailleurs, here finds its reality in the death of Kalandra, an individual who 
Eva Le Grand suggests was convicted for his refusal to match his writing 
to the dominant political and aesthetic ideal.105 In La Vie est ailleurs, 
Éluard’s betrayal takes form in his ability to distance himself from these 
events, to soar above them through his faith in the transcendent power of 
his political beliefs. In Ordinary Enchantments: Magical Realism and the 
Remystification of Narrative, Wendy Faris suggests that the motif of flight 
in Kundera’s work is emblematic of a particular form of escapism which 
seeks to ‘evade questions of mortality and history’.106 The link Kundera 
creates between the student’s personal experience of love and the 
political flight of Éluard places dramatic emphasis on the inevitability of 
such evasions to the human experience. Evading the past, evading what 
we do not or cannot understand, is a condition of the personal and the 
political. To live in the present, itself a slogan for spontaneity, involves an 
attempt, successful to varying degrees, to float away from the baggage of 
the past in all its forms: erasing the past is implicit in the all-absorbing 
experience of the present, which holds on to fragments of what came 
before as these are conditioned by our current perception. The flight 
of the political-poetic dancers takes this evasion a step further. The 
dancers manage to dissolve gravity entirely, creating a world in which 
the claims of the smoking crematorium below can be erased, and having 
been erased, translated seamlessly into present response and present 
living. Kundera depicts this erasure through a fantasy sequence but, as 
Le Livre attests, he is only too aware that such fantasies have already been 
133MILAN KUNDERA’S LE L IVRE DU RIRE ET DE L ’OUBLI
realized. Kundera’s juxtaposition of the poetic and the political explores 
the continued and alarming potency of their association. 
In Le Livre, then, as in La Vie est ailleurs, Kundera assigns specific 
dangers to the poetic. Yet he can only explore these dangers through his own 
novelistic practice, and this practice has its own poetics which renders the 
distinction between novel and poetry less rigid than Kundera’s rejection 
of lyric poetry might suggest. Steinby suggests that ‘[r]enouncing lyrical 
poetry, or, rather, the lyrical stance, meant for Kundera renouncing an 
attitude to the world which makes an acceptance of totalitarian ideology 
possible’.107 But if lyrical poetry offers a dangerously absolutist approach 
to the translation of experience into form, can Kundera’s novel, built as it 
is on formal variation, really offer an ethical approach to experience and 
the aesthetic forms used to understand it? 
Poetry and the novel
Literary form as it emerges in Kundera’s response to the translation of his 
texts delineates not just the architecture of a text but the process through 
which we inhabit our own experiences. In L’Art du roman (1986) Kundera 
writes that ‘dans l’art, la forme est toujours plus qu’une forme. Chaque 
roman, bon gré mal gré, propose une réponse à la question: qu’est-ce que 
l’existence humaine et où réside sa poésie?’/‘in art, the form is always 
more than a form. Every novel, like it or not, offers some answer to the 
question: What is human existence, and wherein does its poetry lie?’108 In 
this comment, Kundera acknowledges that the novel form is concerned, 
precisely, with an exploration of the poetry of human experience. But 
the nature of our response to the question Kundera poses above can, 
he suggests, be read through the aesthetic form in which we choose to 
respond. Kundera’s reading of lyric poetry positions it as a form which 
responds to this question by prioritizing the idea of an absolute Truth 
which excludes interrogation and doubt. In L’Art du roman, Kundera 
endows the novel form with a particular ethical power based upon 
precisely its ability to query preconceived modes of thinking: ‘Le monde 
basé sur une seule Vérité et le monde ambigu et relatif du roman sont 
pétris chacun d’une manière totalement différente. La Vérité totalitaire 
exclut la relativité, le doute, l’interrogation et elle ne peut donc jamais 
se concilier avec ce que j’appellerais l’esprit du roman.’/‘The world of one 
single truth and the relative, ambiguous world of the novel are molded 
of entirely different substances. Totalitarian Truth excludes relativity, 
doubt, questioning; it can never accommodate what I would call the spirit 
of the novel.’109 Kundera here emphasizes an ambiguity at the heart of the 
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novel which is opposed to the certainty he associates with lyric poetry. If 
lyricism is the search for absolute translatability, the novel acknowledges 
the impossibility of this ambition, focusing instead upon the individual, 
untranslatable elements which exist within every interaction.
The demarcation Kundera creates here between poetry and prose, 
and the power he assigns to the novel form to intersect in challenging 
ways with our understanding of human existence, resonates with 
Sartre’s discussion of engaged literature in ‘Qu’est-ce que la littérature?’ 
Like Kundera, Sartre sees the poetic as a response to untranslatability: 
faced with the challenge of transmitting meaning linguistically, poetry 
answers by turning language inside out, redeeming the word in and of 
itself, beyond the (im)possibility of signification. For Sartre, this self-
referentiality means that poetry cannot have an impact upon the world, 
whether positive or negative, for it is concerned with language as object 
as opposed to mediator of reality. In contrast, prose operates from 
within language looking out, using words to challenge or confirm our 
perceptions of reality. For Sartre, this connection with experience enables 
prose to be committed, demanding that the reader see differently, engage 
authentically, attempt to change her or his reality.110 Sartre’s separation 
of prose and poetry enforces conceptions of poetry as inherently 
untranslatable. For if, in poetry, the word is object, any translation will 
inevitably alter that object and therefore fail to transmit the essential in 
and of the poem itself. Sartre’s description of prose, on the other hand, 
hints towards its translatability: unlike poetry, prose is concerned with 
transmitting meaning. The medium for that transmission may change 
from language to language, but its essentials, Sartre implies, can be 
carried across from one to another.
Sartre’s dichotomy offers both a model for and a contrast to Kundera’s 
discussions of prose and poetry. On one level, Sartre endows prose with 
precisely the ambiguity which Kundera suggests is innate within the 
novel form, an ambiguity which requires the reader to engage freely and 
authentically in order to create a representation of experience from the 
words of the author. Yet Sartre differs significantly from Kundera in his 
insistence that the poetic has no impact upon reality. For Kundera, lyric 
poetry is in fact deeply engaged, capable of shaping reality dangerously 
through its formal focus upon unity and perfection, a form designed to 
soothe and harmonize rather than disturb and discomfort. The difference 
between Kundera and Sartre in their approach to the possibility of aesthetic 
engagement reveals that the terms poetic and prosaic are shorthand for a 
difference of attitude and approach to the relationship between writing 
and existence which can span either aesthetic arrangement. In fact, 
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Sartre’s investigation of the possibility of commitment in prose invokes 
precisely the shift away from Surrealism that Jaromil enacts in La Vie est 
ailleurs – a shift from a form which he suggests is concerned only with 
self-conscious experimentation to one whose purpose is to invoke social 
change.111 Yet, as we saw, Jaromil’s shift ultimately immerses him further 
in the illusions which he constructs from his political ideology. Similarly, 
while Sartre invokes the freedom which can be generated by an authentic 
engagement with prose, his depiction of the ways in which prose might 
offer itself to such an engagement sometimes undermines that very 
freedom by restricting the form that prose can take. It is precisely for 
this reason that Adorno, in ‘Commitment’, challenges Sartre’s reading 
of the division between art-for-art’s sake and engaged literature. Adorno 
argues that Sartre deploys form as the servant of an explicit content-based 
message, a practice which undermines the very freedom and authenticity 
he (Sartre) ascribes to prose.112
Adorno contrasts Sartre’s approach with that of Kafka and Beckett, 
who, he suggests, offer a more productive and challenging engagement 
with reality through their use of a form which performs the alienation 
and disturbance other fictional texts only articulate.113 In Les Testaments 
trahis, Kundera also discusses Kafka as an example of an author who 
transforms, indeed remakes, the world through the poetry of his novels. 
Like Adorno, Kundera contrasts Kafka’s writing with a work that he 
believes reveals the failure of an overtly committed literature: Orwell’s 
1984. In discussing this contrast, Kundera again divides the poetic from 
the novelistic, but here he reverses the attributes he assigns to each 
form: it is Kafka’s ‘poetry’ which brings the reader to an awareness of 
the complex reality of human freedom; it is Orwell’s ‘bad novel’ which 
both negates the lucidity of its political message through the ambiguity 
of the novel form, and destroys the power of that ambiguity through its 
insistence upon the articulation of those ideas. Orwell’s novel, in fact, ‘fait 
lui-même partie de l’esprit totalitaire, de l’esprit de propagande’/‘joins in 
the totalitarian spirit, the spirit of propaganda’, by reducing ‘une réalité 
à son aspect purement politique et dans la reduction de ce même aspect 
á ce qu’il a d’exemplairement négatif […] le mal totalitaire  […] est 
précisément la reduction de la vie à la politique et de la politique à la 
propagande’/‘reality to its political dimension alone, and in its reduction 
of that dimension to what is exemplarily negative about it […] totalitarian 
evil […] is, precisely, the reduction of life to politics and of politics to 
propaganda’.114 It is this understanding of the complexity of evil which 
Kundera suggests Kafka captures and Orwell ignores through the formal 
properties of their respective texts. 
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For Kundera, Kafka’s The Castle is concerned with articulating 
the disarticulation of K.’s experience, with finding a form for the 
incomprehensible, fundamentally unpoetic experience he lives through. It 
is an ambiguous form which matches the impossibility of translating this 
experience into kitsch or propaganda. But, ironically, translation – at least 
from the German into French – fails to capture this impossibility: Kundera 
critiques the ways in which Kafka’s French translators have ignored the 
importance of form within Kafka’s novel, rejecting any element which 
clashes with the conventions of the target language. The changes made by 
these translators include standardizing sentence and paragraph length; 
eliminating any repetition of words, regardless of the variance within the 
source text; and adding punctuation at seemingly appropriate points.115 
Kundera’s analysis of this failure of translation, and his own attempt to 
create a faithful version of an extract of Kafka’s text – faithful to the form 
of the text, rather than a pre-digested content – again reframes the debate 
between translatability and untranslatability which I have been pursuing 
in this chapter. Kundera suggests that what fails to be translated of Kafka’s 
texts is precisely their poetic untranslatability – their refusal to make peace 
with the world and reflect that peace in a harmonious aesthetic form. 
Kundera’s focus upon the poetry of Kafka’s texts in Les Testaments 
trahis destabilizes the oppositionary relationship between certainty and 
ambiguity, poetry and the novel, translatability and untranslatability, 
which he appears to assert in Le Livre. Poetry has traditionally been 
considered untranslatable because of a link between form and content 
which is always lost in translation. Roman Jakobson famously claimed 
that ‘poetry is, by definition, untranslatable’, while in Sur la traduction, 
Ricœur focuses upon poetry in his exploration of the binary translatable/
untranslatable, suggesting that ‘[l]a poésie offrait en effet la difficulté 
majeure de l’union inséparable du sens et de la sonorité, du signifié et 
du signifiant’/‘poetry presented the serious difficulty of the inseparable 
combination of sense and sonority, of the signified and the signifier’.116 
But as Kundera discusses in relation to Kafka, the link between form and 
content can be as close in prose as it is in poetry. Kundera’s reading of 
the difference between poetry and prose is less concerned with what we 
call these forms than with how they shape an aesthetic response to our 
experience. If aesthetic forms seek to create a harmonious, kitsch vision of 
our relationships and experiences, they respond to the world as if it were 
inherently translatable. Conversely, if they seek to explore the dissonance 
between experience and reality, between self and other, between our 
beliefs and their manifestation, they respond to the ambiguity and the 
innate untranslatability of our experience. 
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It is in this sense that for Kundera poetry and prose are not in 
opposition so much as two sides of the same coin, two ways in which 
experience and thought are organized aesthetically into a manageable 
coherence. For we all seek poetry in our narratives, and that poetry 
can be deployed in a challenging reframing of dissonance, discord and 
uncertainty. So too, prose has its own lyricism which can produce unilateral 
effects in its very emphasis on plurality, and the novel can emerge as a tool 
for propaganda and political agendas. While it would be possible, then, 
to read Kundera’s art-as-ethics as contained within oppositions between 
poetry and novel, certainty and ambiguity, such oppositions are merely 
a shorthand which, taken at face value, can narrow rather than expand 
the ways in which we think about the ethics of aesthetic forms. Indeed, 
to constrain our thinking to binaries such as these is to deny room for the 
ethical, for it merely allows us to replace one unilateral understanding of 
art with another. Kundera’s project is to inhabit the borderland between 
oppositional statements, to push them to their limits until the oppositions 
collapse and reveal their proximity to one another.
Indeed, despite Kundera’s emphasis upon ambiguity in his texts, 
he is as concerned with the dangers of absolute ambiguity as he is with 
those of absolute certainty. Kundera explores the proximity of these two 
dangers by setting up, and then collapsing, another apparent dichotomy 
within Le Livre: an angelic attitude to experience, conditioned by a poetic 
faith in the possibility of certainty and perfect translatability, and a 
demonic one, conditioned by forms of untranslatability and uncertainty. 
This dichotomy, which Kundera both creates and dissolves in Le Livre, 
further nuances Kundera’s ethics of aesthetic forms.
The angels and the Devil
Kundera’s decision to position the story of the poetic-political dancers 
in Le Livre under the chapter heading ‘Les Anges’ connects the poetic 
to the broader motif of angels, another of the ‘mots-thèmes’ of Le Livre. 
Angels, the narrator suggests, experience existence as ‘ordonné, sagement 
conçu, bon et plein de sens’/‘well ordered, wisely conceived, good, and 
meaningful’ and, as such, are fundamentally opposed to the concept of 
litost, for if litost arises from an awareness of the discrepancy between 
vision and experience, the angels reject that very possibility.117 Kundera’s 
angels embody the qualities Ricœur associates with the perfect translation, 
for they seek an absolute identity between their beliefs and the world they 
create, expressing faith in the fullness of sense in relation to events. Their 
joy in coherence is expressed by their delighted laughter, ‘l’expression de 
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF TRANSLATION138
l’être qui se réjouit d’être’/‘the expression of being rejoicing in being’.118 
This joy reflects a valorization of the present moment above the hauntings 
of the past and the possibilities of the future: to rejoice in being is to 
inhabit a suspended moment ‘sans souvenir et sans désir’/‘without 
memory and without desire’.119 This joy is manifested in ring dancing, in 
the aestheticized confection of kitsch, in the political idyll: indeed, the 
narrator of Le Livre hears ‘le rire effrayant des anges qui couvre de son 
carillon toutes [ses] paroles’/‘the fearsome laughter of the angels […], 
drowning all [his] words with its jangle’ at the very moment when he falls, 
or is pushed, from the idyll for political dissidence.120 
Kundera creates a complement to the world of the angels through 
his construction of the Devil, ‘celui qui refuse au monde divin un sens 
rationnel’/‘the one who refuses to grant any rational meaning to that 
divinely created world’.121 The Devil rejects any kitsch agreement with 
being, insisting that the order of things is not certain, and certainly not 
perfect. While the angels and the poets rise up above the chaos of the 
world, the Devil, Kundera suggests, tumbles headlong into it, laughing, 
because ‘Les choses soudain privées de leur sens supposé, de la place qui 
leur est assignée dans l’ordre prétendu des choses […] provoquent chez 
nous le rire. A l’origine, le rire est donc du domaine du diable’/‘Things 
deprived suddenly of their supposed meaning, of the place assigned 
to them in the so-called order of things […] make us laugh. In origin, 
laughter is the devil’s domain’.122 The angels and the Devil thus exist 
at opposite ends of the spectrum in relation to the forms which allow 
them to express their perceptions and their experience of them. The 
angels see the relation between experience and existence as coherent; 
the Devil sees this relation as fragmented, distorted, disturbed. If the 
angels represent a lyrical world where translation is entirely possible, 
where indeed it is everything, and where any elements of individuality 
and difference must be erased for the sake of unity, the Devil represents 
a much more ambiguous world where translation is impossible, where it 
is a nightmare, and where endlessly fragmented and mutable meanings 
prevent any ultimate coherence. 
Given Kundera’s repeated textual assertions about the dangers of 
seeking answers as opposed to posing questions, and his emphasis upon 
the importance of ambiguity as an aesthetic quality, could we then read 
his Devil as the positive converse of the angels, a unique, fragmenting 
force, capable of liberating us from the dangers of a purely lyrical 
vision of experience? Could the qualities Kundera assigns to the Devil 
in Le Livre offer a way of accessing the ethical charge Kundera perceives 
within aesthetic ambiguity and untranslatability? In much of Kundera’s 
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theoretical work, the value of the ambiguity which constitutes the 
novelistic spirit is asserted almost unconditionally. To read the Devil as a 
positive force would, then, enable a coherent construction of Kundera’s 
aesthetics and his ethics of relation, through which the importance of 
the ambiguous, the sceptical and the uncertain would be reasserted. 
For Steinby, the laughter of the Devil is part of Kundera’s construction 
of a responsible alternative to the lyricism of the angels: ‘The angels’ all-
approving laughter is a sign either of an ideological attitude or a childish 
naïveté, whereas mocking laughter expresses the attitude of a rational 
human being […]. For Kundera, skepticism is a sign of maturity and 
therefore something to strive towards’.123
But Kundera’s parable is in fact more ambiguous than such a 
reading would suggest. In his interview with Roth he comments, 
Both kinds of laughter belong among life’s pleasures, but when 
it is carried to extremes it also denotes a dual apocalypse: the 
enthusiastic laughter of angel-fanatics, who are so convinced of 
their world’s significance that they are ready to hang anyone not 
sharing their joy. And the other laughter, sounding from the opposite 
side, which proclaims that everything has become meaningless 
[…]. Human life is bounded by two chasms: fanaticism on one side, 
absolute skepticism on the other.124
While the majority of Le Livre is concerned with the dangers of an angelic 
fanaticism, in warning of the dangers of ‘a dual apocalypse’ Kundera is 
clearly not proclaiming absolute scepticism as the best response to political 
or aesthetic questions. Indeed, the narrator suggests that ‘s’il y a dans le 
monde trop de sens incontestable (le pouvoir des anges), l’homme succombe 
sous son poids. Si le monde perd tout son sens (le règne des démons), on 
ne peut pas vivre non plus’/‘If there was too much incontestable meaning 
in the world (the angels’ power), man would succumb under its weight. 
If the world were to lose all its meaning (the devil’s reign), we could not 
live either’.125 Politically and ethically, a world with only one meaning, an 
angelic idyll of absolute certainty, crushes any element which is foreign or 
different; equally, a demonic world with no meaning offers only a nihilistic 
experience of emptiness. Linguistically and textually, Kundera’s focus upon 
the limitations of either too much sense or absolute nonsense reflects the 
dangers of both positions. A belief that aesthetic forms can contain absolute 
semantic stability – the ‘translatability’ accusation levelled at Kundera by 
critics of his approach to translation – fails to acknowledge the slipperiness 
of meaning; at the same time, insisting that aesthetic forms are, because 
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of this slipperiness, inherently untranslatable, undermines their power to 
challenge and negotiate our social precepts across and between linguistic 
and cultural boundaries. 
How then should we understand Kundera’s contrasting 
representation of the angels and the Devil? The distinction Kundera 
creates between the angels and the Devil – and, through this, between 
sense and nonsense, certainty and ambiguity, translatability and 
untranslatability, lyricism and the novel – is, as with so many of the 
distinctions in his work, an exploratory and heuristic one. As Steinby 
argues, Kundera is really interested in the continually changing relation 
between such oppositions.126 Kundera’s exploration of the proximity of 
disparate thoughts, feelings and attitudes is exemplified by the origins 
of laughter of the angels and the Devil, an origin which is grounded in a 
difference of translation:
Quand l’ange a entendu pour la première fois le rire du Malin, il 
en a été frappé de stupeur. […] L’ange comprenait clairement que 
ce rire était dirigé contre Dieu et contre la dignité de son œuvre. 
Il savait qu’il devait réagir vite […]. Ne pouvant rien inventer lui-
même, il a singé son adversaire. Ouvrant la bouche, il émettait 
des sons entrecoupés, saccadés, […] mais en leur donnant un 
sens opposé  […]. Ainsi, l’ange et le diable se faisaient face et, se 
montrant leur bouche ouverte, émettaient à peu près les mêmes 
sons, mais chacun exprimait par sa clameur des choses absolument 
contraires.
The first time an angel heard the devil’s laughter, he was 
dumbfounded. […] The angel clearly understood that such 
laughter was directed against God and against the dignity of his 
works. He knew that he must react swiftly […] Unable to come 
up with anything of his own, he aped his adversary. Opening his 
mouth he emitted broken, spasmodic sounds […] but giving them 
an opposite meaning […] Thus the angel and the devil faced each 
other and, mouths wide open, emitted nearly the same sounds, but 
each one’s noise expressed the absolute opposite of the other’s.127
The laughter of the angels and the laughter of the Devil here have 
utterly opposed meanings. But these dual meanings, suggests Kundera, 
take exactly the same form. The difference between the two laughs is 
thus a difference of translation: the laughter of the Devil is the original 
laughter which reveals the essential absurdity of existence; the laughter 
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of the angels is the translation of this original laughter which seeks to 
impose meaning upon this absurdity. The angels’ need for translation 
arises because they can invent nothing for themselves, positioning 
translation as a derivative rather than generative force. But the results 
of this translation offer their own illuminations. Kundera suggests that 
the certainty of the angels’ laughter and the ambiguity of the Devil’s 
are built from the same material. What does this suggest about the 
relation of absolute uncertainty and absolute certainty, the sceptical 
and the fanatical, the ambiguous and the lyrical? Are the absolutely 
untranslatable and the perfectly translatable paradoxically equivalent?
In Against World Literature Emily Apter situates her own exploration 
of the ethics of translation between these two poles. She suggests that the 
Untranslatable, if conceived as an absolute, inhabits precisely the same 
territory as the desire for a perfect translation. For to assert the possibility 
of pure untranslatability is to risk creating ‘a fetish of the Other’, a fetish 
which refuses the attempt to understand another, even with the inevitable 
appropriations this understanding entails.128 For Apter, ‘it would be 
more accurate to understand the Untranslatable, not as pure difference 
in opposition to the always translatable […] but as a linguistic form of 
creative failure with homeopathic uses.’129 This creative failure recognizes 
that untranslatability is a fact, that the attempt at a perfect translation will 
fail, but that we can only fail because we attempt to succeed. Similarly, the 
proximity which Kundera creates between the angels and the Devil in Le 
Livre is a recognition of this inevitable desire to convert the untranslatable 
into the translatable. For this proximity is not the end point of Kundera’s 
argument but rather its beginning. It is the beginning too of his exploration 
of the affective and historical content of the slipperiness of meaning, and 
of how such slippages – an inherent part of our response to any world we 
occupy – can be manipulated, politically, textually and personally. 
Kundera’s exploration of such manipulation hinges upon the way 
the attitude of the angels and the attitude of the Devil can be conflated. 
Kundera highlights this potential conflation through his exploration of 
the original/translated nature of their laughter: 
Un rire ridicule, c’est la débâcle. Pourtant, les anges ont quand 
même obtenu un résultat. Ils nous ont trompés avec une imposture 
sémantique. Pour désigner leur imitation du rire et le rire originel 
(celui du diable) il n’y a qu’un seul mot. Aujourd’hui on ne se rend 
même plus compte que la même manifestation extérieure recouvre 
deux attitudes intérieures absolument opposées. Il y a deux rires et 
nous n’avons pas de mot pour les distinguer.
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF TRANSLATION142
Laughable laughter is disastrous. Even so, the angels have gained 
something from it. They have tricked us with a semantic imposture. 
Their imitation of laughter and (the devil’s) original laughter are 
both called by the same name. Nowadays we don’t even realize that 
the same external display serves two absolutely opposed internal 
attitudes. There are two laughters, and we have no word to tell one 
from the other.130
There is an initial linguistic conflation of two different attitudes behind 
a single word: laughter. As we saw in Derrida’s discussion of Plato’s use 
of the word pharmakon, it is just this failure to address the slippage of 
signification which allows us to assert the possibility of stable essences, 
independent of translation and impervious to it, and convertible 
into absolutes. Like Ricœur’s paradigm of translation, this linguistic 
conflation has far-reaching ethical implications, its dangers hinging upon 
the possibility that we might forget that there are two different types 
of laughter, and assert and act out the idea that only one exists. When 
we fail to recognize that there can be two opposed attitudes contained 
within the same word and the same utterance, we fail to acknowledge 
both the privilege and the limitations of our own perspective. We see only 
what we see: as Timothy Mathews suggests, ‘[o]ptically, a point of view 
is made in pushing out the others. Affectively, culturally, historically, 
spontaneously, intimately, publically, in remembering and forgetting, my 
understanding of you and others still appears to me in my own way of 
seeing, and in my own blindness’.131 
As Kundera asserts, this faith in the coherence of our understanding 
is dangerous: whether we resort to the idyll or to nihilism, place our faith 
in certainty or scepticism, we fail to acknowledge that these attitudes 
are part and parcel of the same motivation: a desire to assert our own 
perspective over that of another. We can never prevent this type of 
forgetting: our perspective is the only one we know; our laughter is the 
only one we can express. Nonetheless, we need, Kundera suggests, to 
find a way to recognize the inevitability of such forgetting; to realize that 
there can be multiple meanings behind and interpretations of the same 
laughter; to understand this forgetting even if we cannot thwart it.
In The Art of Relation, Mathews asks ‘[w]hat ethics do we need 
to understand the repetition of what we do not understand? And what 
art?’132 One answer – partial, at best, but all the more pertinent for that 
partiality – is offered by translation. In multiplying a text into other 
forms, in repeating it in other languages, in its failures and its attempts 
to communicate, translation acknowledges the partiality of every 
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perspective, and the impossibility of absolute understanding. In the next 
section of this chapter, I return to Kundera’s discussions of translation in 
relation to his own work, and suggest that such discussions reveal, not 
a desire to prevent slippages of meaning – which is itself an impossible 
task – but a desire to prevent us forgetting that it is these slippages which 
enable the translation of ambiguity into certainty. 
A hospitable translation
Fidelity and betrayal
As I discussed in the introduction to this chapter, critics such as 
Stanger and Barańczak allege that Kundera writes in a style designed 
for ‘translatability’. Yet the very possibility of attaining such a style 
is, as I have explored throughout this chapter, one which Kundera 
repeatedly disputes through narratives which focus upon the inevitable 
mistranslations which occur in our every attempt to understand another 
person, or even ourselves. Nonetheless, Kundera is not asserting that 
translation is an impossibility, that untranslatability is the norm. For even 
an untranslatable word such as litost can be communicated: meaning, 
though inevitably distorted, can be recreated across linguistic borders 
through the use of narrative. The reality of translation is that we always 
find a way through every impasse into some form of communication, 
however partial and distorted. 
In Sur la traduction, Ricœur focuses upon this paradox, which 
he suggests renders the translatable versus untranslatable binary 
unsustainable as a model for translation theory, as well as in practice. 
If language were so discrete as to be untranslatable, understanding 
between languages would be absolutely impossible: ‘Il faut alors 
conclure que la mécompréhension est de droit, que la traduction est 
théoriquement impossible et que les individus bilingues ne peuvent être 
que des schizophrènes’/‘So we must conclude that misunderstanding is 
a right, that translation is theoretically impossible and that bilinguals 
have to be schizophrenics’.133 A theory and practice of translation which 
culminates in the conclusion that linguistic diversity is a schizophrenic 
experience is an infertile path to pursue, and it is disproved by the 
experiences of bilingual authors such as Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún. 
The converse posits that because translation does exist there must be 
some superstructure to language: either an original language which we 
have lost – the utopian possibility of Benjamin’s pure language – or an 
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eternal, transcendent linguistic model from which all other languages 
have grown. This second model is equally unproductive for Ricœur, 
simply because it has been unproductive: ‘nul ne peut dire comment on 
pourrait dériver les langues naturelles, avec toutes les bizarreries qu’on 
dira plus loin, de la présumée langue parfaite’/‘no one can say how the 
natural languages, with all the peculiarities which we will talk about 
later, could be derived from the supposed perfect language’.134 Despite 
multiple attempts, no empirical sign of linguistic transcendence has been 
uncovered; as I discussed in Chapter 1, such an idea of perfection involves 
an absolutist repression of linguistic plurality and the multilingual reality 
which so many of us inhabit both nationally and transnationally. As in 
Kundera’s discussion of the angels and the Devil, here the weight of either 
pole in the binary translatable/untranslatable continually supplants 
the possibility of the other. The empirical diversity of languages is 
outweighed by the need to accept that some understanding can transcend 
the linguistic separation; the notion of a universal language fails because 
it has no empirical verification. 
This failure of either model to offer a productive approach 
to the linguistic, social, ethical and political issues of translation 
enables Ricœur to address a different model: ‘fidélité versus 
trahison’/‘faithfulness versus betrayal’.135 Splitting translations 
according to this dichotomy has allowed theorists and practitioners 
of translation to valorize translations and translators according to the 
somewhat indefinite criterion of being faithful to the original text or 
authorial intention. Ricœur’s discussion of ‘fidélité versus trahison’ is 
not concerned, however, with the oppositional nature of these two 
ideas, but with the space, the border, between them. Ricœur’s discussion 
begins with a return to the Babel myth; he is interested in the attitude 
towards translation of the original builders of the tower of Babel. This 
attitude, he suggests, was one of acceptance: ‘La traduction est bien 
alors une tâche, non au sens d’une obligation contraignante, mais au 
sens de la chose à faire pour que l’action humaine puisse simplement 
continuer […]. Ils cessent de bâtir! Façon de dire: c’est ainsi. […] À 
partir de cette réalité de la vie, traduisons!’/‘Translation is definitely a 
task, then, not in the sense of a restricting obligation, but in the sense 
of the thing to be done so that human life can continue […] They left 
off building the city! That is a way of saying: this is the way things are. 
[…] Starting from this fact of life, let us translate!’136 It is the reality of 
translation which Ricœur seeks to understand, its reality as a fact of life 
which, for Ricœur, offers a paradigm for all our interactions, be they 
linguistic, political, ethical, social, cultural or affective.
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Ricœur’s reason for turning to the fidelity/betrayal binary is 
that, in the space between these two opposites, he believes there exists 
a productive model for considering this reality of translation. This 
involves rethinking our understanding of what it means to achieve a 
good translation, a criterion which, he suggests, can never be accurately 
judged:
pour qu’un tel critère soit disponible, il faudrait qu’on puisse 
comparer le texte de départ et le texte d’arrivée à un troisième texte 
qui serait porteur du sens identique supposé circuler du premier au 
second. […] Il n’y a pas […] de tiers texte entre le texte source et 
le texte d’arrivée. D’où le paradoxe, avant le dilemme : une bonne 
traduction ne peut viser qu’à une équivalence présumée, non 
fondée dans une identité de sens démontrable.
for such a criterion to be available, we would have to be able to 
compare the source and target texts with a third text which would 
bear the identical meaning that is supposed to be passed from 
the first to the second […]. There is no […] third text between 
the source text and the target text. Hence the paradox, before the 
dilemma: a good translation can aim only at a supposed equivalence 
that is not founded on a demonstrable identity of meaning.137
For Ricœur, this absence of a third text means that we can never determine 
whether a translation is identical in meaning to the source text. Instead, 
every translation is caught between fidelity and betrayal, capable of 
both serving and failing the source text in ways that can never be fully 
assessed. To perceive a text as translatable or untranslatable fashions 
translation as a tool which seeks, but often fails, to attain an absolute, 
perfect identification with an original. But the fidelity/betrayal dichotomy 
allows us to move beyond this impasse, and approach the mystery and 
the task of translation as seeking equivalence rather than identicalness. 
While identicalness of sense implies a type of absolute correspondence 
– the poetic uniformity of a political idyll, for example – equivalence, 
‘the condition of being equal or equivalent in value, worth, function, 
etc.’, enables a working relation with the impossibility of an absolute 
correspondence.138 For, whether in translation, politics or our personal 
lives, we can never truly lose ourselves in another and identify with them 
completely. Equivalence acknowledges that untranslatable elements are 
a living reality uncovered in translation, that absolute identicalness can 
never be measured or attained, and that confronting betrayal as part of 
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fidelity remains the inevitable task of the translator. As Ricœur writes, ‘la 
nature véritable de l’équivalence […] est plutôt produite par la traduction 
que présumée par elle’/‘the true nature of equivalence […] is produced by 
translation rather than presupposed by it’.139
Throughout Kundera’s discussion of the translations of his novels 
there is a similar focus upon the space between fidelity and betrayal, 
and a recognition of both the challenges of translation and its ability to 
illuminate the ethics of our attempts to stabilize meaning, both textually 
and non-textually. As the title of Les Testaments trahis attests, Kundera 
is fascinated by these concepts of faith and betrayal, understood both 
as forms of human motivation and as a translational dynamic. He 
once, somewhat infamously, commented that ‘[l]a traduction est belle 
seulement si elle est fidèle’/‘a translation is beautiful only if it is faithful’, 
though, as Woods notes, he makes no mention of ‘to what the translation 
should be faithful’.140 Kundera saves the issue for Les Testaments trahis. 
Here he explores the multiple ways in which art, understood as a 
testament to the pursuit of freedom and creativity, can be betrayed by 
its own hermeneutic possibilities, and by the appropriation of these 
possibilities by the publisher, the reader, the critic and indeed the 
translator.141 In this text Kundera elaborates upon the importance 
of fidelity in translation, stating that ‘[l]’autorité suprême, pour un 
traducteur, devrait être le style personnel de l’auteur’/‘For a translator, the 
supreme authority should be the author’s personal style’.142 Such a style, 
suggests Kundera, is often itself transgressive in the source language, 
working to challenge or reject established grammatical or stylistic modes. 
Kundera believes that ‘tout auteur d’une certaine valeur transgresse le 
«beau style» et c’est dans cette transgression que se trouve l’originalité 
(et, partant, la raison d’être) de son art. Le premier effort du traducteur 
devrait être la compréhension de cette transgression’/‘every author of 
some value transgresses against “good style,’’ and in that transgression 
lies the originality (and hence raison d’être) of his art. The translator’s 
primary effort should be to understand that transgression’.143 As Woods 
suggests, Kundera believes that it is this transgression of stylistic norms, 
itself a powerful aesthetic expression of freedom, that translation runs 
the risk of betraying.144
In Les Testaments trahis, Kundera thus nuances the criteria through 
which a translation can be judged as faithful or a betrayal. Even so, 
Kundera’s claim that ‘[l]a traduction est belle seulement si elle est 
fidèle’ implies a somewhat circumscribed vision of the role and purpose 
of translation.145 But this vision of translation is only limited if the 
values attributed to fidelity and beauty are stable. In fact, throughout 
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his œuvre Kundera repeatedly questions and challenges those values. 
In L’Insoutenable légèreté de l’être, Kundera explores two different 
conceptions of beauty: 
En Europe, la beauté a toujours eu un caractère intentionnel. Il y 
a eu un dessein esthétique et un plan de longue haleine […]. La 
beauté de New York a une tout autre origine. C’est une beauté 
non-intentionnelle. Elle est née sans préméditation de la part de 
l’homme […]. Des formes, hideuses en elles-mêmes, se retrouvent 
par hasard, sans plan aucun, dans d’improbables voisinages où elles 
brillent tout à coup d’une poésie magique.
Beauty in the European sense has always had a premeditated quality 
to it. We’ve always had an aesthetic intention and a long-range 
plan. […] The beauty of New York rests on a completely different 
base. It’s unintentional. It arose independently of human design 
[…] Forms which are in themselves quite ugly turn up fortuitously, 
without design, in such incredible surroundings that they sparkle 
with a sudden wondrous poetry.146
The difference between the beauty of New York and the beauty of 
Europe, then, is the difference between the planned and the unexpected, 
the intentional and the unintentional, between beauty as the preserve 
of kitsch and the beauty Kundera valorizes in L’Art du roman: ‘Beauté 
dans l’art: lumière subitement allumée du jamais-dit’/‘Beauty in art: the 
suddenly kindled light of the never-before-said.’147 The nuances Kundera 
finds here echo Kant’s separation of the beautiful and the sublime. In 
Kant’s reading, the beautiful delights because it is attractive, pleasant 
and comprehensible, whereas the sublime challenges, disturbs and 
overwhelms.148 A faithful translation, a repetition of a preconceived and 
prewritten idea, may be beautiful as a European city is beautiful, but it 
fails to attain the flash of the unforeseen which Kundera here equates with 
artistic power. Significantly, in an intratextual excerpt from L’Insoutenable 
légèreté de l’être included in L’Art du roman, Kundera endows betrayal 
with the potential for such a transgressive flash of originality: ‘Trahir, 
c’est sortir du rang et partir dans l’inconnu’/‘betrayal means breaking 
ranks and going off into the unknown’.149 To depart into the unknown is 
itself a form of forgetting the past and, perhaps also the future: it is the 
triumph of a present that refuses a debt to any previous experience, to 
any previous text. This is originality, then, but on challenging terms, an 
originality concerned with the very forms of forgetting which Kundera 
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF TRANSLATION148
warns us against in Le Livre. But this transgressive originality is also a 
challenge to the idea of ‘le «déjà connu»’/‘the already-known’, the kitsch 
and pre-digested expression which, in L’Art du roman, Kundera suggests 
is the very opposite of insight.150
So there is a freedom, a beauty, and an insight in betrayal which 
Kundera suggests does not exist in absolute fidelity, nor in absolute 
cohesion. Indeed, as Steinby notes, ‘[i]n Kundera’s view, fidelity is an 
ideal of the sentimental. It is a stubborn insistence on something that has 
already lost meaning’.151 Steinby does not connect this vision to Kundera’s 
own comments about the fidelity of translation. But while Kundera argues 
that a translation is only beautiful if it is faithful, the shifting values he 
assigns to both these terms suggest that such a ‘beautiful’ translation is 
not necessarily the one he would wish for his own novels. Rather, this 
phrase is part of Kundera’s own transgressive challenge to any supposed 
stability in concepts as subjective as beauty, fidelity and originality. 
Indeed, even as he asserts a desire for fidelity Kundera is already 
undermining it through his own continual rewriting. As Woods notes, 
‘Kundera has rewritten almost all of his Czech “originals” so that the 
translations have no original text to be faithful to’.152 In the same way, his 
continual revisions of the translations of his texts into French and English 
render each version temporary and unfinished. The ‘definitive’ English 
version of La Plaisanterie (published in 1992), for example, is the fifth 
version of the text. This endless urge to rewrite can be read as a journey 
towards a perfect translation, a journey which reveals the desire for such 
perfection to be as inevitable as the desire for kitsch. But this is an urge 
which can never be satisfied, for perfection – in writing, in translation, in 
our relations to another – can never be attained. In his ‘Author’s note’ to 
this edition, Kundera offers ‘a promise: there will not be a sixth English-
language version of The Joke’.153 Yet the existence of four previous English 
versions of the text reveals the fragility of this ‘promise’. 
Kundera’s understanding of fidelity in translation, then, is far 
removed from an absolute replication of the first-written text. Drawing 
on Philip E. Lewis’s essay ‘The Measure of Translation Effects’, Woods 
suggests that, because of this continual rewriting, the term ‘abusive 
fidelity’ be applied to Kundera’s work.154 Lewis’s term suggests that 
translations can remain abusively faithful to a text by seeking to 
reproduce its style rather than its content.155 But I would suggest that the 
term ‘faithful betrayal’, which reverses these poles, could also be applied 
to Kundera’s work. Kundera is faithful, but that fidelity is reserved for 
his continual betrayals of the certainty and finality of his own aesthetic 
forms, a faith in the impossibility of fidelity. 
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A faithful betrayal
This ‘faithful betrayal’ is integral to understanding Kundera’s attitude to 
translation, and particularly his description of the control he maintains 
over the translation of his novels as ‘cette activité sisyphesque’/‘this 
Sisyphean activity’.156 Sisyphus was condemned to his endless task 
because of his betrayals, his duplicitous manipulation of the secrets of the 
Gods in an attempt to imprison Death and gain immortality for the human 
race. The punishment for this betrayal of authority is one of translation 
– Sisyphus must engage in a never-ending repetition of an original 
act, displaced each time into a new temporal moment. But while this 
punishment creates a cause-and-effect relationship between betrayal and 
translation, it also enables a re-evaluation of betrayal. For if translation is 
the penalty for transgressing the dictates of the Gods, originality becomes 
the prize for obeying the dictates of a transcendental authority. 
In Le Mythe de Sisyphe, Camus suggests that while Sisyphus’s 
repetitive task reveals the futility of our existence, it also illuminates 
our potential to achieve, through these repetitions, brief and beautiful 
moments of unexpected individual consciousness and power: ‘On retrouve 
toujours son fardeau. Mais Sisyphe enseigne la fidélité supérieure qui nie 
les dieux et soulève les rochers’/‘One always finds one’s burden again. 
But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises 
rocks’.157 A faith built upon a betrayal of the Gods; a brief moment of 
illumination upon a mountain top before an immediate return to the 
darkness of Hades; a beginning which is also a repetition of the same: 
in Sisyphus’s story we read one of the stories of translation. Sisyphus’s 
endless attempt to lay his rock to rest is an acknowledgement of both 
the impossibility of finishing the task of translation and the necessity 
of continuing to try. And, as Camus suggests, the heart of Sisyphus’s 
story is revealed every time he turns from the mountain top to begin 
his task again. Each repetition Sisyphus completes, each variation of his 
challenge, offers him an understanding of his experience in ways which 
one single attempt, an original movement, could not. In Sisyphus’s story, 
nothing is accomplished, but everything is illuminated. For his endless 
movement assigns significance to the attempt and not the result, to the 
process of translation and not the final product, in the space between 
faith and betrayal which is the reality of translation.
This reality of translation, the understanding it reveals through its 
every attempted repetition of a text, is an integral element of Kundera’s 
novels. In Le Rideau Kundera writes that ‘la beauté d’un roman est 
inséparable de son architecture’/‘the beauty of the novel is inseparable 
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from its architecture’.158 While the novel is an attempt to fashion 
aesthetic coherence from the contingency of experience, the beauty of its 
architecture, the unique poetry of its form, is contained for Kundera in the 
powerful affective impact which arises through the novel’s ability to bring 
multiple dialogues, perspectives and genres together. In an interview in 
1979, quoted by Woods, Kundera states that ‘Je n’ai pas quitté la poésie, 
je l’ai trahie. Pour moi, la poésie lyrique, ce n’est pas seulement un genre 
littéraire mais avant tout une conception du monde, une attitude vis-à-
vis du monde. J’ai quitté cette attitude comme on quitte une religion.’/ 
‘I did not leave poetry, I betrayed it. For me, lyrical poetry is not only a 
literary genre but above all a conception of the world, an attitude vis-à-
vis the world. I left this attitude as one leaves a religion’.159 Through the 
novel form, then, Kundera seeks to betray the values of kitsch and poetic 
beauty. But how, even in the novel, are we to escape kitsch? Kundera’s 
answer, like Camus’s, is that this can be achieved through repetition. Just 
as Sisyphus’s task of translation illuminated the shape and form of his 
human experience, Kundera’s use of repetition illuminates the shape and 
form of his ‘faithful betrayal’ of the lyrically poetic form.
Repetition and variation
In the final chapter of Le Livre, Kundera explores two ways in which 
we can understand the illuminations made possible by the process 
of repetition: the first is that repetition can reduce the significance of 
events, words, relationships; the second is that it can illuminate the 
permeations within concepts we believe to be stable.160 ‘La Frontière’ 
focuses upon Jan, another Czech émigré, and the absurdity he perceives 
in attempts to convey our experience through gestures and words. Jan 
believes that repetition is the key to understanding this innate linguistic 
and existential absurdity: ‘Il suffisait de si peu, de si infiniment peu, pour 
se retrouver de l’autre côté de la frontière au-delà de laquelle plus rien 
n’avait de sens: l’amour, les convictions, la foi, l’Histoire. […] Les choses 
se répètent et perdent chaque fois une fraction de leur sens’/‘It takes so 
little, so infinitely little, for someone to find himself on the other side of 
the border, where everything – love, convictions, faith, history – no longer 
has meaning. […] When things are repeated, they lose a fraction of their 
meaning’.161 The potential for repetition to eliminate sense hinges for 
Jan upon the idea that repetition fundamentally devalues the original, 
‘que toute répétition n’est qu’une imitation et que toute imitation est sans 
valeur […] vidée de toute signification à force de se répéter au cours des 
ans’/‘all repetition was mere imitation and all imitation was worthless 
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[…] emptied of all meaning by years of repetition’.162 Here, standard 
hierarchies of translation appear to be imposed: like Plato’s conception 
of the simulacrum which I discussed in Chapter 1 through Gilles Deleuze, 
the copy removes something from the original which prevents it living 
in another language.163 This conception of repetition denies the value of 
imitative action, implicating repetition in the forms of forgetting which, 
throughout Le Livre, Kundera suggests can be translated so dangerously 
into political absolutism. In this reading, Sisyphus’s task would be an 
action void of meaning, a repetition of the already-said and already-
known, destined to be stymied by its lack of originality. 
But while repetition can involve a forgetting and a loss of meaning, 
it can also provide the means through which the inevitability of forgetting 
and the consequent collapse of signification can be revealed. The narrator 
of Le Livre continues: 
Si Jan définit pour lui-même la frontière comme la dose maximale 
admissible de répétitions, je suis donc dans l’obligation de le 
corriger: la frontière n’est pas le résultat de la répétition. La 
répétition n’est que l’une des manières de rendre la frontière visible. 
La ligne de la frontière est couverte de poussière et la répétition est 
comme le geste de la main qui écarte cette poussière.
Since Jan defines the border for himself as the maximum acceptable 
dose of repetitions, I am obliged to correct him: the border is 
not a product of repetition. Repetition is only one of the ways of 
making the border visible. The borderline is covered with dust, and 
repetition is like a hand whisking away dust.164
Here repetition becomes the process of elucidation and illumination 
which Camus suggests Sisyphus’s task reveals. This second conception of 
repetition moves towards the forms of repetition-with-difference which 
I explored in Chapter 1 through Deleuze and Atxaga, where repetition 
gains its own creative value, and the simulacrum offers new ways of 
thinking about originality.165 Repetition of the same means that we forget; 
repetition with difference does not help us remember, but rather allows 
us to acknowledge the inevitability of our forgetting, the impossibility 
of transcending our own perspective, the border between meaning and 
non-meaning which conditions all our interactions.
In Le Livre, Kundera’s own use of repetition operates in this 
illuminating way. As Woods notes, Kundera’s use of repetition, in 
dialogue with translation, is at the heart of his particular poetics of the 
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novel: repetition works to emphasise the key words within Kundera’s 
enquiries into the nature of existence and experience.166 Kundera’s use 
of repetition to explore variations on litost operates as such an existential 
enquiry, enabling Kundera to interrogate the centrality of this emotion, 
its origins and its repercussions, not only in a personal context but also a 
collective one, not only romantically but also politically. These variations, 
which are crucial also to Kundera’s exploration of his other key words – 
laughter, forgetting, the angels, the border – gain their power through 
the coherence and dissolution of coherence effected by the repetition of 
the word litost. For each variation upon the theme of litost – from the 
student’s story, to the story of the Czechoslovakian national soul, to 
Éluard’s poetic transcendence of the death of Kalandra – depends upon an 
equivalence which connects apparently disparate events without seeking 
to confuse or merge them, and concentrates upon the border between 
those events as the location of understanding, which slips even as we 
try to focus upon it. In this sense, the variations which Kundera enacts 
through repetition return us to Ricœur’s vision of the ethical possibilities 
of translation, predicated upon equivalence as opposed to identicalness. 
Perhaps inevitably, though, translation can also operate to limit 
the understanding that Kundera suggests is enabled by repetition. In an 
interview with Christian Salmon, Kundera discusses the translation of 
key words such as litost, emphasizing that, ‘[b]ecause of their categorical 
character, these words cannot be replaced by synonyms. This always has 
to be explained over and over again to translators, who, in their concern 
for “good style”, seek to avoid repetition’.167 As Woods notes, several 
translators of Le Livre have fallen prey to this desire to avoid repetition 
when translating litost: Michael Heim’s English translation, for example, 
adds ‘bitterness’, ‘exasperation’, and ‘resentment’ to the Czech word; 
Kérel’s French translation adds ‘cette tristesse particulière’.168 Kundera’s 
decision to revise and authorize his translations arose precisely from 
his objection to alterations such as these. For translations which try to 
avoid repetition of Kundera’s ‘mots-thèmes’ make a fundamental error: 
by altering the signifier, they seek to invoke an alterity which already 
exists within the word. Failing to repeat these key words prevents us 
recognizing the difference which Kundera, like Deleuze, perceives to be 
inherent within repetition.
But translation also offers an opportunity to illuminate this difference. 
Kundera has acknowledged that it was only in the process of revising his 
translations that he became aware of his use of repetition as a formal 
characteristic and then created a dictionary, ‘Quatre-vingt-neuf mots’, 
which explores the nuances he develops within his texts via the repetition 
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of certain key words.169 In fact, the process of revision via translation also 
enabled Kundera to extend the importance of repetition within his work. 
For in the Czech version of Le Livre, the chapter headings which correspond 
to the theme words are organized differently: rather than repeating the 
title ‘Les Anges’ across two different sections, the Czech version only uses it 
once; and while translations of Kundera’s French text entitle two chapters 
‘Les Lettres perdus’ – a title which highlights the forgettings of the book’s 
title – the Czech text does not use this title at all. While Kundera has claimed 
that translation often undermines the form of his texts, his own approach 
to authorizing the translations of his texts positions it as an opportunity 
to develop and extend that form, to consolidate the relations between the 
repetitions he suggests are so crucial to his aesthetic approach.
Repetition reveals to us the precarity of our perspective, the 
ambiguity at the heart of thinking, and the impossibility of stabilizing 
it. And yet, as Kundera’s experience of translation demonstrates, we 
always seek stability and hope to convert ambiguity into certainty by 
choosing one definition over the other. Like the student in Le Livre, we 
choose one side of the border again and again, thereby imposing our 
perspective on another. Perhaps we can never prevent this imposition, 
but Kundera suggests that we can, and should, at least acknowledge it. 
And Kundera’s aesthetics of translation – developed through his focus 
upon the untranslatable word litost – is integral to the ways in which he 
formulates this acknowledgement in Le Livre. For, through his attempt 
and failure to translate this term, Kundera develops a form of linguistic 
hospitality: a manner of thinking, reading and writing which accepts 
alternative perspectives but does not purport to transcend its own.
Litost and linguistic hospitality
As an untranslated and ‘untranslatable’ Czech word within a French text, 
litost makes explicit an implicit, but already present, linguistic collision 
within both the creation and the reception of Le Livre. This collision 
of Czech and French makes litost an example of the type of resistant 
‘foreignization’ which, as I discussed earlier, Lawrence Venuti reads as 
crucial to an ethics of translation. In The Scandals of Translation Venuti 
suggests that the texts ‘that work best, the most powerful in recreating 
cultural values and the most responsible in accounting for that power, 
usually engage readers in domestic terms that have been defamiliarized 
to some extent, made fascinating by a revisionary encounter with a 
foreign text’.170 Somewhat ironically, given that Venuti discusses Kundera 
as an example of an author with a decidedly non-ethical approach to 
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translation, Kundera’s use of litost within Le Livre operates through 
precisely this type of defamiliarization, reasserting through a linguistic 
moment of foreignness the specificity of the Czech language, and 
simultaneously introducing, in the midst of a French text, an emotion 
Kundera suggests is unique to Czech culture. 
As I discussed in the Introduction, Venuti builds his argument about 
the importance of foreignizing techniques by revisiting a distinction 
Friedrich Schleiermacher makes in his 1813 essay ‘On the Different 
Methods of Translation’. Schleiermacher considers two options for the 
translator: ‘Either the translator leaves the author in peace as much as 
possible and moves the reader towards him; or he leaves the reader in 
peace as much as possible and moves the writer towards him’.171 Venuti’s 
‘foreignization’ shapes the first of these options into a recognition of 
cultural difference by insisting upon the translated nature of the text being 
read. Woods suggests that Kundera’s use of language loans such as litost 
is designed to engender just such an awareness, forcing the reader into 
a recognition of the linguistic duality inherent within Kundera’s creative 
process.172 Language loans problematize the translation process, since 
the translator must negotiate the deliberate presence of an ostensibly 
untranslatable word. They also force both translator and reader to 
become aware of what is foreign and difficult to understand. Reading 
Kundera’s use of language loans as ethical only in this way depends on 
maintaining another series of divisions: between Czech and French; 
between domestic and foreign; between reader and writer; between 
translatability and untranslatability. Yet, as Kundera consistently seeks to 
emphasize, his texts function in the relation between different identities, 
languages, literatures and cultures; the relation between the creative 
processes of reader as well as author; and the relation between visions of 
absolute translatability and untranslatability. 
Is there another way to understand the impact of these language 
loans? Schleiermacher argues that either the reader must come to the 
author or the author to the reader, ‘any attempt to combine them being 
certain to produce a highly unreliable result and to carry with it the 
danger that writer and reader might miss each other entirely’.173 Ricœur, 
on the other hand, suggests that the two methods can be combined: 
‘Amener le lecteur à l’auteur, amener l’auteur au lecteur, au risque de 
servir et de trahir deux maîtres, c’est pratiquer ce que j’aime appeler 
l’hospitalité langagière’/‘Bringing the reader to the author, bringing the 
author to the reader, at the risk of serving and of betraying two masters: 
this is to practise what I like to call linguistic hospitality’.174 In Ricœur’s 
comment the simultaneous action of betrayal and fidelity in translation 
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is again asserted: linguistic hospitality inhabits a borderland between 
loyalty and disloyalty to the concerns of author and reader. Language 
loans such as litost exist within this hospitable borderland, for they 
emphasize the relation, rather than an impervious divergence, between 
the assertions of the author and the interpretations of the reader. In this 
interpretation, encountering a language loan means encountering the 
semantic gaps that separate languages, and separating the authorial 
from the readers’ attempts to consolidate a point. Simultaneously, such 
loans create a hospitable relation between the foreign and the domestic, 
between the possibility and the impossibility of translation. For these 
loans have narrative meaning only in translation: in a Czech text litost 
is linguistically indigenous and provokes neither reader nor author to 
acknowledge the presence of the untranslatable. 
Yet this is not entirely true, for the question ‘What is litost?’ which 
is posed in the translations of Kundera’s texts is also posed in the Czech 
‘original’, thereby drawing attention to the foreign which already exists 
within the domestic. As Woods notes,
Unable to define it even within the Czech language, [Kundera] 
implied that the word was foreign also in its own language, through 
its indefinability. By retaining the Czech word in the text and not 
allowing it to be translated, Kundera was explicitly making his 
readers aware that what they were reading was a translation, but 
he concomitantly revealed the foreignness of words in any given 
language.175
The power and unique perspective which litost reveals, both thematically 
and linguistically, forces us to accept ‘la différence indépassable du 
propre et de l’étranger’/‘the impassable difference of the peculiar and 
the foreign’, to acknowledge that something is always lacking and lost in 
translation between our perception and that of another.176 But this loss 
is within our language as much as beyond it; it is an integral element of 
our inability to transcend our own viewpoint, to see with anything other 
than our own vision – the very inability, in short, which gives rise to the 
emotion of litost itself.
In this sense, language loans are never simply a form of resistance 
to the domesticating actions of translation; nor, however, are they 
encounters with the other designed only to stretch the limits of our 
own perspective. By its multiple linguistic, semantic, interpersonal and 
political forms, litost, itself spoken in another voice, in another language – 
one which Kundera glosses in Le Livre but which, in spite of this, remains 
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untranslated – disrupts a narcissistic illusion of unity or absolutism. Yet 
litost also acknowledges the continued dominance of our own perspective, 
the inevitable narcissism that recognizes the other only in relation to itself. 
This, as Spivak suggests, is the paradox of translation: ‘it is not possible 
for us as ethical agents to imagine otherness or alterity maximally. We 
have to turn the other into something like the self in order to be ethical’.177 
Thinking translation ethically, and thinking ethically through translation, 
means recognizing this appropriative impulse which lies beneath our 
every attempt at recognition. Negotiating and confronting this impulse 
requires a hospitable approach which reflects upon its inevitability even 
as it stakes a claim for the importance of resistance to it. Lying implicit 
within Kundera’s inclusion and use of litost, these two elements remain 
in constant and hospitable tension: litost opens the French language to 
what is foreign to it, even while acknowledging the unavoidable desire to 
translate that foreign element into domestic terms. 
This tension is visible in the ways in which, in the Czech, English 
and French versions of Le Livre, the question of the proper name is 
approached differently. In Kundera’s Czech text the student’s lover is 
called Kristýna.178 The French translation converts her name to Christine, 
while both Heim’s and Asher’s English versions – despite the fact that 
the former is based on the Czech version and the latter on the French 
– keep her name as Kristyna, but without the Czech diacritic. In each 
of these translations Venuti’s distinction between domestication and 
foreignization thus plays out differently. And yet the difference between 
these versions in fact challenges the stability of Venuti’s binary. As 
Derrida suggests, the proper name always calls out to a double desire: 
‘traduis-moi, ne me traduis pas’/‘translate me, don’t translate me’.179 
But in Kundera’s work each linguistic version of his text responds to this 
call differently, the issues of translatability and untranslatability, of the 
foreign and the domestic, being articulated divergently depending upon 
which ‘authorized’ version we read. 
This difference between versions is the reality of translation, as 
Ricœur describes it: a reality in which every translation exists in the 
tension between appropriation and acknowledgement, impossibility 
and necessity. Translation is always a task to be dealt with differently, 
depending on language, audience, time and place. It is to be revised, 
reconsidered, and rethought in every moment. And this task always 
involves possible failure. Indeed, even Kundera’s authorized translations 
contain errors of meaning: Asher’s authorized English translation of Le 
Livre, for example, mistranslates ‘s’en vouloir’ – to hold against, or resent 
– as ‘to want’.180 This error is easy to understand when translating from a 
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language in which the verbs for ‘to resent’ and ‘to want’ – ‘s’en vouloir’ and 
‘vouloir’ – are so similar. But it also reveals the limits of ‘authorization’, 
for every instance of rewriting, whether sanctioned by the author or not, 
contains the possibility of a misreading or misinterpretation. Perfection 
in translation is an ideal which can never be fully attained.
For Ricœur, hospitality in translation means acknowledging this 
fact: ‘Travail de traduction […], travail de deuil aussi, appliqué à renoncer 
à l’idéal même de la traduction parfaite’/‘The work of translation […] the 
work of mourning too, applied to renouncing the very idea of the perfect 
translation’.181 Translation thus entails mourning for the loss of utopian 
and absolute understanding between people and peoples, whether textual, 
linguistic, romantic or political. But this, Ricœur suggests, is a productive 
mourning. For in accepting the loss of the perfect translation, we also 
accept the impossibility of our desire to understand absolutely, identify 
with, or appropriate another. Through this loss we can build a space of 
interaction within which what is foreign in another is welcomed as much 
as erased. It is this that Ricœur defines as linguistic hospitality: ‘où le plaisir 
d’habiter la langue de l’autre est compensé par le plaisir de recevoir chez 
soi, dans sa propre demeure d’accueil, la parole de l’étranger’/‘where the 
pleasure of dwelling in the other’s language is balanced by the pleasure 
of receiving the foreign word at home, in one’s own welcoming house’.182 
As Ricœur suggests, drawing upon Antoine Berman’s phrase ‘l’épreuve 
de l’étranger’, this recognition of the foreign is an ordeal, a challenge to 
our comfortable assumptions about the stability of our own language and 
perspective.183 But it also contains an opportunity for us to connect and 
to develop our relations both with ourselves and others: ‘sans l’épreuve 
de l’étranger, serions-nous sensibles à l’étrangeté de notre propre langue? 
Enfin, sans cette épreuve, ne serions-nous pas menacés de nous enfermer 
dans l’aigreur d’un monologue, seuls avec nos livres? Honneur, donc, 
à l’hospitalité langagière’/‘without the test of the foreign, would we 
be sensitive to the strangeness of our own language? Finally, without 
that test, would we not be in danger of shutting ourselves away in the 
sourness of a monologue, alone with our books? Credit, then, to linguistic 
hospitality’.184 Ricœur’s conception of linguistic hospitality would see a 
language open itself up to difference, even as it consumes it: ‘L’étranger 
dans son étrangeté, le lecteur dans son désir d’appropriation’/‘The 
foreigner in his strangeness, the reader in his desire for appropriation’: 
this is the hospitable space of translating and of thinking.185
In Kundera’s depiction of it, the novel form allows a similar 
hospitality, in which the existence of the other is announced, yet always 
annexed. Kundera repeatedly positions ambiguity, uncertainty, variation 
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as the essence of the ethics he reads in the novel. Yet in the quotation I 
discussed earlier, he also emphasizes the human impulse to translate this 
ambiguity into certainty:
L’homme souhaite un monde où le bien et le mal soient nettement 
discernables car est en lui le désir, inné et indomptable, de juger 
avant de comprendre. Sur ce désir sont fondées les religions et 
les idéologies. Elles ne peuvent se concilier avec le roman que si 
elles traduisent son langage de relativité et d’ambiguïté dans leur 
discours apodictique et dogmatique. Elles exigent que quelqu’un 
ait raison.
Man desires a world where good and evil can be clearly 
distinguished, for he has an innate and irrepressible desire to judge 
before he understands. Religions and ideologies are founded on 
this desire. They can cope with the novel only by translating its 
language and relativity and ambiguity into their own apodictic and 
dogmatic discourse. They require that someone be right.186
This statement reaffirms the idea, raised in Kundera’s exploration of 
the poetic, that a dogmatic politics requires a dogmatic aesthetics to 
complement it. In confrontation with a more ambiguous aesthetic form 
such as the novel, dogma seeks to translate its polyphonic language 
inhospitably, appropriating and altering the novel’s language so that it 
too becomes certain. Such a translation is at the heart of the accusation 
Kundera levels at Orwell’s texts in Les Testaments trahis. But translation is 
never a one-way street: if we can translate in one direction, we can always 
translate in the other. What occurs if we seek to translate dogma into 
ambiguity? Could the paradigm of linguistic hospitality be applied to this 
translation, so that we could see the novel as a space which incorporates 
some dogma into its uncertainty and returns some uncertainty to dogma? 
Could such a hospitable translation offer an ethically aware mode of 
reading, writing, thinking and engaging in political questions through 
the novel form? 
In L’Art du roman, Kundera comments that ‘une fois dans le corps 
du roman, la méditation change d’essence: une pensée dogmatique 
devient hypothétique’/‘Once it is part of a novel, reflection changes its 
essence: a dogmatic thought becomes hypothetical’.187 But this shift 
from dogma to hypothesis is not a shift from certainty to uncertainty. 
Rather it is one conditioned by the possibility of repetition, approached 
as an interaction between these different modes of thought. Through 
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their use of repetition, Kundera’s novels recognize the multiplicity 
of perspective, but also our desire to make sense of this multiplicity 
within our own perspective. As readers, as critics, as translators, we 
acknowledge the individual truths of the novel, its variations and 
repetitions, its untranslatable moments. But we also, always, convert 
these individual truths into our truth, its repetition into themes, those 
untranslatables into narrative. It is in this sense that the novel is 
hospitable: hospitable to the variance of perspective and the fallibility of 
our certainties; hospitable to our inability to escape our own perspective. 
Kundera’s novels explore the desire for appropriation and for freedom, 
for ambiguity and dogma, revealing through repetition and translation 
the ethics and the aesthetics of the novel to be formed at the location of 
both forgetting and understanding. 
Epilogue: on the border with translation
I began this chapter with the quest for a translation of litost; I will end it 
by acknowledging the failure of this quest, but also the continued desire 
to complete it. For through this unresolvable quest, through the desire for 
perfection and the impossibility of attaining it, in the search, the failures, 
the stories, the diversions and asides, we see the complexity and diversity 
of our individual memories and interpretations depicted in narrative 
form. In Sur la traduction Ricœur creates a link between the process 
of creating narrative and the process of translation. He writes that ‘de 
même que dans l’acte de raconter, on peut traduire autrement, sans 
espoir de combler l’écart entre équivalence et adéquation totale […]. Il 
faudra peut-être tout à l’heure faire le deuil du vœu de perfection, pour 
assumer sans ébriété et en tout sobriété la «tâche du traducteur»/‘just as 
in the act of telling a story, we can translate differently, without hope of 
filling the gap between equivalence and total adequacy […] we may soon 
have to mourn the loss of the wish for perfection in order to take on the 
“translator’s task” without intoxication and in all sobriety.’188
In Le Livre we can see these tasks of narration and translation as 
confronting the gap between equivalence and complete adequacy, between 
the untranslatable and the translatable, between our perspective and that 
of others, Kundera suggests that this gap – which, as we have seen, can also 
be conceived as a border – is both almost invisible and ever-present:
la frontière est constamment avec nous […] elle est omniprésente, 
bien qu’elle soit plus ou moins visible selon les circonstances […]. 
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Il suffit de si peu, d’une infime courant d’air pour que les choses 
bougent imperceptiblement, et ce pour quoi on aurait encore donné 
sa vie une seconde avant apparaît soudain comme un non-sens où il 
n’y a rien.
the border is constantly with us […] it is omnipresent, even though 
circumstances might make it more or less visible. […] It takes 
so little, a tiny puff of air, for things to shift imperceptibly, and 
whatever it was that a man was ready to lay down his life for a few 
seconds earlier seems suddenly to be sheer nonsense.189
The challenge Kundera levels in Le Livre is not to close this gap, but rather 
to remain alert to our own innate desire to forget that it exists. For we 
are always on the border between meaning and non-meaning, always in 
danger of using the instability of language to build our own worlds and 
then forgetting that they were built upon such loose soil. It is by forgetting 
this border that models, whether of political or literary thought, are 
sustained. Their strength is predicated on their ability to ignore, to erase, 
to repress what does not coalesce, to translate ambiguity into certainty, 
and to convert the sceptical laughter of the Devil into the joyous laughter 
of the angels.
Translation reveals such forgetting by foregrounding it as an 
inevitable process within our affective, aesthetic and political relations. 
Individually and collectively we are constantly erasing, losing and eliding 
difference through a process of translation between ourselves and others, 
between our thinking and that of others, between our language and what 
we believe that language can express and transmit. It is for this reason 
that translation is both everything and a nightmare: everything because it 
reveals our impregnable desire to perfect all our exchanges; a nightmare 
because it constantly evades the attempt, forcing meaning to slide, to 
slip, to dissolve as we grasp for it. Translation thus understood is not a 
rejection of certainty, but rather an acceptance of the impulse to seek 
it. We can only mourn if we are aware that something has been lost, 
and in this mourning lies the power of translation to create hospitality 
from within the desire to appropriate, in the name of whatever utopia. 
Hospitality means welcoming what is foreign and individual, what is past 
as well as what is present. By accepting the linguistic untranslatability of 
litost, Kundera’s texts invoke hospitality as the site of an interrogation 
of our relation to each other, and render hospitable the artistic forms 
through which we evoke and explore that relation. 
This hospitality is revealed by the differences between the versions 
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of Kundera’s texts in translation which, even when authorized, repeatedly 
challenge the stability of this authorization, and the relation of the foreign 
and the domestic. Translation, a form of repetition and reframing, reveals 
the instability of textual authenticity and authority. In every text, in every 
moment of writing, Kundera, like all readers, writers and translators, 
negotiates again and again the border between control and loss of 
control. As Woods suggests, ‘[t]hat the ambiguities of language harbour 
the ambiguities of interpretation should be an entry point for reading 
Kundera’s work, or any work’.190 The emphatic nature of Kundera’s 
discussion of these translations, his proclamations that only his authority 
allows their authenticity, is a self-consciously fashioned example of the 
language on one side of this border, where certainty and an unshakeable 
confidence in one’s own point of view are to be found; on the other side 
of the border, however, certainty collapses, understanding is to be re-
fashioned, and translation is a continual exchange between the twin 
attractions of fidelity and betrayal.
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Chapter 3
Jorge Semprún’s Quel beau dimanche!: 
a ‘relevante’ translation
Introduction: the struggle of translation
‘Lutter, écrire, c’est ça ma vie’/‘To struggle, to write, that is my life’ 
– Jorge Semprún1
In the prelude to Le Langage est ma patrie, a series of interviews given 
to the cinematographer Franck Appréderis in 2010, Jorge Semprún 
summed up his personal moral approach in a French translation of 
a quotation from F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Crack-Up: ‘Ainsi, il faudrait 
comprendre que les choses sont sans espoir et être pourtant décidé de 
les changer’/‘One should, for example, be able to see that things are 
hopeless and yet be determined to make them otherwise’.2 This phrase 
elucidates not only Semprún’s moral perspective, but also the texture of 
the literary and political interrogations through which he develops this 
perspective in the text I explore predominantly in this chapter, Quel beau 
dimanche! (1980). Semprún’s decision to draw upon an intertextual, 
translated phrase to embody his personal philosophy mirrors his 
fascination with literature as a site of liberation from the constraints of 
the monolingual, a fascination which permeates the narrative of Quel 
beau dimanche!, itself a web of intertextual quotations, language loans 
and translated phrases. Politically, Fitzgerald’s comment offers Semprún 
‘la plus belle définition de la dialectique […] pour reprendre ce concept 
déconsidéré, et même ruiné, par l’usage qu’en ont fait les staliniens’/‘The 
most beautiful definition of the dialectic, to re-engage with that concept 
which was discredited, even ruined, by its Stalinist usage’, and it is 
with the dangers and possibilities of the dialectic, and specifically the 
Stalinist interpretation of dialectical thinking, that Quel beau dimanche! 
is concerned.3 Ethically, Fitzgerald’s phrase ‘sonne comme une morale 
individuelle de la résistance’/‘resonates like an individual ethics of 
resistance’, a resistance which confronts a flawed and hopeless situation, 
yet nonetheless seeks to interrogate, challenge and ultimately transform 
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those flaws productively.4 In Quel beau dimanche!, this challenge, this 
interrogation and/as transformation is both textual and political: the 
text confronts Semprún’s painful disillusionment with the Spanish 
Communist Party (PCE) and with Soviet Communism more generally, 
and through a narrative which merges fiction and autobiography, the 
political and the personal, the past and the present, transforms this 
disillusionment into a powerful call for political responsibility. While 
Semprún claims that ‘[l]utter, écrire, c’est ça ma vie’, this quotation could 
then be rephrased: for Semprún, lutter, c’est écrire; écrire, c’est lutter/to 
struggle is to write; to write is to struggle.
In this chapter, I explore Semprún’s writing-as-struggle through 
the multilingual interrogation of personal and political memory and 
loss he pursues in his texts. The content of this struggle of, for, and 
with memory is both individual and collective: it is Semprún’s struggle 
to confront and interrogate the losses which permeate his memories 
of Buchenwald and of Communism, and to critique and challenge 
the discourses which enabled those losses to be forgotten or erased. 
Semprún’s criticism of the Stalinist use of the dialectic is concerned 
with the ways in which he believes this use enabled such erasures; 
he reads the dialectic as a uniquely dangerous rhetorical rewriting 
of history, which translates the past into new forms according to the 
demands of the present. But Semprún’s narrative is itself a translation 
– an attempted transfer of past into present, of memory into narrative, 
of politics into fiction. As Ofelia Ferrán and Gina Herrmann note, 
‘Semprún continually theorises about the possibility, or impossibility, 
of translating his life into words’.5 Like all translations, this exchange 
reveals ethical dilemmas and ethical opportunities, staging both the 
erasures and the illuminations inherent within the appropriative 
impulse to write, and write about, history.
Drawing on Derrida’s discussion of what constitutes a ‘good’ 
translation in his essay ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une traduction “relevante”?’, I 
explore the ethics of translation as an interlingual, intralingual and 
intersemiotic mode of engaging with, interrogating and rewriting the 
past. Derrida’s essay makes a pertinent comparison between the impulse 
behind dialectical thinking and the impulse behind translation itself. 
In this process of comparison, translation is revealed to contain its own 
dangerous forms of forgetting. But translation also allows us to illuminate 
the past, as Semprún demonstrates in three different temporal and 
linguistic translations of the Buchenwald camp motto Jedem das Seine, 
which allow him to interrogate the complexity of the political history 
through which he lived.
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As Ursula Tidd suggests, in Semprún’s work, ‘ethics becomes 
co-extensive with aesthetics’, and the question which translation raises 
in Semprún’s work is always both an aesthetic and an ethical one.6 How 
much responsibility can we take for our inevitable forgetting of the past, 
and what aesthetic and ethical contribution can writing, thinking and 
translating make towards helping us recognize this responsibility? In this 
chapter, I argue that translation involves a transformative engagement 
with a complex and fragmented past, which in Quel beau dimanche! gives 
a voice to those silenced or erased by the political power of Communism 
and Nazism. 
Semprún: writing between identities
Writing and life
Semprún’s biography straddles the political and the literary. Born in 
Madrid in 1923, Semprún moved to France with his family at the age of 14 
to escape possible persecution at the hands of Franco’s Nationalist faction 
during the Spanish Civil War. He joined the French Resistance in 1941, 
but was captured by the Gestapo while fighting with the Maquis, and in 
September 1943 he was sent to Buchenwald concentration camp, where 
he remained until April 1945. After liberation, Semprún began working 
clandestinely for the PCE, using a variety of pseudonyms, until just after 
the publication of his first work of autobiographical fiction, Le Grand 
Voyage, in 1963. Until the appearance of this text, writing played second 
fiddle to Semprún’s political activities. In Federico Sánchez vous salue bien 
(1993), Semprún explains this decision, commenting that ‘J’ai choisi du 
même élan l’illusion d’un avenir, par le moyen de l’engagement politique, 
puisque l’engagement dans l’écriture me ramenait à l’enfermement de la 
mémoire et de la mort’/‘I chose the illusion of a future through political 
commitment, since a commitment to writing enclosed me in memory 
and death’.7 
Here, as in his evocatively entitled 1994 text L’Écriture ou la vie, 
Semprún positions the desire to write as the converse rather than the 
complement of the desire to live. This mutual exclusivity, this writing 
or life, is born of a crucial interaction Semprún perceives between 
the process of writing and the exploration of memory: writing, he 
suggests, both requires and enables the writer to engage in a powerful 
confrontation with his or her memories. For Semprún, this confrontation 
can be productive and cathartic; equally, however, it can be suffocating, 
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imprisoning the writer in a traumatic and endlessly repeated past.8 In 
an interview with The Paris Review, he suggests that his initial refusal to 
attempt a literary reimagining of his memories of Buchenwald hinged 
upon his fear of being re-incarcerated, through writing, in the camp 
experience: ‘I just knew I could neither relive that experience nor survive 
it if I worked on the memoir at that time […]. For me, remembering 
would have meant death with absolute certainty, suicide that is, and I 
was very much aware of it.’9 Semprún’s decision to turn to politics rather 
than literature following his release from the camp arose from his need to 
survive rather than remember the experience of Buchenwald, a survival 
which he suggests could only be realized through a separation, and, 
ultimately substitution, of his political for his authorial identity.
This separation did not dissolve until 16 years after his release, 
when Semprún finally began writing about his experiences. In Le Grand 
Voyage Semprún confronted the memory of Buchenwald, and through 
a text which fragments linear chronology and the boundaries of fiction 
and autobiography, found a way of combining writing and life. Writing 
and politics, however, were not so complementary, for less than a year 
later, Semprún was expelled from the PCE for anti-political activities. In a 
detailed discussion of the relationship between translation and memory 
in Semprún’s work, Bella Brodzki suggests that this moment marked the 
beginning of an enforced segregation of politics and literature, two modes 
of engaging with the world which had previously been interconnected in 
Semprún’s experience.10 Yet this segregation ultimately proved liberating, 
for Semprún had already been experiencing political doubts about the 
direction of the PCE and the future of Communism more generally. As he 
comments in ‘The Art of Fiction’, 
the day came when that contradiction became intolerable, when 
I refused to perform self-censorship and was thus definitively 
expelled from the Communist Party. I would put it this way: I didn’t 
choose to become a writer, but I did choose to quit being a man of 
action. And that opened up the possibility of becoming a writer.11
In a reversal of priorities, writing enabled Semprún to survive the fall-
out of his political exile: without writing, he suggests, he would have 
‘disintegrated emotionally’ following his expulsion from the Party.12 
Following this expulsion Semprún began to write prolifically, and 
by the time of his death in 2011 he had produced more than 30 books, 
embracing a range of genres from fiction to memoir, screenplays to essays. 
Semprún’s shift from clandestine activist to visible writer was by no means 
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the end of his political engagement, however, for his texts frequently 
explore political issues: Autobiografía de Federico Sánchez (1977) explores 
the world of the PCE in the post-war period; Netchaïev est de retour (1987) 
turns to the world of extremist left-wing politics, commenting upon the 
lives and betrayals of a group of ex-anarchists in the 1980s; Mal et modernité 
(1995) is a series of essays interrogating the political history of Europe 
in the twentieth century. Such texts provide a literary avenue through 
which Semprún poses increasingly direct questions about the nature 
of political responsibility, the dangers of political abstraction, and the 
collective and individual guilt inherent within political decision-making. 
Simultaneously, Semprún continued to explore the potent memory of 
Buchenwald which he had begun to negotiate in Le Grand Voyage and its 
‘sequel’ L’Évanouissement (1967). In Quel beau dimanche! (1980), a single 
Sunday in Buchenwald provides the framework for Semprún to interrogate 
the historical and political complexity of the camp. L’Écriture ou la vie 
(1994) focuses predominantly on the narrator’s life after the liberation 
of the camp, exploring the narrator’s sense that he is still imprisoned, in 
thought, feeling, and memory, in the camp experiences. It is this affective 
proximity to Buchenwald which simultaneously hinders the narrator’s 
attempts to recount his camp experiences and compels him to attempt to 
do so nonetheless. Le Mort qu’il faut (2001) returns to the camp in 1944 
to explore the ‘necessary death’ of another man, by means of which the 
narrator hopes to ensure his own survival. Even those texts which are not 
set in Buchenwald are infiltrated by its memory: in La Montagne blanche 
(1986), the story of three intellectuals who spend a weekend together 
in Normandy during the 1980s, the protagonist, Juan Larréa, is an ex-
detainee whose memories of the camp haunt both the text and his own 
present-day life, culminating in his suicide.
Language and identity
Semprún wrote Le Grand Voyage in French, his second language, and 
French remained his literary language of choice. Of the books he 
published between 1963 and 2011, only three were written in Spanish: 
Autobiografía de Federico Sánchez, Federico Sánchez se despide de ustedes 
(1993) and Veinte años y un día (2003). Semprún’s decision to write 
primarily in French has garnered a great deal of critical attention. 
Myriam Schleiss focuses upon Semprún’s bilingual identity, arguing that 
his linguistic choices reflect the different elements of his experience: 
German, his third language, is the language of the camps; Spanish is 
the language of childhood; while French represents the language of 
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writing, and of adult desire.13 In a similar vein, Ursula Tidd suggests that 
Semprún’s choice of French reflects a desire for distance from the pain of 
exile and from the writings of his father, as well as revealing, more simply, 
the impact of Spanish political censorship.14 Tijana Miletic suggests that 
Semprún’s choice of language reflects an internal division within both 
the actual and the affective content of the memories he is seeking to 
relate. Miletic describes Semprún’s political experiences as ‘passionate, 
but nevertheless impersonal’, and suggests that it was ‘emotionally 
safe’ for him to voice these through his mother tongue. By contrast, she 
believes that the trauma of his experiences in Buchenwald requires the 
emotional distance offered by his second language, French.15 For all 
three critics, then, the Spanish and French texts can be distinguished 
not only linguistically but thematically and emotionally, with Semprún’s 
bilingualism reflecting, and indeed enabling, a schism within the textual 
narration of his past.
To categorize or separate Semprún’s texts by language and 
experience only, however, obscures one of their central elements: 
the continuous merging of experiences, languages and identities. 
Biographically, Semprún’s political persona and his concentration camp 
experiences are integrally related: his activities for the French Resistance 
occasioned his imprisonment in Buchenwald, while his experiences 
at Buchenwald were governed by his membership of the Communist 
Party, which ran the internal administration within the camp. Semprún’s 
Buchenwald texts, from Le Grand Voyage to Le Mort qu’il faut, reflect 
this commingling of political activity and camp experiences: in Quel 
beau dimanche! this relationship is the cornerstone of the text, which 
segues repeatedly from the narrator’s experiences within Buchenwald to 
his growing political disillusionment after his release. Indeed, the idea 
that Semprún’s political experiences were ‘emotionally safe’, as Miletic 
suggests, is profoundly challenged, as the text focuses upon the traumatic 
effect of the narrator’s disenchantment with the PCE. 
If the experiences Semprún relates in his texts are not easily 
segregated, his linguistic choices are no more so. Semprún himself 
provided multiple reasons – simultaneously pragmatic, personal and 
political – for his initial decision to write in French, suggesting that it 
was impelled by his love of the French language, his distance – physical, 
political and linguistic – from Spain at the time of his capture by the 
Gestapo, and the censorship imposed by Franco upon the Spanish literary 
scene until his death in 1975.16 Semprún’s decision to write three texts in 
Spanish was equally pragmatic: following Franco’s death, Semprún was 
reintegrated into Spain in both a literary and a political sense, becoming 
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Minister of Culture for the new Socialist government in 1988 and also 
gaining access to the Spanish readership from which he had previously 
been isolated. Writing in Spanish thus enabled him to redevelop an 
element of his linguistic identity which had become segregated from his 
literary persona: 
I had already published many books in French and was thus in a 
rather bizarre situation in Spain, where I am considered a Spanish 
writer who writes in French! The whole thing is either comic, tragic, 
or just plain silly, depending on your point of view, since technically 
I am a Spanish writer whose works are translated into Spanish.17
This ‘technically’, however, masks critical questions about the relationship 
between authorial identity and nationality, between mother tongue and 
chosen tongue. Is Semprún a Spanish writer simply because he was born 
in Spain? Is the language he was born with more fundamental to his 
authorial identity than the language of his texts?
In L’Écriture ou la vie, Semprún interrogates the relationship between 
language and identity, suggesting that his choice of French was in fact 
more emotional than pragmatic: ‘Pour ma part, j’avais choisi le français, 
langue de l’exil, comme une autre langue maternelle, originaire. Je 
m’étais choisi de nouvelles origines’/‘For my part, I’d chosen French, the 
language of exile, as another mother tongue. I’d chosen a new nationality 
for myself’.18 In this suggestive quotation, national identity becomes fluid, 
and mother tongue becomes a choice. ‘J’avais fait de l’exil une patrie’/‘I’d 
made exile into a homeland’ he states, and this contradiction in terms, 
this homeland-as-exile, explains Semprún’s decision to position French, 
the language which welcomed him following his teenage departure 
from Spain, as the language of this new and unbounded territory.19 Yet 
even this twin mother tongue cannot fully account for the experience of 
exile, which for Semprún is multiple, formed not only by his initial exile 
to France, but also by his subsequent exile to a space delimited more 
by ideological than national boundaries: Buchenwald. Buchenwald is 
another origin, another homeland, one imposed rather than chosen, but 
no less fundamental to Semprún’s perception of his identity. In Le Langage 
est ma patrie, he relates an anecdote which sums up this perception: ‘Et 
à la question aimable et un peu insolente à la fois […] «Finalement, tu es 
quoi, toi? Espagnol? Français? Un homme politique? Un écrivain?» j’ai 
répondu comme ça, brusquement, sans y réfléchir: «Je suis avant tout 
un ancien déporté de Buchenwald.»’/‘And to the question, amiable and a 
little insolent at the same time, “Who are you, in fact? Spanish? French? A 
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politician? A writer?”, I answered like this, brusquely, without thinking: 
“I am above all a former detainee of Buchenwald”.20 Such a response, he 
suggests, was both biographically false and existentially true:
Je suis évidemment espagnol, français, écrivain et homme politique 
– et déporté de Buchenwald. Je suis tout cela à la fois. Mais j’ai fait 
un choix à ce moment-là, pour dire que l’expérience du camp à vingt 
ans est à la fois politique, existentielle, personnelle, historique, 
générale, et qu’elle m’a définitivement marqué, […] je rapporte 
moi-même tout à mon expérience de déporté. C’est en ce sens que 
cette expérience est fondatrice.
I am evidently Spanish, French, writer and politician – and a 
detainee of Buchenwald. I am all these things at once. But I made 
a choice in that moment to say that the experience of the camp at 
the age of twenty was political, existential, personal, historical, 
general, and it marked me definitively […]. I relate everything to 
my experience as a detainee. It is in that sense that the experience 
is fundamental.21
For Semprún, Buchenwald represents the centre of meaning, and the 
centre of meaning’s loss, in relation to the disparate strands of his identity 
– linguistic, national, political, literary: a site where language and 
understanding were disrupted and brought to coalesce in new forms.22
In Quel beau dimanche!, the narrator states that ‘[l]a confusion des 
langues est l’une des premières expériences de l’exil. La nuit sans sommeil 
de l’exil est une nuit babélique’/‘The confusion of tongues is one of the 
first experiences of exile. The sleepless night of exile is a night of Babel’, 
and in Buchenwald Semprún experienced this Babelic night, living 
within a mixture of French, German, English, Russian and Spanish which 
formed the soundscape of his imprisonment.23 This linguistic mixture 
infiltrates Semprún’s return to the memory of Buchenwald within his 
texts: while these narratives are primarily written in French, this second 
mother tongue is fragmented, and the memories which Semprún relates 
are frequently generated by the evocative etymological connotations 
of a single word in Spanish, German or English. It is in this context 
that Semprún’s oft-quoted comment ‘ma patrie, c’est Le langage’/‘my 
homeland is language’ can be understood.24 For if Semprún perceives 
his home to be Le langage rather than une langue, a global system of 
communication rather than a specific, nationally determined example of 
such a system, this home is built, textually, at the interstices of several 
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different languages that are woven into a linguistic patchwork. While this 
linguistic diversity mirrors the Babelic confusion within the experience 
of Buchenwald itself, it simultaneously constructs the narrative through 
which this experience can be narrated.
The losses and gains, destructions and constructions, confusions and 
elucidations enacted by language are central themes within all Semprún’s 
texts: as Gina Herrmann suggests, ‘for Semprún, language is both vehicle 
and destroyer of hope’.25 For Semprún, a single word or phrase can spark 
a painful return to the traumatic memories of Buchenwald. Yet it is also 
through language and narrative that Semprún submits that these memories 
can best be explored. In Quel beau dimanche!, the narrator demands: 
A-t-on vraiment vécu quelque chose dont on n’arrive pas à faire le 
récit, à reconstruire significativement la vérité même minime – en la 
rendant ainsi communicable? […] Mais peut-on prendre en charge 
quelque expérience que ce soit sans en maîtriser plus ou moins le 
langage? C’est-à-dire l’histoire, les histoires, les récits, les mémoires, 
les témoignages: la vie? Le texte, la texture même, le tissu de la vie?
Has one really experienced something that one is unable to describe, 
something whose minimum truth one is unable to reconstruct in 
a meaningful way – and so make communicable? […] But can 
one assume any experience without more or less mastering its 
language? The history – the stories, the narratives, the memories, 
the eyewitness accounts in which it survives – lives on. The text, the 
very texture, the tissue of life.26
In this powerful assertion of the importance of narrative, the texture 
and the text of life become integrally connected: one narrates not only 
to relate a memory but also to relive that memory anew. Whether this 
connection between writing and living can be achieved, whether memory 
can be confronted and relived through narrative, or whether it remains 
continually beyond the grasp of our attempts at aesthetic expression, 
beyond even our ability to remember what it is we wish to express, is the 
question at the heart of Semprún’s aesthetics. 
In positing here that it is through linguistic representation, that is, 
through artifice and recreation, that his memories of Buchenwald can 
best be articulated, Semprún diverges from survivor narratives which 
highlight the impossibility of representing the camp experience in 
language. E. van Alphen suggests that a failure of the representational 
possibilities contained within the symbolic order is a crucial part of 
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the difficulty camp survivors find in articulating their experiences.27 
For Romanian author Elie Wiesel, a detainee of both Auschwitz and 
Buchenwald, only an entirely new language would begin to allow him to 
narrate his experience of the camps: ‘La parole a déserté le sens qu’elle 
était censée recouvrir. […] Jamais nous n’exprimerions en paroles 
cohérentes, intelligibles, notre expérience de la folie absolue. […] Les 
mots me paraissaient usagés, bêtes, inadéquats, maquillés, anémiques, 
je les désirais brûlants. Où dénicher un vocabulaire inédit, un langage 
premier?’/‘The word has deserted the meaning it was intended to convey. 
[…] We could never express in words, coherent, intelligible words, our 
experience of madness on an absolute scale. […] All words seemed 
inadequate, worn, foolish, lifeless, whereas I wanted them to be searing. 
Where was I to discover a fresh vocabulary, a primeval language?’28
The ‘langage premier’ sought by Wiesel is not a pre-Babelic utopian 
language, but a truly original language, one that would be capable of 
expressing a world rendered incomprehensible by the camps. For Semprún, 
however, this vocabulary is already present within our existing linguistic 
structures. The narrator of L’Écriture ou la vie asserts that ‘L’ineffable dont on 
nous rebattra les oreilles n’est qu’alibi. Ou signe de paresse. On peut toujours 
tout dire, le langage contient tout […] On peut tout dire de cette expérience. 
Il suffit d’y penser. Et de s’y mettre.’/‘The “ineffable’’ you hear so much 
about is only an alibi. Or a sign of laziness. You can always say everything: 
language contains everything. […] You can tell all about this experience. 
You have merely to think about it. And set to it.’29 The somewhat dogmatic 
tone of the narrator’s assertion highlights Semprún’s conviction, repeated 
throughout his texts, that it is through, rather than despite, narrative and 
language that he can return to the experience of the camps. 
This rejection of the ineffability claim is not, however, an assertion 
that the traumatic experience of Buchenwald can emerge intact when 
translated into a narrative form. Rather it is, for Semprún, a recognition 
that to seek to translate that experience into narrative is part of an 
endless but ever-changing attempt to negotiate that trauma. As Ursula 
Tidd has discussed, Semprún’s attempted representation of his traumatic 
experiences is a ‘halting journey’, one characterized by an attempted 
repetition of an experience which may always, necessarily, exceed 
or disturb familiar forms.30 In a sense, the possibility or impossibility 
of narrating the experience of Buchenwald is an aside: like every 
translation, this translation of a traumatic experience into narrative form 
is always both possible and impossible, always a task to be undertaken in 
the acknowledgement that it will fail. But it is in the ways in which that 
imperfect translation occurs, in the attempt to ‘tell all’ and in the partial 
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nature of that telling, that Semprún reads the value of narrative. The 
critical point, as the narrator of L’Écriture ou la vie suggests, is not whether 
he can narrate, but the form that narration must take, not if but how.
The plurality of language within Semprún’s texts can be read as 
part of an attempt to respond to this ‘how’, through a form of writing 
permeated with translation. As both Schleiss and Tidd suggest, by 
narrating and re-narrating, translating and re-translating the same words, 
sentences and texts, Semprún multiplies the methods of representation 
available to him for the narration of his memories.31 Kippur describes 
how a text by Semprún, ostensibly written in French, will contain whole 
paragraphs or pages in Spanish, German or English, which Semprún 
will attempt to translate back into French, glossing and commenting 
as he does so on the difficulties of the translation in question.32 This 
multiple endeavour – writing, translating, glossing, criticism – enables 
Semprún to account, albeit partially, for the split between lived event and 
textual representation. By explaining the challenges involved in these 
particular instances of linguistic translation, Semprún focuses upon 
the absences, elisions and fragmentations inherent within attempts to 
render one passage in multiple languages; simultaneously, he confronts 
the absences, elisions and fragmentations inherent within his attempt to 
represent, through language, his experience of Buchenwald. For Tidd, this 
linguistic fragmentation allows Semprún to construct an ethical response 
to the experience of Buchenwald: ‘Bilingualism and intertextuality will 
be two techniques inter alia deployed by Semprún to write against the 
disaster by structuring a compassionate relationship to alterity in the re-
establishment of culture and civility’.33 This ‘compassionate’ poetics, like 
Kundera’s hospitable poetics of the novel, develops through a plurality 
of voices and languages which piece together the shards of the past until 
we perceive, between the cracks, the contours of the camp experience.34 
But are we, as readers, capable of such a perception? The question 
of reception is, for Semprún, as crucial as that of narration; while the 
experience of the camps can be expressed in language, it does not follow 
that it can be understood through language, for the limitations of written 
memory are those of comprehension as much as of construction. In 
L’Écriture ou la vie, the narrator queries the possibility of exceeding these 
conceptual limitations: ‘Mais peut-on tout entendre, tout imaginer? Le 
pourra-t-on? En auront-ils la patience, la passion, la compassion, la rigueur 
nécessaires?’/‘But can people hear everything, imagine everything? 
Will they be able to understand? Will they have the necessary patience, 
passion, compassion, and fortitude?’35 The possibility that understanding 
will not be attained hinges, in part, upon the nature of the experience to 
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be narrated. As Brodzki notes: ‘Semprún’s point is precisely that although 
language has the capacity to record, report, or even reimagine what 
transpired in the crematorium, physical, even temporal proximity will not 
bring anyone closer to the event, which is experientially untranslatable on 
any level, from any remove.’36 But if the events Semprún seeks to narrate 
are untranslatable, this is due not only to the nature of those events, but 
also to the inevitable collapse – a failure of translation – which occurs 
between narration and understanding. This collapse is dramatized by the 
experiential untranslatability of the camp, but as I discussed in Chapter 2, 
it also operates, on some level, within every attempted translation between 
speaking and hearing, writing and reading, creation and reception, and 
within the very essence of communication itself. 
Brodzki describes Semprún as ‘an inveterate translator, the ultimate 
infiltrator’, and these designations reveal the integral connection between 
Semprún’s narrative approach and the practice and theory of translation: 
translation permeates his narratives through his use of language loans and 
translated intertexts, and it also figures the possibilities and limitations of 
narrative communication which are at the heart of his aesthetic ethics.37 As 
Tidd suggests, ‘through this personally formulated language he offers an 
original approach to the task of Holocaust representation and remembrance 
in the broader European context’.38 Yet despite this identification – both 
aesthetic and ethical – with translation, Semprún only self-translated one 
of his texts, Federico Sánchez se despide de ustedes/Federico Sanchez vous 
salue bien (1993).39 Instead, he asked others to recreate his work in French 
or Spanish as required, although, like Kundera, he has acknowledged the 
difficulties inherent within this process, suggesting that he always finds 
it painful to read translations of his texts into Spanish because he knows 
he would have written the Spanish text differently himself.40 Given this 
admission, Semprún’s refusal to self-translate seems all the more surprising. 
In The Paris Review, Semprún offered an explanation for this 
refusal: describing a conversation he had with the Mexican writer Carlos 
Fuentes regarding the question, Semprún suggests that ‘it would have felt 
strained, and quite insane in a sense, like writing the same book twice’.41 
Semprún’s comment implies rejection of both translation and repetition 
as valuable literary methods, yet this anecdote is itself a repetition, 
for Semprún had already narrated this conversation with Fuentes in 
L’Écriture ou la vie. And this version offers a different perspective, one 
which highlights the role of translation as an integral part of both the 
writing and the resistance which characterized Semprún’s life. 
In 1964, Le Grand Voyage had just won the Formentor Prize, a literary 
prize that, at that time, rewarded the winner by having the winning book 
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translated into twelve other languages. Having been presented with 
eleven translations of his text, Semprún awaits the presentation of the 
Spanish version. But what arrives is not what he anticipates, for Franco’s 
censors have prohibited the publication of his text in Spain. In order to 
present the text to the author, a single example of the Spanish version has 
been created. ‘Le format, le cartonnage, le nombre de pages, la jaquette 
illustrée. […] À un détail près: les pages de mon exemplaire d’aujourd’hui 
sont blanches, vierges de tout signe d’imprimerie’/‘The format, binding, 
number of pages, jacket illustration […]. Except for one detail: the pages 
of my presentation copy are blank, without a single printed character’.42 
In this scene, political censorship is enabled by a lack of translation, 
and a textual simulacrum stands in for an absent text. Symbolically, the 
missing text is the one written in Spanish; political repression enacts a 
literal silencing of Semprún’s mother tongue. But this silence cannot be 
absolute precisely because the censored text is a translation, a fragment 
of a larger text which continues to speak, first in French and then in eleven 
other languages. It is, paradoxically, the process of translation which both 
allows for the possibility of such censorship and resists its completion.
It is this resistance to the possibility of textual completion which 
Fuentes, in Semprún’s narration, suggests is the inherent potential of 
self-translation:
– D’ailleurs, ajoutait-il, tu aurais dû faire toi-même la version 
espagnole. Tu n’aurais pas simplement traduit, tu aurais pu te 
permettre de te trahir. De trahir ton texte originaire pour essayer 
d’aller plus loin. Du coup, un livre différent aurait surgi, dont tu 
aurais pu faire une nouvelle version française, un nouveau livre! 
[…] Ainsi […] tu aurais réalisé le rêve de tout écrivain: passer sa 
vie à écrire un seul livre, sans cesse renouvelé.
Anyway, you should have done the Spanish version yourself. You 
wouldn’t have simply translated, you’d have been able to [betray 
yourself]. To [betray] your original text, to try to go further with 
it. This would have created a different book, which you could have 
turned into a new French version, a whole new book! […] And so 
[…] you will have realized every writer’s dream: to spend your life 
writing a single book, endlessly renewed!43
Fuentes’s comment highlights two of the elements of translation which 
I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. As I explored in Chapter 1 through the 
work of Deleuze and Atxaga, translation can operate as a process of 
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repetition with difference, a form of recreating anew. At the same time, 
as I discussed in Chapter 2, translation offers a transformative betrayal 
of textual authority, originality and finality. But Fuentes’s comment also 
elucidates Semprún’s unique relationship to translation. For ‘un seul 
livre, sans cesse renouvelé’ could be the caption to Semprún’s œuvre: 
while Semprún did not translate Le Grand Voyage interlingually, his texts 
are engaged in a constant intralingual translation, an endless return 
to and rewriting of the experiences and memories articulated within 
that first text. In each re-telling, those memories are transformed, not 
through their translation into another national language, but through 
their  translation across time, re-emerging in each of Semprún’s texts 
in different forms and with different affective and aesthetic resonances. 
In this temporal translation, Semprún’s memories are re-envisioned 
through a narrative form which confronts the distortions, losses and 
transformations involved in every attempt to narrate the past. 
Through its very absence, the Spanish version of Le Grand Voyage 
thus becomes a symbol for the powerful and endless renewal and growth 
of Semprún’s literary voice: ‘De tous les exemplaires du Grand voyage que 
j’avais déjà reçus ce soir-là, que je recevrais encore, l’espagnol était le plus 
beau. […] J’en aime l’augure et le symbole: que ce livre soit encore à 
écrire, que cette tâche soit infinie, cette parole inépuisable’/‘Of all the 
copies of Le Grand Voyage that I’ve been given so far this evening, and 
that I will yet receive, the Spanish copy is the most beautiful. […] I love 
the promise and the symbolism of it: that this book yet remains to be 
written, that the task is infinite, [this word inexhaustible]’.44 This infinite 
task, this inexhaustible language, this endless urge to rewrite, is the 
texture of Semprún’s work. While such rewritings are visible throughout 
Semprún’s texts, in Quel beau dimanche! Semprún directly acknowledges 
the importance of this task, returning to the symbolically blank space of 
Le Grand Voyage with a text which is both a repetition and a translation 
of that first text; a text which both betrays Le Grand Voyage – betrays 
its certainty, its authority and its finality – and, simultaneously, reveals 
through forms of writing-as-translation the political betrayal which lies 
beneath the memories related in its pages. 
Quel beau dimanche!: a narrative of loss
Quel beau dimanche! begins with an epigram taken from Milan Kundera’s Le 
Livre du rire et de l’oubli: ‘La lutte de l’homme contre le pouvoir est la lutte de 
la mémoire contre l’oubli’/‘The struggle of man against power is the struggle 
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of memory against forgetting’; and like Le Livre, the text is concerned with 
questions of memory and forgetting.45 The novel is ostensibly concerned 
with describing one Sunday in December in the Buchenwald camp, a 
Sunday experienced by a narrator who, as always in Semprún’s texts, walks 
the narrow path between fictional and autobiographical characterization. 
Yet for Semprún, the textual coherence of time and space, like the coherence 
of genre, is fluid: the narrative of Quel beau dimanche! shifts between the 
narrator’s memories of Buchenwald and those of his post-war experiences 
as a clandestine member of the PCE. While these two experiences are 
separated spatially, temporally and even politically, they are fundamentally 
connected on an emotional level, as part of what Brodzki describes as 
the ‘larger narrative of personal and political loss’ which characterizes 
Semprún’s work.46 In Quel beau dimanche!, Semprún draws the contours 
of this loss, moving back and forth in time between the narrator’s early, 
unequivocal faith in Communism and his growing sense of disillusionment 
with the Party. This disillusionment is prompted by the brutal reality of the 
Soviet concentration camps, a reality which the narrator is no longer able to 
ignore or justify through his faith in the overarching aims of Communism. 
Forced to acknowledge that ‘le système politique post-stalinien n’était 
pas réformable. Le pays du Goulag ne deviendrait jamais celui du 
socialisme’/‘the post-Stalinist political system was not reformable. The 
country of the Gulag would never become that of socialism’, the narrator 
confronts the collapse of his defining belief-system.47
The breakdown of the narrator’s allegiance to Communism bridges 
the gap between fiction and autobiography, mirroring the experience 
Brodzki refers to as ‘emblematic’ for Semprún himself: ‘Not ideal loss, but 
the actual loss of an ideal’.48 In Quel beau dimanche! Semprún explores 
the profound effect of this loss upon the narrator’s (and implicitly his 
own) writing experience, reflecting particularly upon the impact his 
political disillusionment had upon the validity of the narrative of Le 
Grand Voyage. For despite the lack of overt political discussion within Le 
Grand Voyage, Semprún suggests that this narrative took shape within 
the framework of his Communist faith; the subsequent collapse of that 
faith, he submits, fundamentally undermined not only this framework 
but also the legitimacy of the text itself:
Toute la vérité de mon témoignage avait pour référence implicite, 
mais contraignante, l’horizon d’une société désaliénée: une 
société sans classes où les camps eussent été inconcevables. […] 
Mais l’horizon du communisme n’était pas celui de la société sans 
classes, je veux dire: son horizon réel, historique. L’horizon du 
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communisme, incontournable, était celui du Goulag. Du coup, 
toute la vérité de mon livre devenait mensongère.
The very truth of my account had as its implicit but constricting 
reference the horizon of a disalienated society: a society without 
classes in which the camps would have been inconceivable. […] 
But the horizon of Communism – its real, historical horizon – was 
not that of a classless society. The horizon of Communism was, 
inescapably, that of the Gulag. By the same token, the very truth of 
my book became a lie.49
Irrespective of whether he was aware of the existence of the gulags at the 
time he wrote Le Grand Voyage, Semprún perceives himself to have been 
complicit in a lie or at least an omission of the truth. In an excerpt from a 
debate he participated in for the socialist movement Clarté, quoted in Quel 
beau dimanche!, he argues that one cannot justify anything by claiming 
ignorance: ‘Il y a toujours le moyen de savoir, ou tout au moins de mettre 
en question. […] Même ignorants, d’ailleurs, réellement ignorants, nous 
sommes coresponsables, car ce passé est le nôtre et nul ne pourra plus 
le changer.’/‘There are always ways and means of knowing, or at least 
of questioning. […] Even if we were ignorant, really ignorant, we would 
still be co-responsible, for that past is our past, and no one can change 
it.’50 As Semprún’s texts frequently assert, the past is frequently, indeed 
inevitably, changed by its translation into the present. Indeed, a failure by 
the Party to address – as opposed to transform – its history is at the heart 
of the critique Semprún levels at the political uses of dialectical thinking. 
Yet, on a personal level, Semprún believes that to have written Le Grand 
Voyage while ignorant, intentionally or otherwise, of the existence of the 
gulags is to be guilty of a failure to take responsibility for the effects of his 
Communist past. 
But how can we assume the effects of a past which we can 
never grasp absolutely? How, in such circumstances, are we to take 
responsibility? It is this paradox which Semprún will ‘mettre en question’ 
in Quel beau dimanche!, L’Écriture ou la vie and beyond. In Quel beau 
dimanche! the narrator suggests that the best form through which to 
engage in such questioning is a textual one, through which he seeks 
to ‘détruire cette innocence de la mémoire’/‘destroy that innocence 
of the memory’: ‘Je savais qu’il me faudrait revivre mon expérience 
de Buchenwald, heure par heure, avec la certitude désespérée de 
l’existence simultanée des camps russes, du Goulag de Staline. Je savais 
aussi que la seule façon de revivre cette expérience était de la réécrire, 
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en connaissance de cause, cette fois-ci.’/‘I knew that I would have to 
relive my experience of Buchenwald, hour by hour, with the desperate 
certainty of the simultaneous existence of the Russian camps, of Stalin’s 
Gulag. I also knew that the only way of reliving that experience was to 
rewrite it, with full knowledge this time.’51
Quel beau dimanche! is the product of this desire to destroy the 
innocence of memory, a textual reliving of Buchenwald, hour by hour, ‘en 
connaissance de cause’. This developing knowledge, so crucially absent 
in Le Grand Voyage, is highlighted by a chronology which interleaves the 
hours of this single Sunday with temporal strata from the past and the 
future; the disturbance enacted by Semprún’s realization of the existence 
of the gulags is reflected by a similarly disrupted retelling of that 
experience. This distorted chronology is accompanied by what Kippur 
describes as Semprún’s characteristic ‘multilingual aesthetics’ – his use 
of language loans, of glossed translations and of a network of translated 
intertextual quotations – which creates a tissue of languages and texts 
through which the political, historical and literary losses with which Quel 
beau dimanche! is concerned are explored and interrogated.52
Zero hour
Chapitre Zéro begins with the narrator standing in the snow outside 
the Buchenwald camp, one Sunday in December. Gazing meditatively 
across the white, empty landscape, he finds his attention drawn to a 
solitary tree: ‘Un arbre, c’est tout, dans sa splendeur immédiate, dans 
l’immobilité transparente du présent’/‘A tree, just that, in its immediate 
splendour, in the transparent stillness of the present’.53 Contemplating 
this instant of natural beauty, frozen – physically and temporally – 
beneath the snow, the narrator imagines the return of spring, a return as 
distant and immediate, as impossible and inevitable, as his own death: 
‘Décembre, combien de mois à attendre? Il serait mort, lui, peut-être. Le 
bourgeon éclaterait, portant à son terme la vérité profonde de l’hiver. 
Et il serait mort […]. Il serait absent, parti en fumée, et le bourgeon 
éclaterait’/‘December; how many more months to wait? He himself 
might be dead by then. The bud would burst, bringing to an end the 
profound truth of winter. And he would be dead. […] He would be 
absent, gone off in a puff of smoke, and the bud would burst’.54 Within 
the beauty of the scene before him, the narrator perceives the shadow 
of death; beneath the impenetrable snow which surrounds him, he 
uncovers the promise of new life.55 Joyous in his recognition of ‘cette 
dialectique élémentaire’/‘this crude dialectic’, the cycle of birth and 
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death, of presence and absence, of growth and decay, which is life itself, 
‘[i]l riait aux anges, presque béat’/‘[h]is face set in an ecstatic, almost 
beatific smile’.56
But this moment of aesthetic and philosophical enlightenment 
contains the outline of a different, darker experience. The tree which the 
narrator gazes upon – un hêtre in French – is, in German, Buche, and it is 
‘[l]a forêt de hêtres sur la colline de l’Ettersberg qui donne son nom au 
lieudit, Buchenwald’/‘The beech forest on the hill known as the Ettersberg 
[…] which gives its name to the place in question, Buchenwald’.57 There 
is etymological and homophonic play here within both the German 
and the French. Die Buche is the German word for ‘beech tree’ but is 
also etymologically connected to the German for ‘book’, das Buch; le 
hêtre is the French word for ‘beech tree’, but is also a homophone of the 
French verb être, to be. Through this interlinguistic jeu de mots, Semprún 
highlights an intersection of writing and living that is at the heart of his 
representation of Buchenwald. The presence of the Buchenwald camp 
is implicit within every element of the narrator’s experience, both lived 
and textual: it is apparent within the beauty of the tree upon which the 
narrator gazes, just as his death is implicit in the arrival of spring. And, 
all too soon, the narrator’s reverie is brought to an abrupt halt by the 
intrusion of an SS officer from the camp, pistol aimed at the narrator’s 
back. As the violent reality of Buchenwald disrupts the narrator’s solitary 
contemplation, so too the language of that reality – the abrupt German of 
the officer’s questions and the narrator’s responses – disrupts the earlier 
lyricism of the French narration: ‘Was machst Du hier? demandait-il. Il 
demandait, le sous-officier, ce qu’il faisait là, lui’/‘Was machst du hier?’ 
he asked. The warrant officer was asking what he was doing there’.58 
Semprún’s translation of the officer’s question from German into French, 
and his subsequent glossing of this translation, together enable him to 
insert an authorial commentary without interrupting the flow of the 
narrative. This commentary is less concerned with interrogating the 
events experienced than with the dynamics of the languages through 
which that experience is narrated, which takes the form of a perceived 
tonal and affective difference between German and French:
Das Baum, disait-il finalement, so ein wunderschönes Baum! […] Il 
était satisfait d’avoir exprimé en allemand, avec une réelle concision, 
les vrais motifs de sa présence en ce lieu inattendu. L’arbre était, 
en effet, miraculeux de beauté. En français, toutefois, l’explication 
aurait eu un tour solennel ou guindé. C’est l’arbre, aurait-il dit en 
français, un arbre miraculeux de beauté.
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“Das Baum,” he said in the end, “so ein wunderschönes Baum!”! […] 
He was pleased that he had managed to express in German, with real 
conciseness, the true reasons for his presence in that unexpected 
place. The tree really was a miracle of beauty. In French, however, 
the explanation would have had something solemn or affected 
about it. “C’est l’arbre,” he would have said, “un arbre miraculeux 
de beauté”.59
As French shifts into German and back again, this glossed translation 
contrasts the apparent truthful brevity of the German with the affected 
solemnity of the French. This gloss is more than a commentary upon a 
perceived linguistic difference, however, for it simultaneously emphasizes 
the contrast between the terse life-or-death reality of the narrator’s need 
to respond to the officer’s question and the beauty but irreality of the 
aesthetic experience which preceded it. Even as the narrator allows himself 
a moment longer to imagine ‘que le sous-officier aurait pour l’arbre les 
mêmes yeux que lui, […] ils auraient pu parler ensemble de cette beauté 
neigeuse’/‘that the warrant officer would see the tree as he had […] they 
could have talked together about that miracle of beauty’, the scene shifts 
from hypothetical discussion to real danger, the warrant officer pointing 
his pistol at the narrator’s chest and preparing to shout.60 The proximity of 
the narrator’s death here is no longer a matter of philosophical meditation, 
but instead an actual and immediate possibility. As the narrator cries out 
his identification number in German – ‘Häftling vier-und-vierzig-tausend-
neun-hundert-vier!’ – in order to placate the officer, death, lingering in the 
smoke from the crematorium, filters onto the scene.61
Into this powerful opening Semprún distils the affective tone and 
aesthetic form of Quel beau dimanche! as a whole: the intersection of 
philosophical contemplation and political violence, the pervasion of 
death within the camp experience, and the multiplicity of languages and 
elements of translation that draws out the subtleties of this experience. 
These meditations are framed by the temporal specificity which the 
text’s title hints at: ‘Il est dix heures du matin. C’est dimanche. C’est la 
fin du mois de décembre’/‘It is ten o’clock in the morning. It is Sunday. 
It is late December’, the narrator informs us.62 Yet even within these 
opening pages, the narrative exceeds the cadre of this single Sunday 
through Semprún’s exploration of the second framework for the text: the 
space of the camp itself and its proximity to the town of Weimar. It is 
this proximity that enables Semprún to distort the temporal framework 
created by the novel’s title, as he invokes the echoes of others who, in 
very different circumstances and at very different times, walked the same 
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF TRANSLATION186
landscape as his narrator does now. Semprún focuses particularly upon a 
figure who is key within the text as a whole: Goethe, who, in the company 
of Johann Peter Eckermann, walked the space around the Ettersberg Hill 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
Semprún is interested in the symbolic position Goethe inhabits 
within the space and the history of Buchenwald. The power of Goethe’s 
cultural capital is apparent within the name given to the camp, a fact 
Semprún highlights by quoting from a letter to Himmler which explains 
why the camp was not simply named after the Ettersberg Hill upon 
which it was situated. The letter to Himmler states that this name was 
impossible, ‘«car le nom de l’Ettersberg est lié à la vie et à l’œuvre de 
Goethe»’/‘“for the name of the Ettersberg is associated with the life and 
works of Goethe”’. The narrator elaborates upon this point to explain 
that, for those in charge of creating the camp, ‘son attribution à un camp 
de rééducation (Umschulungslager) où se rassemblerait la lie de la terre 
ne pouvait que souiller la mémoire du poète’/‘invoking his spirit in the 
name of a re-education camp (Umschulungslager), in which the dregs 
of the earth would be assembled, could only sully the poet’s memory’.63 
In this letter, re-situated in the novel, the opposition between Goethe – 
symbol of German national pride and cultural capital – and those within 
the camp – the detritus, the dregs of the earth – reveals an enforced 
separation, created to prevent the contamination of Goethe’s memory by 
its connection with the events unfolding within the camp walls. Semprún’s 
critique throughout the text is directed at the implicit valorization and 
romanticization of the space of Buchenwald through its connection to 
Goethe, a romanticization which emphasizes the role aesthetic forms can 
play in the promotion, as well as the illumination, of political violence.64
Goethe also features in L’Écriture ou la vie, one of a number of 
returns and foreshadowings through which Semprún focuses upon an 
impossible-to-conceive moment after Buchenwald. This impossibility is 
elucidated by the different manifestations of Goethe within these two 
texts. In Quel beau dimanche!, the narrator resurrects Goethe and has 
him walk beyond the camp walls, in spaces the narrator can only access 
in fantasy. In L’Écriture ou la vie, this imaginary beyond has become an 
actuality, as the liberated narrator enters Goethe’s house, preserved 
near Weimar, not as a prisoner but as a free man. But the existential 
impossibility of this beyond is the backbone of L’Écriture ou la vie, as the 
narrator explores his sense that he is less a survivor of the camps than 
someone transformed and transfigured by his experience – ‘un revenant’, 
someone returned from the dead.65 The movement from Quel beau 
dimanche! to L’Écriture ou la vie, from this Sunday within the camp to 
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the narrator’s liberation from the camp, is thus anything but a linear 
progression, for as Semprún insists, in the experience of Buchenwald 
there is no shift from during to after, within to beyond, but only ‘une 
contrée immense où ruisselle l’absence’/‘this immense land streaming 
with absence’, through which his narrator wanders endlessly.66 Through 
this allusion to Goethe, mirrored and doubled across both texts, Semprún 
asks us to consider where fiction and life, past and present, coalesce and 
converge. In relation to his experience of Buchenwald, what is imaginary 
and what is real? Are the ghosts of the past vanished or awaiting 
resurrection? And what role does writing, and particularly writing which 
incorporates an aesthetics of translation, play in enabling or repressing 
this ‘revenant’ past?
In both texts, these questions of textual memory are dramatized 
not only by the ‘visitation’ of Goethe but also by the echo of Léon Blum, 
the French socialist minister and three-time prime minister, who was 
imprisoned by the Nazis in a house next to Buchenwald at the same time 
that Semprún was incarcerated in the camp. Separated by more than a 
hundred years, Goethe and Blum collide not only within the space of 
Buchenwald but also, translated in time, through a process of textual re-
imagination. For in 1901 Blum wrote a text named Nouvelles conversations 
de Goethe avec Eckermann, in which he too imagined an immortal Goethe 
living in the late nineteenth century. Nouvelles conversations is an 
intertextual blueprint for Quel beau dimanche!, and Semprún terminates 
Chapitre Zéro with an excerpt from it: ‘ «3 juillet 1898, «Dîné chez Goethe 
qui me cite un mot singulier de Racine. Quand il eut achevé le plan de 
Phèdre, il dit à un ami: Ma pièce est finie. Il ne me reste plus que les vers 
à écrire.»’/‘“July 3 1898, “Dined at Goethe’s. He told me an interesting 
story about Racine. When he had finished planning Phèdre, he said to a 
friend: ‘“My play is finished. All that remains is to write the lines.”’67
This quintuple intertextual sequence – Semprún’s rewriting of 
Blum’s reimagining of Eckermann’s paraphrasing of Goethe’s citation 
of Racine’s discussion of writing – opens the narrative of Quel beau 
dimanche! and reveals the texture of the text: its translation of different 
voices – some literary, some political, some fictional, some real – into a 
dialogic framework through which Semprún negotiates his experiences 
of loss. The narrator’s response to this excerpt – simply, ‘Écrivons’/‘Let us 
write’, – concludes Chapitre Zéro.68 By ending this textual ‘zero hour’ – 
the hour when, in military terms, decisions are made and attacks begin 
– with a collective call to write, Semprún positions it also as a collective 
call to struggle: écrire, c’est lutter; écrivons, c’est luttons. But here, to 
recall Barthes, ‘écrire’ is an intransitive verb: there is no object to be 
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written, and the subject, while collective, is ambiguous.69 Who is the ‘we’ 
addressed here? And against what or whom, or for what or whom, are 
‘we’ to struggle through writing? 
This powerful call to write is followed immediately, at the start of 
Chapter 1, by the words which make up the novel’s title: ‘Les gars, quel beau 
dimanche!’70 The speaker is Fernand Barizon, the narrator’s counterpoint 
and companion: standing in the camp courtyard in the early hours of this 
December Sunday, he cries out these words which, in the context of the 
camp experience, appear incomprehensible to the narrator: ‘il n’a pas dit 
merde. Il a dit quel beau dimanche, les gars! en français’/‘he had not said 
“merde!”’. He had said, “Quel beau dimanche, les gars!” in French’.71 This 
unlikely utterance offers Semprún another opportunity to interrogate 
the differences between French and German, and between the values 
he assigns to each: ‘S’il avait voulu dire merde, d’ailleurs, il aurait dit 
Scheisse, car les mots importants ne sont pas français […] On dit Scheisse, 
Arbeit, Brot, tous les autres mots importants, en allemand. Pain, travail, 
merde: tous les vrais mots’/‘In any case, if he had wanted to say “merde!”’ 
he would have said “Scheisse”, because the important words were not 
French. […] He said “Scheisse”, “Arbeit”, “Brot”, all the important words, 
in German. Shit, work, bread: all the real words’.72 As in the episode with 
the tree, Semprún creates a distinction between a language capable of 
truthfully representing the camp experience – German – and a language 
concerned with articulating the aesthetic – here written quite literally in 
the French word ‘beau’. 
How are we to understand this dichotomy? The narrator’s 
interpretation of Barizon’s call conceives it as integrally connected to 
a past memorialized through its aesthetic pleasures, and through the 
contrast between this remembered beauty and the present camp reality:
Un souvenir, sans doute, des beaux dimanches d’autrefois venu le 
saisir au moment où il allait plonger dans les tourbillons de neige. […] 
Il a peut-être eu le sentiment de la sottise inacceptable de ce monde où 
il y a les dimanches sur la Marne – ailleurs, avant, loin, de l’autre côté, 
dehors – et puis cette neige floconneuse, obstinée, de l’Ettersberg.
It must have been the memory of other beautiful Sundays, at 
home, on the banks of the Marne, which suddenly invaded him as 
he was about to dash into the swirling snow […]. Perhaps he felt 
the unacceptable stupidity of a world in which there are Sundays 
on the Marne – elsewhere, long ago, far away, on the other side, 
outside – and then this obstinate fleecy snow of the Ettersberg.73
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The irony within Barizon’s call, the disjunction between these memories 
and his experience, between the beauty of the Marne and the reality of the 
camp, exists in a constant tension, a tension which highlights the innate 
injustice of the camp experience. To adapt Keats, beauty is not truth, 
truth beauty; rather, the truth of the camp experience exists precisely 
in its inability to be aestheticized and romanticized, in the impossible 
and inevitable gap between this Sunday and the Sundays of a long-ago 
freedom, an experiential gap emphasized by the linguistic disjunction 
Semprún creates when translating between the German and the French. 
The Sunday at Marne is dramatically elsewhere, beyond, before, outside, 
and untranslatable into the possibility of the camp. 
Yet these time and space markers – ‘ailleurs, avant, loin’ – 
reveal not only an experiential disjunction but also a conceptual 
one, emphasized by the insurmountable temporal gap between the 
Sunday now and the Sunday then. For all memory is in debt to a past 
it cannot fully redeem: the Sunday at Marne is ‘loin’ not only because 
it is empirically and affectively such a different experience from the 
Sunday at the camp, but also because every attempt to remember in 
the present is an impossibility which pushes the past further and 
further into oblivion. When we translate the past into the present, we 
confront that past but we also seek to move away from it: the ‘living-on’ 
which Benjamin evokes as the movement of translation is a movement 
of survival but also of forgetting.74 This loss not only of memory but 
as memory is staged in Quel beau dimanche! by the appropriations 
and misinterpretations which run through the narrator’s attempt to 
translate Barizon’s memories into his own narrative. For, as the final 
pages of Quel beau dimanche! reveal, the narrator’s interpretation of 
Barizon’s call is comically misplaced: 
Dis donc, ce matin, quand t’es parti en criant: «Les gars, quel beau 
dimanche!», tu pensais à quoi? […] Ce matin? dit Barizon, je ne 
m’en souviens pas. […] A ce putain de dimanche, je suppose, dit 
Barizon [...] Tu ne pensais pas à la Marne, par hasard? […] Quelle 
Marne? dit-il. La bataille de la Marne? […] J’éclate de rire.
By the way, this morning, when you came out shouting, “Les gars, 
quel beau dimanche!”, what were you thinking about?” […] “This 
morning,” said Barizon, “I don’t remember”. […] About this shitty 
Sunday, I suppose,” […] [“You weren’t thinking about the Marne, 
by any chance?” […] “What Marne?”, he said, “the Battle of the 
Marne?” […] I burst out laughing’].75
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Sheridan’s English translation of this section of the text ends with the 
words ‘I suppose’, a decision which emphasizes the ways in which the 
‘living-on’ of translation always allows a re-envisioning of an existing 
text. But it also reveals the ways in which the inevitably transformative 
impulse of translation can become an appropriation, one which disrupts 
a text’s interpretative possibilities and disturbs its affective content, for 
this elision fundamentally shifts the focus of the extract, in fact erasing 
the very appropriation with which Semprún is concerned. For the 
narrator’s annexation of Barizon’s thoughts dramatizes the same process 
of appropriation at play within the narrative impulse as that which 
characterizes the student’s story in Kundera’s Le Livre. But this annexation 
also reveals the power of narrative to create memory: the narrator finally 
realizes ‘d’où vient cette Marne qui m’a hanté, ce matin, que j’ai imagine 
dans la mémoire de Barizon. Elle me vient de Giraudoux, bien sûr’/‘from 
where that Marne came which haunted me, this morning, that I imagined 
in Barizon’s memory. It came from Giraudoux, of course’.76 In Quel beau 
dimanche!, as well as in several of Semprún’s other texts, the narrator 
often reflects upon the words of Jean Giraudoux when remembering his 
time as a member of the Maquis or his incarceration in Buchenwald. Here, 
the intrusion of Giraudoux into the narrator’s narrative reveals memory to 
be a tissue of elements forgotten, elements imagined, elements translated 
from other texts, other voices, other authors, which enable us to construct 
the past as we want, indeed as we expect, to see it.
Semprún’s retelling of a Sunday within the camp raises questions 
as much about the impulse to narrate and to understand as about the 
nature of the experience to be narrated and understood. Semprún forces 
us to consider where this Sunday lies – in memory, in imagination, in 
expectation, in text, in the past, in the present? And, just as importantly, 
we must consider whose memory (imagination, expectation, text, past 
or present) is being invoked. In positioning Barizon’s words ‘quel beau 
dimanche’ – the title of the text itself – as the first moment of writing 
following the imperative and collective ‘écrivons’, Semprún provides the 
subject matter for his call for a collective form of writing. What is to be 
written is this Sunday, which slips from the narrator’s grasp even as he 
narrates it, even as Semprún writes it, even as we read it, for it is already 
being translated elsewhere into another’s memory, voice, text and time. In 
this sense, Quel beau dimanche! is a question as much as an exclamation, 
revealing Semprún’s fascination with the relationship between agency, 
temporality, and memory as evoked within aesthetic forms. What beauty 
can there be within the camp experience and within the memory of that 
experience? How can such an experience be translated into an aesthetic 
191JORGE SEMPRÚN’S QUEL BEAU DIMANCHE!
form without betraying or silencing the voices and echoes of those who 
also experienced it, or without being complicit in an erasure of precisely 
the past moment which it seeks to grasp? What form, indeed what 
language, is capable of such a narration? As his intralingual translation 
of Le Grand Voyage as Quel beau dimanche! suggests, Semprún insists 
that our relation to the past is never static but always altered by the 
present; reminiscence is a pendulum which swings repeatedly between 
significance and irrelevance, nostalgia and amnesia. The account of 
Buchenwald which Semprún offered in Le Grand Voyage is ‘mensongère’, 
not only because he wrote the text before he was aware of the existence 
of the gulags, but also because every attempt to translate memory into an 
aesthetic form inevitably erases, overwrites and distorts the past which 
it seeks to recover. ‘Écrivons’ states the narrator of Quel beau dimanche!, 
but this writing, its possibility and impossibility, as staged by translation, 
is not the end of the text but its beginning, not its answer but its question. 
Memory and memorialization
Semprún’s concern with the difficulties of translating his memories of 
Buchenwald into an aesthetic form commensurate with their complexity 
is paralleled by another attempt to memorialize this traumatic past: the 
Buchenwald memorial, created by Fritz Cremer in 1958. Memorials 
dramatize the innate problems within all attempts to translate memory 
into an aesthetic form. As Peter Rosenbaum notes in ‘The Buchenwald 
Memorial and its Différend’, ‘memorials always signify a forgetting. […] 
Memorials remind us of our forgetfulness and reinforce this forgetting 
by containing and sealing off the potentially dangerous forgetting that 
emanates from the past’.77 In seeking to mark and commemorate the past, 
memorials allow us to forget that we are incapable of remembering an 
original event, purporting to frame and contain what is an unframeable, 
uncontainable past. The dangers of this approach to memory are 
illustrated by the form of the Buchenwald memorial, which Semprún, 
through the voice of his narrator, subjects to a vehement critique: 
C’était dégueulasse. Une tour, des groupes de sculptures, du marbre, 
une allée bordée de murs couverts de bas-reliefs, des escaliers 
monumentaux. […] Je me suis borné, timidement, à […] raconter 
mon vieux rêve: qu’on abandonne le camp au lent travail de la 
nature, de la forêt, des racines, de la pluie, de l’érosion éclatante des 
saisons. Un jour, on redécouvrirait les bâtiments de l’ancien camp 
envahis par le foisonnement irrésistible des arbres. […] Mais non; 
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un mémorial, quelque chose qui avait un sens éducatif, politique, 
voilà ce qu’ils avaient construit.
It was disgusting. A tower, groups of marble sculptures, an avenue 
bordered with walls covered with bas-reliefs, monumental steps. 
[…] Shyly, I just told […] my old dream: that the camp should be 
left to the slow work of nature, to the forest, to the roots, to the 
rain, to the irreversible erosion of the seasons. One day, people 
would rediscover the buildings of the old camp overgrown by the 
irresistible profusion of trees. […] But no, a memorial, something 
educational, political, that’s what they had built.78
The contrast Semprún evokes between the ‘lent’, ‘éclatante’ and 
‘irrésistible’ invasion of nature the narrator desires and the ‘construit’, 
‘monumentaux’ ‘murs’ of the memorial that exists emphasizes the 
memorial’s reification of an intangible past in a concrete form. The 
narrator imagines a memorial which could reflect the transience of 
memory: one capable of changing, growing, dying and being reborn in 
different forms. Instead, he finds an artistic construction which seeks 
to profit – politically, educationally, affectively – from the deaths that it 
purports to commemorate. 
In The Buchenwald Child: Truth, Fiction and Propaganda, William 
John Niven comments upon the form of this profit, suggesting that the 
human figures which make up this memorial statue are depicted in a way 
which elides the violence and trauma of the experience of Buchenwald:
Far from looking emaciated, they are characterized by muscularity, 
and the shirts, coats, or robes with which they have been fitted 
out are anything but ragged. […] The whole memorial complex, 
in fact, stresses the success of the prisoners’ struggle against death 
and fascism. The prisoners are to be understood as men who threw 
off their yoke to become shapers of their own destiny. […] The 
victimhood of those who were butchered and starved by the SS as a 
matter of course […] is given little attention in the final memorial.79
Niven’s commentary focuses upon a memorial conceived not to remember 
the deaths at Buchenwald but to assert the possibility of transcending 
those deaths – indeed, death itself – by rendering them meaningful within 
the context of a broader, justifiable struggle: the struggle through which 
Communism triumphed over Fascism. In tension with the dialectical 
celebration of life and death which opens Quel beau dimanche!, this 
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absence of death within the memorial becomes particularly pertinent. 
Death is no longer part of the memory of Buchenwald, and the lives 
which continue beyond it, but is rather an element to be repressed – just 
as nature has been repressed – in the creation of a sculptural narrative of 
fraternal triumph and resistance. 
The dangers of this triumphant narrative are twofold. Firstly, the 
memorial elides what is, for Semprún, ‘l’essentiel’ of the camp experience: 
the collective living-through-death which reveals not only the absolute 
evil of the camp but also its fraternal impulse. For Semprún, death 
cannot be vanquished by the fraternal but is instead the experience of 
the fraternal as lived within Buchenwald: death – its promise, proximity, 
inevitability – is the experience shared by all those imprisoned within the 
camp.80 At the same time, this collective experience of death only occurs 
because of the existence of absolute evil, as manifested by the creation of 
the camps. In this sense, Buchenwald is the embodiment of the quotation 
from André Malraux’s Le Miroir des limbes which provides the epigram to 
L’Écriture ou la vie: ‘la région cruciale de l’âme où le Mal absolu s’oppose 
à la fraternité’/‘the crucial region of the soul where absolute Evil and 
fraternity [confront one another]’.81 For to experience Buchenwald 
is to experience both the absolute evil and the fraternity of death, 
manifested within a space where survival and sacrifice, individualism 
and collectivism, destruction and cooperation, exist in constant tension. 
Semprún’s reading of Malraux is indebted to Kant’s conception 
of radical evil in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, a French 
translation of which the narrator of L’Écriture ou la vie reads just prior 
to his incarceration in Buchenwald.82 The temporal intersection of the 
narrator’s arrest – the moment which led, ineluctably, to Buchenwald 
– with a reading of this translation of Kant’s text positions the text as 
the beginning of Buchenwald in two senses: not only does this reading 
precede the narrator’s experience of the camps, but the subject matter 
foreshadows the nature of that experience. Kant emphasizes that our 
choice of whether to be good or evil is not a choice between the human 
and the inhuman, but rather between two equal and possible outcomes 
of our freedom as humans.83 Responding to Kant’s claim, the narrator 
of L’Écriture ou la vie insists that ‘[i]l est […] dérisoire de s’opposer au 
Mal, d’en prendre ses distances, par une simple référence à l’humain, 
à l’espèce humaine… Le Mal est l’un des projets possibles de la liberté 
constitutive de l’humanité de l’homme’/‘it’s ridiculous to oppose Evil, to 
distance oneself from it, through a simple reference to what is human, to 
mankind… Evil is one of the possible designs of the freedom essential to 
the humanity of man – the freedom from which spring both the humanity 
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and the inhumanity of man’.84 For Semprún, it is only by acknowledging 
that the camps are at all times a possible result of our humanity that any 
real understanding of the camp experience can be attained.
A failure to acknowledge the inevitable possibility of the camps is the 
second danger contained within the narrative of triumph evoked by the 
Buchenwald memorial. In L’Écriture ou la vie, Semprún suggests that the 
memorial sets up a symbolic, but false, conflict between the oppression 
of the prisoners under Nazi control and their liberation in the name of 
Communism.85 As Siobhan Kattago suggests, the Socialist Unity Party saw 
the creation of the memorial as an opportunity to glorify the Communist 
resistance to Fascism within Buchenwald, and thereby legitimize their 
claims to power within the German Democratic Republic.86 Semprún 
argues that this symbolic glorification is misleading, in part because it 
hinges upon an opposition between Communism and Fascism which is as 
illusory as that between fraternity and evil. In L’Écriture ou la vie, Semprún 
acknowledges his naivety in this regard: the narrator of the text reveals 
his faith that when Nazism came to an end, there would be no need for 
camps such as Buchenwald.87 But, as the gulags reveal, the existence of 
the camps extends beyond the specificity of the Nazi ideology into the 
ideology Semprún had believed would negate their very possibility: that 
of Communism. 
It is this illusory opposition which is at the heart of the fallacies 
Semprún perceives within Le Grand Voyage, and which he seeks to shatter 
in Quel beau dimanche! Despite the ideological differences between 
Fascism and Communism, the narrator insists that they share a common 
essence, embodied within their reliance upon the use of concentration 
camps such as Buchenwald. ‘Faire travailler et corriger, rééduquer par 
le travail forcé, n’est-ce pas là que se trouve l’identité profonde, quelles 
que soient les différences dues aux circonstances historiques, ou même 
géographiques, entre les deux systèmes?’/‘To put to work and to correct, 
to re-educate by forced labor, is that not where the profound identity 
is to be found, whatever the differences due to the historical or even 
geographical circumstances between the two systems?’, he asks.88
When Quel beau dimanche! was written, Semprún was unaware 
that there was, in fact, a geographic relation between these two systems 
embodied within Buchenwald itself. For Buchenwald is a translated 
site: between 1945 and 1950, the site of the Nazi concentration camp 
in which Semprún spent eighteen months was converted into the Soviet 
internment camp NKVD 2. Buchenwald is thus representative, not only of 
Nazi atrocities, but also of Soviet ones, mirroring spatially the conflicted 
political history which Semprún, as an ex-detainee of the Nazi camp 
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and an ex-Communist, is seeking to come to terms with in the pages of 
Quel beau dimanche! As Bella Brodzki notes, the question for Semprún is 
‘[h]ow to memorialize, even contain, these two pasts, without relativizing 
or equating them, in the same symbolic and physical landscape? What 
constitutes appropriate, respectful, responsible commemoration of the 
history of each regime, without confusing or conflating their respective 
crimes?’89
As Couze Venn discusses in relation to Auschwitz and Hiroshima, 
very different experiences of trauma can resonate with each other in 
illuminating ways. Yet we must always respect the particularity of these 
experiences. Via Derrida, Venn reads this simultaneous connection and 
particularity in relation to the question of the proper name:
the proper name […] makes a requirement both of untranslatability 
and translatability, that is, it requires, on the one hand, that one 
respects the irreducible specificity and singularity associated with 
the proper name […] which exceeds representation and would lose 
meaning in translation. Yet, on the other hand, the proper name, 
because it stands in testimony to a debt, summons one to attempt 
to translate the experience into a common idiom, as a response to 
suffering and fragility and a sign of solidarity.90
As Derrida discusses, the proper name always calls for both translatability 
and untranslatability; ‘traduis-moi’/‘translate me’ into understanding 
and connection; ‘ne me traduis pas’/‘do not translate me’, for I am unique, 
and can never be adequately represented or narrated.91 Buchenwald and 
NKVD 2, two proper names situated within one space, exist within this 
tension between connection and separation, calling for an approach 
which can understand their relation without overwriting their specificity. 
The possibility of this overwriting is always present in any attempt to 
translate the traumatic experiences embodied by one proper name into 
another. The relationship between the memorialization of Buchenwald 
and that of Auschwitz reveals one way in which such an overwriting can 
occur. As Rosenbaum describes, the Buchenwald memorial was in fact 
designed to memorialize Auschwitz via Buchenwald, to translate the 
specificity of these two camps into one narrative of the concentration 
camp experience. On one level, the memorialization of both camps 
within one space allows the atrocities committed in both to stand 
together, as Venn suggests, in solidarity and ‘testimony to a debt’. But this 
combined testimony ultimately erases the other camp also connected to 
Buchenwald: NKVD 2. For as Rosenbaum describes, in seeking to connect 
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF TRANSLATION196
Buchenwald to Auschwitz, the memorial programme at Buchenwald 
specifically erased the history of NKVD 2 in order to create a meaningful 
and cohesive narrative of the horrors of the Nazi camp programme.92
Semprún’s concern throughout Quel beau dimanche! is how to bring 
this translatable/untranslatable binary into dialogue, how to find an 
aesthetic form capable of acknowledging the parallels between different 
experiences of totalitarianism without absorbing these differences into a 
homogeneity which ultimately erases as much as it remembers. Semprún’s 
own experiences of translation offered one answer to these questions. For 
it was, he suggests, only after Quel beau dimanche! was translated into 
German that he became aware of the double history contained within the 
space of Buchenwald camp itself. In L’Écriture ou la vie, Semprún discusses 
this discovery, describing the moment when, following a discussion of the 
German translation of Quel beau dimanche!, a reader approached him and 
told him the story of NKVD 2.93 As Semprún narrates it, then, translation 
quite literally illuminated the connection between Buchenwald and 
NKVD 2 which was masked in the official memorial. 
But the connection between the two different totalitarian regimes 
is also part of Semprún’s own experiences as both a Communist and a 
detainee of the Nazis. For Semprún, it is by translating these experiences 
into narrative form that he can begin to understand them in ways that 
connect but do not conflate these two traumatic histories. In Quel beau 
dimanche!, this understanding requires the narrator to address his 
failure to see or accept the parallels between Buchenwald and the gulags 
during his time as a member of the PCE. Alongside his struggle to find 
an appropriate aesthetic form to narrate the traumatic experience of 
Buchenwald and the loss of his political faith, Semprún is thus also 
concerned with understanding the sleight of thought or memory which 
enabled him to continue as a Communist despite his growing awareness 
of the flaws and failings within the Communist dream: indeed, the 
question ‘[p]ourquoi sommes-nous toujours communistes?’/‘Why are 
we still Communists?’ is posed three times, and provides the concluding 
question to the text as a whole.94 In Written in Red, Gina Herrmann 
suggests that the answer to this question hinges upon the ideological 
polarization of Europe at that period; to reject Communism, she suggests, 
was an implicit valorization of Fascism.95 But Semprún’s own response in 
Quel beau dimanche! suggests that his continued Communist faith rested 
on an illusion about Communism which he maintained even in the face of 
all evidence to the contrary: ‘L’illusion de maintenir et de faire progresser 
les valeurs du Communisme, malgré le parti communiste ou même contre 
lui’/‘the illusion of maintaining and of fostering the values of Communism, 
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despite the Communist Party or even against it’.96 The narrator’s ability to 
maintain this illusion hinges upon a refusal to confront  the contradictions 
between those ‘valeurs’ and the reality of their implementation.
How can we take responsibility for the past if we do not acknowledge 
its complexity and contradictions? How can we acknowledge its losses if 
we insist upon focusing only upon its triumphs? These questions are at 
the heart of Quel beau dimanche!, taking particular form in Semprún’s 
focus upon the role played by the dialectic, a process of thinking which, 
he suggests, enabled him to ignore, indeed, forget, the existence of 
these contradictions, and even to profit from them just as the memorial 
profits from death and the contradictions of Buchenwald’s past. From the 
opening pages of Quel beau dimanche!, when the narrator experiences 
the ‘dialectique élémentaire’ of life and death, Semprún foregrounds 
the power of dialectical argumentation and its important role in both 
human thought and human experience. But the positivity of this initial 
moment of dialectical thinking is contrasted with Semprún’s depiction 
of the Party’s – and the narrator’s own – use of the dialectic as a form of 
historical and political justification to support a series of fundamentally 
flawed ideological, ontological and ethical premises. In Quel beau 
dimanche!, Semprún’s aesthetics of translation elucidates not only the 
flaws he perceives within Stalinist dialectical argumentation, but also 
the power and prevalence of the impulse which draws us towards such 
forms of thinking. 
The dialectic
Dialectical forgettings
The dialectic as a model of political and philosophical thinking has 
a long and potent intellectual history. For Plato, the dialectic was 
a Socratic method which perceived the internal contradictions in 
every argument, and ultimately overcame these in order to uncover 
the truth of concepts such as justice, love or piety. The Hegelian 
dialectic contains a similar desire to overcome, as embodied within 
the formula ‘abstract, negative, concrete’.97 Every abstraction, Hegel 
suggests, contains its own negation; this negation, however, can be 
resolved through Aufhebung, an ‘untranslatable’ German word which 
represents the sublation of the abstract and the negative into a concrete 
force of progression and change which produces a higher form of 
consciousness.98 It is this concept of progress which is integral to the 
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Marxist-Leninist version of the dialectic. Here the formula of Hegel’s 
thinking is reversed: dialectical materialism seeks to address the 
materiality of social change rather than to overcome that materiality 
itself.99 In both the Hegelian and the Marxist forms however, the same 
crucial formulation is asserted: the dialectic operates as a movement of 
progression through the contradictory. 
Semprún’s critique of the dialectic in Quel beau dimanche! is not 
aimed at this formulation itself, but rather at its manipulation by Stalin’s 
Communist Party; under Soviet Communism the dialectical alliance of 
progress and contradiction was reified and hardened into a myth that 
was then read backwards to embrace Marxism itself: 
Si j’en crois les textes qui se réclament aujourd’hui du marxisme 
[…], le marxisme semble être […] une activité idéologique dont la 
fonction essentielle consisterait à produire des concepts capables 
d’occulter la réalité, de mythifier l’histoire, d’escamoter le grossier 
impact des faits historiques. Le marxisme semble réduit à n’être 
plus que l’art et la manière de justifier le cours des choses.
If the writings that claim to be Marxist today are to be believed […] 
Marxism […] seems to be an ideological activity whose essential 
function is to produce concepts capable of obscuring reality, or 
mystifying history, of concealing the crude impact of historical 
facts. Marxism seems reduced to being no more than the art of 
justifying the way things turn out.100
This interrogation of Marxism by Semprún is part of a more general 
critique in Quel beau dimanche! of the appropriations of Marxist thinking 
by Stalinist Communism, a critique which Derrida also explores in 
Spectres de Marx.101 While Derrida seeks to deconstruct the connection 
which has been created between Marx and the gulags, however, Semprún 
is interested in exploring precisely how this connection was created 
through a misinterpretation of Marx’s approach to the dialectic. 
The vision of the dialectic as a process enabling an endless 
justification of the present is apparent in Stalin’s 1938 text, Dialectical 
and Historical Materialism:
dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all 
things and phenomena of nature […] the struggle between these 
opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that 
which is dying away and that which is being born, between that 
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which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the 
internal content of the process of development […]. Everything 
depends on the conditions, time and place.102
Here, the dialectic emphasizes the relativity of all structures and 
experiences, indeed the relativity of history itself. But in Stalin’s 
interpretation this relativity is simultaneously a justification, for it 
enables all past systems and structures to become meaningful as part of 
a continuous social evolution: ‘only such an approach saves the science 
of history from becoming a jumble of accidents and an agglomeration of 
most absurd mistakes’, he writes.103 The Stalinist dialectic is concerned 
with the construction of meaning through an engagement with history 
which seeks to overcome the contradictions within that history, an 
unethical translation of the contingencies of the past into a coherent 
historical narrative. 
In Quel beau dimanche!, Semprún challenges the wisdom of such 
historical justifications, suggesting that the coherence required by such 
a dialectical narrative prevents a productive engagement with the past 
on its own terms: ‘C’est l’art et la manière de toujours retomber sur ses 
pattes’/‘It’s the art of always falling on your feet’.104 Semprún’s battle 
with the dialectic is not only concerned with the ways in which dialectical 
thinking operates to justify the events of the past, but also with its apparent 
inevitability as an intellectual procedure, and the consequences of that 
inevitability. Throughout Quel beau dimanche! Semprún interrogates this 
‘art’ of the dialectic. He describes how the Stalinist formulation of the 
dialectic involved a rejection of any form of thought considered ‘trop peu 
dialectique, puisqu’elle ne parvenait pas à justifier pleinement la réalité, 
puisqu’elle prétendait l’expliquer dans ses contradictions et non pas la 
glorifier dans la solution ou le dépassement (l’Aufhebung, camarades, 
l’Aufhebung!) desdites contradictions’/‘insufficiently dialectical, 
because it failed to justify reality completely, because it claimed to 
explain it in its contradictions and not to glorify it in the resolution or 
supersession (Aufhebung, comrades, Aufhebung!) of the afore-mentioned 
contradictions’.105
In Semprún’s discussion here, a failure to engage with the past 
becomes a failure to engage with the present. Semprún is only too 
aware, however, of the attractions of such forms of thinking, and of the 
innate human urge to translate the past according to our own needs 
and desires. Indeed, the narrator of Quel beau dimanche! justifies his 
own somewhat unpalatable actions through just such a dialectical 
formulation. Presented with evidence of the innocence of Hungarian 
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Communist László Rajk, condemned to death as a capitalist spy during 
one of Stalin’s show trials, the narrator retreats from this threat to the 
coherence of his ideological beliefs by calling upon the transformative 
power of the dialectic:
Car, même si Rajk était innocent, il ne fallait pas quitter le parti pour 
autant. […] Nous avions une phrase pour justifier dialectiquement 
cette attitude. Mais oui, dialectiquement. Nous disions qu’il valait 
mieux se tromper avec le parti que d’avoir raison en dehors de lui ou 
contre lui. Car le parti incarnait la vérité globale, la raison historique. 
Une erreur du parti ne pouvait être que partielle et passagère. Le cours 
même de l’histoire la corrigerait. Une vérité contre le parti ne pouvait 
être, elle non plus, que partielle et passagère. Stérile, donc, et néfaste, 
puisqu’elle risquait d’obnubiler, d’obscurcir, d’oblitérer la vérité 
globale de notre raison historique. L’arbre qui vous cachait la forêt, la 
vérité qui vous cachait la Vérité et qui en devenait mensongère.
For even if Rajk were innocent, one should still not leave the Party 
[…]. We had a phrase to justify this attitude, dialectically. We said 
that it was better to be wrong with the Party than to be right outside 
it or against it. For the Party embodied overall truth, historical 
reason. An error on the part of the Party could only be partial and 
temporary. The very course of history would correct it. A truth 
against the Party, by the same token, could only be partial and 
temporary. Sterile, therefore, and pernicious, since it ran the risk 
of obscuring, obliterating, the overall truth of our historical reason. 
The tree that kept you from seeing a forest, the truth that hid the 
Truth and thus became a lie.106
As innocence turns to guilt and wrong to right, individual moments of 
truth become tools in the service of an overarching Truth. In this critical 
moment of ideological confusion, the narrator reveals his understanding 
of the Party’s dialectic as a power which confronts, synthesizes and 
transcends the elements of the past which contradict its vision of the 
present and the future. Semprún, like Kundera in Le Livre du rire et de 
l’oubli, represents the narrator’s rhetorical transcendence of the material 
contradictions of the past through the metaphor of flight: ‘Je me trouvais 
archangélique. Je battais doucement des ailes sur le trottoir du boulevard 
Saint-Germain, je m’envolais vers le ciel vif-argent du bolchévisme’/‘I felt 
like the Archangel Michael. I gently beat my wings on the sidewalk of 
the Boulevard Saint-Germain and flew up toward the bright silver sky of 
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Bolshevism’.107 As in Le Livre, this metaphor of flight emphasizes a desired 
evasion of the unforeseen and uncontrollable elements of the past. Unlike 
Walter Benjamin’s angel of history whose ‘face is turned toward the past’ 
as he wrestles with a storm which ‘irresistibly propels him into the future 
to which his back is turned’, the angelic here turns its back upon the past, 
irresistibly propelling itself, through the justifications of the dialectic, into 
a future which is already mapped out.108 ‘Hence’ as Stalin himself wrote, 
‘in order not to err in policy, one must look forward, not backward’.109
Translation and the dialectic
By narrating this episode, Semprún positions narrative as a way to ‘mettre 
en question’ his own Communist past and to challenge the dialectical 
justifications which he suggests sustained it: écrire, c’est lutter. But in 
his exploration of the dangers of the dialectic in the pages of Quel beau 
dimanche! Semprún also stages the ways in which all forms of writing, and 
particularly those which employ translated intertexts, are motivated and 
governed by the same impulses towards angelic flight which the dialectic 
promotes. For narrative can itself be dialectical, weaving fictions around 
the past and re-ordering history into new forms. As Flynn and Judovitz 
suggest, ‘[n]arrative, after all, is usually processful, temporalizing, and 
totalizing, as is Hegelian dialectic […] Given that narrative is often 
multilevel and, when required, can be self-critical as well, the similarity 
of its argument to that of dialectic may be very strong’.110
Semprún’s approach to writing exemplifies several of these 
elements: his manipulation of chronology, the self-criticism displayed 
by his continual desire to rewrite, and the dynamics he creates between 
apparently opposing ideas reveal a constant staging of the dialectic 
between his past and his present, his ideological faith and his growing 
doubt. In Written in Red, Gina Herrmann suggests that memoirs 
of Communism – including Quel beau dimanche! – are frequently 
permeated by a rhetoric which reveals a continued faith in the ideals 
of Communism: ‘the recourse to Communist rhetorical patterns within 
the autobiographical narratives signals in and of itself the depth of the 
political commitment enacted by these authors in the exposition of their 
conversion’.111 For Herrmann, these rhetorical tropes are apparent even in 
texts such as Quel beau dimanche! which were written substantially after 
Semprún’s exit from the Party and which ostensibly mark his growing 
rejection of that rhetoric: she refers to what she calls the ‘residue of 
Stalinist language’ which permeates his work.112 The narrative qualities 
Herrmann reads in Semprún’s work – self-righteous and inquisitorial, 
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yet self-repressed – may indeed reflect this continuing residue, for his 
rewriting of his Communist past presents it as entrenched within the very 
rhetoric he seeks to evade. The close connections between Semprún’s 
narrative approach and the dialectical approach he condemns in Quel 
beau dimanche! reveal the vulnerability of that condemnation, staging 
the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of escaping our innate attraction 
to dialectical constructions.
This connection is particularly pertinent in relation to Semprún’s 
use of translated intertexts. For intertexts can be deployed to construct 
the narrative we wish to see, particularly when translated into our own 
language. Indeed, the narrator of Quel beau dimanche! creates his own 
justifications through such translations. As he attempts to justify the 
flaws within Communism following his discovery of Rajk’s innocence, he 
weaves multiple quotations into his dialectical reasoning: 
J’aurais pu jeter à la figure de cet importun quelques vers de 
Maïakovski. Ou quelques vers d’Aragon. Ou encore […] je lui aurais 
lancé à la figure les phrases de Bertholt Brecht: «Celui qui lutte pour 
le communisme – doit savoir se battre et ne pas se battre – dire la 
vérité et ne pas la dire – rendre service et refuser ses services – tenir 
ses promesses et ne pas les tenir – s’exposer au danger et fuir le 
danger – se faire reconnaître et rester invisible – Celui qui lutte pour 
le communisme – ne possède, de toutes les vertus, qu’une seule – 
celle de lutter pour le communisme.»
I would have thrown in my critic’s face a few lines from Mayakovsky. 
Or a few lines from Aragon. Or […] I would have thrown in my critic’s 
face Bertholt Brecht’s words: ‘He who struggles for Communism/must 
know how to fight and how not to fight/to tell the truth and not tell it/
to serve and to refuse his services/to keep his promises and not to keep 
them/to expose himself to danger and to flee danger/to be recognized 
and to remain invisible/He who fights for Communism/possesses, of 
all the virtues, only one/that of fighting for Communism.’113
The stream of possible textual justifications to which the narrator appeals 
desperately and ironically in an attempt to salvage his faith in the Party 
reveals Semprún’s ultra-intimate means of highlighting the lure of 
justification. This excerpt is reminiscent of Mme Raphael’s intransitive 
urge to belong in Le Livre. Here, however, the narrator has found the 
direct object for that urge – Communism – and now seeks a textual form 
through which to complement it. Like the dialectic, then, such quotations 
JORGE SEMPRÚN’S QUEL BEAU DIMANCHE! 203
enable the continuation and consolidation of a threatened individual and 
ideological coherence. While, as I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, translated 
intertextual excerpts can enable ethical and hospitable forms of textual 
inclusivity, by challenging chronicity and authority such texts can also 
enable motivated narratives of the past to be repeatedly recreated.
This dialectical recreation is particularly pertinent to translations, 
which inevitably involve the distortion of historical order, pulling a 
text from its original context and transforming it into a new form to 
appease the demands – linguistic, formal and content-based – of the 
present moment. Indeed, as Peter Fawcett discusses in ‘Ideology and 
Translation’, Marxist-oriented translation theory perceived the essence 
of translation to be, precisely, dialectical: ‘As in all good dialectical 
practice’, he writes, ‘the thesis (source language) and the antithesis 
(target language) are resolved in the synthesis of translation’.114 
Implicit within Fawcett’s description of this Marxist conception of 
‘good’ dialectical practice is the question I have been pursuing of 
how we might define a ‘good’ translation, whether that translation be 
between languages or between memory and narrative. The relationship 
Fawcett describes between translation and synthesis reveals both 
the ethical possibilities and the limitations of translation. In every 
narrative – thought, remembered, spoken, written, lived – we attempt 
this translation-as-synthesis of the contradictory in order to construct 
a coherent path from past to present to future. As Timothy Mathews 
comments, ‘We read what we read, in our own imaginings, translating 
and synthesising in the present of our reading and living’.115 Can we 
ever avoid this synthesis of past in present, other voices into our own, 
which takes place in translation? 
Perhaps we cannot escape our desire to dialectically synthesize 
the past into narrative. But we can at least acknowledge this desire. 
Key to this acknowledgement is the proximity between translation and 
dialectical thinking, a proximity which gives translation a uniquely 
powerful vision of the illusions within dialectical thinking itself. In Quel 
beau dimanche!, this proximity is emphasized by Semprún’s focus upon 
the German language loan Aufhebung as the embodiment of both the 
possibilities and the flaws within dialectical thinking. 
Translating the dialectic: aufheben as relever
For the narrator, the irreality of the dialectic is embodied by the 
‘untranslatable’ Hegelian term Aufhebung. ‘C’est la maudite Aufhebung 
qui fout en l’air la dialectique hégélienne, qui la rend irréelle à force de 
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perfection’/‘It’s [the] damned Aufhebung that explodes the Hegelian 
dialectic, makes it unreal because of its striving after perfection’.116 Like 
Ricœur’s discussion of the impossibility of the perfect translation which 
I explored in Chapter 2, the narrator’s emphasis upon the perfection of 
Aufhebung highlights the illusions this desire for perfection involves. 
Throughout Quel beau dimanche!, the noun Aufhebung and the verb 
aufheben, which means both ‘to raise up’ and ‘to preserve’, become the 
root of Semprún’s broader critique of the dialectic, the grammar of an 
endless attempt to synthesize the contradictions of the past and the 
present into a perfect dialectical narrative. For Derrida, in his essay 
‘De l’économie restreinte à l’économie générale’, Hegel’s Aufhebung is 
precisely the mark of a discourse which seeks to understand negativity 
only insofar as it offers a progression towards a higher ideal: 
elle signifie l’affairement d’un discours s’essoufflant à se réapproprier 
toute négativité, à élaborer la mise en jeu en investissement, à 
amortir la dépense absolue, à donner un sens à la mort, à se rendre 
du même coup aveugle au sans-fond du non-sens dans lequel se 
puise et s’épuise le fond du sens.
it signifies the busying of a discourse losing its breath as it 
reappropriates all negativity for itself, as it works the “putting at 
stake” into an investment, as it amortizes absolute expenditure; 
and as it gives meaning to death, thereby simultaneously blinding 
itself to the baselessness of the nonmeaning from which the basis of 
meaning is drawn, and in which this basis of meaning is exhausted.117
In this evocative quotation Aufhebung is seen as the textual figure of a 
desire to absorb meaninglessness into sense, find a significance for death, 
and resolve all conflicts and complexities into a coherent discourse. 
Derrida’s reading of Aufhebung is particularly relevant in relation to 
the two sorts of forgetting which I discussed earlier: the memorial at 
Buchenwald, and the narrator’s unabated justification of his Communist 
faith. For Semprún’s discussion of these two failures of memory connects 
them to precisely this desire to progress beyond the incomprehensible 
elements of the past by sublimating them in the name of a greater cause: 
the triumphant configuration of the memorial statue which, in order 
to assert the triumph of Communist resistance, masks the victimhood 
of those who died at Buchenwald, and the narrator’s dialectical 
justifications which, to maintain the broader Truth of the Party, erase the 
reality of the Communist experience. In Quel beau dimanche!, Aufhebung 
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is the textual figure for a power constructed upon contradictions which, 
though never fully reconciled, are still nevertheless masked, a power 
built upon an attempted transcendence of death through the triumphant 
memorialization of the dead.  Semprún’s struggle with his past in Quel 
beau dimanche! is, then, a struggle against Aufhebung: a power created 
through a rhetorical forgetting of any element of reality or history which 
contradicts the premises upon which that power is constructed.
If lutter, c’est écrire, can this struggle against Aufhebung be achieved 
through writing? In L’Écriture et la différence, Derrida reveals the flaws 
within Hegel’s dialectical argumentation, precisely by focusing upon the 
impossibility of transcending the textuality of that argument, a textuality 
embodied by the untranslatability of Aufhebung. As Philippe Büttgen 
notes, writing in Barbara Cassin’s Dictionnaire des intraduisibles, 
Aufheben et Aufhebung sont révérés comme des fétiches de 
l’intraduisible. Le «double sens» (pour reprendre les termes de Hegel) 
d’un verbe, aufheben, qui signifie à la fois «maintenir, conserver» et 
«faire cesser, mettre fin» est non seulement connu des exégètes de Hegel 
et des spécialistes de philosophie allemande, mais appartient tout 
simplement à la culture philosophique d’aujourd’hui.
Aufheben and Aufhebung have been revered as fetishes of the 
untranslatable. The “double meaning” (to adopt Hegel’s term) of 
a verb, aufheben, that means both “maintain, preserve” and “halt, 
end” has not only been recognised by Hegel’s interpreters and 
specialists in German philosophy but has become simply part of 
today’s philosophical culture.118
This ‘fetishization’ of the untranslatability of aufheben, provoked by its 
double meaning, is apparent in the philosophical weight which Hegel 
gives to the word. For it is through, and not despite, the contradictions 
inherent within the meaning of the verb aufheben – the fact that, in 
German, the term means simultaneously to raise up and to negate – 
that Hegel develops his approach to the dialectic. In Science of Logic, 
Hegel suggests that it is the untranslatability of aufheben which makes 
it the perfect example of the overcoming through contradiction which 
he perceives as the essence of the dialectical process towards full 
consciousness. Derrida quotes Hegel’s text as follows:
Lexicologiquement, ces deux déterminations de l’Aufheben 
peuvent être considérées comme deux significations du mot. Il 
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est remarquable qu’une langue en soit venue à employer un seul 
et même mot pour deux significations contraires. La pensée 
spéculative se réjouit de trouver [nous soulignons] dans la langue 
des mots qui ont par eux-mêmes un sens spéculatif, et la langue 
allemande en possède plusieurs.
Lexicologically, these two determinations of the Aufheben may 
be considered as two meanings of the word. It is remarkable that 
a language comes to use one and the same word to express two 
opposed meanings. Speculative thought is delighted [my italics] 
to find in language words which by themselves have a speculative 
sense; the German language possesses several of these.119
By emphasizing Hegel’s delight in finding these two significations 
within one word, Derrida highlights the inherent, and fortuitous, 
untranslatability of aufheben. It is this good fortune which enables Hegel 
to represent the process of profit through negation that he perceives 
as fundamental to the dialectic itself. Hegel thus profits from the 
contradictions within aufheben himself, using the ambivalence of this 
term to produce an affirmative philosophical concept. 
For Derrida, however, translation reveals that the profit Hegel reads 
in Aufhebung is fundamentally unobtainable. Hegel’s formulation of the 
dialectic, he suggests, is itself constructed upon a contradiction which 
cannot be synthesized: the need to perceive Aufhebung as simultaneously 
translatable and untranslatable, as both able to exceed the written form 
of its expression and only comprehensible through that form. Derrida’s 
comment returns us to the relationship between translatability and 
untranslatability that I explored in Chapter 2. For Derrida, as for Ricœur, 
there is a proximity between translatability and untranslatability, and it is 
by acknowledging this proximity that Derrida confronts the flaws within 
Hegel’s formulation. For, in order to embody the philosophical process 
of overcoming through contradiction which Hegel suggests underpins 
certain universal categories of existence – being, identity, cause, effect 
– Aufhebung must be untranslatable. But unless this process applies 
only to a specifically German experience of existence, Aufhebung must 
also be translatable, capable of representing and transcending its own 
contradictions not only in German but in every language. Only through 
this translatability can Aufhebung mark the universality of Hegel’s 
dialectical thinking. Hegel’s exploration of Aufhebung thus hinges upon 
an inherent paradox: on the one hand, Hegel acknowledges, welcomes, 
indeed requires, the lack of semantic stability within this term; on the 
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other, he represses this lack, reproducing his thinking from within a 
discourse which depends upon precisely the semantic stability which 
Aufhebung as a word has already dissolved.
Translation forces an acknowledgement that it is impossible 
to overcome the contradictions of Aufhebung or the traces they 
leave. In Marges de la philosophie, Derrida returns to Aufhebung and 
disrupts Hegel’s claim that ‘la langue allemande détient le privilège 
intraduisible’/‘the […] untranslatable privilege is wielded by the 
German language’ by translating the verb form of this noun, aufheben, 
into French.120 The word Derrida finds to translate aufheben is ‘relever’, 
a verb which, like the German, contains multiple meanings: ‘Aufheben, 
c’est relever, au sens où “relever” veut dire à la fois déplacer, élever, 
remplacer et promouvoir dans un seul et même mouvement’/‘Aufheben 
is relever, in the sense in which relever can combine to relieve, to displace, 
to elevate, to replace and to promote, in one and the same movement’.121 
While Hegel’s exploration of aufheben requires it to be simultaneously 
untranslatable between languages and translatable beyond the language 
of its articulation, Derrida’s translation of aufheben as relever reverses 
this paradox: aufheben, he suggests, can never be translated beyond 
language but only between languages, via the use of words such as relever 
which themselves contain the traces of other meanings which can never 
be synthesized or overcome. 
Through translation Derrida thus multiplies aufheben, forcing it to 
write itself as other: ‘On plie l’Aufhebung – la relève – à s’écrire autrement. 
Peut-être, tout simplement, à s’écrire. Mieux, à tenir compte de sa 
consommation d’écriture’/‘The Aufhebung – la relève – is constrained into 
writing itself otherwise. Or perhaps simply into writing itself. Or better, 
into taking account of its consumption in writing’.122 Translating aufheben 
as relever encapsulates this folding and consumption within writing, for 
relever is both the double of aufheben and the textual mark of its différance: 
an understanding that every articulation involves a combination of spatial, 
temporal and semantic difference and deferral. Just as Derrida’s term 
requires writing to reveal its variance from the word ‘différence’, so too the 
différance within aufheben can only be articulated through a writing which 
reveals the simultaneous translatability and untranslatability of the term. 
For while relever reveals that aufheben can be translated, the subtle but 
endless differences of signification between the French and the German 
words reveal the inevitable imperfection of that translation, the gaps and 
elisions between languages which prevent the possibility of any absolute 
identity of meaning. By first unmasking and then reversing the paradox 
of translatability/untranslatability which Hegel both demands of and 
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assigns to Aufhebung, Derrida throws into relief the semantic instability of 
Aufhebung which Hegel’s discourse conceals. 
In Derrida’s reading it is translation which forces Aufhebung ‘à 
s’écrire autrement’, because, in its essence, translation is writing-as-
other: an endless doubling and folding which consumes and regurgitates 
texts and words without seeking to exceed the textuality of its own 
process. In acknowledging its own textuality, translation forces the 
dialogues and narratives it confronts – whether literary or political – 
to acknowledge their own textuality, the fictional constructions, the 
masked interpretations, which are integral to all narratives, whatever 
their purpose or form. The ‘relevance’ of bringing translation into an 
exploration of these forms of thinking is not to suggest that we can evade 
these constructions, but to shift the emphasis so that we can become 
aware that all our translations between past and present, between 
theory and action, between experience and memory, are subject to an 
interpretative impulse which is then masked. 
Translating translation: relever as the essence of translation
How can we avoid the fantasy which enables us to forget that we forget? 
Or is it only in fantasy that we can create and sustain the illusion that we 
have not forgotten? In ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une traduction “relevante”?’, Derrida 
extends the dynamic between translation and Aufhebung further by 
employing the same verb – relever – to translate the essence of translation 
itself. ‘Ce mot “relevant”, ce participe présent en situation d’attribut, il se 
voit ici confier une tâche exorbitante. Non pas la tâche du traducteur, 
mais la tâche de définir, rien de moins, l’essence de la traduction.’/‘This 
word “relevant,” this present participle that functions as a predicate, is 
here entrusted with an exorbitant task. Not the task of the translator, 
but the task of defining – nothing less – the essence of translation.’123 In 
translating both aufheben and the action of translation as relever, Derrida 
positions translation not only as the process through which Aufhebung is 
forced to confront its own limitations, but also as a mode of thought and 
engagement with others which limits the dialectical forgetting of the past 
enacted by Aufhebung itself. He writes:
Ce que démontrerait cette traduction par le mot ‘‘relevante’’, ce 
serait aussi, exemplairement, que toute traduction devrait être 
par vocation relevante. Elle assurerait ainsi la survie du corps de 
l’original (survie au double sens que lui donne Benjamin dans 
La Tâche du traducteur, fortleben et überleben: vie prolongée, vie 
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continuée, living on, mais aussi vie par-delà la mort). N’est-ce pas 
ce que fait une traduction? Est-ce qu’elle n’assure pas ces deux 
survies en perdant la chair au cours d’une opération de change? 
En élevant le signifiant vers son sens ou sa valeur, mais tout en 
gardant la mémoire endeuillée et endettée du corps singulier, du 
corps premier, du corps unique qu’elle élève et sauve et relève ainsi.
What the translation with the word “relevant” also demonstrates, in 
an exemplary fashion, is that every translation should be relevant 
by vocation. It would thus guarantee the survival of the body of the 
original (survival in the double sense Benjamin gives it in “The Task of 
the Translator,” fortleben and überleben: prolonged life, continuous 
life, living on, but also life after death). Isn’t this what a translation 
does? Doesn’t it guarantee these two survivals by losing the flesh 
during a process of conversion [change]? By elevating the signifier to 
its meaning or value, all the while preserving the mournful and debt-
laden memory of the singular body, the first body, the unique body 
that the translation thus elevates, preserves, and negates [relève]?124
Translation, when ‘relevante’, is a form of writing imbued with an 
unsynthesizable movement between death and life, part of an endless and 
ultimately impossible recognition of the debt to the past, to the voices of 
others, which are silenced by the progression towards perfection embodied 
in the aspirations of Aufhebung. Rather than seeking to mimic dialectical 
forms of synthesis and erasure, a ‘relevante’ translation of memory into 
narrative, past into present, acknowledges this impulse towards synthesis 
and, through this acknowledgement, stages a potential resistance to it, 
creating a space where those memories are elevated, transformed and 
thrown into relief through their translation into different aesthetic forms. 
In the final section of this chapter, I explore Semprún’s writing as 
a ‘relevante’ translation, one which, by translating his experiences into a 
textual form, seeks to throw light on the losses of his past without ever 
accounting for them or totalizing them. In this textual commemoration, 
the dialectical forgettings with which the text is concerned are confronted, 
and Aufhebung is redeemed from the erasures enacted by the impulse 
– political, literary, human – towards synthesis and transcendence, to 
become instead the textual representation of this translational movement 
between, but never beyond, life and death. In this resolutely textual 
redemption, Aufhebung is itself ‘relevantly’ translated, and the human 
impulse towards synthesis is  revealed, emphasized, even transformed, 
but never overcome.
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A ‘relevante’ translation
Translating Jedem das Seine: Goethe and Blum
What would a ‘relevante’ translation look like? In ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une 
traduction “relevante”?’, Derrida contrasts ‘relevance’ with a traditional 
European conception of a ‘good’ translation: ‘il faut que, hors de toute 
paraphrase, explication, explicitation, analyse, etc., la traduction soit 
quantitativement équivalente à l’original’/‘the translation must be 
quantitatively equivalent to the original, apart from any paraphrase, 
explication, explicitation, analysis, and the like’.125 Translation is 
here positioned as a form of absolute equality which presupposes a 
universality within language through which signifieds can be transferred 
intact between different languages. While Ricœur’s use of the term 
‘equivalence’ in translation emphasizes a relation but not an identity of 
value, Derrida’s use of the term suggests that the traditional conception 
of a good translation depends upon the possibility of achieving absolute 
parity between the source and target text. While such a translation may 
be skilfully good, however, it cannot be conceived as ethically good, for it 
fails to account for the differences between languages themselves, thereby 
determining an ethics of exchange which seeks to raze and synthesize 
difference in order to create an illusory notion of universality. 
Derrida suggests that this ‘good’ conception of translation is 
disrupted by forms which emphasize, through the use of glossing, the 
semantic remainder which persists even within an attempted linguistic 
synthesis. Glossing threatens the univocity of the word by insisting upon 
what is hidden within language and challenging the ‘loi économique 
du mot, qui définit l’essence de la traduction au sens strict’/‘economic 
law of the word, which defines the essence of translation in the strict 
sense’.126 Translations which include glosses mark and comment upon 
every inevitable failure to attain absolute equivalence with an original. In 
this sense, they become ‘relevante’ insofar as they are concerned with the 
proliferation of semantic meaning revealed by translation, rather than its 
limitation.  
Semprún’s own use of glossing can be read as part of an attempt 
to disrupt any supposed universality on a linguistic level by repeatedly 
exceeding the norms of translatability and expanding and elaborating 
upon the (un)translatability of the expressions on which his attention 
is fixed. In Quel beau dimanche! Semprún focuses upon one particular 
example of a manipulated language loan, the German phrase and camp 
motto Jedem das Seine, ‘to each his (or her) own’. Fixed, to this day, in iron 
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upon the main gate of the camp, Jedem das Seine is a slogan with a long 
history. A translation of the Latin suum cuique, made famous in Cicero’s 
philosophical dialogue as an exemplum of the fairness of the justice 
system, it remains the official Latin motto of the German military police, 
and appeared – in its German translation – in works by Martin Luther 
and Johann Sebastian Bach, before being appropriated by the Nazis at 
Buchenwald as a textual justification for the creation of the camp. As 
Semprún noted in a speech which he gave in 2010, sixty-five years after 
the liberation of Buchenwald, this appropriation reflects a deeply cynical 
and arrogant conception of equality: ‘Une sentence référant à l’égalité 
entre les êtres humains à l’entrée d’un camp de concentration, au seuil 
d’un endroit mortifère, un lieu consacré à l’injustice la plus arbitraire et 
la plus brutale, où il n’existait pour les déportés que l’égalité face à la 
mort!’/‘A sentence referring to equality amongst human beings at the 
entrance to a concentration camp, on the threshold of a space of death, 
a place consecrated to the most arbitrary and brutal injustice, where for 
the detainees there only existed equality before death!’127
It is the cynicism inherent in the choice of Jedem das Seine, a phrase 
which purports to speak of the equality of all men, as the motto for a camp 
built upon a tremendous and destructive inequality, which motivates 
Semprún’s exploration of this phrase. In Tradition, Translation, Trauma, 
Susan Bassnett suggests that the injustice and violence represented 
by Jedem das Seine is a form of translation of ‘what is inscribed in the 
gates of Dante’s Hell, composed in Italian eight hundred years ago, 
although serving a completely different purpose and emanating from a 
totally different ethics’.128 But through his interlingual and intralingual 
translations of Jedem das Seine, Semprún queries how different this 
purpose and ethics can be, for as he reveals, Jedem das Seine is always 
repeated, always repeatable, and always marks the edge between the 
living and the dead, the deserving and the punished, the evil and the 
fraternal, ‘au seuil d’un endroit mortifère’.129
‘Qu’aurait dit Goethe’, the narrator asks, ‘s’il avait remarqué 
l’inscription forgée dans le fer de la grille monumentale du camp Jedem 
das Seine?’/‘what [would] Goethe […] have to say about this inscription 
over the Buchenwald gate, TO EACH HIS DUE?’130 Semprún’s question 
invokes not only the echoes of Goethe which permeate the space of the 
Buchenwald camp, but also the philosophical proximity which Semprún 
discovers between Goethe’s thinking on liberty and the cynicism of 
the camp motto. Interleaving extracts from Goethe’s actual texts with 
imagined conversations between Goethe and Eckermann, Semprún 
suggests that Goethe, had he truly been immortal, would have perceived 
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the inscription over the gates of Buchenwald as the embodiment of an 
ideal form of freedom:
je trouve très significatif et très encourageant qu’une inscription 
semblable orne la porte d’entrée d’un lieu de privation de liberté, 
de rééducation par la contrainte de travail. Car enfin, qu’est-ce 
que cela signifie, «à chacun son dû»? N’est-ce pas là une excellente 
définition d’une société organisée pour défendre la liberté de tous, 
celle de l’ensemble de la société, au détriment s’il le faut d’une 
liberté individuelle exagérée et néfaste? […] À chacun son dû, en 
effet, à chacun la place qui lui est due, par la naissance, le talent, 
dans la hiérarchie des libertés et des contraintes individuelles qui 
font la liberté de tous.
I find it most significant and encouraging that such an inscription 
should decorate the gates of a place where freedom has been 
withdrawn, a place of re-education through forced labor. For, after 
all, what does it mean, ‘to each his due’? Is it not an excellent motto 
for a society organized to defend the freedom of all, to the detriment, 
if necessary, of an excessive, harmful individual freedom? […] 
To each his due, indeed, to each the place that is due to him, 
through birth or talent, in the hierarchy of individual freedom and 
constraints that make up the liberty of us all.131
It might seem paradoxical that Semprún’s imagined Goethe is inspired to 
this vision of collective liberty by the words marked upon the iron gates 
of Buchenwald, gates which deny the liberty of those within. And yet 
it is precisely this paradox which explains the particular cynicism that 
Semprún reads in Jedem das Seine, for in Goethe’s imagined reaction the 
motto comes to define a hierarchical form of collective liberty built at the 
expense of the freedom of the individual. Through this reading Jedem 
das Seine becomes, ironically, the most appropriate epigram for the 
Buchenwald camp. For Buchenwald is the culmination of a conception of 
freedom which depends upon repressing the individual, upon rejecting 
the ‘untranslatable’ which I explored in Chapter 2: it is a site which 
embodies the Nazi insistence upon the existence of a superior race, and 
the legitimization this provided them to humiliate, torture and murder 
those they conceived as inferior. 
The imagined Goethe’s understanding of Jedem das Seine brings 
us to the collision of radical evil and fraternity with which Semprún is 
concerned in L’Écriture ou la vie. Here the fraternal, prioritized above 
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the individual, becomes a means of repression; the search for equality is 
converted into the experience of radical evil embodied in Buchenwald. 
In ‘Mal et modernité’, Semprún comments upon this contamination, 
implicating Goethe in a form of humanism which, in its abstraction, fails 
to acknowledge the structures of human existence: 
Il semble bien que Goethe […] [n’ait] pas vraiment saisi le sens 
reél et profound des thèses kantiennes. […] le mal est radical parce 
qu’[…] il s’enracine dans l’être même de l’homme, dans l’être-
homme, indépendamment de toute détermination historique ou 
sociale; […] comme source et suite de la liberté constituante de 
l’être-homme.
It seems that Goethe […] did not really grasp the real and profound 
meaning of Kant’s theories […] Evil is radical because […] it is 
rooted in the very being of man, in being human, independent of 
any historical or social determinism; […] as both the source and 
the consequence of the essential freedom of all human beings.132
The imagined Goethe’s abstract musings on the nature of human liberty 
and equality miss the radical reality of evil which, for Semprún, exists 
precisely in, and not in opposition to, these expressions of liberty and 
equality.
This omission is particularly pertinent because of the symbolic 
power of Goethe within cultural memory. The memory of Goethe, 
Semprún suggests, has been deployed to enable a subsequent forgetting 
of the reality of the camp experience. It is this potent cultural heritage to 
which the narrator himself appeals later in the text, defending himself to 
the SS officer against the potential repercussions of his decision to leave 
the designated route of the camp, by claiming that he wanted to look 
at ‘Goethe’s tree’, the tree beneath which Goethe and Eckermann are 
believed to have conversed: ‘Il a l’air très intéressé. – Goethe! S’exclame-
t-il. Vous connaissez l’œuvre de Goethe? J’incline la tête modestement. Il 
m’a dit «vous», peut-être sans s’en rendre compte. Le fait que je connaisse 
l’œuvre de Goethe l’a fait changer de ton, instantanément. C’est beau, la 
culture, quand même.’/‘He looks very interested. “Goethe!” he exclaims. 
“So you know the works of Goethe?” A distinct change of tone. Kultur has 
its uses. I nod modestly’.133
In the black comedy of this collision of the literary and the political, 
Goethe’s name becomes symbolic of a form of cultural capital which can 
engender respect even for those within the camp. The nub of Semprún’s 
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critique here is directed at the implicit valorization and romanticization 
of the space of Buchenwald through its connection to Goethe. The 
narrator’s comment following his interrogation by the SS officer reveals 
the dangers of such cultural valorizations; the exclamation ‘C’est beau, la 
culture’ is as ironic as the exclamation ‘Quel beau dimanche!’ after which 
the text itself is named. The exploitation of Weimar’s literary past to mask 
its political reality is embodied by the relationship between Goethe and 
the Buchenwald camp, by this interplay of the literary and the political 
which transgresses temporal and conceptual boundaries; it is this mask 
which Semprún seeks to confront and expose through his own interplay 
of the literary and the political, enabled by intertextuality and by his 
translation of Jedem das Seine into the voice of Goethe. 
Semprún explores a supposedly ethical alternative to Goethe’s 
prioritization of collective liberty through another glossed translation 
of Jedem das Seine, provided this time in the voice of Léon Blum. While 
in L’Écriture ou la vie, these two literary figures are brought together 
through their occupation of the same space at different times, in Quel 
beau dimanche! this temporal disjunction is annulled with comic results: 
the imaginary Goethe, fascinated by Blum’s audacity in ventriloquizing 
his voice in Nouvelles conversations de Goethe avec Eckermann, attempts to 
uncover the location of Blum’s incarceration near Buchenwald, much to 
the chagrin of Semprún’s imagined Eckermann, who is put out by Blum’s 
appropriation of his role as Goethe’s interrogator. Semprún quotes 
liberally from Blum’s ‘Notes d’Allemagne’, which Blum began writing a 
few days after his incarceration by the Nazis in a house near Buchenwald. 
In these notes, Blum offers a ‘revolutionary’ conception of equality, which 
he has translated from Plato: ‘l’égalité équité, qui accepte le “matériau” 
humain tel qu’il est, qui reconnaît comme un fait premier la diversité, la 
variété, et par conséquent l’inégalité intrinsèque des données humaines et 
qui se traduit, non par l’uniformité numérique, mais par la juste proportion 
maintenue entre les données humains inégales.’/‘equality-equity, which 
accepts the human “raw material” as it is, which recognizes as a premise 
the diversity, variety, and consequently intrinsic inequality of the human 
givens, and which is expressed, not in numerical uniformity, but in the 
maintenance of a just proportion between the unequal human givens.’134 
In this ‘égalité équité’, absolute identification is renounced in favour of 
an equality formed through variety and diversity, one which recognizes 
rather than represses differences, whether linguistic, social, ontological 
or ideological. Blum suggests that this vision of equality has a radical 
power: ‘Ce concept de l’égalité est pleinement révolutionnaire’/‘This concept 
of equality is fully revolutionary’, he writes in ‘Notes d’Allemagne’.135
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The importance of acknowledging difference, here evoked by 
Blum, is at the heart of the ethical conception of translation which I read 
through Deleuze and Ricœur in Chapters 1 and 2. In his discussion of a 
‘relevante’ as opposed to ‘good’ translation, Derrida similarly emphasizes 
the value of recognizing diversity and variety: glossed translations, such 
as those employed by Semprún, challenge the idea(l) of absolute identity 
of meaning between two different languages and recognize rather than 
repress the inevitable differences which are revealed by translation. For 
all three theorists, then, an ethics of translation emerges in the ways 
that translation allows us to acknowledge diversity, the same type of 
acknowledgement which Blum offers as his revolutionary conception 
of equality. But Semprún’s exploration of Blum’s thinking ultimately 
destabilizes this ethical and positive dynamic, for the intertextual insertion 
by Blum upon which Semprún focuses culmiates, ironically, in Blum 
writing the very phrase which, unbeknownst to him, is written on the 
gates of the camp next to his own lodge: ‘J’ai toujours considéré que l’égalité 
était le respect exact de la variété et, par conséquent, de l’inégalité naturelle. 
Les formules de l’égalité sont, non pas Tous à la toise ou Tous dans le même 
sac, mais Chacun à sa place et À chacun son dû.’/‘I have always considered 
that equality was the scrupulous respect of variety and, consequently, of 
natural inequality. The formulas of equality, consequently, are, not THE 
SAME STANDARD FOR ALL, but EACH HAS HIS PLACE and TO EACH HIS 
DUE.’136 Semprún’s exploration of Blum’s words returns us, through the 
French translation, to Jedem das Seine. And this return – the culmination 
of Blum’s theoretical desire to prioritize variety above uniformity – 
undermines the ethical potential of this dimension of Blum’s work. 
For as the inscription of Jedem das Seine is translated from the gates of 
Buchenwald onto the pages of Blum’s work and back again, from German 
to French, and back to German, the abstract gap between tous and 
chacun, between an equality built through identification and an equality 
built through difference is diminished: Jedem das Seine, the pinnacle of 
Blum’s ‘revolutionary’ exploration of that equality through difference, is 
simultaneously the motto of the Nazi repression of that difference. 
The parallel Semprún shows between Blum’s theoretical discussion 
of Jedem das Seine and the words which appear on the camp gates 
highlights one of Semprún’s most troubling thoughts: that the ethical 
conception of equality and liberty embodied by Jedem das Seine translates 
only too easily into a repressive and destructive reality. Jedem das Seine 
may be distorted in its translation from philosophy to action, from Latin 
to German, from the pages of a book to the gates of Buchenwald. But the 
possibility of this translation emphasizes  Semprún’s overriding argument 
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regarding the reality of the camp experience: that the experience of 
radical evil is not inhuman but is contained in the very possibilities and 
philosophies to which humans accord the greatest ethical value. Through 
the use of glossed translations, Semprún emphasizes the ways in which 
translation questions our ability to respect difference rather than 
affirming or confirming our ability to do so.  
Mistranslating Jedem das Seine: Chalamov and Semprún
The ease with which even the most ostensibly ethical phrases can be 
converted into repression is behind the third of Semprún’s explorations 
of Jedem das Seine: a misremembering of the term which the narrator 
suggests appears in the French translation of Varlam Chalamov’s Kolyma 
Tales, a series of short stories which Chalamov, who spent seventeen 
years in Soviet labour camps, wrote about the Kolyma gulag. Semprún 
quotes from one story in Récits de Kolyma, in which Chalamov refers to 
the motto above the gates of Buchenwald: 
Chalamov écrit: «On dit qu’au-dessus des camps de concentration 
allemands figurait une citation de Nietzsche: chacun pour soi». 
Et dans les récits sans doute colportés par des Russes qui auraient 
évoqué, dans un baraquement de Kolyma, leur expérience de 
Buchenwald, Jedem das Seine avait fini par devenir Jeder für Sich: 
«À chacun son dû» était devenu «Chacun pour soi».
Shalamov writes: ‘It is said that over the German concentration 
camps there appeared a quotation from Nietzsche: “Everyone for 
himself”. And in the accounts that must have been brought back 
by Russians talking, in some hut in Kolyma, of their experience in 
Buchenwald, Jedem das Seine ended up as Jeder für Sich: TO EACH 
HIS DUE had become EVERYONE FOR HIMSELF’.137
In showing this slippage from ‘à chacun son dû’ to ‘chacun pour soi’, 
Semprún highlights the damaging impact of a political transformation. 
For this phrase only reappears in Chalamov’s book about the Kolyma 
gulag because some of the Russians who were interned in Buchenwald 
for contravening the Nazi ideals were, ironically, later interned in the 
Soviet Gulags, repressed by the Communist ideology they had fought so 
long to establish. In their transfer to the Gulags they also transferred the 
words written upon the gate of Buchenwald, ‘et comme souvent, presque 
inévitablement, dans les récits transmis de bouche à oreille, le sens de 
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l’inscription initial s’était peu à peu transformé’/‘And, as happens so 
often, almost inevitably, in accounts transmitted by word of mouth, the 
meaning of the original inscription had gradually become transformed’.138 
But this is not a transformation of the beliefs of those imprisoned in both 
Buchenwald and Kolyma; rather it is a transformation of Communism 
itself, so that those who were once part of this programme have become 
excluded by it.
Through his exploration of Chalamov’s discussion of Jedem das Seine, 
Semprún highlights the ideological connections between Buchenwald 
and Kolyma: the misremembering of Jedem das Seine, created by its oral 
transmission from Buchenwald to Kolyma, occurs because of an inherent 
identity between these two camp experiences, which enables the same 
individuals to be incarcerated for transgressing two different political 
movements. This common essence between the camps transcends 
historical and geographical specificity, but it also transcends ideological 
specificity, for it reveals the human impulse expressed by Jedem das 
Seine: the impulse to assign to others what we believe to be their due 
and to find an ideological mirror which best reflects what we believe we 
should receive. 
The breadth of this human impulse is dramatized by the ideological 
duality of the camp experience at Buchenwald: translated across time 
and ideology, Jedem das Seine marks the gates of both the Nazi camp 
and the Soviet NKVD 2. And, as the motto for two ostensibly opposed 
ideologies, Jedem das Seine illuminates the role played by intertextuality 
in enabling the translation of ideal into ideology, impulse into slogan. 
Slogans such as Jedem das Seine are powerful, not because they reflect 
a unique ideological moment, but because they reveal the general 
human impulse to give symbolic meaning to the contingent and the 
everyday. The slogan represents this impulse translated into soundbite, 
painted upon walls, branded upon placards, wrought in iron upon gates, 
engraved upon memorials; it is ‘mythic’ in the sense Barthes gives this 
word in Mythologies, seeking to naturalize the implicitly historical into an 
eternal image through which universal values can be asserted.139
Even as Semprún engages with literature’s potential to map the 
contours of an ethics of communication and representation based on 
difference, though, he again acknowledges the role literature plays 
in distorting that ethics, in reifying those questions into motivated 
answers. Indeed, Semprún’s narration of Chalamov’s discussion of 
Jedem das Seine reveals this process of mistranslation – and consequent 
appropriation – to be at play even within his own use of quotation. For 
the 2003 French translation of Récits de Kolyma does not, in fact, contain 
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the misremembering to which the narrator of Quel beau dimanche! refers, 
but accurately cites the phrase as ‘À chacun son dû’.140 According to this 
translation then, Chalamov’s text quotes and translates Jedem das Seine 
correctly; it is Semprún’s own text, Quel beau dimanche!, which contains 
and creates the misremembering to which he alludes. 
This 2003 translation is based in part upon Katherine Fournier’s 
1980 translation of the text, the text which Soledad Fox suggests 
Semprún read.141 Yet both this text and Quel beau dimanche! were 
published in the same year, and in the text itself the narrator states that 
he read Récits de Kolyma in 1969. For this reason, Ursula Tidd suggests 
that Semprún probably read a collection of Chalamov’s tales published 
by Maurice Nadeau in 1969.142 However, this edition of the text only 
contains a selection of Chalamov’s stories, and does not include the story 
‘Rations de campagne’ upon which Semprún draws for his exploration of 
Jedem das Seine. Given that Semprún does not reference the translation 
of Chalamov upon which he draws, it is impossible to know for certain 
the origins of his slippage: whether it originated from a mistranslated, 
and subsequently corrected, French translation which Semprún read; 
whether Semprún himself misread, misremembered or misquoted it; or 
whether, if it was a misquotation, this was accidental or deliberate. In 
fact, Semprún’s misquotation of Chalamov’s phrase is not the first time he 
has been implicated in such a misremembering: as Fox notes, Semprún 
also misquoted the phrase on the gates at Buchenwald in Le Grand 
Voyage, replacing it with Arbeit macht frei – ‘work sets you free’ – the 
slogan which actually appeared on the gates at Auschwitz. Fox suggests 
that this misquotation is deliberate, part of an attempt by Semprún to 
align his first text with existing literature concerned with narrating the 
concentration camp experience, within which Auschwitz frequently 
appears as the symbol of the Holocaust.143 This particular instance 
of miswriting is, then, implicated in precisely the types of forgetting 
which Semprún critiques in relation to the Buchenwald memorial: in 
attempting to create resonances between the experiences of Auschwitz 
and Buchenwald, Semprún ultimately overwrites some of the specific 
realities of Buchenwald itself. 
Taken individually and together, these two instances of 
misappropriation or forgetting reveal an obstacle to thinking of writing 
through translation as an inherently ethical act, an act capable of 
challenging discourses which appropriate, mask and overwrite other 
voices and other pasts. For translation inevitably contains its own 
non-ethical element: the element which appropriates without any 
real reference, which synthesizes and erases the trace of the text from 
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which it originated. While any intertextual quotation, removed from its 
original context, can betray just as much as call to mind the text from 
which it originated, translated quotations enact this betrayal on multiple 
levels, for in translation it is not only the context which is altered but 
the language of the original quotation which is distilled and, inevitably, 
distorted in the voice of another. Can writing-as-translation, a form 
of writing which incorporates an aesthetics of translation, transcend 
the ethical dilemmas of its own form, and resist the appropriations it 
enables? Or is all translation a betrayal, not only of an original text, but 
of the voices of the past to which it bears witness? 
A ‘relevante’ translation of Jedem das Seine
Taken together, these complexities return us to the question I have been 
pursuing through Semprún and Derrida, and in this book more generally: 
what is a good translation? This question asks us to consider not only 
what qualities within a translation we would consider to be ‘good’, but 
also what criteria we would use to define ‘good’ itself. Effective, high-
quality and proficient? Or virtuous, noble and respectable? Is a good 
translation a question of skill or of ethics? In Semprún’s translation of his 
memories into a textual form, would a good translation seek to achieve 
the impossible task of replicating the past exactly as it was? Or, given that 
the past is always shifting and altering in its own translation into memory, 
is there a virtue in distortion, in misappropriation and mistranslation?
For Derrida, ‘la traduction la plus relevante (celle qui se présente 
comme le transport du signifié intact dans un signifiant véhiculaire 
indifférent) est la moins relevante qui soit’/‘the most relevant translation 
(that which presents itself as the transfer of an intact signified through the 
inconsequential vehicle of any signifier whatsoever) is the least relevant 
possible’.144 ‘Relevante’, Derrida suggests, operates at the intersection 
of the English word ‘relevant’ – appropriate, pertinent, significant – and 
the French verb relever – to raise up, to emphasize, to throw into relief, 
to displace or change (‘la relève de la garde’/‘the relief [relève] of the 
guard’).145 The essence of ‘une traduction “relevante”’ is revealed by 
the difference of meaning between the English and French words. For 
Derrida, the most ‘relevante’ translation does not involve the perfect (and 
impossible) transmission of the meaning of a signifier – the signified – 
from one language into another. Rather, a ‘relevante’ translation involves 
a confrontation between the two languages in question, a confrontation 
which enacts a ‘relève’ – a substitution, an elevation, perhaps even a 
transformation – upon that signified which reveals its meaning only 
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in the ways that that meaning is always being displaced and deferred 
elsewhere.
This displacement is at play within the slippage from Jedem das 
Seine to Chacun pour soi in Semprún’s discussion of Chalamov’s text. 
The narrator of Quel beau dimanche! comments that Chacun pour soi 
‘n’a strictement aucun rapport, nul besoin d’en faire la démonstration’/‘of 
course, is not at all the same thing’.146 And yet there is a relation between 
these two phrases. For, in the political context Semprún is exploring, 
the context which enables both Buchenwald and Kolyma to exist, ‘each 
to their own’ inevitably morphs into ‘everyone for themselves’. This 
phrase expresses the desire for the collective with which one identifies 
– whether that be an ideological or national group – to be the best it 
can – even, perhaps especially, at the cost of the repression or erasure 
of those excluded from this collective. But not only this: as Semprún’s 
narratives of life within Buchenwald attest, Chacun pour soi is not only 
the essence of the Nazi and Communist ideologies which run the camps, 
but also a condition of survival within the camps themselves, for behind 
every survival lies the possible triumph of one individual at the expense 
of another, or, conversely, the sacrifice of one person’s life for another. 
Here, in this mistranslation, the clash of the fraternal and of radical 
evil is manifested on a linguistic level: Jedem das Seine and Chacun pour 
soi are two sides of the same coin, of the experience of what it means 
to be human, distilled and catalysed within the camp experience. The 
substitution of names on a list of those to be sent to the forced labour 
camp Mittelbau-Dora; the decision to steal another inmate’s food, or 
to share one’s own; even, as Le Mort qu’il faut describes, the possibility 
of achieving one’s own survival through the death of another – these 
narratives explore, through the intensity of the camp experience, the 
ethical dilemmas and possibilities which constitute our human desire 
for survival. While Chacun pour soi is not a ‘good’ translation of Jedem 
das Seine – it fails to transfer, intact, one signified into another signifier 
– it is, nonetheless, a ‘relevante’ translation, expressing, through its own 
linguistic slippage, the human impulse towards fraternity and evil which 
erupts at both Buchenwald and Kolyma. 
In Semprún’s engagement with translation, a value is thus assigned 
to the ‘relevante’ failure to translate perfectly, a failure which stages the 
slippages and distortions involved in the translation of memory into 
narrative. In this regard, the three translations of Jedem das Seine which 
Semprún explores through the voices of Blum, Goethe and Chalamov, are 
themselves ‘relevante’: in their relation to each other, they dramatize the 
distortions and mistranslations at play in any interaction of the aesthetic 
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and the political, whether that interaction occurs in a memorial, a slogan, 
or a narrative. Paradoxically, then, the ethics of writing-as-translation is 
implicit within those aspects of its practice which appear to reveal the lack 
of ethics in any writing: by appropriating, synthesizing and mistranslating 
other voices, other texts, other narratives and other memories, writing-
as-translation illuminates the losses and appropriations involved in all 
memory, all narrative, all experience. 
But this translation of voices from beyond the camp – spatially, 
temporally and conceptually – also highlights crucial elements within the 
nature of the camp experience that are explored by Semprún in Quel beau 
dimanche!, and L’Écriture ou la vie. Semprún’s intertextual exploration 
of the shift from Jedem das Seine to Chacun pour soi is a journey from 
Goethe and Eckermann – who exist before the time, before the very 
conception of the camp, only inhabiting the same temporal plane as the 
camp within the narrator’s imagination – to Chalamov, whose words 
reveal the continuation of the impulses and ideas upon which the camp 
was founded. Clearly, this journey far exceeds the boundary of the 
Sunday at Buchenwald which Semprún describes; it is a journey from 
the inconceivable to the conceivable; from a moment before or beyond the 
conception of the camps to a moment when before and beyond themselves 
seem inconceivable. Semprún’s most troubling thoughts are concerned 
with the possibility that it is not only within memory that the camps 
continue to exist, but within human thought, impulse and society. For 
if, as Semprún’s intertextual exploration of Goethe and Blum suggests, 
thinking equality and liberty culminates in thinking Jedem das Seine, and 
Jedem das Seine culminates in Buchenwald and Kolyma, can there be any 
thinking without the possibility of thinking the camps, and any thinking 
the camps without the possibility of creating the camps? 
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer suggest 
that Enlightenment thinking, with its valorization of enlightened 
reason, brings us ineluctably to the type of totalitarianism revealed 
by the existence of the camps. To insist that we can, through reason, 
understand and master all aspects of existence leads, they suggest, to 
Nazism and the tragedy of the Holocaust, for it allows the dominance 
of singular versions of reality in which ‘[t]he mere existence of the 
other is a provocation’.147 Similarly, Giorgio Agamben suggests that 
the concentration camp is the culmination of precisely the modern, 
democratic validation of the rights of the individual which promised 
a liberation from such forms of tyranny. Ultimately, Agamben posits, 
this liberation inscribes politics into the individual life, ironically 
embedding the individual more firmly into a state apparatus which 
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regulates every aspect of our lives. In this regulation, those who fail 
to conform are excluded, entering a ‘state of exception’ for which the 
camps become the inevitable receptacle.148
How can we respond to this seemingly ineluctable movement 
from the ostensibly enlightened, democratic and liberal to the existence 
of the camps? Adorno and Horkheimer speak of ‘the necessity for 
enlightenment to reflect upon itself if humanity is not to be betrayed’.149 
One possible form for this reflection is to redeem the mimetic action, 
which they suggest has been over-regulated and denigrated by 
enlightenment rationality. For Agamben, too, art can offer an avenue to 
explore the inevitability of the camp experience. But this testimony must 
acknowledge its limitations: bearing witness, he suggests, can only occur 
in relation to the remnants of an experience always caught between loss 
and redemption.150 Semprún’s response in Quel beau dimanche! speaks 
to both of these ethical attempts to respond to the challenge of narrating 
the realities of Buchenwald. His writing is always concerned with the 
possibility of copying reality through art, with bearing witness to his past 
in narrative form. But, as his three different intertextual translations of 
Jedem das Seine reveal, that testimony is always fragmented, disrupted 
and situated in between voices, perspectives and temporal moments in 
a way which refuses to combine these remnants into a single narrative. 
As Tidd suggests, in writing, translating, quoting and imagining Goethe 
and Blum, Semprún ‘forces both the ideological vision of German 
Enlightenment humanism incarnated by Goethe and the failures of 
proletarian internationalism and social democracy, represented by 
Blum, to face the reality of Buchenwald’s existence’.151 And this reality, 
always complex, always permeated with misrememberings, with the 
history of NKVD 2 as well as Buchenwald, with both Nazi and Communist 
repression, can only be narrated in intertextual and translated fragments 
which contradict and challenge one another in the very ways in which 
they connect. 
As Susan Bassnett notes, ‘[t]ranslation […] always involves a 
relationship that spans time and space. […] That relationship reminds 
us that all texts are in a way connected, that the world we live in is a vast 
network of connecting threads, so many of which began to be spun aeons 
ago.’152 Paradoxically, then, Semprún’s focus upon the words which 
marked the gates of his own incarceration opens rather than closes the 
frame of his text: translating this phrase linguistically from German to 
French allows him simultaneously to translate it temporally, carrying 
us on an intertextual journey away from the gates of Buchenwald into 
an exploration of the other echoes and voices which constitute the 
223JORGE SEMPRÚN’S QUEL BEAU DIMANCHE!
memory, the legacy, and the very possibility of the camp. As Bassnett 
goes on to write, translation always involves crossing a ‘threshold from 
one world into another’.153 In repeating Jedem das Seine within the pages 
of Quel beau dimanche! Semprún draws the reader across this threshold, 
exploring the space between the living and dead, between the past and 
present, between man’s humanity and man’s inhumanity, which for him, 
constitutes the essential truth of Buchenwald. 
In Le Masque et le masqué, María Semilla Durán suggests that the 
multiplicity of memory, conceived through the figures of Blum and 
Goethe, operates as ‘une sorte d’absolutisation de l’écho, de la trace, 
comme si l’espace pourrait garder et contenir un précipité du temps, 
un semblant d’éternité’/‘a sort of absoluteness of the echo of the trace, 
as if the space could hold and contain a rushing of time, a semblance 
of eternity’.154 But the echoes Semprún offers here are never absolute; 
rather, they disrupt any attempted synthesis of the conflicted memories 
of his past and of the space of the Buchenwald camp. By fragmenting 
the temporal and ideological unity of the space which the Buchenwald 
memorial represents as one of spatial wholeness, writing-as-translation 
inscribes an ethical alterity into Semprún’s representation of Buchenwald 
and into his discussion of Jedem das Seine. In so doing, it throws into 
relief the contradictions, both theoretical and historical, in which it is 
implicated, forcing Buchenwald – like Aufhebung – to write itself as other, 
to write itself in memory of the echoes of the dead. 
Intertextuality: translating the voices of the dead 
In her monograph on Semprún’s work, Jorge Semprún: Writing the 
European Other, Ursula Tidd focuses upon the role of intertextuality within 
Semprún’s attempt to write the trauma of his experiences. Intertextuality, 
she suggests, enacts the ‘narrator’s repeated disappearance from the 
testimonial text […]. The narrator seeks other words and the words 
of others to communicate his exile and Buchenwald experience, as if 
the multiplication of linguistic and cultural resources might ultimately 
succeed in expressing his Holocaust experience’. This multiplication 
writes otherness into Semprún’s narration, enabling ‘the self to encounter 
and exist in relationship to its own alterity as well as the alterity of 
others’.155 In Tidd’s reading, Semprún reflects Levinas’s discussion of 
the necessity of hearing the voice of the Other in its irreducible alterity. 
In this account, Semprún’s deployment of intertextuality is a response 
which seeks to ‘keep’ faith with this irreducibility, to listen to the Other in 
the words, language and voice of that alterity.156
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This relationship to alterity is, however, always negotiated and 
shaped by the self: the intertextual excerpts which appear within Quel 
beau dimanche! are selected by Semprún, and they are discussed and 
framed by the narratorial voice in the text who shapes the reader’s 
understanding of them. In this sense, Semprún’s extensive quotation 
from Goethe, Blum and Chalamov hints, in each reading and rewriting, 
at a memory in translation between Semprún’s voice and the voices of 
others, and at a textual illumination of a past which is always sinking 
into oblivion, nostalgia or glorification, through every attempt to address 
and witness it. These quotations and translations are integral, not only 
to Semprún’s writing of memory in Quel beau dimanche!, but to the 
continuously altered formation of those memories themselves. The 
narrator suggests that his rejection of Communism as a viable ideological 
model was compelled by literature, specifically his reading of the French 
translation of Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich in 1963: 
‘En une nuit, ces quelques dizaines de pages avaient réussi à me faire voir 
ce que des années d’expérience, depuis 1956, des dizaines d’heures de 
discussion et de lectures n’étaient pas parvenus à éclaircir pour moi de 
manière définitive’/‘In one night, those few dozen pages had managed to 
make me see what years of experience, from 1956 onwards, had failed to 
elucidate for me definitively’.157 This definitive illumination, prompted by 
Solzhenitsyn’s narration of the brutality of the Soviet concentration camps, 
forces the narrator to acknowledge that the failures of Communism can 
no longer be redeemed through dialectical and intertextual justifications. 
His subsequent reading of Chalamov’s Récits de Kolyma consolidates 
this realization; the narrator finds his memory layered by the words of 
this text, his camp experiences multiplied and expressed through the 
mouth of another: ‘J’avais l’impression que […] je flottais comme un 
fantôme dans la mémoire de quelqu’un d’autre. Ou alors c’était Chalamov 
qui flottait dans ma mémoire à moi comme un fantôme. C’était la même 
mémoire, en tout cas, dédoublée’/‘I felt like a ghost floating in someone 
else’s memory. Or was it Shalamov floating in my memory like a ghost? 
It was the same memory in any case, [doubled and] divided in two’.158 
The camp the narrator remembers here is one he has visited only through 
literature. And yet it is this textual memory which infiltrates the narrator’s 
experience in a form that is, at times, more powerful and tenacious than 
the memory of his lived experience of Buchenwald.
This phantom memory offers both illumination and oblivion: ghosts 
can appear in many guises, but they can also fade or be obscured. In this 
intertextual excerpt, however, oblivion is briefly held at bay, as Semprún 
writes the dead into the dual memory of the two camps: 
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Les têtes coupées des paysans russes, raconte Chalamov, 
s’alignaient devant la baraque de la kommandantura, à Kolyma. 
Yeux ouverts sur la mort. Yeux fous, d’un bleu pale, d’un gris 
glacial: petits lacs où s’était reflétée l’ardeur subite et mortelle 
du printemps. Yeux fous de la folie russe. La même folie qu’à 
Buchenwald. La même folie de vivre des paysans russes dans les 
camps de Hitler et les camps de Staline. Il n’y a plus de mémoire 
innocente, plus pour moi.
The heads of the Russian peasants, Shalamov tells us, were lined 
up in front of the kommandantura at Kolyma. Eyes open on death. 
Mad eyes, pale-blue, icy-gray: tiny lakes in which was reflected 
the sudden, lethal ardor of spring. [The same madness as at 
Buchenwald. The mad desire for life within] the Russian peasants 
in Hitler’s camps and in Stalin’s. There is no such thing as innocent 
memory. Not for me any more.159
The memory of the dead is doubled and re-inscribed through a narrative 
itself formed through a doubling and a re-inscription of Chalamov’s text. 
In this doubling, those deaths are translated, temporally, geographically 
and linguistically, from their original context – Chalamov’s tales of Kolyma, 
written in Russian between 1954 and 1973 – into a new one – Semprún’s 
narrative of Buchenwald, written in French in 1980.  But unlike the 
decontextualized translation of quotation into dialectical justification, this 
out-of-context translation reveals the forms of its own concealment. For 
the innocence of memory which Semprún  seeks to disrupt in Quel beau 
dimanche! is born of a faith in context, a faith that even the most horrific 
events, such as those that took place at Buchenwald or Kolyma, can be 
contained, and understood, within their context; as Alan Bennett wrote in 
The History Boys, ‘to put something in context is a step towards saying it can 
be understood and that it can be explained. And if it can be explained then 
it can be explained away’.160  By revealing, through intertextuality, that 
these two different but parallel experiences of torture and death exceed the 
context of their happening, Semprún’s narrative refuses the explanations 
and understandings to which Bennett alerts his readers. In his English 
translation, Sheridan omits this reference to Buchenwald. But this omission 
ignores the critical connection between these two traumas: the experiences 
of death at Buchenwald and at Kolyma cannot be erased, synthesized or 
overcome, but only written, over and over, in different forms.
Throughout Quel beau dimanche! Semprún uses intertextuality 
to insist upon the impossibility of moving beyond the losses and the 
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memories of this traumatic past; the narrator, and the reader, are 
continually returned to that past, even in the midst of seemingly 
unrelated experiences. In one powerful section, Chalamov’s text 
intrudes quite literally into the flow of the narrator’s memories of 
Buchenwald and of his time in the PCE: ‘J’étais à Londres, je lisais les 
Récits de Kolyma, de Varlam Chalamov. C’était à la fin du printemps, en 
1969’; ‘Mais j’étais à Londres et je lisais les Récits de Kolyma, de Varlam 
Chalamov’; ‘J’étais à Londres, je lisais dans les Récits de Kolyma’; ‘Je 
lisais les Récits de Kolyma, à Londres, la gorge serrée’/‘I was in London, 
reading Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales. It was in the late spring on 
1969’; ‘But I was in London, reading Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales’; 
‘I was in London, reading in Kolyma Tales’; ‘I was reading Kolyma Tales 
in London, my heart in my mouth’.161 Here, in the constant return of the 
text’s title, the memories articulated in and created by Chalamov’s text 
become uncrushable, repeatedly rising to the surface of the narrator’s 
memories of other times and other experiences.  But this is imperfect 
memory, in both tense and form: the repetition of this past action, 
this reading of Chalamov’s text in a present narrative, shifts in each 
repetition, the first reading erased by the second, the second distorted 
by the third, and so on, endlessly. This, then, is a textual erasure of 
memory as much as a return, for memory re-read and re-written is also 
memory altered, tracing its own forgetting. 
This textual circling without progress which moves between the 
losses of the past and the losses of that past in the present has an ethical 
value, giving the fragments and ruins of the past their own momentum 
which is not dialectically subsumed beneath the thrust of the future. 
In this circling, Benjamin’s angel of history beats its wings against the 
force of the future; it cannot move backwards, into the past, but it can, 
perhaps, achieve an equilibrium, a moment of suspension in the present 
through which past and present can be illuminated, even while they 
remain vulnerable to further erasure and loss. It is in the present that 
history has meaning for Benjamin. As Mathews discusses in Tradition, 
Translation, Trauma, Benjamin draws history with a Janus-face: even as 
we look backwards into the past, we simultaneously look forward; these 
two viewpoints are synthesized in the present, which is the only temporal 
plane which can be seen as opposed to simply faced.162 Benjamin’s vision 
of history is dialectical, but his history is not a synthesis of past and 
present which enables a progression into a new, implicitly better, future; 
rather, it is a synthesis of a past and a future in a present which, like the 
narrative of Quel beau dimanche!, is troubled and disrupted by echoes 
and foreshadowings which can never be fully or clearly perceived. 
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Benjamin articulates powerfully the difference between a cause-
and-effect attitude to history, and one in which fragments of the past are 
allowed to leap out of sequence and illuminate moments of the present: 
Historicism contents itself with establishing a causal connection 
between various moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is 
for that very reason historical. It became historical posthumously, 
as it were, through events that may be separated from it by 
thousands of years. A historian who takes this as his point of 
departure stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of 
a rosary. Instead, he grasps the constellation which his own has 
formed with a definite earlier one.163
Benjamin’s concept of the constellation highlights the way in which 
the past and the present come together in an expansive yet connected 
array of fragmentary moments which interact tangentially rather than 
causally. For Benjamin, these historical constellations appear in writing 
through the process of translation and quotation: ‘To write history thus 
means to cite history. It belongs to the concept of citation, however, 
that the historical object in each case is torn from its context’.164 As I 
have discussed, the dangers of this tearing from context are implicit in 
translation and in quotation, manifested within the slogan and within the 
dialectic as a mode of thought. But if this process is to be acknowledged 
as much as masked, quotation must become a doubling, indeed a 
multiplying, of different voices and of different pasts, as in Semprún’s 
quotation from Chalamov. In this sense, quotation offers a ‘relevante’ 
translation – a transformation and a displacement – which reveals the 
constellations and connections between those voices and pasts.  
This ‘relevante’ translation of past into present, this constellation of 
different moments pulled from linearity to reveal their indefinite relation 
to each other, is at the heart of the chronological fragmentation within 
Quel beau dimanche! As the narrator comments, his life and writing 
are not a flow towards an end point but a continuous repetition and 
back-and-forth: ‘Ma vie est constamment défaite, perpétuellement en 
train de se défaire, de s’estomper, de partir en fumée. Elle est une suite 
hasardeuse d’immobilités, d’instantanés, une succession discontinue de 
moments fugaces, d’images qui scintillent passagèrement dans une nuit 
infinie.’/‘My life is constantly being undone, perpetually undoing itself, 
growing blurred, going up in smoke. It is a random succession of arrested 
moments, of snapshots, a discontinuous succession of fleeting instants, 
of images that flicker momentarily in an endless night.’165 The ethical 
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value Semprún perceives within this continual ebb and flow of life and 
death is revealed in the final pages of Quel beau dimanche!. The narrator 
returns to the moment with which Quel beau dimanche! began – a snowy 
Sunday, the perfect tree, the crude dialectic revealed by the tree and the 
snow. But this time this experience is distilled through the narrator’s 
own memory, and through his conversation with another – a Jehovah’s 
Witness also imprisoned in the camp, whom the narrator refers to simply 
as Jehovah.
Tout à l’heure […] Jehovah m’avait demandé si j’avais passé un bon 
dimanche. J’avais pensé à cet arbre. […] J’avais eu l’impression 
fugitive de découvrir une vérité essentielle: la vérité de cet arbre, 
de tous les arbres autour, toute la forêt, toutes les forêts, le monde 
qui n’avait nul besoin de mon regard. […] Pendant un bref instant 
d’éternité, j’avais contemplé cet arbre avec le regard d’au-delà de 
ma mort, avec les yeux de ma propre mort. Et l’arbre était toujours 
aussi beau. Ma mort ne mutilait pas la beauté de cet arbre. […] Oui, 
dis-je à Jehovah, un très bon dimanche.
Just now […] Jehovah asked me if I’d had a good Sunday. I 
thought of that beech tree. […] For a brief moment, I thought I had 
discovered some fundamental truth: the truth of that tree, of all the 
trees around, the whole forest, every forest, the word, which had no 
need of my gaze. […] For a brief moment of eternity, I looked at that 
tree with a gaze from beyond my death, with the eyes of my own 
death. And the tree was still as beautiful. My death did not diminish 
its beauty. […] ‘Yes’, I say to Jehovah, ‘a very good Sunday’.166 
Here, in the substitution of ‘bon’ for ‘beau’, the impossibility of an 
aesthetically beautiful translation of the reality of the camp experience 
into narrative is replaced by the possibility of a good translation, 
understood in the sense of Derrida’s ‘relevante’ translation: one which 
recognizes the inevitable and unsubsumable presence of death beneath 
the experience to be narrated.167 In her discussion of this extract, 
Ursula Tidd argues that the narrator realizes that ‘the Other in the form 
of life will always transcend the egoic perceiving subject’.168 Yet this 
transcendence is always temporary and imperfect: the narrator can only 
experience this redemption through memory and narrative: by reflecting 
upon and rewriting the ‘beau dimanche’ of the past as a ‘bon dimanche’ 
in the present. And, as Semprún suggests throughout his discussion 
of the dialectic, life and beauty cannot ultimately transcend death, or 
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the limitations of our own subjective perspective, but only remain in 
‘relevante’ dialogue with them. 
In these final pages of Quel beau dimanche!, the different forgettings 
which I have discussed in this chapter are brought together by their 
‘relevante’ translation into a narrative which elevates, transforms, but never 
entirely redeems them. Here the memory of the dead and the power of 
nature, erased by the memorial, are returned to the memory of Buchenwald. 
Here too, the formula with which the narrator revealed his own dialectical 
justifications earlier in the text is reversed: ‘L’arbre qui vous cachait la forêt, 
la vérité qui vous cachait la Vérité et qui en devenait mensongère’/‘The tree 
that kept you from seeing a forest, the truth that hid the Truth and thus 
became a lie’ is transformed into ‘cet arbre’ and ‘une vérité essentielle’, one 
of many different, individual, truths which the narrator realizes cannot be 
synthesized into a single vision, whether personal, historical or political.169 
And finally, the text returns us to the elementary dialectic of life and death, 
spring and winter, with which it began. Through this return, Semprún’s 
narrative enacts a ‘relevante’ translation of the dialectic itself, highlighting, 
displacing and transforming this form of thinking to reveal its power, beyond 
its political incarnations, to narrate the experience in which Semprún is 
immersed. At the start of Quel beau dimanche!, the narrator reflects that 
‘ce bourgeon fragile, encore impalpable, cette verte moiteur végétale dans 
le ventre enneigé du temps, ne serait pas seulement la négation mais aussi 
l’accomplissement de  l’hiver. Le vieux Hegel avait raison’/‘that delicate, 
still-impalpable bud, that green vegetal dampness in the snow-covered 
belly of time, would be not only the negation, but also the fulfillment of 
winter. Old Hegel was right’.170 In the final lines of Quel beau dimanche! this 
‘raison’ is elucidated: Hegel’s own Aufhebung is transformed into the written 
articulation of a constant and continuous movement between life and death, 
past and future, nature and man, which can never  be transcended.  
This dialectical circulation of life and death is the ‘vérité essentielle’ 
which is the heart of Quel beau dimanche!, and which remained unwritten 
in Le Grand Voyage. And this recognition of the inevitable, endless 
presence of death and loss characterized by Semprún’s return, over and 
over again, to the losses within his past, produces its own form of textual 
memorial to that past. Unlike the camp memorial which converts the 
memory of the dead into a triumph of resistance, the narrative Semprún 
creates in Quel beau dimanche! acknowledges the permeation of death, 
in multiple forms, throughout all the experiences told and retold. For 
Semilla, Semprún’s use of textual repetition lends to his experiences 
precisely this more fluid form of memorial, one in which each book adds 
to the construction of a textual monument to Semprún’s experience of 
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trauma, loss and pain. But, as Semilla insists, this is not a fixed or closed 
memorial, concerned with endorsing or profiting from the deaths it 
commemorates.171 Rather, this textual memorial is always in a process of 
movement and flux, for narrative, as Semprún’s texts repeatedly attest, 
is a never-finished transcription of the experience of a death continually 
being relived.172
This continual re-beginning, generated by an insurmountable debt 
to the voices of the past, is the essence of both translation and the narration 
of Quel beau dimanche!. It is the essence, indeed, of all Semprún’s texts. 
For Quel beau dimanche! is another unfinished text, another attempt to 
translate memory into narrative, which in its inevitable failure carries 
that memory beyond its own pages into other beginnings, other texts, 
into L’Écriture ou la vie and beyond it. In this sense, the commemorative 
space Semprún creates in Quel beau dimanche! is one of renewal and 
change, a living and breathing memorial which embodies its loss even as 
it seeks to salvage scraps from it, not so much a site of memory as a site 
of translation.
This site of translation is inevitably disjointed and unfinished, since 
translation does not render memory perfectly, but only in fragments. As 
Derrida comments, ‘peut-être une traduction est-elle vouée à la ruine, 
à cette forme de mémoire ou de commémoration qu’on appelle une 
ruine; la ruine est peut-être sa vocation et un destin qu’elle accepte 
dès l’origine’/‘but perhaps a translation is devoted to ruin, to that form 
of memory or commemoration that is called a ruin; ruin is perhaps 
its vocation and a destiny that it accepts from the very outset’.173 To 
struggle against forgetting through translation is not, then, to remember 
what we have forgotten but simply that we have forgotten. Perhaps this 
is what makes it an ethical space, enabling Semprún to confront the 
losses and elisions within his political past. For a struggle is a continuous 
motion, a never-finished action, destined, like translation itself, to be 
repeated again and again, in recognition of ‘la mémoire endeuillée et 
endettée du corps singulier’/‘the mournful and debt-laden memory of 
the singular body’.174 In the process of translation, the debt to the past 
is never redeemed but endlessly deferred; never overcome but only 
partially salvaged. Semilla posits the recognition of this debt as the 
momentum behind the narrative of Quel beau dimanche!: a debt towards 
the dead and towards the survivors which takes form in a resistance to 
the ideologically governed histories which Semprún explores through 
a narrative of translation and rewriting.175 For to resist is to re-inscribe 
and re-lose that past over and over again, in different forms and different 
spaces. 
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Epilogue: luttons, écrivons, traduisons 
Quel beau dimanche! develops the relationship – integral to all Semprún’s 
work – between luttons and écrivons. In this text, both the subject and 
the object of Semprún’s writing coalesce in an attempted resistance to 
the erasure of the losses which have permeated his past. For, in a sense, 
the subject and object of écrivons are one and the same: as Brodzki 
suggests, to articulate truthfully the experience of loss which is anyone’s, 
we need to speak of the dead, in the voices of the dead which are never 
ours.176 This ventriloquism contains its own dangers: for the narrator, 
‘rien ne m’autorisera jamais à parler au nom des morts, l’idée même de 
m’attribuer ce rôle me remplit d’horreur’/‘nothing will ever give me the 
right to speak for the dead, and the very idea of assuming that role fills me 
with horror’.177 This horror can be understood as a fear of betraying those 
who are unable to narrate for themselves in the translation, and potential 
appropriation, of their voices, even into an aesthetic form designed to 
allow those voices to speak. As Semprún repeatedly acknowledges within 
the pages of Quel beau dimanche!, this appropriative impulse cannot be 
evaded: our personal and our political thinking, our individual and our 
collective actions, are governed by this dialectical desire to synthesize the 
past into a comprehensible form. 
But insofar as this appropriation can be acknowledged and written, 
the erasure of the past against which Semprún struggles in Quel beau 
dimanche! can, at the very least, be subjected to a ‘relevante’ translation 
into narrative. This ‘relevante’ translation simultaneously displaces, 
elevates and transforms the voices of the dead, creating a tissue of 
different, translated, intertextual voices of those who are gone – Goethe, 
Blum, Solzhenitsyn, Chalamov – through which Semprún transcribes his 
experiences. The ending of Quel beau dimanche! in French emphasizes the 
importance of these voices to the affective force of Semprún’s narrative. 
In the company of Barizon, the narrator begins to recite an extract from 
a Giraudoux text; Barizon interrupts him, and the narration turns to the 
narrator’s discussion with the Jehovah’s witness and his recognition of 
his ‘bon dimanche’. It is at this moment that Sheridan ends his English 
translation of Quel beau dimanche!, choosing not to translate the final 
lines of Semprún’s text. In so doing, Sheridan alters the ending of the text: 
for an English reader, the Sunday which Semprún describes in his novel 
ends with the narrator’s affirmation that he has had a ‘good’ day.  But the 
very final lines of the French version of Quel beau dimanche! continue 
the narrative away from this emphasis upon what is good to return again 
to what is ‘relevante’:  these voices from the past, formed of other texts 
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and other memories, which can never be fully interrupted, never fully 
silenced, never fully understood, for they always return, translated again 
and again into new forms and new texts: ‘je préfère Giraudoux’, states 
the narrator, ‘C’est avec lui que j’ai envie de finir ce dimanche’/‘I prefer 
Giraudoux. It’s with him that I want to finish this Sunday’.178 This is the 
‘we’ of the écrivons with which the text began, the voices and memories of 
other texts, other authors, other languages. ‘Écrivons’: let us speak with 
the dead, in their multiple and fragmented voices, but not in their name. 
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Epilogue
On violence and vision: translation 
and Europe
Translation deterritorializes the rigidity of our national, linguistic and 
historical positions. Translation reveals the possibility of approaching 
otherness in the spirit of recognition rather than appropriation. And 
translation allows us to confront the impulse to synthesize the complexity 
of the past into a uniform narrative in the present. The three journeys of 
translation which I have pursued in this book open onto aesthetic and 
ethical landscapes which take form through a shift from singularity to 
plurality. One voice becomes multiple voices, drawn from the past as 
well as the present, each offering divergent perspectives. One language 
becomes many languages, offering an interlinguistic network which 
challenges monolingual boundaries, not only across texts, but within 
them as well. One text in one language becomes many texts in many 
languages, each a ‘becoming’ of that first text, connected tangentially one 
to another. 
This shift from the single to the plural resonates, in the work of 
each author I have discussed, with a somewhat idealized vision of Europe 
as a multilingual, democratic and open community in which unity is 
always inscribed with difference. Atxaga’s writing of his Obaban village 
into a broader European framework through intertextuality positions 
this framework as an ethical alternative to the isolation of the Basque 
linguistic and literary scene. Indeed, in an interview, Atxaga suggests 
that European multilingualism offers an implicit resistance to the type 
of nationalist linguistic politics with which the Basque Country has 
struggled: 
Un buen porcentaje de europeos son bilingües e incluso trilingües. 
[…] creo que la idea de una única lengua, sea el inglés o sea 
cualquier otra, es inviable. A los veinte años de establecerse esa 
única lengua empezarían a aparecer dialectos, dialectos que 
acabarían convirtiéndose en lenguas. […] Y si no ocurriera tal 
cosa, aún peor, porque sería la señal de que un Gobierno totalitario 
estaría controlando todo, hasta la lengua doméstica.
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A good percentage of Europeans are bilingual and even trilingual. 
[…] I think the idea of  a single language, be it English or any other, 
is impossible. Within twenty years of establishing such a language, 
dialects would appear, and these dialects would themselves 
eventually become languages. […] And it would be even worse 
if such a thing did not happen, because it would signal that a 
totalitarian government could control everything, even domestic 
languages.1
Atxaga here emphasizes a form of political freedom he suggests is 
inherent within multilingualism, the embodiment of a democratic 
community able to resist cultural domination. This multilingual reality 
is, as Gabilondo suggests, always caught up in questions of repression 
and colonialism, as well as freedom and democracy.2 But it is a reality 
Atxaga suggests must be addressed if we are to perceive and confront, 
rather than consolidate, the illusions of linguistic essentialism.
Kundera’s conception of the novel as an innately ethical aesthetic 
form is also integrated into questions of European identity. As Steinby 
discusses in Kundera and Modernity, Kundera suggests that the ‘spirit’ of 
the novel is fundamentally connected to that of Europe: ‘a spirit of quest, 
adventure, questioning and challenge, a spirit of the relativity of truth’.3 
For Steinby, the shared values Kundera assigns to European authors are 
undermined by the fact that ‘an author’s instrument, his or her language, 
represents a fundamental restriction on such unity’.4 But as Kundera 
asserts repeatedly and diversely, in his texts and in his responses to the 
translations of those texts, when we approach the language of another 
we always seek to translate it into our own style and idiom. Kundera’s 
‘European’ novels, positioned in an ailleurs between Czech and French, 
explore and acknowledge the inevitability of the appropriative impulse 
at stake within translation from one language into another. Yet this 
inevitability has its own ethical value: Kundera suggests that what makes 
his novels European, rather than Czech or French, is precisely that they 
are not constrained to one language; rather, moving between and across 
languages, they are always caught up in the questions of translation. And 
these questions require us both to recognize the limitations of openness 
and understanding between different languages and cultures and to 
continue to seek this openness by challenging the dominance of single 
perspectives, languages, and national identities.
For Semprún, the existence of a European politics is the best 
response to Jedem das Seine: our inability to escape the claims of ‘to 
each their own’ is transformed, he suggests, by a European conception 
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of unity though difference. In his interview with Franck Appréderis, 
Semprún suggests that the network of thought and language created 
by the incarceration of political prisoners in the Buchenwald camp 
represents the epitome of the European future he desires: ‘la pensée de 
l’Europe est née dans cette communauté’/‘European thought was born 
in that community’, he claims.5 In Semprún’s reading, Buchenwald, a 
space born of a desire to assert the dominance of one nation and one 
language over others, becomes a space through which such dominance 
can be contested through the community built there, upon non-national 
and non-linguistic boundaries. For Semprún, this community is defined 
by its openness: ‘L’identité européenne […] c’est précisément l’ouverture 
à l’altérité; la curiosité inlassable, rationnelle des différences; le goût de 
la découverte, de ses aventures voyageuses’/‘European identity [...] is 
precisely openness to otherness; a relentless, rational curiosity towards 
difference; the taste of discovery, of its nomadic adventures’.6 In invoking 
its welcoming of alterity, its desire for difference, Semprún positions 
Europe as the political and spatial manifestation of the ethical potential 
of translation itself.
A weak utopia, or a potential community?
Semprún’s comment about the openness of the European community 
was written in 2005. Thirteen years later, his depiction of Europe as the 
site of this unity through difference remains utopian. Just as the destiny 
of translation is never to keep its promise, so too European democracy 
does not always speak for the many but often for the few. Europe contains 
the promise of an open, diverse yet harmonious community; yet, like 
translation, that openness has limitations. In this sense, we might agree 
with Lawrence Venuti that translation opens on to a possible community 
which is always both ideologically inscribed and idealistically resistant to 
that inscription:
Translation is always ideological because it releases a domestic 
remainder, an inscription of values, beliefs, and representations 
linked to historical moments and social positions in the receiving 
culture. […] Yet translating is also utopian. The domestic inscription 
is made with the very intention to communicate the foreign text, 
and so it is filled with the anticipation that a community will be 
created around that text – although in translation. […] A translation 
projects a utopian community that is not yet realized.7
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Translation repeatedly and diversely negotiates the poles of 
communication and appropriation, community and individualism. 
Thinking translation, and thinking its ethics, means thinking about 
the best translation we can, the best community we can, and the best 
ways we can formulate our relations to one another. This ‘best’ is always 
unobtainable: what we read as a good translation depends on the context 
and the criteria we bring with us as we attempt to define its terms. Yet 
in our attempts to articulate, to find the shape of, a good translation, 
we begin to understand what Derrida describes as the ‘promise’ of 
translation:
Cette promesse fait signe vers un royaume à la fois «promis et 
interdit où les langues se réconcilieront et s’accompliront». […] 
Ce royaume n’est jamais atteint, touché, foulé par la traduction. Il 
y a de l’intouchable et en ce sens la réconciliation est seulement 
promise. Mais une promesse n’est pas rien, elle n’est pas seulement 
marquée par ce qui lui manque pour s’accomplir. […] Qu’il soit ou 
non honoré n’empêche pas l’engagement d’avoir lieu et de léguer 
son archive. Une traduction qui arrive, qui arrive à promettre la 
réconciliation, à en parler, à la désirer ou faire désirer, une telle 
traduction est un événement rare et considérable.
This promise signals a kingdom which is at once “promised and 
forbidden where the languages will be reconciled and fulfilled.” […] 
This kingdom is never reached, touched, trodden by translation. 
There is something untouchable, and in this sense the reconciliation 
is only promised. But a promise is not nothing, it is not simply 
marked by what it lacks to be fulfilled. As a promise, translation is 
already an event, and the decisive signature of a contract. Whether 
or not it be honored does not prevent the commitment from taking 
place and from bequeathing its record. A translation that manages, 
that manages to promise reconciliation, to talk about it, to desire it 
or make it desirable – such a translation is a rare and notable event.8
Derrida offers us translation as a promise and as a prohibition. For him, 
translation contains the possibility of a desired understanding between 
and across diverse languages, texts, and sites of authorship. Yet he also 
recognizes that this is an understanding which can never be fully realized. 
Both Venuti and Derrida position translation as an action able to 
reveal the shape of a utopian community, one in which difference can 
be acknowledged but also traversed, to enable forms of reconciliation 
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and understanding. For both thinkers, this utopia is, by its very nature, 
unobtainable: nonetheless, translation can hint towards it in ways which 
allow us to think differently about our relationships and our communities. 
For Jacques Lezra, however, these utopian ideas of translation are 
inherently unhelpful, condemning us to an abstraction which ends up 
saying nothing at all:
Globalization has taken our tongues from us – local, autochthonous, 
idiomatic, ancestral tongues. Its clamorous internationalism hangs 
critics on a mute peg, with no common voice or general vocabulary 
on which to string alternative inter- or transnational forms of 
work, thought, and organization. […] We ask in this context what 
might be the genealogy of the recent turn to “translation,” of its 
“new” characterization as a communication of singularities, of 
its deployment as a weak-utopian concept on which a critique of 
economic and cultural globalization can be mounted.9
Lezra’s strongly worded critique of this ‘weak’ utopia calls attention to the 
dangers as well as the possibilities of an ethics of translation. According 
to Lezra, invoking a European community founded upon the vision of 
diversity revealed by translation, as Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún all 
do to varying degrees, cannot combat the violent reality of the conflicts 
which confront us – territorial, national, political. Nor can acknowledging 
translation as the voice of singularity offer resistance to the homogeneity 
of globalization. 
But, precisely in the ways that this utopian vision fails to materialize, 
thinking about European identity through questions of translation 
elucidates the challenges confronting that identity. Any utopian 
conception of Europe will falter from the start unless it acknowledges the 
repression Europe has enacted both beyond and within its own borders. 
And, as Cheyfitz discusses in Poetics of Imperialism, this repression is 
fundamentally bound up with questions of translation: he suggests that 
‘our imperialism historically has functioned (and continues to function) 
by substituting for the difficult politics of translation another politics of 
translation that represses these difficulties’.10 This substitution allows 
a reading of the translation of European values into other cultures, the 
heart of the European colonial project, as neutral or even positive, rather 
than conditioned by forms of erasure and oppression. To truly understand 
Europe, in its past and present incarnations, involves understanding 
the reality of translation and the role it has played within the creation, 
consolidation and collapse of these incarnations. 
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The universal and the particular
Translation resonates with our understanding of European identity 
because both are constrained by the tension between the universal and 
the particular. As Giesen and Eder suggest, European identity is caught 
between a need to define itself as a transnational or post-national project, 
operating outside the borders of national or ethnic identity, and the 
desire to impose itself as the embodiment of a democratic and pluralistic 
approach which, ironically, always constructs itself in opposition to those 
who do not embody these values.11 The borders of Europe take shape in 
relation to this dynamic: within those borders, the struggles of nationalism 
challenge ideas of homogeneous European values; outside them, the need 
to protect the apparent homogeneity of those values becomes a reason to 
refuse entry to those who live by different ideals. In much the same way, 
translation always highlights the tension between the national and the 
transnational. As Apter suggests, translation ‘breaks the isomorphic fit 
between the name of the nation and the name of a language’; reading 
in translation opens onto ‘language worlds characterized by linguistic 
multiplicity and phantom internations’.12 Yet, as Venn discusses, this 
opening up can also lead to a universalism which, in its very claims that 
global understanding is possible, ‘leads to the tyranny of the common 
idiom’.13 It is this dilemma which Derrida addresses in relation to the 
tower of Babel. For if Babel reveals a dissolution of understanding, the 
birth of linguistic confusion, it also stages that dissolution as a response 
to the desire to impose a single idiom – the name of its builders, the 
family of Shem – upon the world.14
How can we understand difference without losing our own 
identity? How can we welcome that difference without seeking to erase 
it? These questions are negotiated again and again in the bilingual 
approaches to writing which Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún pursue in 
their texts. Hokenson and Munson describe the bilingual writer as a 
‘citizen of no language or perhaps traitor to two’: either positioned in a 
no-man’s-land, or in two places at once, the identity of a bilingual author 
is always mediated by questions of belonging and betrayal, singularity 
and plurality. This identity, formed across the constraints of language 
and nation, represents a continual challenge to those constraints. In 
their texts, Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún suggest that this challenge is 
essential if we are to negotiate and disrupt the violence enacted in the 
name of nation and language. But this disruption is not without its own 
challenges: the collapse of the nation, as Hannah Arendt suggests, also 
entails a loss of rights, an expulsion from a space which protects us as 
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much as it imprisons or excludes, an exile which is linguistic but also 
cultural, political, social and affective.15
The ways in which Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún write about 
Europe in their work speak to this dichotomy. For, even as all three 
suggest that Europe embodies the possibility of a democratic and 
pluralistic community, the Europe they describe in their texts, through 
an aesthetics of translation, emerges as a space of repression as much 
as of liberation. This aesthetics of translation raises the spectres of 
nationalism, of colonization, of war and of exile, of the Nazi camps 
and the Gulag. But it cannot lay these to rest, for Europe is founded 
upon them: they are the history of Europe, both written from inside 
its borders and seen from outside them. Indeed, the utopian vision of 
a multilingual Europe which all three authors invoke, based around a 
welcoming of otherness, a curiosity towards difference, a fragmenting of 
linguistic essentialism and an unassailable relativity, is an illusion which 
collapses repeatedly in relation to the historical and political moments 
Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún describe in their work. In Obabakoak, 
Atxaga depicts the challenge and loss involved in multilingualism: the 
movements towards other languages and cultures described in the text 
are always accompanied by loss, even as the decision to reject those other 
languages and cultures offers only isolation and silencing. In Kundera’s 
Le Livre, the relationship between untranslatability and translatability 
reveals that plurality is always waiting to be translated into univocity, 
the democratic into the totalitarian, the ambiguous into the certain. And 
Semprún’s discussion of a European identity built around a multilingual 
understanding of alterity situates this understanding in Buchenwald, the 
site of an absolute repression and attempted erasure of that alterity.
In fact, even as Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún use their writing 
to invoke Europe as a space open to a plurality of voices, their texts 
sometimes limit that plurality or shape it in reductive ways. As Ursula 
Tidd discusses in Writing the European Other, Semprún rarely includes 
the voices of women in his writing of otherness into his ideal European 
community.16 Similarly, Gabilondo suggests that Atxaga sometimes erases 
gender, racial and sexual differences in his desire to create a paradigmatic 
allegory of Basque difference, a move which Gabilondo suggests makes 
his texts ‘indifferent’ to the complexity of Basque identities.17 And, as 
O’Brien notes, Kundera’s texts often seem to enforce a misogynistic 
conception of women, writing the female body through a male gaze 
which repeatedly defines his female characters in relation to stereotyped 
and divisive gender binaries.18 The attempt by each author to articulate 
otherness through the incorporation of an aesthetics of translation thus 
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silences some voices in the very ways in which it makes others speak. The 
silencing of these voices undermines the ethical potential of the authors’ 
work. But it also acknowledges the challenges of realizing this potential. 
For even as we invoke an ethics of difference and particularity, we risk 
overwriting that ethics by failing to acknowledge the partiality of all our 
attempts at communication, the ease with which speaking to and with 
others can be translated into speaking for or over them. 
In Poetics of Imperialism, Cheyfitz suggests that this risk is inherent 
to those of us who operate from within a Western European patriarchal 
model. Terrified of what we do not understand, even as we claim to desire 
this understanding, ‘[w]e talk to ourselves about ourselves, believing 
in a grand hallucination that we are talking with others’.19 Cheyfitz’s 
comment seems particularly perceptive in the current political climate, 
as we negotiate the challenges of social media echo chambers in which 
the only voices we hear are those who already concur with us. In this 
bubble we believe translation to be unnecessary, for – as in Kundera’s 
idyll – we all think the same; and, if we encounter someone who does 
not agree with us, we seek to diminish or discredit their perspective, 
to exclude them from our utopia of harmony and consensus, even as 
we describe that utopia as a pluralistic and tolerant one. Perhaps, as 
Agamben suggests, democracy – at least in its current incarnation – is 
not always so different from totalitarianism after all. For, as he describes 
in Homo Sacer, in giving priority to our personal politics and seeking 
to free the individual from the regulations of state apparatus, that 
apparatus becomes part of our individual life: we sustain the shape of 
our democratic perspective by rejecting what does not conform to it – a 
move that echoes the totalitarian control which it purports to reject.20
Indeed, the risk that we may make a claim about the importance 
of diversity in ways which fundamentally undermine that diversity is 
always a possibility within any community which attempts to create 
consensus through difference. In L’Autre cap, Derrida suggests that ‘Les 
projets européens les mieux intentionnés, apparemment et expressément 
pluralistes, démocratiques et tolérants, peuvent tenter […] d’imposer 
l’homogénéité d’un médium, de normes de discussion, de modèles 
discursifs’/‘The best intentioned of European projects, those that are 
quite apparently and explicitly pluralistic, democratic, and tolerant, 
may try […] to impose the homogeneity of a medium, of discursive 
norms and models’.21 As Derrida suggests here, projects which seek to 
create a universal ethics based around a recognition of singularity and 
tolerance can often do so in reductive ways, thereby dictating the ways 
that difference can be understood, or at least failing to address it in all 
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its possible permutations. In doing so, such an ethics may turn those 
differences into an easily comprehensible narrative of ethical responses 
to alterity, a narrative which can flatten out or overwrite those differences 
in its quest to acknowledge their parity of value.
The task of translation
Kundera describes his ideal Europe as ‘Le maximum de diversité dans le 
minimum d’espace’/‘maximum diversity in minimum space’.22 Yet this 
diversity is not an answer to the issues of European identity, but always 
a question: how can we respond to the ethical promise of diversity, 
without either erasing it in the name of universalism or converting it into 
nationalism? In L’Autre cap, Derrida links this problematic question to 
issues both of translation and of European identity: ‘Quelle philosophie de 
la traduction dominera en Europe? Dans une Europe qui devrait désormais 
éviter aussi bien les crispations nationaliste de la différence linguistique 
que l’homogénéisation violente des langues à travers la neutralité d’un 
médium traducteur, prétendument transparent, métalinguistique, 
universel?’/‘What philosophy of translation will dominate in Europe? In 
a Europe that from now on should avoid both the nationalistic tensions of 
linguistic difference and the violent homogenization of languages through 
the neutrality of a translating medium that would claim to be transparent, 
metalinguistic, and universal?’23 Derrida’s question dramatizes the ways in 
which thinking translation can help us think about the ever-shifting shape 
of a possible European community, even as that thinking always risks 
sliding into forms of essentialism itself. For his call to translation here does 
not position it as an action concerned with asserting the singular above 
the collective, but rather as a task always concerned with negotiating the 
claims of that singularity in relation to the pull of the universal. 
The link Derrida identifies between translation and an understanding 
of European identity is one in which the possibility of reconciliation always 
confronts its dissolution into potential violence. Thinking translation 
and thinking Europe does not mean seeking refuge in utopian solutions, 
but rather understanding that the tension between the universal and 
the particular inherent in both presents us with a task to be approached 
again and again, without the possibility of resolution: ‘Le même devoir 
dicte de respecter la différence, l’idiome, la minorité, la singularité, mais 
aussi l’universalité du droit formel, le désir de traduction, l’accord et 
l’univocité, la loi de la majorité, l’opposition au racisme, au nationalisme, 
à la xénophobie’/‘The same duty dictates respecting differences, idioms, 
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minorities, singularities, but also the universality of formal law, the 
desire for translation, agreement and univocity, the law of the majority, 
opposition to racism, nationalism, and xenophobia’.24 This double duty 
towards the claims of particularity and universality, the untranslatable and 
the translatable, is the task of translation and the task of understanding 
European identity in its difference as well as its similarity.
This task is not easy; the desire to construct coherent narratives 
about Europe is as difficult to avoid as the desire to construct coherent 
narratives about translation. Indeed, it is tempting to take Derrida’s 
comment as a reflection upon the issues facing Europe as a whole. But 
Derrida’s discussion of the double duty confronting Europe is implicitly 
situated within the context of French Republican universalism, a 
universalism governed by the maxim liberté, égalité, fraternité. And, 
like the fictionalized Goethe’s response to Jedem das Seine in Quel beau 
dimanche!, in which Jedem das Seine symbolizes a collective liberty 
dependent upon the constraint of individual freedoms, liberté, égalité, 
fraternité also invokes an equality in which individual freedoms may 
be subsumed in the name of the collective good. But not all European 
projects are caught up in the same contradictions between the universal 
and the singular: equality is not a prescribed virtue everywhere we look; 
tolerance takes a multitude of forms; and the battle to prevent pluralism 
ending in essentialism is playing out differently across the continent. 
The European projects Derrida discusses in L’Autre cap reveal one way to 
conceive the challenges facing the European community more generally. 
But is this how Europe looks from the Basque Country? Is it how it appears 
in the Czech Republic? How is Europe shaped for and by those who feel 
their identity to be shared between nations, languages and identities? 
Thinking about these differences means trying not to dissolve Europe 
itself – its problems and its successes – into a homogeneous whole. If 
we want to avoid the ‘grand hallucination’ of which Cheyfitz speaks, we 
need to recognize that, while the borders between nations within Europe 
have become increasingly permeable, at least for those with the right 
passports, the languages we speak, both interlingually and intralingually, 
remain as diverse as ever.
This recognition fails as often as it succeeds. But this failure 
is itself essential. If we formulate our ethics, whether in regard to 
the ways in which we translate or the ways in which we relate as 
communities, only in relation to the ways that we manage to achieve 
comprehension and communication – in relation to the ideal of a perfect 
translation – we ignore the insights which arise from mistranslation 
and misunderstanding. If we seek always to translate our failings into 
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success then we maintain an illusion of understanding which limits our 
ability to confront the reality of our experiences. We will be like those 
on Atxaga’s island of Euskera who insist that the island is sufficient 
in and of itself; like Kundera’s student writing poetry to reframe his 
romantic failures; like Semprún’s narrator calling upon the dialectic 
to erase the contradictions in his past. The insistence that failures of 
understanding and connection can be transcended erases the vision 
which translation offers us through those failures. For translation is 
ethical precisely because it can never transcend its limitations: the pure 
language which Benjamin invokes as the utopian ideal of translation 
can never be attained: instead, each individual language calls to others 
in its particularity, seeking through them to move towards a universal 
completeness and understanding which is always subject to its own 
retranslations, always just out of reach.25
As Cheyfitz notes, ‘Benjamin’s notion of supplementarity, with its 
suggestion of a community of languages with mutual needs, resists the 
mastery of one language by another’.26 But it also calls to this mastery, 
acknowledging our desire for universality even while drawing attention 
to the impossibility of attaining it without diminishing the claims of the 
particular. In the translation of one text into multiple languages, the 
universal and the particular meet in a relationship of connection which 
can never be finally resolved: every translation is a fragment of a perfect 
translation into a universal language, in its fragmentary nature both 
hinting towards that perfection and resisting it. As Richard Kearney, 
responding to Ricœur’s thinking on translation, suggests: ‘The creative 
tension between the universal and the plural ensures that the task of 
translation is an endless one, a work of tireless memory and mourning, 
of appropriation and disappropriation, of taking up and letting go, 
of expressing oneself and welcoming others’.27 This creative tension 
is ethical precisely in the ways in which it cannot be resolved. For the 
reality is that translation is not a utopia, whether weak or strong. It is 
at the heart of our constant struggle to find meaning and transmit that 
meaning in ways that are appreciative but not appropriative. And this 
struggle needs to be acknowledged when we are thinking about how 
we might formulate a European identity; the failures of Europe must be 
recognized as much – if not more – than its successes. By approaching 
the shape of a European community through an awareness that this 
community can never be a utopia but only a battle to respond continually 
to the demands of the universal and the particular, the challenges of 
recognizing differences and the desire for common understanding can 
be brought into a productive confrontation.
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A philosophy of translation and a philosophy of life
I began this book with a quotation from Anne Michaels’s Fugitive Pieces, 
in which it was suggested that choosing a philosophy of translation might 
give an indication about our philosophy of life. But can the ways in which 
we translate really help us think about the ways in which we live? As 
Lezra suggests, translation does not provide answers to the challenges 
of an increasingly violent global community. But it does at least raise the 
questions which are crucial to any engagement with these challenges. 
When does clamour become silence? When do too many voices mean 
that there is no one left to hear? These dilemmas are at the heart of 
translation. For Babel incarnates the problematic dichotomies of silence 
versus speech; of listening versus deafness; of renouncing understanding 
versus a never-ending attempt to understand, in the face of failure. We 
all speak different languages, whether interlingually or intralingually. 
We can choose to respond to this difference through silence, abandoning 
our attempt to construct, giving up on our desire to understand. Or we 
can choose to build from within that difference, acknowledging the 
inevitable miscommunications and misrepresentations we will make, that 
understanding will crumble even as we try to formulate it. Translation 
reveals to us both the possibility and the failure of communication; 
both the form and the absence of connection; both the shape and the 
formlessness of our understanding of community. The territories of 
language, nation, historical moment and individual perspective can 
never be fully exceeded: our lines of flight always return us somewhere; 
as some borders collapse, others are constructed, imprisoning us once 
again within our monolingual universe. We forget the past in the ways we 
remember it. But this failure offers, perhaps, its own measure of success. 
By failing to attain the utopian ideal of perfect communication through 
translation we confront the mistranslations and untranslatables within 
all our relations.
Indeed, the ethical value of translation derives from its ability to 
reveal that our openness to other perspectives finds its limit in our inability 
to see through any eyes but our own, confronting us with our ignorance as 
much as our insight. The value of translation is thus contained in both its 
violence and its vision: in its aggressive annexations of the spectres of the 
past – original text, language, author and moment of publication – and its 
ability to represent these annexations. Bermann and Wood describe ‘the 
ethical double bind in any act of translation – the impossibility of fully 
rendering another’s voice or meaning, and yet the necessity of making 
the attempt’.28 Impossibility and necessity: this is perhaps the best way 
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to understand translation. Neither the impossibility nor the necessity 
of translation is a matter of choosing between the binary opposites of 
translatable and untranslatable; relevant and irrelevant; foreign and 
domestic; fluent and resistant; visible and invisible. Translation is always 
a space between, an encounter and a confrontation, a negotiation and an 
appropriation. In the encounters it enables – between languages, between 
texts, between reader and writer – translation invites us to confront the 
instability of textual authority, to lose our confidence in the possibility of 
stable meanings and universal truths. 
Losing truth means acknowledging that there are no answers 
to the ethical challenges raised by translation. But in its simultaneous 
impossibility and necessity, translation reveals its reality, its lived space, 
where communication and silence, remembrance and forgetting, 
confront each other repeatedly and diversely. The questions raised 
through translation by Atxaga, Kundera and Semprún explore the 
specific historical and geographical moments in which their texts 
were conceived, written, published, translated and read. But through 
translation, those moments are also fragmented, deterritorialized, 
brought into hospitable contact with others. The violence of translation 
shows us our violence: the appropriations and aggressions we enact upon 
the other languages and perspectives which surround us, the elements 
we forget even as we seek to remember. In illuminating the space of our 
struggle to understand without annexation, translation offers us a space 
to begin this understanding. There is no end to this task, as there is no 
end to translation. But there is value in the attempt. In trying and failing 
to translate ethically, we do, perhaps, begin to see differently, to perceive 
the impossibility and the necessity of our attempts at ethical forms of 
understanding.
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Kalandra, Záviš 132, 152
Kant, Immanuel 147, 193, 213
Kattago, Siobhan 194
Kearney, Richard 118, 248
Keats, John 189
Kérel, François 19, 20, 99, 105, 113, 152, 156
Kippur, Sara 177, 183
kitsch (in Kundera) 126, 136, 138, 147–8, 150
Knoop, Christine Angela 101, 106, 107–8
Kolyma gulag, Récits de Kolyma (Chalamov) 




bilingualism issue 2, 14–16, 17–18, 39, 101–3
biographical details 15, 101
chapter overview 27
European identity and diversity 246
European identity and the novel 239
fanaticism vs skepticism 139
fidelity and betrayal (Franz and Sabina) 
109–110
interview with Christian Salmon 152
interview with Normand Biron 150
interview with Philip Roth 131, 139
kitsch 126, 136, 138, 147–8, 150
Kundera and translation
authority and ambiguity 104–8, 157–9, 
160–1
faithful betrayal 149–50
fidelity and betrayal 143–8, 161
form and architecture 111–13
Gallimard editions paratext 111
hegemony of authorship within translated 
literature 42, 107
repetition and variation 150–3, 158–9, 161
translatability and untranslatability 27, 
99–100, 101–3, 108–9
translation as Sisyphean task 108–11, 
149, 150, 151
Kundera-Ricœur pairing 2, 26, 100
Le Livre du rire et de l’oubli
angels and the Devil 114, 137–43, 160
Asher’s English translation from French 
translation 20, 156
Czech version 19, 153, 156
epigram in Semprún’s Quel beau 
dimanche! 180–1
forgetting theme 100, 114–15, 124–5, 
142–3, 147, 151, 160
Heim’s English translation from Czech 
text 20, 152, 156
‘idyll’ concept 121–3, 127, 138, 139, 142, 
145, 245
Kérel’s French translation from Czech text 
19, 20, 99, 105, 113, 152, 156
litost, ‘untranslatable’ word 24, 27, 
99–100, 102, 115–19, 152, 153, 159
litost, variations on 119–23, 152
litost and erasing the untranslatable 123–7
litost and linguistic hospitality 153–9
miscommunication theme 109, 117–19, 
128
plurality and univocity 244
repetition theme and ‘La Frontière’ 150–3, 
159–61
structure of novel 25, 100, 114, 114–15
misogynistic conception of women 244
other works
L’Art du roman 106, 133, 147–8, 158
L’Immortalité 105, 109, 110, 125, 130
L’Insoutenable légèreté de l’être 109–10, 
126, 147
‘Un occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de 
l’Europe Centrale’ 102
La Plaisanterie 102, 107, 125
La Plaisanterie (1985 ed., ‘Note de 
l’auteur’) 111–13




Le Rideau 104, 149–50
speech at 4th Congress of Czechoslovak 
Writers 101
Les Testaments trahis 135–6, 146, 158
La Vie est ailleurs 129–33, 135
poetry and lyricism 100, 126–9, 150
poetry and politics 23–4, 113, 125, 129–33
poetry and the novel 133–7
the political and the personal 113–14
polyphonic technique 104, 111, 158
reading him in translation 18, 19–20
reading translation in his works 23–5
See also Ricœur, Paul; Steinby, Liisa; Woods, 
Michelle 
language. See bilingualism; minor-major 
language issue
language loans 24, 154–5, 167, 178, 183
Lasagabaster, Jesús María 34
Lefevere, André 6–7, 12
Le Grand, Eva 132
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF TRANSLATION 275
LeVan, Michael 73, 87
Levinas, Emmanuel 223
Lewis, Philip E. 148
Lezra, Jacques 242, 249
liminal spaces 11, 13–14, 18–19, 26
Linhartova, Vera 102
Luther, Martin 211
Malraux, André, Le Miroir des limbes 193
Manterola Agirrezabalaga, Elizabete 43, 86
Marxism
Marxist-Leninism 197
Marxist-oriented translation theory 203
See also Communism; Stalinism
Mathews, Harry 3
Mathews, Timothy 6, 142, 203, 226
memory (in Semprún’s work)
innocence of 182–3, 224–5
and loss 168–9, 180–1
and narrative/translation 170, 175, 177, 
180, 189–91, 220, 223–5, 226, 230
and writing 169–70
See also forgetting (in Kundera)
metaliterature 55
metaphor, vs metamorphosis 74–81
Michaels, Anne 1–2, 249
Miletic, Tijana 39, 101, 172
‘minor literature’ debate 26, 27, 32–3, 47–9, 
74
from metaphor to metamorphosis 74–81
translation as minor literature 81–8
minor-major language issue 31–3, 39–41, 74
See also bilingualism
Misurella, Fred 113
Munson, Marcella 13, 16–17, 90, 243




parallels with Communism (in Semprún) 
24, 182–3, 194, 196, 203, 216–17, 
220–1, 222
See also concentration camps; Fascism; 
totalitarianism
Nietzsche, Friedrich 216
Niven, William John 192
O’Brien, Justin 244
Olaziregi, Mari Jose 43
originality
Romantic concept 54, 55
See also plagiarism
Orwell, George, 1984 novel 124, 135, 158
Pardo Bazán, Emilia 41
Parr, Adrian 48, 59
the particular, vs the universal 243–6
Perret, Sally 39
Perrot d’Ablancourt, Nicolas 3
Petrarch 127–8
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